United States v. Peterson

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 08-4889

JOHN ANTHONY PETERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.



Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.

W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge.

(4:07-cr-00045-BR-1)

Argued: September 24, 2010

Decided: January 14, 2011

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and

GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer

wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Gregory

joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Slade Culli Trabucco, THE TRABUCCO LAW

FIRM, PA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Kristine

L. Fritz, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

2 UNITED STATES v. PETERSON

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: George

E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Jenni-

fer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,

North Carolina, for Appellee.

OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

After a jury convicted John Peterson on six counts of drug

trafficking and firearms charges, the district court sentenced

him to 420 months’ imprisonment. In making its sentencing

decision, the district court found that Peterson was a career

offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), because he had two prior

felony convictions of a crime of violence, one of which was

a North Carolina conviction for involuntary manslaughter.

Peterson contends that his North Carolina manslaughter

conviction was not a crime of violence, as defined in U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.2(a) and that, therefore, he should not have been sen-

tenced as a career offender.

We agree. Because Peterson’s prior involuntary man-

slaughter conviction did not have any requirement of intent or

mens rea, we conclude that it was not a crime of violence, as

defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Accordingly, we vacate

Peterson’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

I

A jury convicted Peterson in April 2008 of (1) conspiracy

to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 50

grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2)

distribution of more than five grams of crack cocaine, in vio-

lation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (3) distribution of more than

UNITED STATES v. PETERSON 3

50 grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1); (4) possession of more than 50 grams of crack

cocaine and quantities of cocaine powder, marijuana, and

MDMA ("Ecstasy") with the intent to distribute, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (5) possession of firearms in fur-

therance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 924(c); and (6) unlawful possession of firearms by

a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 921(g)(1).

In calculating Peterson’s sentencing range for counts 1

through 4 and 6, the district court found that Peterson was a

career offender, based on two prior convictions, one of which

was a North Carolina conviction in 2001 for involuntary man-

slaughter. That conviction arose from an incident in which

Peterson accidentally shot his close friend, William Reid,

while the two were playing with what they believed (mis-

takenly) was an unloaded pistol. Overruling Peterson’s objec-

tion to use of this conviction, the district court determined that

the Guidelines sentencing range for these counts was 360

months to life imprisonment. The sentence for Count 5 was

an additional, consecutive 60 months’ imprisonment.

If the North Carolina conviction had not been used as a

predicate offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), Peterson’s

Guidelines range would have been 168 to 210 months’

imprisonment for Counts 1 through 4 and 6 and 60 consecu-

tive months’ imprisonment for Count 5.

The district court acknowledged that use of the North Caro-

lina involuntary manslaughter conviction presented a "close

call," but the court determined that it was bound by our deci-

sion in United States v. Payton, 28 F.3d 17 (4th Cir. 1994),

holding that a South Carolina conviction for involuntary man-

slaughter qualified as a predicate crime of violence under the

predecessor to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).

The court sentenced Peterson to 420 months’ imprison-

ment, which included concurrent 360-month terms of impris-

4 UNITED STATES v. PETERSON

onment on Counts 1 through 4, a concurrent 120-month

sentence on Count 6, and a consecutive 60-month sentence on

Count 5.

This appeal followed.

II

Peterson contends that his prior North Carolina conviction

for involuntary manslaughter does not qualify as a "crime of

violence," as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), so as to make

him a career offender under § 4B1.1(a). He argues that our

1994 decision in Payton, on which the district court relied,

was implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court’s 2008 deci-

sion in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144-45 (2008),

holding that a conviction for a violent felony under the Armed

Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), had to

involve conduct that was "purposeful, violent, and aggres-

sive." He asserts that a North Carolina conviction for involun-

tary manslaughter was categorically not purposeful.

The government argues that Payton is still binding prece-

dent and that Begay construed ACCA, not the Sentencing

Guidelines, which have their own binding interpretive rubrics.

Because Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) includes

"manslaughter" as a "crime of violence," without distinguish-

ing voluntary from involuntary manslaughter, the government

contends that Peterson’s involuntary manslaughter conviction

qualifies as a predicate offense, making him a career offender

under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).*

Because resolution of the issue involves interpretation of

the Sentencing Guidelines, we begin with the text. The Guide-

*The government does not argue that Peterson’s involuntary man-

slaughter conviction was a crime of violence as defined in U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.2(a)(1), which must have "as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of another."

