“We publish this opinion to emphasize that participation in administrative proceedings before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, like such participation before any agency, ... does not, without more, satisfy a petitioner’s Article III injury-in-fact requirement.”
How later courts described this case
- “We publish this opinion to emphasize that participation in administrative proceedings before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, like such participation before any agency, ... does not, without more, satisfy a petitioner’s Article III injury-in-fact requirement.”
- participation in administrative proceedings does not, without more, satisfy a petitioner’s Article III injury-in-fact requirement
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Filed December 12, 1997
No. 97-1394
Inner City Press, et al.,
Petitioners
v.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Respondent
Appeal from the a Decision of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System
---------
On Motion to Dismiss
Matthew R. Lee and Laura Davis, for petitioners.
Katherine H. Wheatley and Douglas B. Jordan were on the
motion to dismiss, for respondent.
Before: Wald, Silberman, and Randolph, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.
Per Curiam: We publish this opinion to emphasize that
participation in administrative proceedings before the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, like such partic-
ipation before any agency, see Reytblatt v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 105 F.3d 715, 720 (D.C. Cir.
1997), does not, without more, satisfy a petitioner's Article III
injury-in-fact requirement. This point has recently been the
express holding of the Second Circuit in a case involving the
same petitioners appearing here. See Lee v. Board of Gover-
nors, 118 F.3d 905, 911 (2d Cir. 1997) (dismissing petition for
lack of standing, notwithstanding petitioner's participation in
administrative proceedings).
The Bank Holding Act limits judicial review to "part[ies]
aggrieved" by an act of the Board. See 12 U.S.C. s 1848.
Petitioners must, therefore, satisfy statutory prudential stan-
dards as well as constitutional requirements. See, e.g., Syno-
vus Financial Corp. v. Board of Governors, 952 F.2d 426, 432
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (because intervenor faces realistic threat that
its relocation proposal will be vetoed by State if Board's order
is upheld, intervenor is aggrieved and has standing); Irving
Bank Corp. v. Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 845 F.2d
1035, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that petitioner has stand-
ing to seek judicial review because it has a fiduciary duty to
protect its shareholders from injury and also participated in
agency proceedings). See also Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. United States, 101 F.3d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir.
1997). Cf. Martin-Trigona v. Federal Reserve Bd., 509 F.2d
363, 365-66 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (in a holding limited to the
specific circumstances of that case, court dismissed petition
for review brought by party who had participated in adminis-
trative proceedings before the Board, for failure to satisfy
Article III standing requirements).
While petitioners may have satisfied prudential standing by
virtue of their participation in the administrative proceedings,
see Jones v. Board of Governors, 79 F.3d 1168 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (dismissing petition where petitioner had not participat-
ed before the Board, without addressing whether Article III
standing had been satisfied), they have not demonstrated
Article III standing. See United Food and Commercial
Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 116 S. Ct.
1529, 1533 (1996) (three essential requirements for Article III
standing are injury-in-fact; casual relationship between inju-
ry and challenged conduct; and redressability). Therefore,
we grant the motion to dismiss.