Gammage v. West Jasper School Board of Education

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-60304

GERALDINE GAMMAGE

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

WEST JASPER SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION; WEST JASPER SCHOOL DISTRICT

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Mississippi

June 28, 1999

Before POLITZ, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Geraldine Gammage urges that the district court erred in

disposing of her ADA claim on summary judgment on grounds of claim

and issue preclusion. We conclude that issue preclusion bars

Gammage’s federal ADA claim, so we AFFIRM.

I.

In February 1995, Principal Elijah J. Buckley delivered a

memorandum to Geraldine Gammage, a veteran teacher in the West

Jasper County School District, advising her that he would recommend

to the School Board that her contract not be renewed for the

following school year. Then, in March 1995, Principal Buckley and

Superintendent Charles Lyle informed Gammage that the West Jasper

School District Board of Trustees had voted to accept Principal

Buckley’s recommendation not to renew her contract.

Then, pursuant to Gammage’s request and in accordance with

Mississippi’s School Employment Procedures Act (“SEPA”), MISS. CODE

ANN. § 37-9-101 et seq., an extensive nonrenewal hearing was

conducted. The hearing covered a period of 11 days and generated

a transcript numbering 2170 pages. In addition, over 60 exhibits

were introduced. Gammage and the school district were both

represented by counsel. On December 22, 1995, the hearing officer

rendered his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, wherein he

upheld the nonrenewal decision. The School District’s Board of

Trustees subsequently reviewed and adopted the hearing record and

the hearing officer’s decision.

On February 8, 1996, Gammage appealed the Board’s decision to

the Jasper County Chancery Court, in accordance with the review

mechanisms provided by SEPA. While her appeal to the Chancery

Court was pending, she filed a lawsuit in federal district court

pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102,

and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 20003, charging

that the School Board and the School District had terminated her

employment on account of a disabling kidney disorder from which she

suffered and for which, she alleged, they had failed to make

reasonable accommodation. On June 11, 1997, the defendants in the

federal suit filed a motion urging the district court to abstain

pursuant to the abstention principles of Younger v. Harris, 401

U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny. On June 24, 1997, while that

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motion was still pending, the Chancery Court upheld the School

Board’s decision. Gammage then filed a notice of appeal to the

Mississippi Supreme Court. On October 2, 1997, the district court

granted the defendants’ abstention motion.

Eventually, Gammage voluntarily dismissed her state appeal,

and, as a result, on April 13, 1998, the district court lifted its

stay. Then, on April 22, 1998, the district court granted the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the

claim preclusive and issue preclusive effect of the state court

judgment barred Gammage’s federal ADA claim. Gammage filed a

timely appeal.

II.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738 governs the preclusive effect to be

given the judgments of state courts: a federal court must give to

a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given

that judgment under the law of the state in which the judgment was

rendered. The preclusion doctrines of Mississippi apply here, and

Mississippi law precludes a party from relitigating “a specific

issue actually litigated, determined by, and essential to the

judgment in a former action, even though a different cause of

action is the subject of the subsequent action.” Dunaway v. W.H.

Hopper & Assocs., Inc., 422 So. 2d 749, 751 (Miss. 1982).

Gammage’s ADA claim rests primarily on a theory of failure to

provide reasonable accomodation. In addition, Gammage’s federal

complaint, read generously, alleges an ADA violation on a theory of

animus discrimination. Gammage’s complaint also appears to allege

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an ADA violation based on the School Board’s and School District’s

use of standards or other criteria that constitute disability

discrimination.

