Jackson v. Watkins

Case: 09-10635 Document: 00511231942 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/13/2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 13, 2010

No. 09-10635 Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

RICK JACKSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CRAIG WATKINS, in his individual and official capacities; DALLAS

COUNTY,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Div.

Before DeMOSS, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff-Appellant Rick Jackson appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees on his claims that he was

discharged on account of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and § 21.051 of the Texas

Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Labor Code Ann. § 21.001 et seq.

(Vernon 2006). For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

I.

Prior to his termination, Rick Jackson, who is Caucasian, served in the

Dallas County District Attorney’s office for nearly seventeen years. He began

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his career at that office as a misdemeanor prosecutor in 1990, and he was

promoted in 1996 to the position of chief prosecutor of a felony court, where he

amassed over 330 jury trials and a conviction rate of ninety-four percent. In

2006, he was promoted to the position of division chief of the Organized Crime

Division (“OCD”). Throughout his career in the OCD, Jackson worked on a

number of high-level drug cases and drug-related murder cases, and he was

given responsibility for training and supervising dozens of new prosecutors.

Jackson received commendations from various community members, and he

obtained high marks in employment reviews for ethics and professionalism. His

employment records also reflect that he received strong evaluations in such

areas as fostering teamwork, creating a productive and positive work

environment, and fostering open communication. Jackson’s career at the

District Attorney’s Office ended in December 2006 when newly elected Dallas

County District Attorney Craig Watkins terminated him. It is undisputed that

Watkins, who is African-American, initially replaced Jackson with an African-

American.

After exhausting his administrative remedies, Jackson sued Dallas County

and Watkins, in his personal and official capacities, for terminating him based

on race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

and § 21.051 of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Labor Code

Ann. § 21.001. Defendants denied all claims, and Watkins asserted qualified

immunity as to those claims filed against him in his individual capacity. In

November 2008, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that

(1) Jackson could not recover under Title VII because he was a member of

Watkins’s personal staff, not an “employee” entitled to the protections of Title

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VII; (2) the evidence in the summary-judgment record was legally and factually

insufficient to overcome Watkins’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

terminating Jackson’s employment; (3) Watkins was entitled to qualified

immunity for claims asserted against him in his individual capacity; and (4)

Jackson’s state-law claim should be dismissed without prejudice. Jackson filed

a response disputing all of Watkins’s contentions, and he also filed a motion

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) seeking a continuance for

additional discovery.

In May 2009, the district court denied Jackson’s motion for a continuance

and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court found that,

because Jackson had submitted sufficient evidence to show that he was an

employee within the meaning of Title VII and was not a member of the District

Attorney’s personal staff, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether

he was entitled to the protections of Title VII. Nevertheless, the court granted

summary judgment in favor of defendants on Jackson’s Title VII claim because

Watkins had failed to provide summary-judgment evidence to rebut any of

Watkins’s four proffered “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons” for terminating

Jackson. The court did not reach the question whether Watkins was entitled to

qualified immunity, and it dismissed Jackson’s state-law claims without

prejudice. See McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 1998)

(“[W]hen all federal claims are dismissed or otherwise eliminated from a case

prior to trial, we have stated that our ‘general rule’ is to decline to exercise

jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims.” (citation omitted)), overruled in

part on other grounds by Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan, 338 F.3d 433, 440 (5th

Cir. 2003) (en banc). This appeal followed.

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II.

We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.

LeMaire v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2007).

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the discovery and disclosure materials

on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); Breaux v. Halliburton Energy Servs., 562 F.3d 358, 364 (5th Cir.

2009). This court must take all the facts and evidence in the light most

favorable to Jackson, the non-moving party. See Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231,

234 (5th Cir. 2010).

III.

Because claims brought pursuant to Title VII and § 1981 are “governed by

the same evidentiary framework,” such that the analyses under both statutes

are substantively the same, we analyze Jackson’s Title VII and § 1981 claims

together. Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 281 n.7 (5th Cir. 2004).