UNITED STATES v. PETERSON 5

lines provide for a sentencing enhancement if the defendant

is a "career offender." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A career offender

is defined as a defendant (1) who is "at least eighteen years

old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of

conviction"; (2) whose instant offense is "a felony that is

either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense";

and (3) who "has at least two prior felony convictions of

either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense."

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (emphasis added). The term "crime of

violence" is, in turn, defined in § 4B1.2(a) as follows:

The term "crime of violence" means any offense

under federal or state law, punishable by imprison-

ment for a term exceeding one year, that —

(1) has as an element the use, attempted

use, or threatened use of physical

force against the person of another, or

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or

extortion, involves use of explosives,

or otherwise involves conduct that

presents a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2(a)

explains:

"Crime of violence" includes murder, manslaughter,

kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex

offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate

extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling. Other

offenses are included as "crimes of violence" if (A)

that offense has as an element the use, attempted use,

or threatened use of physical force against the person

of another, or (B) the conduct set forth (i.e.,

expressly charged) in the count of which the defen-

dant was convicted involved use of explosives

6 UNITED STATES v. PETERSON

(including any explosive material or destructive

device) or, by its nature, presented a serious potential

risk of physical injury to another.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) cmt. 1 (emphasis added).

It is now established that this commentary to the Sentenc-

ing Guidelines is authoritative and binding, "unless it violates

the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or

plainly erroneous reading of" the Guideline itself. Stinson v.

United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993). Because we find no

inconsistency here, we treat the commentary as binding. See

United States v. Seay, 553 F.3d 732, 737 (4th Cir. 2009) (find-

ing no inconsistency between U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 and its com-

mentary).

The parties’ arguments suggest two ways by which a North

Carolina conviction for involuntary manslaughter might be a

crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). North Carolina

involuntary manslaughter might be "manslaughter" as explic-

itly included in § 4B1.2(a) cmt. 1, or it might be an offense

that "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious poten-

tial risk of physical injury to another" under § 4B1.2(a)(2).

We address these two questions in order.

A

The first question, whether a North Carolina conviction for

involuntary manslaughter is "manslaughter," raises two sub-

sidiary questions: (1) what constitutes "manslaughter," as the

term is used in the Sentencing Guidelines commentary, and

(2) whether the North Carolina conviction for involuntary

manslaughter qualifies as "manslaughter."

Courts employ a categorical approach in determining

whether a prior conviction will lead to a sentence enhance-

ment under the Sentencing Guidelines. Seay, 553 F.3d at 737

("In determining whether a conviction qualifies as a crime of

UNITED STATES v. PETERSON 7

violence under the Sentencing Guidelines, we use the ‘cate-

gorical approach’"); see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.

575, 588 (1990) ("[T]he enhancement provision always has

embodied a categorical approach to the designation of predi-

cate offenses").

As described in Taylor, the categorical approach involves

two steps. First, a court must distill a "generic" definition of

the predicate offense based on how the offense is defined "in

the criminal codes of most states." Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598.

The Taylor Court borrowed the "generic," "contemporary,"

and "modern" definition of burglary from the Model Penal

Code and a modern criminal law textbook, which provided

similar definitions. See id. & n.8. Pointing out the necessity

of distilling the generic crime of burglary, the Court rejected

simply applying a single State’s form of burglary. It explained

that any definition of a predicate offense that would be deter-

mined by a single State’s criminal law could result in unac-

ceptable differences in applying federal law in sentencing

defendants. Id. at 590-91. "That would mean that a person

convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm would, or

would not [through an enhancement based on a single State’s

definition of burglary], receive a sentence enhancement based

on exactly the same conduct, depending on whether the State

of his prior conviction happened to call that conduct ‘bur-

glary.’" Id.

Second, after finding the generic form of the predicate

offense, a court must determine whether the defendant’s prior

conviction constituted a conviction of the generic offense.

That determination is made categorically, not by comparing

the defendant’s prior conduct with the generic offense, but

rather by comparing the elements of the crime of conviction

with the generic offense. As the Taylor Court admonished, the

court must "look[] only to the statutory definitions of the prior

offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those con-

victions." Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600.

