Opinion

Hamilton v. Brown

  • 630 F.3d 889
  • 2011 WL 9568
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Jan 4, 2011
Status
Published
Author
Tashima
On the bench
Cowen, Tashima, Silverman
Cited by
289 cases
Authority
More cited than 98.8%

holding that claim that use of physical force to extract blood sample violates the Eighth Amendment fails as a matter of law where plaintiff failed to allege more than that he was handcuffed and restrained to effect the blood test, and did not allege pain beyond what would be expected from the needle stick

How later courts described this case

  • holding that claim that use of physical force to extract blood sample violates the Eighth Amendment fails as a matter of law where plaintiff failed to allege more than that he was handcuffed and restrained to effect the blood test, and did not allege pain beyond what would be expected from the needle stick
  • explaining that a prisoner “state[s] a claim 10 under the Eighth Amendment” when he or she alleges that “force was applied for the purpose of 11 causing harm, i.e., ‘maliciously and sadistically,’ rather than for legitimate reasons, such as 12 maintaining order or discipline in the prison”
  • finding no Fourth Amendment 10 violation because, “[h]aving been convicted and incarcerated, [the plaintiff] has no 11 legitimate expectation of privacy in the identifying information derived from his DNA”
  • concluding that “[d]e-liberate indifference may include ... intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care” (internal citation omitted)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GEORGE HAMILTON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 09-15236

v.

 DC No.

CV 04-5929 NVW

EDMUND G. BROWN JR.,* Attorney

General, et al., OPINION

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 10, 2010**

San Francisco, California

Filed January 4, 2011

Before: Robert E. Cowen,*** A. Wallace Tashima, and

Barry G. Silverman, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tashima.

*Edmund G. Brown Jr. is substituted for his predecessor as Attorney

General of California pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

**The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

***The Honorable Robert E. Cowen, Senior United States Circuit

Judge for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

273

276 HAMILTON v. BROWN

COUNSEL

George Hamilton, Kern Valley State Prison, Delano, Califor-

nia, plaintiff-appellant, appearing pro se.

No appearance for the defendants-appellees.

OPINION

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether California state prison inmates

constitutionally may be required to provide blood samples for

DNA identification under California’s DNA and Forensic

Identification Database and Data Bank Act of 1998, as

amended, Cal. Pen. Code § 295 et seq. (the “Act” or the “Cal-

ifornia DNA Act”). Pro se plaintiff George Hamilton, a Cali-

fornia state prison inmate, alleges that prison officials forcibly

extracted a blood sample for DNA identification without his

consent. He contends that this violated his rights under the

Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution and under California state law. The district

court dismissed Hamilton’s second amended complaint

(“SAC”) with prejudice.1 This appeal followed. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1

Because the district court dismissed this action at the screening stage

under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a),

defendants did not enter an appearance either in the district court or here

on appeal.

HAMILTON v. BROWN 277

H3>I

BACKGROUND

A. Hamilton’s allegations2

Hamilton is serving a sentence of thirty-nine years to life

in state prison. He alleges that, on October 7, 2003, Corcoran

State Prison guards attempted to break his arm in retaliation

for his trouble-making, which included filing complaints

against prison officials, accusing them of corruption, and

helping a legally-blind fellow inmate to file a lawsuit against

prison officials. The day after that incident, the same prison

guards escorted Hamilton to the prison medical clinic and

demanded that Hamilton provide a blood sample for DNA

analysis. Hamilton refused on the grounds that he did not

receive a written notice or proof of a valid court order. Hamil-

ton alleges that defendants’ true motive in collecting a blood

sample was to “set him up” in retaliation for his complaints.

