Opinion

Cuadra v. Houston Independent School District

  • 626 F.3d 808
  • 31 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 805
  • 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23623
  • 2010 WL 4629002
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Nov 17, 2010
Status
Published
Author
Haynes
On the bench
Jones, Reavley, Haynes
Cited by
214 cases
Authority
More cited than 95.9%

holding that claims based on alleged pretrial deprivations of constitutional rights such a prosecution without probable cause should be brought under the Fourth Amendment

How later courts described this case

  • holding that claims based on alleged pretrial deprivations of constitutional rights such a prosecution without probable cause should be brought under the Fourth Amendment
  • finding no “fact issue” regarding whether appellees tainted the, decision of two grand juries to return indictments
  • recognizing that the nonmoving party has the burden of presenting specific facts which demonstrate that a genuine issue for trial
  • stating plaintiff's "Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim” based upon prosecution without probable cause was "foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Albright”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Case: 09-20715 Document: 00511296128 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/17/2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 17, 2010

No. 09-20715 Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

KENNETH CUADRA

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; CAROL WICHMANN;

MARMION DAMBRINO; BILLY ALDRICH; BETH BONNETTE; MELBA

MARTIN; ANNE PATTERSON

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

HAYNES, Circuit Judge:

Kenneth Cuadra (“Cuadra”) appeals a grant of summary judgment for the

Houston Independent School District (“HISD”) and several HISD personnel

(collectively “Appellees”) on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Cuadra filed suit

against the Appellees after he was indicted and subsequently arrested in

connection with a falsified student drop-out report sent to the State of Texas by

Sharpstown High School (“SHS”). Because we find that Cuadra failed to raise

a genuine issue of material fact as to any of his constitutional claims, we

AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Appellees.

Case: 09-20715 Document: 00511296128 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/17/2010

No. 09-20715

I. Facts and Procedural History

Cuadra served as a network specialist at SHS until August 2004. As part

of his job responsibilities, Cuadra played a role in the school’s required annual

reporting of student drop-out data to the State of Texas. SHS uses a computer

program known as SASI to maintain official records of student data, including

student drop-out information. Once data is entered into the SASI program, it

can be uploaded to HISD’s Public Education Information Management System

(“PEIMS”). Data in the PEIMS system is then transferred to the Texas

Education Agency (“TEA”) via a server known as TEA Edit Plus. Cuadra and

Melba Martin (“Martin”), an attendance clerk at SHS, had access to SASI to edit

data for “leavers,” students who were enrolled or attended the school at some

point during the previous school year, but did not re-enroll in the fall. Martin

was responsible for inputting or editing “leaver codes,” numbers referencing the

reason why a student left school. Some of these codes indicated that the student

qualified as a “drop-out,” while other codes gave other reasons for leaving, such

as a family move to another city. Only Cuadra could upload the student drop-

out data to the PEIMS program, and this data was periodically sent to the TEA.

Cuadra claims that, on October 22, 2002, Assistant Vice Principal

Marmion Dambrino (“Dambrino”) and Principal Carol Wichmann (“Wichmann”)

told him to randomly delete ten to fifteen names from the student drop-out list

in anticipation of a meeting with General Superintendent Kaye Stripling

(“Stripling”).1 Cuadra admitted that he removed some names from the list on

the night of October 22nd. Computer log-in information indicated that Cuadra’s

ID was the only one used to log on to the system between the evening of October

22nd and the afternoon of October 23rd. During this time frame, the SHS

1

Dambrino and Wichman dispute Cuadra’s account.

2

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No. 09-20715

student data report changed from listing thirty drop-outs to listing zero drop-

outs.2

Sometime after making the changes to the student drop-out data, Cuadra

claimed that he accessed the SASI program again and changed the information

back. Cuadra alleged that Martin later changed the drop-out data again to show

zero drop-outs. Cuadra alleged that the Appellees knew the drop-out numbers

were incorrect and tried to cover up their part in the false reporting by pinning

responsibility for it on him.