8 UNITED STATES v. PETERSON

The categorical approach applied in this way achieves uni-

formity in enforcement of federal sentencing enhancements

and avoids retrials of prior convictions, which would effec-

tively result from delving into the conduct underlying a prior

conviction rather than looking to the elements of the offense

of the prior conviction.

We now turn to the question of what constitutes generic

"manslaughter," as used in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) cmt. 1.

Because a review of "manslaughter" offenses under various

state criminal laws appears to yield material variations, espe-

cially when looking at relevant state laws, such as those in

North Carolina (applicable here) and South Carolina (applica-

ble in Payton), we conclude, as did the Supreme Court in Tay-

lor, that the Model Penal Code provides the best generic,

contemporary, and modern definition, particularly because it

has been widely adopted. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598 n.8; see

also United States v. Velez-Alderete, 569 F.3d 541, 544 (5th

Cir. 2009); United States v. Gonzalez-Ramirez, 477 F.3d 310,

316 (5th Cir. 2007). The Model Penal Code defines "man-

slaughter" as a homicide that "is committed recklessly," or

that would be murder except for the fact that it was "commit-

ted under the influence of extreme mental or emotional distur-

bance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse."

Model Penal Code § 210.3 (1962). In turn, it defines reckless-

ness to mean a "conscious[] disregard[] of a substantial and

unjustifiable risk that the material element will result from

[the] conduct." Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c). Concluding

the Code’s definition to be a satisfactory generic definition of

"manslaughter," we hold that "manslaughter" in U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.2(a) cmt. 1 means a criminal homicide that is commit-

ted (1) recklessly (i.e., with a conscious disregard of risk) or

(2) intentionally if committed under the influence of extreme

mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reason-

able explanation or excuse.

Against that generic definition of manslaughter, we now

determine whether the elements of Peterson’s prior North

UNITED STATES v. PETERSON 9

Carolina conviction for involuntary manslaughter fit the

generic crime of manslaughter. Under North Carolina law,

involuntary manslaughter is "the unintentional killing of a

human being without malice, proximately caused by (1) an

unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally danger-

ous to human life, or (2) a culpably negligent act or omis-

sion." State v. Hudson, 483 S.E.2d 436, 438 (N.C. 1997)

(internal quotation marks omitted). This definition includes

conduct amounting to both negligent homicide and homicide

resulting from "a thoughtless disregard of consequences or a

heedless indifference to the safety and rights of others," which

North Carolina defines as "reckless." State v. Davis, 680

S.E.2d 239, 242 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added)

(quoting State v. Weston, 159 S.E.2d 883, 886 (N.C. 1968)).

"Thoughtless disregard," however, is less than "conscious

disregard," which is the definition of recklessness under the

Model Penal Code. Therefore, these alternative elements of

negligence and thoughtless disregard of consequences fall

short, we conclude, of the generic crime of manslaughter,

which requires at least reckless conduct (a conscious disre-

gard of risk). North Carolina involuntary manslaughter is not

generic "manslaughter" as used in the Sentencing Guidelines.

Rather, it is more like homicide "committed negligently,"

which the Model Penal Code defines separately as the lesser

offense of "negligent homicide." Model Penal Code § 210.4.

The government’s position suggests that the appellation

"involuntary manslaughter" implies the existence of a class of

crimes constituting "manslaughter," such that "involuntary

manslaughter" is a subset of the class "manslaughter" and

therefore included in the word "manslaughter" as used in

§ 4B1.2(a) cmt. 1. But this linguistic argument fails to

account for the fact that North Carolina’s definition of "invol-

untary manslaughter" includes elements materially different

from those of "manslaughter." While North Carolina "invol-

untary manslaughter" might be a lesser included offense of

"manslaughter," it is nonetheless a different crime with a sub-

10 UNITED STATES v. PETERSON

stantially less serious degree of culpability. The distinctness

is borne out by the Model Penal Code’s recognition of two

separate crimes—"manslaughter" and "negligent homicide."

See Model Penal Code § 210.3 (defining "manslaughter"); id.

§ 210.4 (defining as a separate crime "negligent homicide").