After Hamilton’s refusal, he received a notice stating that

blood sample collection is authorized by Cal. Penal Code

§ 296. The notice also stated: “ON 10/8/03 YOU WERE

INFORMED OF YOUR REQUIREMENT TO SUBMIT

AND YOU REFUSED. AS A RESULT, YOU ARE NOW

SUBJECT TO USE OF FORCE.” In response, Hamilton

wrote to various state and federal officials to inform them that

he was “the victim of malicious and excessive force,” and that

prison officials were trying to force him to turn over a blood

sample without proper written notice or a “bona fide court

order.”

On November 17, 2003, Hamilton received a medical pass,

allowing him to visit the prison hospital the next day for what

2

These facts are taken from the allegations in Hamilton’s SAC, which

we accept as true for purposes of this appeal. Resnick v. Warden Hayes,

213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000).

278 HAMILTON v. BROWN

he thought was a podiatry appointment. The next day, defen-

dant M. Jost came to Hamilton’s cell, handcuffed him and

escorted him to the medical clinic. When Hamilton arrived,

defendants Sgt. E. Lawton, M. Chapman, a medical assistant,

and a nurse demanded that he provide a blood sample. When

he refused, the defendants exerted force. They strapped Ham-

ilton, still handcuffed, into a chair and extracted a blood sam-

ple. On the prison’s record of Hamilton’s visit to the medical

clinic, Hamilton wrote, “My DNA was taken against my will,

under deception, fraud, force and fear, while I was hand-

cuffed.”

B. Procedural History

In his complaint, Hamilton named the state Attorney Gen-

eral, a State Senator, and Does 1-100, identified as personnel

of the state’s Forensic Identification Data Base and Data

Bank, as defendants. Reviewing Hamilton’s complaint pursu-

ant to the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,3 the magistrate judge

dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, with leave

to amend. The court explained that Hamilton “must link each

named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that

demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s federal rights.” In addi-

tion, the court explained that Hamilton could not pursue a

claim for damages against the Attorney General in his official

capacity.

Hamilton then filed an amended complaint, which the mag-

istrate judge again dismissed with leave to amend. The court

explained that Hamilton again failed to link his claims to any

named defendant or any Doe defendant. The order reiterated

3

The PLRA requires a court to review, before docketing or as soon

thereafter as practicable, any civil action brought by a prisoner seeking

redress from a governmental entity, officer or employee. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). At the screening stage, the court must dismiss the complaint

or any portion thereof that is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b).

HAMILTON v. BROWN 279

that the Attorney General could not be sued for damages in

his official capacity. Hamilton was instructed that he was

required to

demonstrate in the Second Amended Complaint how

the conditions complained of resulted in a depriva-

tion of his constitutional rights. [Citation omitted.]

The Second Amended Complaint must specifically

state how each Defendant is involved. Further, there

can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between

a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation.

Hamilton’s SAC adds as defendants prison officials and

employees allegedly involved in the collection of the blood

sample, including the prison warden, two prison guards, and

prison medical clinic personnel. On January 6, 2009, the dis-

trict judge dismissed the SAC with prejudice. He concluded

that it was “not organized into a short and plain statement of

the claim,” in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In addition, the

district court stated that Hamilton failed to “allege that [he]

suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a

defendant and show an affirmative link between the injury

and the conduct of the defendant.”

Hamilton timely appealed.

II

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a prisoner

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447.

“Under § 1915A, when determining whether a complaint

states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of

material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. “Additionally, in general, courts

280 HAMILTON v. BROWN

must construe pro se pleadings liberally.” Id. (citing Balistreri

v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)).

We may affirm the district court on any ground supported by

the record. O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056,

1059 (9th Cir. 2007).

III

DISCUSSION

A. Overview of the California DNA Act

[1] The California DNA Act, Cal Pen. Code §§ 295-300.3,

was adopted in 1998

to assist federal, state, and local criminal justice and

law enforcement agencies . . . in the expeditious and

accurate detection and prosecution of individuals

responsible for sex offenses and other crimes, the

exclusion of suspects who are being investigated for

these crimes, and the identification of missing and

unidentified persons, particularly abducted children.

