Ray v. Township of Warren

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 09-4353

LAWRENCE V. RAY,

Appellant,

v.

TOWNSHIP OF WARREN; CAROLANN GARAFOLA,

Mayor, in her official capacity; WARREN TOWNSHIP

POLICE DEPARTMENT; WILLIAM STAHL, Chief of

Police, in his official capacity; RUSSELL W. LEFFORT,

Lieutenant; ANGELO PAOLELLA; JOSEPH E. COHEN,

Officer; DONALD V. CALABRESE, Officer; LARRY

FRANK, Officer; RAE S. QUAST, Officer, in their individual

capacities and official capacities as Police

Officers in the Township of Warren;

RICHARD M. SASSO, Judge of Warren Township

Municipal Court, in his official capacity,

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 3-07-cv-02812)

District Judge: Hon. Joel A. Pisano

Argued

October 12, 2010

Before: SCIRICA, FUENTES and JORDAN, Circuit

Judges.

(Filed: November 23, 2010)

Michael V. Gilberti

Epstein & Gilberti

21 East Front Street - #210

Red Bank, NJ 07701

Paul H. Levinson [ARGUED]

McLaughlin & Stern

260 Madison Avenue

New York, NY 10016

Counsel for Appellant

2

Juan C. Fernandez [ARGUED]

Dawn M. Sullivan

O’Toole Fernandez Weiner Van Lieu

60 Pompton Avenue

Verone, NJ 07044

Counsel for Appellees

OPINION OF THE COURT

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

Lawrence V. Ray appeals from an order of the United

States District Court for the District of New Jersey granting

summary judgment, based on qualified immunity, to several

officers of the Warren Township Police Department on his

Fourth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ray claims

that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right against

unlawful searches when they entered his home while

investigating concerns expressed by his estranged wife about the

Rays’ daughter. For the following reasons, we will affirm.

3

I. Background

A. Factual Background

On the evening of June 17, 2005, Theresa Ray1 went to

her husband’s home in Warren, New Jersey, to pick up their

youngest daughter for court-ordered visitation.2 After ringing

the doorbell, Ms. Ray observed a man whom she believed to be

her husband moving about in the home. Ms. Ray continued to

ring the doorbell and knock on the door for several minutes in

an attempt to alert the man to her presence. After receiving no

response, she called the police.

Sergeant Angelo Paolella and Officers Donald Calabrese

and Larry Frank responded to the call and were soon joined by

Officer Joseph Cohen (collectively, the “responding officers”).

Some of the responding officers had been called by the Rays in

the past to deal with domestic problems and were aware of the

“acrimonious nature of the Ray’s [sic] divorce proceedings and

child custody disputes at the home.” (App. at 114, 117.) On the

evening in question, Ms. Ray informed the responding officers

that she had arrived at the home to pick up her child for

visitation pursuant to a final restraining order that, in part,

1

We will refer to Lawrence Ray as “Ray” and his wife as

“Ms. Ray.”

2

While the record is not clear on the point, it appears from the

briefing that the Rays’ daughter was four or five years old at the

time of these events.

4

addressed visitation rights.3 She informed the officers that she

had seen someone inside the home who was not responding to

the door, whom she believed to be her husband and whom she

assumed had custody of the child at the time.4 Ms. Ray was

visibly upset and told the officers that she was concerned for the

well-being of her daughter.5 The officers shared her concern.

3

Ray asserts that it is not clear whether his wife was actually

entitled to visitation on that evening and complains that the

officers never confirmed that she had a visitation order.

However, the record reflects that Ms. Ray showed Officer

Calabrese a copy of the order and that Officer Paollela

confirmed through dispatch that there was a restraining order in

effect. (App. at 39, 75, 114.) Regardless of whether Ms. Ray

was legally entitled to visitation at the time – a fact that the

District Court correctly concluded was immaterial – there is no

dispute that the officers were aware of ongoing custody issues

with the couple and that they had been informed that evening

that Ms. Ray had arrived at the house to pick up her daughter for

visitation.

4

The record does not indicate that Ms. Ray saw her daughter

while she was at the door; however, some of the officers

testified that they had been informed that the child was in the

house.

