Wilson v. Corcoran

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2010) 1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

BILL K. WILSON, SUPERINTENDANT, INDIANA

STATE PRISON v. JOSEPH E. CORCORAN

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 10–91. Decided November 8, 2010

PER CURIAM.

Federal courts may not issue writs of habeas corpus to

state prisoners whose confinement does not violate federal

law. Because the Court of Appeals granted the writ to

respondent without finding such a violation, we vacate its

judgment and remand.

* * *

In 1997, respondent Joseph Corcoran shot and killed

four men, including his brother and his sister’s fiance. An

Indiana jury found him guilty of four counts of murder,

found the statutory aggravating circumstance of multiple

murders, and unanimously recommended capital punish

ment. The trial judge agreed and sentenced respondent to

death.

But on appeal, the Supreme Court of Indiana vacated

the sentence out of concern that the trial judge might have

violated Indiana law by relying partly on nonstatutory

aggravating factors when imposing the death penalty.

Corcoran v. State, 739 N. E. 2d 649, 657–658 (2000).

When addressing respondent at sentencing, the trial court

had remarked:

“ ‘[T]he knowing and intentional murders of four inno

cent people is an extremely heinous and aggravated

crime. . . . I don’t think in the history of this county

we’ve had a mass murderer such as yourself. It

makes you, Mr. Corcoran, a very dangerous, evil mass

murderer. And I am convinced in my heart of hearts,

2 WILSON v. CORCORAN

Per Curiam

. . . if given the opportunity, you will murder again.’ ”

Id., at 657 (quoting transcript).

According to the Indiana Supreme Court, the trial judge’s

reference to the innocence of respondent’s victims, the

heinousness of his offense, and his future dangerousness

was not necessarily improper; it is permissible to provide

“an appropriate context for consideration of the alleged

aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Ibid. (inter

nal quotation marks omitted). But because the trial court

might have meant that it weighed these factors as aggra

vating circumstances, the Indiana Supreme Court re

manded for resentencing. See ibid.

On remand, the trial court issued a revised sentencing

order. It wrote:

“ ‘ The trial Court, in balancing the proved aggravators

and mitigators, emphasizes to the Supreme Court

that it only relied upon those proven statutory aggra

vators. The trial Court’s remarks at the sentencing

hearing, and the language in the original sentencing

order explain why such high weight was given to the

statutory aggravator of multiple murder, and further

support the trial Court’s personal conclusion that the

sentence is appropriate punishment for this offender

and these crimes.’ ” Corcoran v. State, 774 N. E. 2d

495, 498 (Ind. 2002) (quoting order).

On appeal, over respondent’s objection, the Supreme Court

accepted this explanation and affirmed the sentence. Id.,

at 498–499, 502. It explained that it was “now satisfied

that the trial court has relied on only aggravators listed in

Indiana Code §35–50–2–9(b). . . . There is no lack of clar

ity in [the trial court’s] statement and no plausible reason

to believe it untrue.” Id., at 499.

Respondent later applied to the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Indiana for a writ of

habeas corpus. His habeas petition asserted a number of

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2010) 3

Per Curiam

grounds for relief, including a renewed claim that, not

withstanding its assurances to the contrary, the trial court

improperly relied on nonstatutory aggravating factors

when it resentenced him. Respondent also asserted that

this reliance violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend

ments. Record, Doc. 13, p. 11. In its response to the peti

tion, the State specifically disputed that contention. Id.,

Doc. 33, p. 16 (“[Respondent] fails to establish any consti

tutional deficiency in [the] Indiana Supreme Court’s re

view of the trial court’s treatment of Corcoran’s sentence

on remand, let alone does it show that the state supreme

court’s judgment is in any way inconsistent with applica

ble United States Supreme Court precedent”).

The District Court, however, had no need to resolve this

dispute because it granted habeas relief on a wholly dif

ferent ground: that an offer by the prosecutor to take the

death penalty off the table in exchange for a waiver of a

jury trial had violated the Sixth Amendment. Corcoran v.

Buss, 483 F. Supp. 2d 709, 725–726 (2007). It did not

address the sentencing challenge because that was “ren

dered moot” by the grant of habeas relief. Id., at 734.

The State appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed

the District Court’s Sixth Amendment ruling. Corcoran v.

Buss, 551 F. 3d 703, 712, 714 (2008). Then, evidently

overlooking respondent’s remaining sentencing claims, the

Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the District Court

“with instructions to deny the writ.” Id., at 714. To cor

rect this oversight, we granted certiorari and vacated the

Seventh Circuit’s judgment. Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 558

U. S. 1 (2009) (per curiam). We explained that the Court

of Appeals “should have permitted the District Court to

consider Corcoran’s unresolved challenges to his death

sentence on remand, or should have itself explained why

such consideration was unnecessary.” Id., at ___ (slip op.,

at 2).