Likewise, the Model Penal Code distinguishes "recklessness"

from "negligence." Compare Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c)

with § 2.02(2)(d).

The government argues nonetheless that our decision in

Payton controls the disposition here. In Payton we held that

a South Carolina conviction for involuntary manslaughter

constituted a "crime of violence" as used in U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.2(1) (1994), the predecessor to § 4B1.2(a). In reaching

that conclusion, we applied a decision from the Ninth Circuit,

which held that involuntary manslaughter was an offense that

"‘by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force

may be used in the course of committing the offense.’" See

Payton, 28 F.3d at 19 (quoting United States v. Springfield,

829 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1987)). The Springfield court con-

cluded that a Montana conviction for involuntary manslaugh-

ter, "which ‘by its nature’ involves the death of another

person, is highly likely to be the result of violence." Id. (sum-

marizing and quoting Springfield, 829 F.2d at 863).

If Payton remains good law in light of Begay, it is nonethe-

less inapplicable here for two reasons. First, it is not clear that

South Carolina’s crime of involuntary manslaughter, which

Payton considered, is similar with regard to intent to North

Carolina’s crime of involuntary manslaughter. As noted,

North Carolina involuntary manslaughter is defined as the

unintentional killing of another without malice when caused

by "(1) an unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor natu-

rally dangerous to human life, or (2) a culpably negligent act

or omission." Hudson, 483 S.E.2d at 438. By contrast, South

Carolina involuntary manslaughter is defined as the uninten-

tional killing of another without malice while engaged in (1)

"an unlawful activity not naturally tending to cause death or

UNITED STATES v. PETERSON 11

great bodily harm," or (2) "a lawful activity with reckless dis-

regard for the safety of others." State v. Mekler, 664 S.E.2d

477, 478 (S.C. 2008). Under South Carolina law, recklessness

is "a state of mind in which the actor is aware of his or her

conduct, yet consciously disregards a risk which his or her

conduct is creating." State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 167

(S.C. 2007) (emphasis added). While South Carolina’s reck-

lessness requirement would appear to require a mens rea that

comports with the Model Penal Code definition, North Caroli-

na’s culpable negligence requirement clearly does not. See

also Davis, 680 S.E.2d 242; State v. Brown, 307 S.E.2d 831

(N.C. Ct. App. 1983).

Second, in finding that involuntary manslaughter under

South Carolina law was a predicate offense for a Sentencing

Guidelines enhancement, the Payton court found that conduct

violating South Carolina’s law carried with it "the ‘risk’ of

physical force" because it resulted in the death of another. See

Payton, 28 F.3d at 19. This analysis relies on the language of

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), which parrots the language of ACCA,

as included in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). While the Payton

court concluded that this language was satisfied by conduct

amounting to involuntary manslaughter because it "involves

the death of another person," the Supreme Court in Begay,

which was decided 14 years after Payton, rejected such an

analysis. The Begay Court held that an offense that "involves

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical

injury to another" was limited by the nature of the example

crimes (burglary, arson, extortion, and use of explosives) and

therefore had to be "purposeful, violent, and aggressive."

Begay, 553 U.S. at 144. This holding overruled at least in part

the reasoning of Payton.

Although the language of ACCA that was considered in

Begay is identical to the language in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2),

the commentary to § 4B1.2(a)(2) adds to the list of example

crimes listed in § 4B1.2(a)(2) an additional six crimes of vio-

lence under the Guidelines—murder, manslaughter, kidnap-

12 UNITED STATES v. PETERSON

ping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, and robbery.

See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) cmt. 1. Nonetheless, when the Begay

analysis is applied even to the enlarged list of example crimes

included in the Sentencing Guidelines commentary, it does

not lead to a holding different from that reached in Begay, as

we point out below.

At bottom, under the categorical approach, a North Caro-

lina conviction for involuntary manslaughter does not fit the

generic definition of "manslaughter," as that term is used in

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) cmt. 1 to enhance sentences under

§ 4B1.1(a).

B

Even though North Carolina’s involuntary manslaughter

crime does not fit the generic crime of manslaughter, as it is

a crime distinct from manslaughter, it might nonetheless be

argued that it is an "other" predicate offense under U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.2(a)(2), which defines a crime of violence as any

offense, other than the example crimes, that "otherwise

involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of phys-

ical injury to another." Because this language is identical to

the ACCA language, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defin-

ing crimes that enhance sentences for firearms offenses), it is

subject to the Begay analysis addressing the ACCA language.