5

Ray argues that Ms. Ray did not have any concern for the

little girl. He relies on the fact that, at her deposition, when

asked about the basis for her concern, Ms. Ray responded, “My

husband’s acting like completely nuts, not giving me my

daughter for visitation ... and I can tell you I did not see her

5

They circled the perimeter of the house, knocked on the doors

and windows, and called Ray’s home telephone, but received no

response. That heightened the officers’ apprehensions because

on other occasions when police had been called to the residence,

Ray had always responded and turned over his daughter to his

wife.

In light of the circumstances, Officer Calabrese, at

Sergeant Paolella’s instruction, contacted a municipal court

judge for guidance as to whether the officers could “go in the

house to look” for the child.6 (App. at 70.) Exactly what was

discussed during the phone call is not clear. Paolella and

Calabrese testified that they only sought approval to enter the

home out of concern for the Rays’ daughter and that the judge

gave them such authorization. Both Paolella and Calabrese

testified that they did not regard the call to the judge as a request

for a warrant of any kind. In contrast, the judge understood the

since June first. He is increasing his alienation of my children.

He’s already turned ... one daughter against me ... .” (App. at

93). Regardless of Ms. Ray’s actual motivations for calling the

police, the record is clear that the officers on the scene were

genuinely concerned for the child’s well-being and that they

perceived Ms. Ray was as well.

6

The officers called into headquarters and either someone

provided Calabrese the contact information or someone there

contacted the judge, who called Calabrese on his cell phone. It

appears that Officer Calabrese failed to follow department

protocol when he called the judge rather than Lieutenant Russell

Leffert, his immediate supervisor, or the prosecutor’s office.

6

officers to be asking for an arrest warrant based on Ray’s

violation of the terms of the restraining order, though he

indicated that Officer Calabrese “was afraid for the safety of the

kids.” (App. at 82). Based on the call, the judge issued an arrest

warrant for Ray, which was later voided. Regardless of the

ambiguity regarding the call to the judge, the record reflects that

the primary motivation of the officers on the scene was to enter

the home so that they could check on the child.7

The officers entered Ray’s home through an unlocked

door that was ajar, but obstructed by a piece of lumber meant to

keep the door secured.8 The lumber was moved aside with a

“slim jim,” a device used to gain access to a locked vehicle.

Upon entering the home, the officers encountered Ray’s father,

who explained to the officers that he had been sleeping and that

his son was not at home. After quickly looking through the

home, the officers found neither Ray nor his daughter. The

event was captured on video by cameras installed in Ray’s

home. Shortly after the incident, the officers were informed that

7

Officer Calabrese initially filed a handwritten police report

including a reference to the phone call made to the judge prior

to entry into the home. That report was later typed and the

reference to the phone call was omitted at the request of

Lieutenant Leffert.

8

During the call to the judge, Calabrese described the door as

“open.” The record clearly indicates that the door could not be

closed – hence the use of the lumber as an improvised lock since

the lock on the door was of no practical use. (App. at 88, 108.)

7

someone had made contact with Ray and that he was bringing

the child to police headquarters.

B. Procedural History

Ray filed a complaint asserting a claim under § 1983 and

several state law claims based upon the allegedly

unconstitutional search of his home. Ray named as defendants

the responding officers and Lieutenant Leffert in their individual

and official capacities, the Township of Warren, the Township

of Warren Police Department, and Chief of Police William Stahl

in his official capacity, all of whom filed a joint motion for

summary judgment.9 In that motion, the responding officers and

Leffert (“Appellees”) asserted that they were entitled to

qualified immunity.

The District Court agreed and, based upon qualified

immunity, granted summary judgment to the Appellees on Ray’s

§ 1983 claim.10 The District Court also dismissed Ray’s claims

9

Ray named three other defendants in his amended complaint,

all of whom were dismissed from the matter before the

remaining defendants filed for summary judgment.