In its opinion, the Chancery Court addressed all three of

Gammage’s theories for recovery under the ADA. The court stated

that Gammage’s argument for reversal of the Board’s decision was

“abject Handicap Discrimination.” The Chancery Court continued:

“[T]he Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff has wholly failed to

establish the existence of ‘abject Handicap Discrimination.’” In

reaching this conclusion, the Chancery Court referred to a section

in its findings of fact that pertained to Gammage’s claim of

handicap discrimination. In that section, the Chancery Court

stated:

No witness in these proceedings has testified that

Plaintiff advised Principal Buckley, Superintendent Lyle

or any other member of the faculty or staff of Defendant

of any alleged medical problem which would prevent her

from performing her assigned duties. Plaintiff did not,

in fact, testify to same in her affidavit filed after

completion of the hearing. Exhibit 44 is a letter from

Philip Rogers, M.D., Hattiesburg Clinic, wherein Dr.

Rogers indicates that “After Ms. Gammage has been on

dialysis for approximately 12-13 treatments she should be

reasonably stable and should be able to continue to

function in her classroom as well as she ever has.” At

that time, she was taking treatments three times per week

and had already completed some of these 12-13 treatments.

Therefore, it is the conclusion of the Court that any

deficiencies in Plaintiff’s job performance was [sic] not

related in any way to her health. There is no evidence

that Mrs. Gammage was discriminated against due to her

health.

Thus, the Chancery Court found that, while the administration

knew of Gammage’s disability from the doctor’s letter, Gammage had

failed to prove that the administration knew of any work-related

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limitations that Gammage would experience as a result of her

disability that necessitated accomodation. This court has noted

that the term “discriminate” in the context of the ADA “includes

not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or

mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a

disability . . . .” Riel v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d

678, 681 (5th Cir. 1996)(emphasis added)(citing 42 U.S.C. §

12112(b)(5)(A)). And, “[f]or purposes of proving ADA

discrimination, it is important to distinguish between an

employer’s knowledge of an employee’s disability versus an

employer’s knowledge of any limitations experienced by the employee

as a result of that disability. This distinction is important

because the ADA requires employers to reasonably accommodate

limitations, not disabilities.” Taylor v. Principal Financial

Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the

ADA does not require an employer to assume that an employee with a

disability suffers from a limitation; as a result, it is incumbent

upon the ADA plaintiff to assert not only a disability, but also

any limitation resulting therefrom. See id. Thus, the Chancery

Court’s determination on the knowledge issue -- that the School

Board and School District did not know of any limitations stemming

from Gammage’s condition which required accomodation -- is relevant

to Gammage’s federal ADA lawsuit because, in order to bring a

successful ADA claim based on failure to provide reasonable

accomodation, an employee must prove that the employer knew of the

employee’s substantial physical limitation.

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Furthermore, the Chancery Court concluded in its opinion that

there was no merit to a claim of animus discrimination when it

stated that there was no evidence that the School Board or School

District had discriminated against Gammage due to her health. The

court also negated Gammage’s argument that the School Board and

School District instituted standards that screened her out because

of her disability when it determined that the deficiencies that led

to her nonrenewal were unrelated to her condition.

The Chancery Court’s conclusions on these issues have

preclusive effect, thereby barring Gammage’s federal ADA claim, if

the issues were fully litigated in the administrative proceedings

and if the court’s conclusions were essential to its judgment. We

find that the extensive administrative hearing satisfies the

requirement that the issues have been fully litigated. Moreover,

the determinations were essential to the judgment because the

Chancery Court’s obligation to review the decision of the School

Board included a statutorily mandated review to determine whether

the decision of the Board violated some statutory or constitutional

right of the employee. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-9-113 (stating that

the scope of review of the Chancery Court includes a review to

determine if the nonrenewal decision was “in violation of some

statutory or constitutional right of the employee”). That is, the

Chancery Court had to determine whether the nonrenewal decision

violated Gammage’s right to be free from disability discrimination,

and the court’s conclusions on each of Gammage’s alleged grounds

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for ADA violations were essential to determining that Gammage’s

rights were not violated.

III.

In sum, we find that the Chancery Court’s determinations

regarding handicap discrimination are issue preclusive and bar

Gammage’s federal ADA claim. AFFIRMED.

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