Cal. Pen. Code § 295(c). California contributes information in

its DNA database to a national DNA index maintained by the

Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI uses a computer

program to identify forensic unknowns (e.g. crime scene sam-

ples) with reference to a felony offender’s known sample that

was previously obtained, analyzed, and stored in accordance

with state or federal law. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d

813, 818-820 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (plurality opinion);

Cal. Pen. Code § 295(c), (g), (h)(4).

[2] As is relevant here, the Act requires California prison

inmates4 to “provide buccal swab samples and thumb and

4

The Act applies to “qualifying persons.” Qualifying persons include

“any person, including any juvenile, who is convicted of or pleads guilty

HAMILTON v. BROWN 281

palm print impressions and any blood or other specimens

required pursuant to this chapter.” Id. § 296.1(a)(2)(A). The

submission of samples is “mandatory and appl[ies] whether or

not the court advises a person . . . that he or she must provide

the data bank and database specimens, samples, and print

impressions.” Id. § 296(d); People v. Travis, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d

177, 183 (Ct. App. 2006) (“The provisions of the act are man-

datory and automatic upon conviction of a felony.”). A pris-

oner who refuses to provide a sample after receiving a written

or oral request is subject to the use of reasonable force. Spe-

cifically, the Act provides that

authorized law enforcement, custodial or corrections

personnel, including peace officers . . . , may employ

reasonable force to collect blood specimens, saliva

samples, or thumb or palm print impressions pursu-

ant to this chapter from individuals who, after writ-

ten or oral request, refuse to provide those

specimens, samples, or thumb or palm print impres-

sions.

Cal. Pen. Code § 298.1(b)(1). Prison officials must make “ef-

forts to secure voluntary compliance” before applying reason-

able force. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3025(k).5

or no contest to any felony offense.” Cal. Pen. Code § 296(a)(1). Since

2009, the term “qualifying persons” also includes any adult “arrested for

or charged with” any felony offense. Id. § 296(a)(2)(A)-(C). A challenge

to the expansion of the Act to those merely arrested on felony charges is

pending on appeal. Haskell v. Brown, No. 10-15152 (argued and submitted

July 13, 2010) (appeal of denial of preliminary injunction, see 677 F.

Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2009)). We are concerned in this appeal only

with application of the Act to convicted felons.

5

Reasonable force is defined in Department of Corrections regulations

as “[t]he force that an objective, trained and competent correctional

employee, faced with similar facts and circumstances, would consider nec-

essary and reasonable to subdue an attacker, overcome resistance, effect

custody, or gain compliance with a lawful order.” 15 Cal. Code Regs.

§§ 3268(a)(1), 3025(j).

282 HAMILTON v. BROWN

B. The Fourth Amendment Does Not Preclude the Col-

lection of Blood Samples from Prison Inmates for

DNA Identification

[3] Hamilton alleges that the warrantless, suspicionless

taking of his blood sample was an illegal seizure in violation

of the Fourth Amendment, which protects “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, . . . against unreasonable

searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This claim

fails as a matter of law. “The compulsory extraction of blood

for DNA profiling unquestionably implicates the right to per-

sonal security embodied in the Fourth Amendment, and thus

constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Constitution.”

Kincade, 379 F.3d at 821 n.15. We have repeatedly held,

however, that such compulsory blood extractions from con-

victed felons on supervised release do not violate the Fourth

Amendment.6 Id. at 836 (citations omitted); United States v.

Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 946 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that

the federal DNA Act, as amended in 2004 to expand the qual-

ifying offenses to all felonies, did not violate the Fourth

Amendment); United States v. Hugs, 384 F.3d 762, 769 (9th

Cir. 2004) (“A condition of supervised release requiring a

qualified felon to provide a DNA sample pursuant to the pro-

cedures set forth in the DNA Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14135a, does

not violate the Fourth Amendment.” (citing Kincade)).7 Simi-

6

We recently held that required submission of a DNA sample is an

allowable condition of pre-trial release under the Bail Reform Act, 18

U.S.C. § 3142. United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010); but

see Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding unconsti-

tutional the warrantless, suspicionless forcible taking of a DNA sample

from pre-trial detainee). A petition for rehearing en banc is pending in

Pool.

