Abbott v. United States

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2010 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ABBOTT v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 09–479. Argued October 4, 2010—Decided November 15, 2010*

Petitioners Abbott and Gould, defendants in unrelated prosecutions,

were charged with drug and firearm offenses, including violation of

18 U. S. C. §924(c), which prohibits using, carrying, or possessing a

deadly weapon in connection with “any crime of violence or drug traf

ficking crime,” §924(c)(1). The minimum prison term for a §924(c) of

fense is five years, §924(c)(1)(A)(i), in addition to “any other term of

imprisonment imposed on the [offender],” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Abbott

was convicted on the §924(c) count, on two predicate drug-trafficking

counts, and of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He received a

15-year mandatory minimum sentence for his felon-in-possession con

viction and an additional five years for his §924(c) violation. Gould’s

predicate drug-trafficking crime carried a ten-year mandatory mini

mum sentence; he received an additional five years for his §924(c)

violation. On appeal, Abbott and Gould challenged their §924(c) sen

tences, resting their objections on the “except” clause prefacing

§924(c)(1)(A). That clause provides for imposition of a minimum five

year term as a consecutive sentence “[e]xcept to the extent that a

greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by [§924(c) itself] or

by any other provision of law.” Abbott urged that the “except” clause

was triggered by his 15-year felon-in-possession sentence; Gould said

the same of the ten years commanded by his predicate trafficking

crime. The Third Circuit affirmed Abbott’s sentence, concluding that

the “except” clause “refers only to other minimum sentences that may

be imposed” for §924(c) violations. Gould fared no better before the

Fifth Circuit.

——————

* Together with No. 09–7073, Gould v. United States, on certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

2 ABBOTT v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

Held: A defendant is subject to the highest mandatory minimum speci

fied for his conduct in §924(c), unless another provision of law di

rected to conduct proscribed by §924(c) imposes an even greater

mandatory minimum. Pp. 5–18.

(a) Section 924(c) was enacted as part of the Gun Control Act of

1968, but the “except” clause was not added until 1998. Under the

pre-1998 text, it is undisputed, separate counts of conviction did not

preempt §924(c) sentences, and Abbott and Gould would have been

correctly sentenced under §924(c). The question here is whether

Congress’ 1998 reformulation of §924(c) rendered their sentences ex

cessive. The 1998 alteration responded primarily to Bailey v. United

States, 516 U. S. 137, which held that §924(c)(1)’s ban on “use” of a

firearm did not reach “mere possession” of a weapon, id., at 144. In

addition to bringing possession within the statute’s compass, Con

gress increased the severity of §924(c) sentences by changing “once

mandatory sentences into mandatory minimum sentences,” United

States v. O’Brien, 560 U. S. ___, ___, and by elevating the sentences

for brandishing and discharging a firearm and for repeat offenses.

Congress also restructured the provision, “divid[ing] what was once a

lengthy principal sentence into separate subparagraphs,” id., at ___,

and it added the “except” clause at issue. Pp. 5–8.

(b) The leading portion of the “except” clause now prefacing

§924(c)(1)(A) refers to a “greater minimum sentence . . . otherwise

provided by [§924(c) itself]”; the second segment of the clause refers

to a greater minimum provided outside §924(c) “by any other provi

sion of law.” To determine whether a greater minimum sentence is

“otherwise provided . . . by any other provision of law,” the key ques

tion is: otherwise provided for what? Most courts have answered: for

the conduct §924(c) proscribes, i.e., possessing a firearm in connection

with a predicate crime.

Abbott and Gould disagree. Gould would apply the “except” clause

whenever any count of conviction at sentencing requires a greater

minimum sentence. Abbott argues that the minimum sentence “oth

erwise provided” must be one imposed for the criminal transaction

that triggered §924(c) or, in the alternative, for a firearm offense in

volving the same firearm that triggered §924(c). These three inter

pretations share a common, but implausible, premise: that Congress

in 1998 adopted a less aggressive mode of applying §924(c), one that

significantly reduced the severity of the provision’s impact on defen

dants. The pre-1998 version of §924(c) prescribed a discrete sentence

to be imposed on top of the sentence received for the predicate crime

or any separate firearm conviction. It is unlikely that Congress

meant a prefatory clause, added in a bill dubbed “An Act [t]o throttle

criminal use of guns,” to effect a departure so great from §924(c)’s

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2010) 3

Syllabus

original insistence that sentencing judges impose additional punish

ment for §924(c) violations. Abbott’s and Gould’s readings would un

dercut that same bill’s primary objective: to expand §924(c)’s coverage

to reach firearm possession. Their readings would also result in sen

tencing anomalies Congress surely did not intend. Section 924(c), as

they construe it, would often impose no penalty at all for the conduct

that provision makes independently criminal. Stranger still, the

worst offenders would often secure shorter sentences than less grave

offenders, because the highest sentences on other counts of conviction

would be most likely to preempt §924(c) sentences. Abbott and Gould

respond that sentencing judges may take account of any anomalies

and order appropriate adjustments. While a judge exercising discre

tion under 18 U. S. C. §3553(a) would not be required to sentence a

more culpable defendant to a lesser term, this Court doubts that Con

gress had such a cure in mind in 1998, seven years before United

States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, held that district courts have discre

tion to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines based on §3553(a).