In February of 2003, a local news station reported that SHS had falsified

its student drop-out data. Soon after, Billy Aldrich (“Aldrich”), a member of the

HISD Department of Professional Standards, commenced an investigation into

the matter at the request of Anne Patterson (“Patterson”), Superintendent of

HISD’s West District. During the course of his investigation, Aldrich spoke to

HISD and SHS employees and interviewed Cuadra twice. In both interviews

with Aldrich, Cuadra did not disclose that anyone asked him to change the drop-

out data.

In May 2003, Assistant Principal Robert Kimball (“Kimball”) wrote a letter

to Lester Blizzard (“Blizzard”), a Harris County Assistant District Attorney, and

alleged that SHS administrators, including several of the named Appellees, were

responsible for the false drop-out numbers. Blizzard contacted Aldrich after

receiving Kimball’s letter and requested a copy of Aldrich’s completed report,

which Aldrich sent in June 2003. Aldrich’s report concluded that Cuadra

knowingly changed student leaver codes without authorization. Ultimately,

Blizzard decided not to prosecute Cuadra.

2

The last student data report, printed at 4:39 p.m. on October 23rd, served as the

foundation for Cuadra’s subsequent criminal indictment for knowingly making a false

alteration to a government record.

3

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No. 09-20715

After Cuadra initiated an internal grievance, complaining that he was the

false target of Aldrich’s investigation, HISD decided to hire outside counsel, the

law firm of Rusty Hardin and Associates, to conduct an independent

investigation into the events. The findings of two attorneys from the firm

(“Hardin report”) confirmed the allegation that Cuadra knowingly changed

leaver codes listed on the PEIMS student drop-out report sent to the TEA

without authorization on October 22nd or October 23rd. After reviewing the

Hardin report, HISD’s Deputy Superintendent Abe Saavedra (“Saavedra”)

denied Cuadra’s grievance and recommended that the report be sent to the

Harris County District Attorney’s office for an independent determination of

potential criminal liability of any individual involved. Cuadra was again re-

assigned, this time to the HISD Bus Barn. Cuadra lost another grievance

related to this re-assignment and eventually resigned in August 2004.

On October 7, 2005, Tess Buess (“Buess”), District Attorney Blizzard’s

replacement, sought and obtained a grand jury indictment against Cuadra for

knowingly making a false alteration to a government record.3 Cuadra was

arrested and released on bond following the indictment, which was eventually

quashed. However, another grand jury subsequently re-indicted Cuadra in May

2006.

A few days after a conversation with Cuadra’s defense attorney in October

2006, Buess dismissed the second indictment against Cuadra and issued a press

release on the same day. Cuadra contends that Buess dismissed the indictment

because of a document she received from Cuadra’s defense attorney that Cuadra

3

That indictment against Cuadra stated that on or about October 22, 2002, Cuadra

unlawfully and knowingly made a false alteration of a governmental record, namely a public

school record (Exhibit A) and Cuadra’s actions were done with intent to defraud and harm

another. Exhibit A was the PEIMS Data Review Drop-out Roster printed on October 23, 2002

at 4:39 p.m.

4

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No. 09-20715

deems the “smoking gun.”4 Cuadra argues that at least one of the Appellees

possessed this document and did not disclose it to Buess prior to his indictments.

Cuadra filed the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit in federal district court.

The Appellees moved for summary judgment on all of Cuadra’s claims, and

Cuadra then moved for partial summary judgment on his First and Fourteenth

Amendment claims, the only claims that are the subject of this appeal.

Ultimately, the district court dismissed Cuadra’s action with prejudice and

denied Cuadra’s post-judgment motion. This timely appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

The Fifth Circuit reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying

the same standard as the district court. Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 149 (5th

Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the discovery and

disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(c). This court “construes all facts and

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party when reviewing

grants of motions for summary judgment.” Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 284

(5th Cir. 2005). Where the burden of production at trial ultimately rests on the

nonmovant, “the movant must merely demonstrate an absence of evidentiary

support in the record for the nonmovant’s case.” Shields, 389 F.3d at 149. Then,

“the nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (citing F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(e)). “An issue is

‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for

4

This document is a portrait-printed roster of the names of thirty students alongside

six columns of data with two sets of handwriting on it. Dambrino’s handwriting is on the

bottom of the document. Cuadra alleged that Martin’s handwriting was the other set. He

asserts that this document proves his innocence because the handwritten information matches

the codes entered for each student that eventually resulted in a zero drop-out report to the

Texas Education Agency. The document has no date on it.