10

Appellee Officer Larry Frank was inadvertently omitted

from the motion as a movant, thus the District Court did not

include Officer Frank in its opinion and order. However, the

court amended its order granting summary judgment to include

Officer Frank, with the agreement of the parties. Appellees also

moved for summary judgment based on New Jersey’s Tort

Claims Act. The District Court granted summary judgment on

8

against the officers, Lieutenant Leffert, and Chief Stahl in their

official capacities, as well as his claim against the Warren

Township Police Department, because all of those claims were

redundant of the claim against the Township. Thereafter, the

parties stipulated to the dismissal of the claims against the

Township. Ray then filed this timely appeal.

II. Discussion11

We exercise de novo review over the District Court’s

grant of summary judgment. Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775

(3d Cir. 2004). An order granting summary judgment is

appropriate when the evidence reveals there is “no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In

reviewing the record, we are required to view the facts and draw

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Kopec, 361 F.3d at 775.

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government

officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (internal

all of Ray’s state law claims, and that decision is not before us

on appeal.

11

The District Court had jurisdiction over this action based

upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We exercise jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

9

quotations omitted). Thus, if a reasonable officer is not on

notice that his or her conduct under the circumstances is clearly

unlawful, then application of qualified immunity is appropriate.

Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475

U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

The Supreme Court has established a two-part analysis

that governs whether a government official is entitled to

qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

The first question in the Saucier analysis asks whether the

official’s conduct violated a constitutional or federal right. Id.

This is not a question of immunity, but whether there is any

wrong to address. Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 207 (3d Cir.

2007). The second question asks whether the right at issue was

“clearly established.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. To be clearly

established, “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is

doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,

640 (1987). If “the officer made a reasonable mistake about the

legal constraints on his actions,” then qualified immunity should

protect him from suit. Curley, 499 F.3d at 207. In considering

that question, we judge the officer’s actions from the perspective

of an objectively reasonable law enforcement officer under the

circumstances, and we endeavor to avoid hindsight. Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

The Supreme Court has held that the questions in the

Saucier analysis need not be addressed in sequence. Pearson,

129 S.Ct. 818. Instead, courts may “exercise their sound

discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified

10

immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the

circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id.

The constitutional right at issue in this appeal is Ray’s

right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from an

unreasonable search of his home. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

Searches of a home without a warrant are presumptively

unreasonable, though the warrant requirement is subject to

carefully defined exceptions. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.

177, 191 (1990). Since the responding officers did not have a

warrant to search Ray’s home, the question of whether Ray’s

rights have been violated rests on whether an exception to the

warrant requirement applies. While one might have thought the

officers would claim that their search was justified by exigent

circumstances, which is a well-recognized exception to the

warrant requirement, they do not. To justify their actions, they

instead point to what has come to be called the “community

caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant

requirement. Ray, of course, contends that no such exception

applies here.

The Supreme Court first recognized the community

caretaking exception in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439

(1973). In Cady, a Chicago police officer named Dombrowski

was visiting in Wisconsin and reported to the local police that he

had been in an automobile accident. The police picked him up

and returned to the scene of the accident. Id. at 435-36.

Dombrowski had been drinking, appeared intoxicated to the

officers, and offered conflicting versions of the accident. Id. He

informed the local officers that he was a Chicago policeman. Id.

at 436. The local officers believed that members of the Chicago

11

police force were required to carry a service revolver at all

times, so, when no gun was found on Dombrowski’s person, an

officer checked the front seat and the glove compartment of the

wrecked car, but to no avail. Id. The effort to find the weapon

was motivated by the obligation of the police “to protect the

public from the possibility that a revolver would fall into

untrained or perhaps malicious hands.” Id. at 443. The police

had the vehicle towed to a privately owned garage, where it was

left parked outside. Id. at 436. After taking Dombrowski to a

local hospital for treatment of injuries he sustained in the

accident, one of the Wisconsin officers returned to

Dombrowski’s car to again try to recover the service revolver,

id. at 436-37, again pursuant to standard departmental procedure

“to protect the public from a weapon’s possibly falling into

improper hands.” Id. at 434. Upon opening the trunk, the

officer discovered various items that linked Dombrowski to a

murder. Id. at 437-38.