Abbott and Gould alternatively contend that Congress could have an

ticipated that the then-mandatory Guidelines would resolve dispari

ties by prescribing a firearm enhancement to the predicate sentence.

But Congress expressly rejected an analogous scheme in 1984, when

it amended §924(c) to impose a penalty even when the predicate

crime itself prescribed a firearm enhancement. Between 1984 and

1998, Congress expanded the reach or increased the severity of

§924(c) four times, never suggesting that a Guidelines firearm en

hancement might suffice to accomplish §924(c)’s objective. Nor is

there any indication that Congress was contemplating the Guide

lines’ relationship to §924(c) when it added the “except” clause.

Pp. 8–14.

(c) The Government’s reading—that the “except” clause is triggered

only when another provision commands a longer term for conduct vio

lating §924(c)—makes far more sense. It gives effect to statutory

language commanding that all §924(c) offenders shall receive addi

tional punishment for their violation of that provision, a command re

iterated three times: First, the statute states that the §924(c)(1) pun

ishment “shall” be imposed “in addition to” the penalty for the

predicate offense, §924(c)(1)(A); second, §924(c) demands a discrete

punishment even if the predicate crime itself “provides for an en

hanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous

weapon or device,” ibid.; third, §924(c)(1)(D)(ii) rules out the possibil

ity that a §924(c) sentence might “run concurrently with any other

term of imprisonment.” Interpreting the “except” clause to train on

conduct offending §924(c) also makes sense as a matter of syntax.

The clause is a proviso, most naturally read to refer to the conduct

4 ABBOTT v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

§924(c) proscribes. See United States v. Morrow, 266 U. S. 531, 534–

535. There is strong contextual support for the view that the “except”

clause was intended simply to clarify §924(c). At the same time Con

gress added the clause, it made the rest of §924(c) more complex, di

viding its existing sentencing prescriptions into four paragraphs, and

adding new penalties for brandishing and discharging a firearm.

Congress thought the restructuring might confuse sentencing judges:

It added the “except” clause’s initial part, which covers greater mini

mums provided “by this subsection,” to instruct judges not to stack

ten years for discharging a gun on top of seven for brandishing the

same weapon. In referencing greater minimums provided by “any

other provision of law,” the second portion of the clause simply fur

nishes the same no-stacking instruction for cases in which §924(c)

and a different statute both punish conduct offending §924(c). Con

gress likely anticipated such cases when framing the “except” clause,

for the bill that reformulated §924(c)’s text also amended 18 U. S. C.

§3559(c) to command a life sentence for certain repeat felons con

victed of “firearms possession (as described in §924(c)).” This inter

pretation does not render the “except” clause’s second part effectively

meaningless. Though §3559(c) is the only existing statute, outside of

§924(c) itself, that the Government places within the “except” clause,

the “any other provision of law” portion installs a safety valve for ad

ditional sentences that Congress may codify outside §924(c) in the fu

ture. Neither United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, nor Republic of

Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. ___, warrants a different conclusion. Pp. 14–

18.

No. 09–479, 574 F. 3d 203; No. 09–7073, 329 Fed. Appx. 569, affirmed.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other

Members joined, except KAGAN, J., who took no part in the considera

tion or decision of the cases.

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2010) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

Nos. 09–479 and 09–7073

_________________

KEVIN ABBOTT, PETITIONER

09–479 v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

CARLOS RASHAD GOULD, PETITIONER

09–7073 v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[November 15, 2010]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

As one of several measures to punish gun possession by

persons engaged in crime, Congress made it a discrete

offense to use, carry, or possess a deadly weapon in con

nection with “any crime of violence or drug trafficking

crime.” 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1). The minimum prison term

for the offense described in §924(c) is five years,

§924(c)(1)(A)(i), in addition to “any other term of impris

onment imposed on the [offender],” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii). The

two consolidated cases before us call for interpretation of

§924(c) as that provision was reformulated in 1998.

Kevin Abbott and Carlos Rashad Gould, petitioners

here, defendants below, were charged with multiple drug

2 ABBOTT v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

and firearm offenses; charges on which they were con

victed included violation of §924(c). Each objected to the

imposition of any additional prison time for his §924(c)

conviction. Their objections rested on the “except” clause

now prefacing §924(c)(1)(A). Under that clause, a mini

mum term of five years shall be imposed as a consecutive

sentence “[e]xcept to the extent that a greater minimum

sentence is otherwise provided by [§924(c) itself] or by any

other provision of law.”