5

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No. 09-20715

the nonmoving party.” Hamilton v. Seque Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th

Cir. 2000). “A fact issue is ‘material’ if its resolution in favor of one party might

affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law.” Id. The Fifth Circuit

may “affirm a grant of summary judgment on any grounds supported by the

record and presented to the [district] court.” Hernandez v. Velasquez, 522 F.3d

556, 560 (5th Cir. 2008).

III. Discussion

Cuadra challenges the summary judgment entered on his Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment claims.5 We address each issue in turn.

A. Cuadra’s Fourth Amendment Claims

1. No Free-Standing Malicious Prosecution Claim

Cuadra alleges that the Appellees violated his Fourth Amendment rights

by intentionally withholding information and manipulating evidence to procure

his indictment. To the extent that Cuadra alleges that the Appellees violated his

constitutional rights by engaging in malicious prosecution, that argument is

foreclosed by our decision in Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 958 (5th Cir.

2003) (en banc). In Castellano, we noted that “[t]he initiation of criminal charges

without probable cause may set in force events that run afoul of explicit

constitutional protection--the Fourth Amendment if the accused is seized and

arrested, for example, or other constitutionally secured rights if a case is further

pursued.” Id. at 953. However, we held that a freestanding 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claim based solely on malicious prosecution was not viable. Id. at 942. Rather,

the claimant must allege “that officials violated specific constitutional rights in

5

Cuadra asserted a litany of other constitutional violations at various times throughout

these proceedings, including a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, First

Amendment retaliatory prosecution claims, and conspiracy claims. Because Cuadra failed to

brief any of these claims in his initial brief to this court, he has waived them. See Yohey v.

Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993) (“This Court will not consider a claim raised for the

first time in a reply brief.”) (internal citations omitted).

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No. 09-20715

connection with a ‘malicious prosecution.’” Id. at 945. Thus, Cuadra’s attempt

to assert a free-standing § 1983 malicious prosecution claim fails as a matter of

law.6

2. Independent Fourth Amendment Violations

Cuadra has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to any other

possible violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Cuadra explicitly waived a

false arrest claim in the district court. Although Cuadra alleges he was the

subject of an “unreasonable seizure,” he has not shown that his arrest occurred

“in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual’s privacy or

even physical interests.” Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir.

2001).

Even if we considered either a false arrest or unreasonable seizure claim,

Cuadra has failed to raise a fact issue as to lack of probable cause, a necessary

component of each claim. “Probable cause exists when the totality of the facts

and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest

are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed

or was committing an offense.” United States v. McCowan, 469 F.3d 386, 390

(5th Cir. 2006). We have held that “if facts supporting an arrest are placed

before an independent intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the

6

Even if we were to reach the common law elements of malicious prosecution to

determine whether the Appellees’ actions led to violations of Cuadra’s Fourth Amendment

rights, we find that Cuadra failed to create a fact issue on several of those elements. To

establish a Texas common law claim for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must show: (1) a

criminal action was commenced against him; (2) the prosecution was caused (initiated or

procured) by the defendant or with his aid; (3) the action terminated in the plaintiff’s favor;

(4) the plaintiff was innocent; (5) the defendant acted without probable cause; (6) the

defendant acted with malice; and (7) the criminal proceeding damaged the plaintiff. Taylor

v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1994), overruled in part by Castellano, 352 F.3d 939;

Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 952 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. 1997). Cuadra has not shown that

any of the Appellees initiated or procured his prosecution, as the evidence shows that the

Appellees did not influence Buess and merely cooperated with her during her independent

investigation. Cuadra also created no fact issue as to whether any of the Appellees actively

sought his indictment.