Pursuant to Title VII, it is a violation of federal law for an employer to discharge

an employee because of race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII affords

employees the option of proving a violation through either direct or

circumstantial evidence. Because Jackson’s claim is based on circumstantial

evidence, we analyze it under the three-step, burden-shifting analysis embodied

in the “modified McDonnell Douglas approach.” Burrell v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up

Bottling Grp., Inc., 482 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2007). Pursuant to this

framework, Jackson must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

See id. at 411-12. Second, once Jackson establishes a prima facie case, Watkins

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must then articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating

him. See id. at 412. Third, assuming that Watkins meets this burden, Jackson

must then show that Watkins’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were

pretexts for discrimination.1 See Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305,

312 (5th Cir. 2004).

As the first two steps of the modified McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

analysis are satisfied,2 the only question on appeal is whether Jackson has met

his burden of producing evidence sufficient to show pretext with respect to

Watkins’s four proffered reasons for terminating Jackson:

(1) it was important to Watkins to bring a new image and sense of

purpose to the OCD following the “fake drug scandal” that occurred

in that division under the previous administration; (2) he believed

he could not trust Jackson to follow his policies and practices; (3)

Watkins’ own experience with Jackson was overwhelmingly

negative; and (4) Jackson’s reputation within the District Attorney’s

Office and within the legal community practicing in the felony

courts in Dallas was that Jackson was disrespectful, unnecessarily

confrontational, and uncooperative.

The district court found that Watkins was entitled to summary judgment

because Jackson failed to address, much less rebut, each of Watkins’s proffered

1

Jackson conceded at oral argument that this is solely a pretext case, not a mixed-

motive case, so we consider any mixed-motive arguments to be waived. See Saavedra v.

Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 930 F.2d 1104, 1109 (5th Cir. 1991).

2

Watkins originally conceded that Jackson could show the prima facie discrimination

case. On appeal, Watkins contends for the first time that, since September of 2007, nine

months after Jackson’s termination, another Caucasian attorney held his position. Because

Jackson was initially replaced by an African-American and Watkins conceded in the district

court that Jackson had established his prima facie case, we proceed to the third step of the

analysis.

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reasons for terminating Jackson. It also found that Jackson’s summary-

judgment evidence was insufficient to rebut two of Watkins’s proffered reasons.

On appeal, Jackson asserts that (1) Fifth Circuit precedent does not

require him to rebut all of Watkins’s proffered reasons to preclude summary

judgment and (2) even if he were required to rebut all of Watkins’s reasons, he

submitted sufficient evidence to do so. We address these arguments in turn.

Because our precedent is clear that a plaintiff asserting a Title VII claim

must rebut each of the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reasons in order to survive

summary judgment, Jackson’s contention that he is required to rebut only some

of Watkins’s reasons is without merit. We have long recognized that to satisfy

step three of the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff “must put forward

evidence rebutting each of the nondiscriminatory reasons the employer

articulates.” Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001);

see Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003). Where a plaintiff

“falls short of [his] burden of presenting evidence rebutting each of the legitimate

nondiscriminatory reasons produced by [the employer],” summary judgment is

appropriate. Wallace, 271 F.3d at 222 (emphasis in original); see also Rutherford

v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 197 F.3d 173, 184 (5th Cir. 1999); accord Rubinstein v.

Admins. of Tulane Edu. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 400-01 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming

grant of summary judgment on behalf of the employer where the plaintiff

produced evidence of pretext as to some, but not all, of the employer’s

nondiscriminatory reasons). Accordingly, Jackson cannot withstand summary

judgment without providing sufficient evidence to rebut each of Watkins’s

nondiscriminatory reasons. He has not done so.