See Seay, 553 F.3d at 739 ("[W]e conclude that Begay’s anal-

ysis is applicable to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)").

In Begay, the Supreme Court held that not "every crime

that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to

another" constitutes a predicate offense under ACCA. Begay,

553 U.S. at 142 (emphasis omitted). Rather, the Court con-

strued the serious-potential-risk-of-physical-injury language

to refer only to those offenses "that are roughly similar, in

kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the examples"

included in the definition of "violent felony"—namely, bur-

glary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explo-

UNITED STATES v. PETERSON 13

sives. Id. at 142-43. Observing that these crimes "typically

involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct," id. at

144-45, the Begay Court concluded that other crimes must

also have those attributes to be violent felonies under ACCA.

Applying the Begay analysis to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) cmt. 1,

which adds six crimes to the list of example crimes for Guide-

lines cases—murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated

assault, forcible sex offenses, and robbery—we now ask

whether the predicate offense under consideration is "roughly

similar, in kind, as well as in degree of risk posed, to the

examples." See Begay, 553 U.S. at 143. Just as the Supreme

Court concluded from the four example crimes that a predi-

cate crime typically must involve purposeful, violent, and

aggressive content, we have little difficulty in concluding

similarly, by looking at the enlarged array of example crimes,

that a qualifying predicate offense under § 4B1.2(a) must also

be purposeful, violent, and aggressive.

The particular requirement of a mens rea, which is the

characteristic relevant here in considering North Carolina’s

involuntary manslaughter, is clearly present in the additional

six example crimes. Considering the Model Penal Code’s def-

inition of the additional examples readily demonstrates this.

Murder is committed purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly,

Model Penal Code § 210.2(1); kidnapping must be committed

purposefully, Model Penal Code § 212.1; aggravated assault

is committed "purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly," Model

Penal Code § 211.1(2); forcible sex offenses are generally

committed purposefully or knowingly, Model Penal Code

§§ 213.1, 213.2; and robbery is committed purposefully or

recklessly, Model Penal Code § 222.1 note. Because reckless-

ness under the Model Penal Code is at least a conscious disre-

gard of risk, we conclude that a predicate offense under

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) must similarly have a mens rea.

As we have already noted, North Carolina’s involuntary

manslaughter crime is defined as "unintentional" and can be

14 UNITED STATES v. PETERSON

committed through negligent conduct, which does not have a

mens rea. North Carolina courts have made this clear, observ-

ing that its version of involuntary manslaughter does not

include purposeful conduct. See Brown, 307 S.E.2d at 832.

"The difference between voluntary and involuntary man-

slaughter is a question of intent. As it relates to involuntary

manslaughter, intent is not an issue." Id.

While it is true that conduct leading to a North Carolina

involuntary manslaughter conviction will generally be set in

motion by purposeful conduct, that fact does not convert

involuntary manslaughter convictions into "crimes of vio-

lence." Otherwise, the purposeful acts of drinking alcohol and

driving a motor vehicle would have caused the Begay defen-

dant’s prior DUI arrests to qualify as predicate offenses under

ACCA. See United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 408-09

(7th Cir. 2009). Yet the Begay Court held to the contrary.

Begay’s reference to "purposeful" conduct concerned an

actor’s mens rea ("guilty mind"), not his actus reus ("guilty

conduct"). Cf. Begay, 553 U.S. at 145-46. The Court

explained that while "a drunk driver may very well drink on

purpose . . . the conduct for which the drunk driver is con-

victed (driving under the influence) need not be purposeful or

deliberate." Id. at 145. This explanation applies equally to

North Carolina involuntary manslaughter.

In short, we hold that a North Carolina conviction for

involuntary manslaughter does not "otherwise involve[] con-

duct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to

another," as limited in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) cmt. 1, with the

result that Peterson’s 2001 North Carolina conviction for

involuntary manslaughter does not serve as a predicate crime

of violence for determining whether he is a career offender

under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).

We vacate Peterson’s sentence and remand for resentenc-

ing.

VACATED AND REMANDED