Abbott and Gould read §924(c)’s “except” clause to se

cure them against prison time for their §924(c) convic

tions. They claim exemption from punishment under

§924(c) because they were sentenced to greater mandatory

minimum prison terms for convictions on other counts

charging different offenses. The “except” clause, they

urge, ensures that §924(c) offenders will serve at least five

years in prison. If conviction on a different count yields a

mandatory sentence exceeding five years, they maintain,

the statutory requirement is satisfied and the penalty

specified for the §924(c) violation becomes inoperative.

The courts below, agreeing with the Government’s

construction of the statute, read §924(c)(1) as independ

ently requiring a sentence of at least five years, tacked

onto any other sentence the defendant receives. The

“except” clause refers to “a greater minimum sentence . . .

otherwise provided.” “[O]therwise provided” for what, the

courts below asked; their answer, for conduct offending

§924(c), i.e., possessing a firearm in connection with a

crime of violence or drug-trafficking crime.

A defendant is not spared from a separate, consecutive

sentence for a §924(c) conviction, the lower courts deter

mined, whenever he faces a higher mandatory minimum

for a different count of conviction. Instead, according to

the courts below and the Government here, the “except”

clause applies only when another provision—whether

contained within or placed outside §924(c)—commands a

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2010) 3

Opinion of the Court

longer term for conduct violating §924(c). For example,

the mandatory minimum sentence for a §924(c) offense is

five years, but if the firearm is brandished, the minimum

rises to seven years, and if the firearm is discharged, to

ten years. §924(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii), (iii). A defendant who

possessed, brandished, and discharged a firearm in viola

tion of §924(c) would thus face a mandatory minimum

term of ten years.

We hold, in accord with the courts below, and in line

with the majority of the Courts of Appeals, that a defen

dant is subject to a mandatory, consecutive sentence for a

§924(c) conviction, and is not spared from that sentence by

virtue of receiving a higher mandatory minimum on a

different count of conviction. Under the “except” clause as

we comprehend it, a §924(c) offender is not subject to

stacked sentences for violating §924(c). If he possessed,

brandished, and discharged a gun, the mandatory penalty

would be 10 years, not 22. He is, however, subject to the

highest mandatory minimum specified for his conduct in

§924(c), unless another provision of law directed to con

duct proscribed by §924(c) imposes an even greater man

datory minimum.

I

Abbott and Gould, defendants in unrelated prosecutions,

were each charged with violating §924(c)(1)(A)(i) by pos

sessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking

crime. Abbott’s case was tried to a jury in the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania, which convicted him on the

§924(c) count and three others: two predicate trafficking

counts, 21 U. S. C. §§841, 846, and being a felon in posses

sion of a firearm, 18 U. S. C. §922(g). Given Abbott’s

extensive criminal history, his felon-in-possession convic

tion triggered a 15-year mandatory minimum under the

Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U. S. C. §924(e).

The District Court sentenced Abbott to the 15 years man

4 ABBOTT v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

dated by ACCA, and to an additional five years for the

§924(c) violation, yielding a total prison term of 20 years.1

Gould’s indictment listed seven separate drug and fire

arm charges. In return for Gould’s agreement to plead

guilty, the Government dropped all but two: one §924(c)

offense and one predicate drug-trafficking crime. The

latter, for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

cocaine base, carried a ten-year mandatory minimum

under §841(b)(1)(A). Firearm involvement was not an

element of that offense. The United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas imposed a sentence of

11 years and 5 months for the trafficking offense and an

additional five years for the §924(c) violation, for a total of

16 years and 5 months.

On appeal, Abbott and Gould challenged the five-year

consecutive sentence each received under §924(c). Abbott

urged that ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum triggered

§924(c)’s “except” clause, because ACCA qualified as

“[an]other provision of law” that “provided” a “greater

minimum sentence.” Gould said the same of the ten years

commanded by his predicate trafficking crime.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir

cuit affirmed Abbott’s sentence, concluding that the “ex

cept” clause “refers only to other minimum sentences that

may be imposed for violations of §924(c).” United States v.

Abbott, 574 F. 3d 203, 208 (2009). Gould fared no better

before the Fifth Circuit. United States v. Gould, 329 Fed.

Appx. 569, 570 (2009) (per curiam). That court’s precedent

already confined the exception to conduct offending

§924(c). United States v. London, 568 F. 3d 553, 564

(2009). To resolve the division among the Circuits on the

——————

1 Abbott received ten years on each drug-trafficking count. Those

sentences, imposed concurrently, did not alter his total term of impris

onment and do not figure in this case.

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2010) 5

Opinion of the Court

proper construction of §924(c)’s “except” clause,2 we

granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them for

argument. 559 U. S. ___ (2010).