7

The federal DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act, Pub. L. No. 106-

546, 114 Stat. 2726 (2000), as amended by the Justice for All Act, Pub.

L. No. 108-405, § 203(b), 118 Stat. 2260, 2270 (2004), requires the collec-

tion of DNA samples from individuals arrested for, facing charges, or con-

victed of “qualifying federal offenses,” which include any felony, any

crime of violence, any crime of sexual abuse, or conspiracy to commit any

such crime. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a), (d); 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (providing a

complete list of qualifying offenses). The federal DNA Act applies to indi-

viduals in custody or on probation, parole or supervised release. 42 U.S.C.

§ 14135(a)(1), (2).

HAMILTON v. BROWN 283

lar state laws have been upheld, in this and other circuits, with

respect to state prison inmates. E.g., Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d

1556 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding Chapter 669, Oregon Laws

1991 against prison inmate’s Fourth Amendment challenge);

Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding

a Connecticut law requiring convicted sexual offenders to

submit blood samples to a DNA bank); Vanderlinden v. Kan-

sas, 874 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Kan. 1995) (upholding Kansas law

requiring convicted felons to submit blood samples for DNA

identification), aff’d sub nom. Schlicher v. Peters, 103 F.3d

940, 941 (10th Cir. 1996); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th

Cir. 1992) (upholding Virginia law requiring convicted felons

to submit blood specimens for DNA identification). The Cali-

fornia DNA Act is substantially similar to the federal and

state law this circuit previously has upheld against Fourth

Amendment challenges; it passes constitutional muster for the

same reasons.

[4] Kincade addressed the application of the federal DNA

Act to convicted felons on supervised release. 379 F.3d at

816. The Kincade plurality considered whether the search

(i.e., the taking of a blood sample) was reasonable by weigh-

ing the degree of intrusion on individual privacy against the

degree to which the search was necessary to promote legiti-

mate government interests.8 Id. at 831-32, 836. First, the Kin-

cade court considered the reasonable expectation of privacy

of those on supervised release. Id. at 836. After noting that

blood draws are a routine fact of modern life, the court elabo-

rated that

8

Kincade was a plurality opinion. Five judges voted to uphold the fed-

eral DNA Act against the Fourth Amendment challenge using a totality of

the circumstances analysis. 379 F.3d at 832. One judge voted to uphold

the federal DNA Act applying the special needs analysis. Id. at 840

(Gould, J., concurring). Five judges on the en banc panel would have

found a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 842 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)

(joined by three judges); id. at 871 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); id. at 875

(Hawkins, J., dissenting).

284 HAMILTON v. BROWN

[f]or parolees and supervised releasees especially—

individuals who while in custody have been lawfully

subject to much more severe intrusions of their cor-

poreal privacy than a sterile blood draw conducted

by a trained medical professional, and who therefore

leave prison with substantially reduced sensitivities

to such exposure—the DNA Act’s compelled breach

of their bodily integrity is all the less offensive.

Id. at 837. It follows that the physical intrusion occasioned by

a blood draw is no more, or perhaps even less, invasive for

those who are currently incarcerated, like Hamilton, and

therefore have even less of an expectation of privacy. Fried-

man, 580 F.3d at 862 (explaining that “Fourth Amendment

rights for inmates . . . fall on the lowest end of the expectation

of privacy spectrum”) (Callahan, J., dissenting).