The Supreme Court held that the search of Dombrowski’s

vehicle was permissible because it was the result of a police

officer’s community caretaking function, “totally divorced from

the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating

to the violation of a criminal statute.” Id. at 441; see also United

States v. Smith, 522 F.3d 305, 313 (3d Cir. 2008) (“In

performing this community caretaking role, police are ‘expected

to aid those in distress, combat actual hazards, prevent potential

hazards from materializing and provide an infinite variety of

services to preserve and protect public safety.’” (quoting United

States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 784-85 (1st Cir.

1991))). The Court determined that the search for the gun was

12

reasonable, though its holding was based largely on the

constitutional distinction between automobiles and dwellings:

Because of the extensive regulation of motor

vehicles and traffic, and also because of the

frequency with which a vehicle can become

disabled or involved in an accident on public

highways, the extent of police citizen contact

involving automobiles will be substantially

greater than police-citizen contact in a home or

office ... . The Court’s previous recognition of the

distinction between motor vehicles and dwelling

places leads us to conclude that the type of

caretaking “search” conducted here of a vehicle

that was neither in the custody nor on the

premises of its owner, and that had been placed

where it was by virtue of lawful police action,

was not unreasonable solely because a warrant

had not been obtained.

Id. at 439, 447-448.

The Cady Court recognized that, while some contact

between police officers and vehicles will occur because of a

possible violation of a criminal statute, much of the contact will

be completely unrelated to criminal law enforcement and will

occur when officers are acting as community caretakers. Id. at

441. The Court expressly distinguished automobile searches

from searches of a home, saying that a search of a vehicle may

be reasonable “although the result might be the opposite in a

search of a home.” Id. at 440. That distinction recognizes that

13

the sanctity of the home “has been embedded in our tradition

since the origins of the Republic.” Payton v. New York, 445

U.S. 573, 601 (1980). Indeed, the Supreme Court has

emphasized that “[t]he physical entry of the home is the chief

evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is

directed.” United States v. United States District Court, 407

U.S. 297, 313 (1972).

There is some confusion among the circuits as to whether

the community caretaking exception set forth in Cady applies to

warrantless searches of the home. The majority of circuits have

reasoned that the community caretaking doctrine announced in

Cady is limited to searches of automobiles. The Ninth Circuit,

in United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529, 533 (9th Cir. 1993),

held that Cady was based on the distinction made between

vehicles and residences and that an officer acting as a

community caretaker may only enter a building based on an

already acknowledged exception to the warrant requirement,

like exigent circumstances. 991 F.2d at 531-32 (“Although it

involved a community caretaking function, Cady clearly turned

on the ‘constitutional difference’ between searching a house and

searching an automobile.”). The Seventh Circuit took a similar

approach in United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204 (7th Cir.

1982), which concerned a warrantless search of a privately

owned warehouse. The court held that Cady was limited to

automobile searches and refused to create a “warehouse

exception,” even if the officers were acting as community

caretakers. Id. at 207-09 (“[T]he plain import from the language

of the Cady decision is that the Supreme Court did not intend to

create a broad exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant

requirement to apply whenever the police are acting in an

14

‘investigative,’ rather than a ‘criminal’ function.”). Likewise,

the Tenth Circuit held that the community caretaking doctrine

announced in Cady applies only to automobiles. United States

v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 535 (10th Cir. 1994). There the court

found that the search of an old manufacturing plant under the

auspices of the community caretaking doctrine was

unconstitutional because the holding in Cady was based on the

“constitutional difference” between searches of automobiles and

searches of homes or businesses. Id.

Some circuits do appear to have relied on the community

caretaking exception created in Cady to uphold warrantless

entries into houses. In United States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005

(8th Cir. 2006), the Eighth Circuit held that an officer acting in

a community caretaking role may enter a residence when the

officer has a reasonable belief that an emergency exists that

requires attention. 448 F.3d at 1007-08. The Sixth Circuit took

a similar approach in United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506 (6th

Cir. 1996), when it held that two officers’ warrantless entry into

a home was permissible since they were acting as community

caretakers to abate a significant noise nuisance. 98 F.3d at 1509.