II

A

Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. §924(c) as part of the Gun

Control Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1213. The “except” clause,

which did not appear in §924(c) as originally composed,

was introduced by statutory amendment in 1998. See An

Act [t]o throttle criminal use of guns, 112 Stat. 3469. We

begin by setting out §924(c), first as it read before 1998,

then as amended that year.

The earlier version read in relevant part:

“Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of vio

lence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of

violence or drug trafficking crime which provides for

an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a

deadly or dangerous weapon or device) . . . , uses or

carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment

provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking

crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years,

——————

2 Compare United States v. Williams, 558 F. 3d 166, 171 (CA2 2009)

(clause covers “minimum sentences for . . . offenses arising from the

same criminal transaction or operative set of facts”); and United States

v. Almany, 598 F. 3d 238, 241 (CA6 2010) (clause applies whenever a

defendant “is subject” to a greater mandatory minimum), with United

States v. Parker, 549 F. 3d 5, 11–12 (CA1 2008) (clause does not cover

sentences for predicate drug offenses but might cover sentences for

ACCA firearm offenses); United States v. Villa, 589 F. 3d 1334, 1343

(CA10 2009) (clause covers only sentences for conduct offending

§924(c)); United States v. Segarra, 582 F. 3d 1269, 1272–1273 (CA11

2009) (same); 574 F. 3d, at 208 (case below) (same); United States v.

Easter, 553 F. 3d 519, 526 (CA7 2009) (per curiam) (same); United

States v. Studifin, 240 F. 3d 415, 423 (CA4 2001) (same); United States

v. Alaniz, 235 F. 3d 386 (CA8 2000) (same); and 329 Fed. Appx., at 570

(case below) (same).

6 ABBOTT v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

and if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle, short

barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon,

to imprisonment for ten years, and if the firearm is a

machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped

with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to impris

onment for thirty years. In the case of his second or

subsequent conviction under this subsection, such

person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for twenty

years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a de

structive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer

or firearm muffler, to life imprisonment without re

lease. Notwithstanding any other provision of law,

. . . the term of imprisonment imposed under this sub

section [shall not] run concurrently with any other

term of imprisonment including that imposed for

the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime in

which the firearm was used or carried.” §924(c)(1)

(1994 ed.).

If this pre-1998 text governed, all agree, separate counts of

conviction would have no preemptive force, and Abbott

and Gould would have been correctly sentenced under

§924(c). The question we confront is whether Congress’

1998 reformulation of §924(c) rendered the sentences

imposed on Abbott and Gould excessive.

The 1998 alteration responded primarily to our decision

in Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137 (1995). In pro

scribing “use” of a firearm, Bailey held, §924(c)(1) did not

reach “mere possession” of the weapon. Id., at 144. Con

gress legislated a different result; in the 1998 revision,

“colloquially known as the Bailey Fix Act,” the Legislature

brought possession within the statute’s compass. United

States v. O’Brien, 560 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 14)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

In addition to the change prompted by Bailey, Congress

increased the severity of §924(c) sentences in two other

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2010) 7

Opinion of the Court

respects: The 1998 revision “changed what were once

mandatory sentences into mandatory minimum sen

tences,” O’Brien, 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13); and it

elevated the sentences for brandishing and discharging a

firearm and for repeat offenses. Congress also restruc

tured the provision, “divid[ing] what was once a lengthy

principal sentence into separate subparagraphs.” Id., at

___ (slip op., at 7). And it added the prefatory “except”

clause at issue in the cases now before us. As amended,

§924(c)(1)(A) prescribes:

“Except to the extent that a greater minimum sen

tence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by

any other provision of law, any person who, during

and in relation to any crime of violence or drug traf

ficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug

trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced pun

ishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dan

gerous weapon or device) for which the person may be

prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or

carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such

crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the

punishment provided for such crime of violence or

drug trafficking crime—

“(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not

less than 5 years;

“(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a

term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and

“(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to

a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.”

The 1998 reformulation, furthermore, removed to sepa

rate paragraphs the provisions commanding higher penal

ties for especially destructive weapons and “second or

subsequent” offenses. See §924(c)(1)(B), (C).3 While leav

——————

3 These provisions read:

8 ABBOTT v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

ing the penalties for highly destructive weapons un

changed, the revision raised the base punishment for

“second or subsequent” offenses from 20 years to 25. Ibid.

The reformulation also transferred the bar on concurrent

sentences to §924(c)(1)(D)(ii):

“[N]o term of imprisonment imposed on a person

under this subsection shall run concurrently with any

other term of imprisonment imposed on the person,

including any term of imprisonment imposed for the

crime of violence or drug trafficking crime during

which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.”