According to the Kincade plurality, the privacy intrusion of

the DNA identification itself is similarly small. 379 F.3d at

837. The plurality explained that “the DNA profile derived

from the defendant’s blood sample establishes only a record

of the defendant’s identity—otherwise personal information

in which the qualified offender can claim no right of privacy

once lawfully convicted of a qualifying offense (indeed, once

lawfully arrested and booked into state custody.” Id. In fact,

“once a person is convicted of one of the felonies included as

predicate offenses under [the DNA Act], his identity has

become a matter of state interest and he has lost any legiti-

mate expectation of privacy in the identifying information

derived from blood sampling.” Id. (quoting Rise, 59 F.3d at

1560). The en banc plurality therefore concluded that the

intrusion into privacy was minimal.

[5] Here, DNA testing under the California DNA Act, like

the federal law, is limited to the collection of identifying

information. Cal. Pen. Code § 299.5 (limiting use of samples

to criminal identification, exclusion of suspects, and identifi-

cation of missing persons and imposing penalties for misuse).

HAMILTON v. BROWN 285

Having been convicted and incarcerated, Hamilton has no

legitimate expectation of privacy in the identifying informa-

tion derived from his DNA. Accordingly, the DNA identifica-

tion at issue here is no more intrusive than that considered by

the court in Kincade.

[6] Finally, the Kincade plurality measured the govern-

ment’s interest in obtaining DNA identification from those on

supervised release and concluded that it is “monumental.” Id.

at 839. The compelling interests included: (1) ensuring com-

pliance with the conditions of supervised release (by making

it more likely that violations will be detected); (2) deterrence

(by alerting the supervised releasee that the government will

be able to identify him if he re-offends); and (3) “contributing

to the solution of past crimes” to “help[ ] bring closure to

countless victims of crime who have languished in the knowl-

edge that perpetrators remain at large.” Id. at 838-39. The plu-

rality concluded that compulsory DNA profiling of qualified

offenders under the federal DNA Act was reasonable. Id. at

839.

[7] Here, the Kincade interests in ensuring compliance

with conditions of release and deterrence are less immediate,

as Hamilton alleges that he is not eligible for parole until at

least 2028. However, the Rise court, considering the Oregon

law compelling DNA samples from prisoners convicted of

serious felonies including murder and sexual offenses, con-

cluded that the interest in preventing recidivism and identify-

ing and prosecuting offenders was a sufficiently compelling

government interest to outweigh the minimal privacy intru-

sion. 59 F.3d at 1562. Although the California DNA Act

applies to a broader range of felons, the state’s interest in

adding convicted felons to its DNA data bank is at least as

immediate as in Rise. See People v. Robinson, 224 P.3d 55,

66 (Cal. 2010) (citing “the overwhelming public interest in

prosecuting crimes accurately“ as a “compelling government

interest” justifying the “minimal” intrusion of non-consensual

collection of blood samples from felons (citations omitted)).

286 HAMILTON v. BROWN

In light of the applicable precedent and the persuasive reason-

ing of the Kincade plurality, we conclude that Hamilton fails

to state a claim under the Fourth Amendment for which relief

may be granted.9

C. The Remaining Constitutional Challenges Are

Without Merit

In addition to his Fourth Amendment claim, Hamilton

alleges an array of other federal and state constitutional chal-

lenges against the California DNA Act. We review them

briefly below. All of them are meritless.

1. Due Process Claim

[8] The Ninth Circuit explicitly has rejected the argument

that prison officials are required to provide a hearing before

requiring an inmate to provide a blood sample for DNA anal-

ysis. Rise, 59 F.3d at 1562. In Rise, the court explained:

The extraction of blood from an individual in a sim-

ple, medically acceptable manner, despite the indi-

vidual’s lack of an opportunity to object to the

procedure, does not implicate the Due Process

Clause. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 759-

60 (1966) (upholding withdrawal of blood despite

defendant’s refusal to consent); Breithaupt v. Abram,

352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957) (upholding blood extrac-

tion from unconscious person). Because the only cri-

terion under Chapter 669 for extracting blood is a

9

We note that some of Hamilton’s allegations could be read to suggest

that his blood sample was not taken in accordance with state law, but

rather in retaliation for Hamilton’s conduct as a prison gadfly. However,

despite having been given three opportunities, Hamilton has failed to con-

nect the collection of his blood sample to the malign intent of any named

defendant. We hold only that the neutral application of the Act to prison

inmates does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

HAMILTON v. BROWN 287

conviction for a predicate offense, there would be lit-

tle of substance to contest at any provided hearing.