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Jackson failed to bring forth summary-judgment evidence to rebut

Watkins’s contention that his own experience with Jackson was overwhelmingly

negative. Therefore, we find that the district court did not err in granting

summary judgment on behalf of defendants.3

Before the district court, Jackson did not respond specifically to Watkins’s

contention that he had experienced negative personal interactions with him, but

instead argued generally that “[t]he reasons given by Defendant Watkins for

firing Mr. Jackson are nothing more than a pretext for discrimination.” He then

sought to rebut all four reasons with statistical evidence of Watkins’s alleged

replacement of Caucasian division chiefs with African-Americans. The district

court rejected Jackson’s statistical evidence as unreliable because it was not

“assembled or compiled so as to present any statistically significant or

meaningful information about Watkins’s employment decisions.” But even

assuming arguendo that his statistics were reliable, we agree with the district

court that such evidence is not sufficient here to raise a genuine issue of

material fact in the absence of evidence tailored to rebut Watkins’s specific

reason of terminating Jackson—negative personal interactions.4 See E.E.O.C. v.

3

We note, however, that the district court applied the incorrect analysis in evaluating

the sufficiency of Jackson’s proffered evidence presented to rebut two of Watkins’s other

proffered reasons—that Watkins believed Jackson had a bad reputation in the District

Attorney’s office, and that Jackson would refuse to follow his policies and procedures. The

district court should have followed Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 580 (5th Cir. 2003),

which provides that an employee’s burden of demonstrating pretext is satisfied where he

brings evidence “challenging the substance” of the employer’s reason together with “evidence

that undermines the overall credibility of [the employer’s] proffered justification.” Laxton, 333

F.3d at 580.

4

Jackson faults Watkins for failing to provide any “examples, experiences, or facts” to

support his reason that his interactions with Jackson were negative. Watkins was not required

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Tex. Instruments, Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1184 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[S]tatistical

evidence usually cannot rebut the employer’s articulated nondiscriminatory

reasons.”); accord Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 820 (5th Cir. 1990)

(explaining that, although statistical data may occasionally establish pretext

where it is combined with additional evidence, it is generally insufficient to raise

a genuine issue of material fact in cases where a plaintiff puts forward no

additional evidence that a specific nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual).

Our review of the record confirms that Jackson put forward no additional

evidence sufficient to refute this specific nondiscriminatory reason articulated

by Watkins. Jackson contends that his numerous positive reviews, performance

evaluations, and letters from community members prove that he was well

respected in the community, but this evidence in no way undercuts Watkins’s

claim to have experienced negative interactions with Jackson such that he would

not wish to retain Jackson as an employee. Jackson could have deposed Watkins

in an effort to obtain contradictory testimony that could raise a genuine issue of

material fact, but Jackson conceded at oral argument that the district court

denied his Rule 56(f) motion for continuance to depose Watkins, and he has not

appealed that ruling. Without additional evidence, Jackson cannot rebut

Watkins’s contention that he terminated Jackson not because of race, but

because they had a history of negative personal interactions.5

to produce such evidence at this stage; rather, he “need only produce admissible evidence

which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had

not been motivated by racial animus” to avoid summary judgment. Tex. Dept. of Comm. Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981).

5

Our holding that Jackson has not met his summary-judgment burden is not an

endorsement of Watkins’s decision to terminate Jackson, a veteran prosecutor with seventeen

years of experience. But it is not our place to second-guess the business decisions of an

employer, so long as those decisions are not the result of discrimination. See Walton v. Bisco

Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 1997)

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Because we find that Jackson has failed to rebut one of Watkins’s four

proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for firing him, we need not address

Watkins’s remaining reasons for terminating Jackson,6 nor do we reach the

argument that Watkins is entitled to qualified immunity for those claims filed

against him in his personal capacity. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s

grant of summary judgment on Jackson’s Title VII and § 1981 claims.

6

Watkins proffered, as his first nondiscriminatory reason, his desire to create a “new

image” for the District Attorney’s Office. We do not address the difficult question whether a

stated desire to create a “new image” could ever be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

termination.

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