B

The leading portion of the “except” clause, which now

prefaces §924(c)(1)(A), refers to a “greater minimum sen

tence . . . otherwise provided by this subsection,” i.e., by

§924(c) itself; the second segment of the clause refers to a

greater minimum provided outside §924(c) “by any other

provision of law.” Beyond debate, the latter instruction

does not relieve a §924(c) offender of additional punish

ment “simply because a higher mandatory minimum

sentence exists in the United States Code.” Brief for

——————

“(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation of

this subsection—

“(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic

assault weapon, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprison

ment of not less than 10 years; or

“(ii) is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is equipped with a

firearm silencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be sentenced to a

term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years.

“(C) In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this

subsection, the person shall—

“(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years;

and

“(ii) if the firearm involved is a machinegun or a destructive device,

or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, be sentenced

to imprisonment for life.”

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2010) 9

Opinion of the Court

Petitioner in No. 09–479, p. 19 (hereinafter Abbott Brief).

Were it otherwise, the statute’s ascending series of mini

mums, set out in §924(c)(1)(A)–(C), would have no work to

do; the only possible §924(c) sentence would be the Code’s

highest—life. The “except” clause, it is therefore undis

puted, “has to have some understood referent to be intelli

gible.” United States v. Parker, 549 F. 3d 5, 11 (CA1

2008). What should that referent be? As we comprehend

the clause, to determine whether a greater minimum

sentence is “otherwise provided . . . by any other provision

of law,” the key question one must ask is: otherwise pro

vided for what? As earlier noted, see supra, at 3, most

courts, in line with the courts below and the Government,

have answered: for the conduct §924(c) proscribes, i.e.,

possessing a firearm in connection with a predicate crime.

Abbott and Gould disagree and offer diverse readings.

Gould principally would apply the “except” clause to pre

clude a §924(c) sentence whenever “any of a defendant’s

counts of convictio[n] at sentencing” require a greater

minimum sentence. Brief for Petitioner in No. 09–7073,

p. 14 (hereinafter Gould Brief).

In lieu of Gould’s position that any greater minimum

sentence on a different count of conviction will do, Abbott

advances a somewhat narrower “transactional approach.”

Any sentence imposed on the defendant fits the bill, he

urges, so long as the sentence was imposed “because of the

criminal transaction that triggered §924(c) in the first

place.” Abbott Brief 10. Accord United States v. Williams,

558 F. 3d 166, 171 (CA2 2009).

Abbott also tenders an alternative construction: The

minimum sentence “otherwise provided” must be for a

firearm offense—for example, Abbott’s felon-in-possession

charge—involving the same firearm that triggered

§924(c).4 Conceding that this reading is “not commanded

——————

4 Because Gould’s only firearm-related offense is his §924(c) offense,

10 ABBOTT v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

by the [statute’s] plain language,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 24,

Abbott asserts that it advances §924(c)’s goal—to discour

age bearing arms in furtherance of crime—while avoiding

the imposition of “two consecutive mandatory minimum

sentences for the single use of a single firearm,” Abbott

Brief 47 (emphasis omitted).

The three interpretations just described share a com

mon premise. In adding the “except” clause in 1998, all

three posit, Congress adopted a less aggressive mode of

applying §924(c), one that significantly reduced the sever

ity of the provision’s impact on defendants. Like the

courts below, we regard this premise as implausible. As

earlier observed, see supra, at 5–6, the pre-1998 version of

§924(c) prescribed a discrete sentence—punishment to be

imposed regardless of the sentence received for the predi

cate crime or any separate firearm conviction. Abbott and

Gould think the “except” clause installed, instead, a mod

est scheme designed simply to ensure that all §924(c)

offenders “serve at least 5 years in prison.” Gould Brief 5;

see Abbott Brief 10. We doubt that Congress meant a

prefatory clause, added in a bill dubbed “An Act [t]o throt

tle criminal use of guns,” to effect a departure so great

from §924(c)’s longstanding thrust, i.e., its insistence that

sentencing judges impose additional punishment for

§924(c) violations.

Were we to accept any of the readings proposed by

Abbott or Gould, it bears emphasis, we would undercut

that same bill’s primary objective: to expand §924(c)’s

coverage to reach firearm possession. In 1999, more than

half of those who violated §924(c) in connection with a

drug-trafficking offense received a mandatory minimum of

ten years or more for that trafficking offense. Letter from

Glenn R. Schmitt, United States Sentencing Commission,

to Supreme Court Library (Nov. 10, 2010) (available in

——————

Gould’s sentence would stand under Abbott’s alternative construction.