Id. at 1562-63. The same is undoubtedly true here. Under the

California DNA Act, all “qualifying persons,” without excep-

tion, must submit the required specimens and samples. This

includes “any person . . . who is convicted of or pleads guilty

or no contest to any felony offense.” Cal. Pen. Code

§ 296(a)(1). California courts have explained that “the [Act’s]

requirements that specified persons give DNA samples are . . .

‘self-executing’ in that they are mandatory and arise with or

without a trial court advisement or order to that effect.” Peo-

ple v. Dial, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 252, 254 (Ct. App. 2005).

Accordingly, we conclude that Hamilton’s claims for relief

based on an alleged due process violation were properly dis-

missed. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395

(1989) (“Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit

textual source of constitutional protection against . . . physi-

cally intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not

the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’

must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”)

2. Eighth Amendment Claim

[9] Hamilton alleges that by forcibly taking his blood sam-

ple, defendants demonstrated “reckless and deliberate indif-

ference” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This claim

fails as a matter of law. The Supreme Court has held that “de-

liberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners

constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . .

proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Deliberate indifference may include

a prison doctor’s inadequate response to a prisoner’s medical

needs, “prison guards intentionally denying or delaying access

to medical care, or intentionally interfering with the treatment

once prescribed.” Id. at 104-105. Here, Hamilton makes no

allegation that any defendant remained deliberately indifferent

288 HAMILTON v. BROWN

to his serious medical needs. Accordingly, his deliberate

indifference claim fails as a matter of law.

[10] To the extent the SAC can be read to allege that

defendants’ use of physical force to extract the blood sample

violates the Eighth Amendment, this claim fails as well. In

order to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff

must allege that the challenged force was applied for the pur-

pose of causing harm, i.e., “maliciously and sadistically,”

rather than for legitimate reasons, such as maintaining order

or discipline in the prison. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175,

1180 (2010) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9

(1992)). Notably, Hamilton does not allege that defendants, in

subjecting him to a blood draw against his will, caused “the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Albers,

475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). He does not allege that he was sub-

ject to physical force in connection with the taking of the

blood sample beyond being handcuffed and then restrained in

a chair. He does not allege the infliction of pain beyond the

needle stick and the discomfort of the temporary restraint.

Even assuming that Hamilton found this experience uncom-

fortable, frustrating and humiliating, on these facts, there is no

viable Eighth Amendment claim. See Sanders v. Conan, 864

F. Supp. 496, 499-501 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (finding no Eighth

Amendment violation where prison officials used reasonable

force to collect DNA samples from unwilling prisoners pursu-

ant to North Carolina statute). We conclude that this claim for

relief was properly dismissed.

3. Remaining Claims

[11] Hamilton’s state law claims also fail as a matter of

law. He challenges the California DNA Act as violating the

right to procedural due process under the California Constitu-

tion. The California courts, however, have rejected this argu-

ment. See Travis, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 192-95. California courts

also have repeatedly rejected Hamilton’s argument that the

collection of blood samples under the Act is an illegal search

HAMILTON v. BROWN 289

or seizure. See Robinson, 224 P.3d at 67; Travis, 44 Cal. Rptr.

3d at 184; People v. Adams, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 170, 183-84 (Ct.

App. 2004); People v. King, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 230 (Ct.

App. 2000); see generally 4 Witkin, CAL. CRIMINAL LAW, Ille-

gal Evidence § 326B (3d ed. 2010) (compiling cases).

We have reviewed appellant’s remaining federal and state

law claims and we find them to be without merit.

IV

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district

court is

AFFIRMED.

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