7

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No. 09-20715

intermediary’s decision breaks the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating

the initiating party.” Taylor, 36 F.3d at 456. However, the chain of causation

remains intact if “it can be shown that the deliberations of that intermediary

were in some way tainted by the actions of the defendant.” Hand v. Gary, 838

F.2d 1420, 1428 (5th Cir. 1988). “[T]he chain of causation is broken only where

all the facts are presented to the grand jury, or other independent intermediary

where the malicious motive of the law enforcement officials does not lead them

to withhold any relevant information from the independent intermediary.” Id.

Here, both Buess and two separate grand juries qualified as independent

intermediaries. Cuadra’s mere allegations of “taint,” without more, are

insufficient to overcome summary judgment. Taylor, 36 F.3d at 457

(emphasizing that the “taint” must be shown and finding no summary judgment

evidence to support assertions that an intermediary relied on an officer’s false

report). Cuadra admitted to changing the student drop-out data on October

22nd, which alone should suffice to establish probable cause for his indictments.

Despite the alleged significance of the “smoking gun,” Buess testified in her

deposition that she did not consider the document exculpatory, and it was in her

possession before she sought Cuadra’s re-indictment. Cuadra has also not raised

a fact issue as to whether any of the Appellees knowingly withheld the “smoking

gun” document or any other allegedly exculpatory information, thereby tainting

Buess’s independent decision to seek Cuadra’s indictments or either grand jury’s

decision to return the indictments.

As Cuadra has failed to raise a fact issue as to any potential Fourth

Amendment violation, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of the Appellees on this issue.

B. Cuadra’s Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Claim

Cuadra preserved for appeal only one Fourteenth Amendment substantive

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No. 09-20715

due process claim based on his prosecution.7 We find such a claim foreclosed by

the Supreme Court’s decision in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994). In

Albright, the Court held that there was no Fourteenth Amendment “liberty

interest” or substantive due process right to be free from criminal prosecution

unsupported by probable cause. Id. at 270-71; Castellano, 352 F.3d at 946S47.

Rather, “[w]here a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of

constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that

Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process’ must

be the guide for analyzing these claims.’” Albright, 510 U.S. at 273 (internal

citations omitted). Thus, the Albright Court held that the plaintiff’s claims

based on prosecution without probable cause were best analyzed under the

Fourth Amendment, as the “Framers [of the Constitution] considered the matter

of pretrial deprivations of liberty and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address

it.” Id. at 274.

Cuadra’s Fourteenth Amendment claims are based on alleged pretrial

deprivations of his constitutional rights and, under the holding in Albright, such

claims should be brought under the Fourth Amendment. Cuadra attempts to

support his Fourteenth Amendment due process claims by citing the Supreme

Court’s holding in Napue v. Illinois, where the Court stated that “a State may

not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted

conviction . . . .” 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). However, Cuadra was not convicted

7

Cuadra’s other Fourteenth Amendment claims were time-barred. The applicable

limitations period for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims is governed by reference to the most analogous

cause of action under state law. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 236 (1989). Under the general

Texas tort statute, Cuadra had two years after the day the cause of action accrued to bring his

claims. TEX . CIV . PRAC . & REM . CODE ANN . § 16.003 (Vernon 2005). Federal law determines

the date of accrual for § 1983 claims. Jackson v. Johnson, 950 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1992).

A general cause of action accrues when the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an

injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been injured. Id. As the events

Cuadra complained of in most of his Fourteenth Amendment claims occurred in 2004, and

Cuadra did not file suit until 2007, those claims were time-barred.

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No. 09-20715

of a crime based on false evidence. Rather, he complains of alleged deprivations

of his pretrial rights resulting from his indictments. Such a claim is not a viable

Fourteenth Amendment claim. Thus, we AFFIRM summary judgment for the

Appellees on Cuadra’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim.

IV. Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment for

the Appellees.

10

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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