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2010) 11

Opinion of the Court

Clerk of Court’s case file). Congress, however, imposed

only a five-year minimum for firearm possession “in fur

therance of” a drug offense. As construed by Abbott and

Gould, the amendment to include firearm possession as a

§924(c) offense would spare the most serious drug offend

ers from any discrete punishment for the very firearm

activity the amendment targeted. “We are disinclined to

say that what Congress imposed with one hand . . . it

withdrew with the other . . . .” Logan v. United States, 552

U. S. 23, 35 (2007).

Abbott’s and Gould’s proposed readings, moreover,

would result in sentencing anomalies Congress surely did

not intend. We note first that §924(c), as they construe it,

would often impose no penalty at all for the conduct that

provision makes independently criminal. Tr. of Oral Arg.

52. For example, an individual who sold enough drugs to

receive a ten-year minimum sentence under §841(b)(1)(A)

could, so far as §924(c) is concerned, possess or even bran

dish a gun without incurring any additional punishment.

Stranger still, under the Abbott and Gould readings, the

worst offenders would often secure the shortest sentences.

Consider two defendants convicted of trafficking in co

caine. The first possesses 500 grams and is subject to a

mandatory minimum of five years, §841(b)(1)(B); the

second possesses five kilograms and is subject to a manda

tory minimum of ten years, §841(b)(1)(A). Both brandish

firearms, calling for a sentence of seven years under

§924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The first defendant, under all readings,

will spend at least 12 years in prison. The second defen

dant’s ten-year drug minimum, according to Abbott and

Gould, triggers the “except” clause and wipes out that

defendant’s §924(c) penalty; though the more culpable of

the two, the second defendant’s minimum term would be

just ten years. Brief for United States 40. Like the Third

Circuit below, “[w]e are confident that Congress did not

intend such a bizarre result.” 574 F. 3d, at 209.

12 ABBOTT v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Abbott’s alternative construction, which homes in on

other firearm offenses, gives rise to similar oddities. On

this reading, Abbott’s 15-year ACCA sentence for being a

felon-in-possession would preempt his five-year §924(c)

sentence, and his minimum term would be 15 years,

rather than 20.5 But if ACCA were not at issue, Abbott’s

minimum term would be the same 15 years: his five-

year §924(c) sentence on top of his ten-year drug sen

tence. Qualification as a career criminal would carry no

consequence.

Nor does Abbott’s second construction necessarily pro

mote more equitable outcomes. Suppose, for example, that

a career criminal sold drugs together with a first-time

offender, and both brandished firearms in the process.

The first-time offender, lacking a felon-in-possession

conviction, would serve a seven-year §924(c) sentence on

top of a ten-year drug sentence, for a total of 17 years. But

the career criminal’s ACCA sentence would preempt the

§924(c) sentence; he would serve only 15 years.

Abbott and Gould respond that sentencing judges may

take account of such anomalies and order appropriate

adjustments. We observe first that no correction or avoid

ance appears possible for the anomaly that, while §924(c)

“defines a standalone crime,” a §924(c) sentence would be

wiped out by a wholly separate and independent convic

tion. United States v. Easter, 553 F. 3d 519, 526 (CA7

2009) (per curiam) (“A determination of guilt that yields

no sentence is not a judgment of conviction at all.”). We

do, however, agree that a judge exercising discretion un

der 18 U. S. C. §3553(a) “would [not] be required to sen

tence” a more culpable defendant to a lesser term; the

judge could increase that defendant’s sentence for a predi

cate crime to make up for §924(c)’s failure to effect any

enlargement of the time served. United States v. Whitley,

——————

5 ACCA sentences may run concurrently with drug sentences.

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2010) 13

Opinion of the Court

529 F. 3d 150, 155 (CA2 2008). But we doubt Congress

had such a cure in mind in 1998, seven years before we

held, in United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220 (2005), that

district courts have discretion to depart from the Sentenc

ing Guidelines on the basis of §3553(a).

Abbott and Gould alternatively contend that Congress

could have anticipated that the then-mandatory Guide

lines would resolve disparities. See Abbott Brief 32–35;

Gould Brief 30–32. On this view, the “except” clause

ensures that a §924(c) offender incurs a minimum sen

tence of considerable length; the Guidelines would then

control, elevating that sentence based on firearm posses

sion or use. See United States Sentencing Commission,

Guidelines Manual §§2D1.1(b)(1), 2K2.1(b)(5) (Nov. 1998)

(increasing offense level for defendants who use or possess

firearms in course of violent crime or drug trafficking);

§§2D1.1(b)(1), 2K2.1(b)(6) (Nov. 2009) (same).