4 WILSON v. CORCORAN

Per Curiam

On remand—and without any opportunity for briefing

by the parties—the Court of Appeals changed course and

granted habeas relief. Corcoran v. Levenhagen, 593 F. 3d

547, 555 (2010). After determining that respondent’s

sentencing challenge had been waived by his failure to

include it in his original cross-appeal, the Seventh Circuit

concluded that the claim satisfied plain-error review. Id.,

at 551. The panel explained that, “unlike the Indiana

Supreme Court,” it was unsatisfied with the trial court’s

representation that it relied only on aggravating factors

authorized by Indiana law. Ibid. Because the trial court’s

revised sentencing order said that it used the nonstatutory

factors of heinousness, victims’ innocence, and future

dangerousness to determine the weight given to the ag

gravator of multiple murders, the Seventh Circuit con

cluded that the Indiana Supreme Court had made an

“ ‘unreasonable determination of the facts’ ” when it ac

cepted the trial court’s representation that it did not rely

on those factors as aggravating circumstances. Ibid.

(quoting 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(2)). The panel therefore

required the Indiana trial court to reconsider its sentenc

ing determination in order to “prevent non-compliance

with Indiana law.” 593 F. 3d, at 552–553.

But it is only noncompliance with federal law that ren

ders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral

attack in the federal courts. The habeas statute unambi

guously provides that a federal court may issue the writ to

a state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(a). And we have re

peatedly held that “ ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not

lie for errors of state law.’ ” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S.

62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U. S. 764, 780

(1990)). “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court

to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions.” 502 U. S., at 67–68. But here, the panel’s

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2010) 5

Per Curiam

opinion contained no hint that it thought the violation of

Indiana law it had unearthed also entailed the infringe

ment of any federal right. Not only did the court frame

respondent’s claim as whether “the Indiana trial court

considered non-statutory aggravating circumstances . . . in

contravention of state law,” 593 F. 3d, at 551 (emphasis

added), it also explicitly acknowledged that “[n]othing in

[its] opinion prevents Indiana from adopting a rule per

mitting the use of non-statutory aggravators in the death

sentence selection process. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S.

862, 878 (1983) (permitting their use under federal law),”

id., at 551–552 (citations omitted).

Nor did it suffice for the Court of Appeals to find an

unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U. S. C.

§2254(d)(2). That provision allows habeas petitioners to

avoid the bar to habeas relief imposed with respect to

federal claims adjudicated on the merits in state court by

showing that the state court’s decision was “based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” It does

not repeal the command of §2254(a) that habeas relief may

be afforded to a state prisoner “only on the ground” that

his custody violates federal law.

In response to the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, the State

filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. The

State’s petition argued that the Seventh Circuit had erred

by granting relief in the absence of a federal violation. It

also contended, on the authority of our opinion in Wain

wright v. Goode, 464 U. S. 78 (1983) (per curiam), that the

Court of Appeals erred by second-guessing the Indiana

Supreme Court’s factual determination that its own trial

court complied with Indiana law.

The Seventh Circuit denied rehearing, but amended its

opinion to include this language:

“This [remand for resentencing] will cure the state

trial court’s ‘unreasonable determination of the facts.’

6 WILSON v. CORCORAN

Per Curiam

28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1) [sic]. (It will also prevent non

compliance with Indiana law. [Corcoran] contended

that, under the circumstances of this case, noncompli

ance with state law also violates the federal Constitu

tion and thus warrants him relief under 28 U. S. C.

§2254(d)(2). [The State] has not advanced any con

trary argument based on Wainwright v. Goode, 464

U. S. 78 (1983), or any similar decision.)” App. to Pet.

for Cert. 144a–145a.

The amendment did not cure the defect. It is not

enough to note that a habeas petitioner asserts the exis

tence of a constitutional violation; unless the federal court

agrees with that assertion, it may not grant relief. The

Seventh Circuit’s opinion reflects no such agreement, nor

does it even articulate what federal right was allegedly

infringed. In fact, as to one possible federal claim, the

court maintains that it would not violate federal law for

Indiana to adopt a rule authorizing what the trial court

did. 593 F. 3d, at 551–552.

In lieu of finding or even describing a constitutional

error, the amended opinion says only that the State had

not “advanced any contrary argument based on Wain

wright v. Goode . . . or any similar decision.” App. to Pet.

for Cert. 145a. It is not clear what this language was

meant to convey. It cannot have meant that the State

forfeited the position that respondent’s allegations do not

state a constitutional violation, since (as we observed) the

State explicitly disputed that point before the District

Court—the last forum in which the subject had been

raised, leading the Court of Appeals to conclude that

respondent had waived the claim entirely. 593 F. 3d, at

551. And there is no suggestion that the State has ever

conceded the existence of a federal right to be sentenced in

accordance with Indiana law. Under those circumstances,

it was improper for the Court of Appeals to issue the writ

Cite as: 562 U. S. ____ (2010) 7

Per Curiam

without first concluding that a violation of federal law had

been established.

The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent’s

motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the

case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion. We express no view about the merits of the

habeas petition.

It is so ordered.