Those cases, however, do not simply rely on the

community caretaking doctrine established in Cady. They

instead apply what appears to be a modified exigent

circumstances test, with perhaps a lower threshold for exigency

if the officer is acting in a community caretaking role. For

example, in Quezada, the Eighth Circuit held that the officer had

to have a “reasonable belief that an emergency exists requiring

his or her attention” for the community caretaking doctrine to

apply to a warrantless search of a home. 448 F.3d at 1007

15

(emphasis added). And in Rohrig, the Sixth Circuit recognized

that some situations addressed by officers within their

community caretaking functions, though not within the scope of

traditional law enforcement, can still present important

government interests that may rise to the level of traditionally

recognized “exigent circumstances.” 98 F.3d at 1521-22. In

fact, the Sixth Circuit itself has questioned whether Rohrig

created a new community caretaking exception to the warrant

requirement for entry into a home. United States v. Williams,

354 F.3d 497, 508 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[D]espite references to the

doctrine of Rohrig, we doubt that community caretaking will

generally justify warrantless entries into private homes.”).12

We agree with the conclusion of the Seventh, Ninth, and

Tenth Circuits on this issue, and interpret the Supreme Court’s

decision in Cady as being expressly based on the distinction

between automobiles and homes for Fourth Amendment

purposes. The community caretaking doctrine cannot be used

to justify warrantless searches of a home. Whether that

exception can ever apply outside the context of an automobile

search, we need not now decide. It is enough to say that, in the

context of a search of a home, it does not override the warrant

requirement of the Fourth Amendment or the carefully crafted

and well-recognized exceptions to that requirement.

12

While the Eleventh Circuit has cited Rohrig as one case that

“ha[s] recognized that police officers may enter a house without

a warrant based on what could be characterized as their

community caretaking functions,” United States v. McGough,

412 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2005), we defer to the Sixth

Circuit’s interpretation of its own precedent.

16

Those exceptions include exigent circumstances, which

may involve circumstances beyond those confronted by police

in a criminal investigatory context. See United States v. Coles,

437 F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Examples of exigent

circumstances include, but are not limited to, hot pursuit of a

suspected felon, the possibility that evidence may be removed

or destroyed, and danger to the lives of officers or others.”)

(emphasis added). Circumstances involving the protection of a

child’s welfare, even absent suspicions of criminal activity, may

present an exigency permitting warrantless entry, but only if the

officer reasonably believes that “someone is in imminent

danger.” Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1996).

Under the circumstances of this case, it is debatable whether the

officers confronted exigent circumstances.13

Regardless of whether there were exigent circumstances

in this case, however, the responding officers are entitled to

qualified immunity. “The qualified immunity question is

whether the officer was reasonably mistaken about the state of

the law.” Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 214 (3d Cir. 2007).

There is no dispute that at the time of the officers’ actions in this

case, two Circuits had arguably extended the community

caretaking doctrine to warrantless entries into homes. See

13

We note that, on the surface at least, the facts of this case

raise the question of whether a valid entry may have been made

under the exigent circumstances doctrine, since the belief of the

officers on the scene was that a four or five year-old child was

left alone in a home with an unresponsive adult who had always

previously promptly responded to police contacts and who was

involved in a bitter custody dispute over the child.

17

Quezada, 448 F.3d at 1007; Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1521-22.

Moreover, this Circuit had addressed the issue only in a non-

precedential opinion, Burr v. Hasbrouck Heights, 131 Fed.

Appx. 799 (3d Cir. 2005), one month prior to the officers’

actions, and had left unresolved whether a community

caretaking exception might justify a warrantless search of a

home. Until our decision in this case, the question of whether

the community caretaking doctrine could justify a warrantless

entry into a home was unanswered in our Circuit. Given the

conflicting precedents on this issue from other Circuits, we

cannot say it would have been apparent to an objectively

reasonable officer that entry into Ray’s home on June 17, 2005

was a violation of the law.