We do not gainsay that Abbott and Gould project a

rational, less harsh, mode of sentencing. But we do not

think it was the mode Congress ordered. Congress ex

pressly rejected an analogous scheme in 1984, when it

amended §924(c) in the same law that created the Sen

tencing Commission and the Guidelines. Pub. L. 98–473,

98 Stat. 1987, 2138. Four years earlier, in Busic v. United

States, 446 U. S. 398, 404 (1980), we had read §924(c) to

impose no penalty when the predicate crime itself pre

scribed a firearm enhancement; similarly, Abbott and

Gould now read §924(c) to impose no penalty when the

Guidelines prescribe a firearm enhancement to the predi

cate sentence. The 1984 legislation “repudiated” Busic,

clarifying that §924(c) applied even when the predicate

crime already “provides for an enhanced punishment if

committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or

device.” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 10 (1997)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Between 1984 and 1998, Congress expanded the reach

14 ABBOTT v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

or increased the severity of §924(c) on four occasions,

never suggesting that a Guidelines firearm enhancement

might suffice to accomplish §924(c)’s objective.6 Nor is

there the slightest indication that Congress was contem

plating the Guidelines’ relationship to §924(c) when it

added the “except” clause in the 1998 amendments.7

The “except” clause, we note, would have been a most

haphazard way to achieve a Guidelines-driven rollback of

§924(c). If Congress wanted to ensure that §924(c) offend

ers “receive at least five years in prison,” and to rely on

the Guidelines for the rest, Abbott Brief 10, there was an

obvious solution: Congress could have excised all prescrip

tions ordering that §924(c) sentences shall run consecu

tively to other sentences. Without such a requirement, all

defendants would benefit from a minimum-plus-

Guidelines regime—not just the most culpable offenders.

Congress did not adopt that obvious solution, we think,

because it did not want the Guidelines to supplant §924(c).

C

The Government’s reading of the “except” clause, we are

convinced, makes far more sense than the interpretations

urged by Abbott and Gould. In imposing a sentence for a

——————

6 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, 1986, Pub. L. 99–308, §104(a), 100

Stat. 456–457 (increasing sentences for certain firearms and adding

drug trafficking as a predicate felony); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,

Pub. L. 100–690, §6460, 102 Stat. 4373–4374 (increasing sentences);

Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101–647, §1101, 104 Stat. 4829

(same); Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act,

1994, Pub. L. 103–322, §110102(c), 108 Stat. 1998 (same).

7 For those who take legislative history into account, it is as silent as

is the statute’s text. The sole reference to the “except” clause appears

in the statement of one witness at a Senate hearing. See Hearing on S.

191 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st

Sess., 38 (1997) (statement of Thomas G. Hungar) (“[B]y adding an

introductory clause authorizing imposition of stiffer minimum sen

tences if required under other provisions of law, S. 191 eliminates any

potential inconsistency with other statutes.”).

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2010) 15

Opinion of the Court

§924(c) violation “[e]xcept to the extent that a greater

minimum sentence is otherwise provided . . . by any other

provision of law,” Congress meant:

“[I]f another provision of the United States Code

mandates a punishment for using, carrying, or pos

sessing a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking

crime or crime of violence, and that minimum sen

tence is longer than the punishment applicable under

§924(c), then the longer sentence applies.” Brief for

United States 17.

This reading gives effect to the statutory language

commanding that all §924(c) offenders shall receive addi

tional punishment for their violation of that provision, a

command reiterated three times. First, the statute states

that the punishment specified in §924(c)(1) “shall” be

imposed “in addition to” the penalty for the predicate

offense. §924(c)(1)(A). Second, after Busic, §924(c) de

mands a discrete punishment even if the predicate crime

itself “provides for an enhanced punishment if committed

by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device.”

Ibid. Third, §924(c)(1)(D)(ii) rules out the possibility that

a §924(c) sentence might “run concurrently with any other

term of imprisonment.” We doubt that Congress, having

retained this thrice-repeated instruction, would simulta

neously provide an exception severely limiting application

of the instruction. Cf. Greenlaw v. United States,

554 U. S. 237, 251 (2008) (“We resist attributing to Con

gress an intention to render a statute so internally

inconsistent.”).

Interpreting the “except” clause to train on conduct

offending §924(c) also makes sense as a matter of syntax.

The “except” clause is not a standalone enactment, or even

a standalone sentence. Rather, it precedes and qualifies

§924(c)(1)(A)’s principal clause, which punishes the pos

session of a firearm in connection with specified predicate

16 ABBOTT v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

crimes. The “grammatical and logical scope” of a proviso,

we have held, “is confined to the subject-matter of the

principal clause” to which it is attached. United States v.

Morrow, 266 U. S. 531, 534–535 (1925). As a proviso

attached to §924(c), the “except” clause is most naturally

read to refer to the conduct §924(c) proscribes. Accord

United States v. Villa, 589 F. 3d 1334, 1343 (CA10 2009).

There is strong contextual support for our view that

Congress intended the “except” clause to serve simply as a

clarification of §924(c), not as a major restraint on the

statute’s operation. At the same time Congress added the

“except” clause, it made the rest of §924(c) more complex.

The 1998 revision divided the statute’s existing sentencing

prescriptions into four paragraphs in lieu of one, and

added new penalties for brandishing and discharging a

firearm. §924(c)(1)(A)–(D). We know that Congress

thought the restructuring might confuse sentencing

judges: Warding off confusion, all agree, was the Legisla

ture’s sole objective in adding the initial part of the “ex

cept” clause, which covers greater minimums provided “by

this subsection.” That portion of the clause instructs

judges to pick the single highest sentence stipulated for a

§924(c) violation within §924(c) itself, and not to stack ten

years for discharging a gun on top of seven for brandishing

the same weapon, whenever a defendant does both.

In referencing greater minimums provided by “any other

provision of law,” we think, the second portion of the

“except” clause simply furnishes the same no-stacking

instruction for cases in which §924(c) and a different

statute both punish conduct offending §924(c). Congress

likely anticipated such cases when the “except” clause was

framed in 1998, for the bill that reformulated the text of

§924(c) did just one thing more: It amended 18 U. S. C.

§3559(c) to command a life sentence when certain repeat

felons are convicted of “firearms possession (as described

in §924(c)).” Pub. L. 105–386, §1(b), 112 Stat. 3470.

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2010) 17

Opinion of the Court

Our interpretation, Abbott and Gould protest, renders

the second part of the “except” clause effectively meaning

less. Section 3559(c) is the only existing statute, outside of

§924(c) itself, the Government places within the “except”

clause. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32–35, 42–44.8 But §3559(c)

already imposes a life sentence. A defendant would find

little comfort in knowing that no §924(c) sentence, say five

years or seven, will be tacked on to his §3559(c) life term.

As Courts of Appeals have observed, however, the “any

other provision of law” portion of the “except” clause in

stalls a “safety valve.” United States v. Studifin, 240 F. 3d

415, 423 (CA4 2001). It “allow[s] for additional §924(c)

sentences,” akin to the sentence prescribed in §3559(c),

that Congress may codify outside §924(c) “in the future.”

See Abbott, 574 F. 3d, at 208. We do not regard this al

lowance as “implausible.” See Abbott Brief 22; Gould Brief

21. As the Government points out, “there is nothing un

usual about Congress prescribing mandatory minimum

penalties for substantive offenses codified in other provi

sions.” Brief for United States 22. See, e.g., §3559(c)

(prescribing penalties for violations of, inter alia, 49

U. S. C. §46502 and 18 U. S. C. §§1111, 2111, 2113, and

2118); §3559(d) (prescribing penalties for violations of,

inter alia, 18 U. S. C. §§2422, 2423, and 2251); 18 U. S. C.

§924(e) (prescribing penalty for violation of §922(g)). See

also 18 U. S. C. §924(j)(1) (prescribing a nonmandatory

penalty of death for individuals who commit murder with

a firearm in the course of a §924(c) offense).

Our decisions in Gonzales and Republic of Iraq v. Beaty,

556 U. S. ___ (2009), do not warrant a different conclusion.

We observed in Gonzales that “the word ‘any’ [ordinarily]

——————

8 We agree with the Government that a qualifying statute need not

“explicit[ly] reference” §924(c), Tr. of Oral Arg. 27; a statute will fit the

bill if it provides a greater mandatory minimum for an offense that

embodies all the elements of a §924(c) offense.

18 ABBOTT v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

has an expansive meaning.” 520 U. S., at 5 (holding that

“any other term of imprisonment” includes terms imposed

by state courts). See also Beaty, 556 U. S., at ___ (slip op.,

at 7) (the word “any” in “any other provision of law” was

“no warrant to limit the class of provisions of law”). But

our decision on the petitions of Abbott and Gould does not

turn on artificial confinement of the phrase “any other

provision of law.” We rely, instead, on the different direc

tion Congress prescribed for the “except” clause: It applies

only when “a greater minimum sentence is otherwise

provided.” “In the contest between reading” that phrase

“to refer to penalties for the [§924(c)] offense in question or

to penalties for any [other] offense [a defendant commits],

we believe the former is the most natural.” Easter, 553

F. 3d, at 526.9

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgments of the Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit and the Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit are

Affirmed.

JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration or

decision of these cases.

——————

9 Abbott and Gould invoke the rule of lenity as a final reason to con

strue the “except” clause to bar their punishments under §924(c); if

their proposed limitations are textually possible, they maintain, we

may not choose the Government’s. “[T]he touchstone of the rule of

lenity is statutory ambiguity.” Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381,

387 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]fter consulting

traditional canons of statutory construction,” United States v. Shabani,

513 U. S. 10, 17 (1994), we are persuaded that none remains here: The

“except” clause covers only conduct offending §924(c). Although the

clause might have been more meticulously drafted, the “grammatical

possibility” of a defendant’s interpretation does not command a resort

to the rule of lenity if the interpretation proffered by the defendant

reflects “an implausible reading of the congressional purpose.” Caron v.

United States, 524 U. S. 308, 316 (1998).