That conclusion is amply supported by the record. The

officers were aware of the contentious circumstances underlying

the Rays’ divorce and custody proceedings between Ray and his

wife. Ms. Ray was visibly concerned and had informed the

officers she was at the residence to pick up her daughter for

scheduled visitation and that her husband was in the home but

failing to respond. On previous occasions, Mr. Ray had always

come to the door and turned over his daughter when the police

arrived. It was objectively reasonable for the officers to be

concerned for the young child and to believe that entry was

appropriate under the state of the law at that time.

Ray accuses the District Court of indulging in a “skewed”

reading of the record (Appellant’s Op. Br. at 20); however, it is

his own reading of the record that appears to be out of balance.

Instead of looking at what the officers were told on the evening

in question, he essentially accuses them of taking his wife’s side

18

in their marital disputes and implies that they were biased

against him. Ray’s entire theory depends on an inference that

the officers conspired to acquire an invalid arrest warrant from

the judge in order to permit them to enter the house. That

inference is too far a stretch to survive summary judgment on

the record before us.14 While the police may not have acted

14

In support of his theory, Ray points out that Officer Cohen

searched a dresser drawer too small to contain a child, which

must have reflected a search “for evidence.” (Appellant’s Op.

Br. at 29.) First, the record does not suggest that the police were

searching for evidence. Even if the police were, as Ray

contends, “investigating” Ray’s failure to make his daughter

available for visitation, it would not make sense to open and

immediately shut a drawer. Regardless, while Officer Cohen

probably should not have opened the drawer at all – a casual and

thoughtless act caught by the surveillance camera – that fact

cannot be stretched into a material issue on this record.

Additionally, Ray argues that Officer Calabrese’s telling

the judge that the door was “open,” rather than “unlocked,”

illustrates the officers’ acknowledgment that their actions were

in violation of the law. That is likewise too far a stretch. The

record indicates that the door was “open” in the sense that it was

ajar since it could not close entirely. Furthermore, the police

department form filled out by Calabrese after the incident lists

several options that an officer can circle to indicate method of

entry. Calabrese circled “open/unlocked,” which suggests that

he understood the two words to be essentially interchangeable

in this context.

Ray also alleges that Officer Calabrese’s failure to follow

department protocol when he called Judge Sasso rather than his

19

ideally in the situation,15 what is quite clear from the record is

that they were trying to do a difficult job in a potentially

immediate supervisor or the prosecutor’s office indicates that

the officers’ actions were not reasonable under the

circumstances. It may be that some training or disciplinary steps

are warranted to encourage more careful adherence to the chain

of command, see infra note 15, but that does not mean that the

call to the judge reflected a lack of reasonableness in seeking

entry to check on the child.

15

Although the officers acted within the bounds of

reasonableness, we cannot say that all of their actions were

commendable. Their failure to follow department procedure

resulted in the issuance of an invalid warrant, which could have

resulted in Ray’s unnecessary arrest. That could have been a

particularly serious though unintended consequence and perhaps

explains why the officers altered the police report. Of course,

we do not condone the officers’ alteration of the initial police

report to remove the reference to the judge. Regardless, even if

the officers may have acted inappropriately after the search, that

does not mean that the search itself was objectively

unreasonable.

We realize that the police must have been frustrated in

their dealings with the Rays. The record shows that both Ray

and his wife repeatedly and unnecessarily involved the police in

their marital disputes. Law enforcement officers do not, of

course, have the luxury of not responding to calls for help, even

though they may at times be ill-used in domestic dramas like the

Rays’. In the future, though, we anticipate that police officers

will follow proper procedures in exercising their judgment.

20

dangerous situation. They were acting out of concern for the

well-being of the Rays’ young daughter, and, for that reason, we

cannot say that they acted unreasonably in mistakenly believing

that they were permitted to enter the house pursuant to the

unclear boundaries of the community caretaking exception at

that time.

Under the circumstances, the officers were not on notice

that their conduct was a clear violation of the law, and they

acted reasonably in their belief that they could enter Ray’s home

for the purpose of checking on his daughter. Accordingly, we

agree with the District Court that Appellees are entitled to

qualified immunity.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s

order granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment as to

qualified immunity.

21