noting that “Congress determined that a one-year limitations period was reasonable for federal habeas petitioners[,]” in the interest of “curbing] abuse of the writ of habeas corpus .... ”
How later courts described this case
- noting that “Congress determined that a one-year limitations period was reasonable for federal habeas petitioners[,]” in the interest of “curbing] abuse of the writ of habeas corpus .... ”
- “A habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.”
- distinguishing Pace and 12 finding successive petition was properly filed under Artuz
- consolidation in one petition possible with post-conviction tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 08-70021 Document: 00511210648 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/20/2010
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 20, 2010
No. 08-70021 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
MILTON WUZAEL MATHIS,
Petitioner - Appellant
v.
RICK THALER, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,
Respondent - Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:
In April 2007, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), this court permitted
petitioner-appellant Milton Wunzael Mathis to file a successive federal habeas
application asserting a claim based upon Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002),
the Supreme Court case barring the execution of mentally retarded persons. The
district court dismissed Mathis’s successive federal habeas application on the
grounds that: (1) Mathis failed to meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(2); and (2) his petition was untimely and not entitled to equitable tolling.
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No. 08-70021
Because we find that Mathis’s successive petition does not meet § 2244(b)(2)’s
requirements, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1999, Mathis was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death
for the murders of Travis Brown and Daniel Hibbard.1 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed Mathis’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal
(which ran concurrent to his state habeas application) in February 2002. Mathis
v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). On April 3, 2002, it adopted the
trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied Mathis’s first state
habeas application.
Atkins was decided on June 20, 2002. On April 3, 2003, Mathis filed his
first federal habeas application pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his federal habeas
application, Mathis noted that he intended to file a successive state application
alleging an Atkins violation but did not include the Atkins claim in his federal
petition because it was not exhausted in state court as required under AEDPA.
The federal petition was denied on the merits on February 2, 2004.
While his federal petition was pending, Mathis filed his second state
habeas application, raising his Atkins claim for the first time, on June 20, 2003.
On March 3, 2004, Mathis’s second state habeas application was dismissed
without prejudice because he had not shown that the federal court had stayed
its proceedings as required by Ex parte Soffar, 143 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004).2
1
The facts of the crime are described in one of our earlier opinions in this case. In re
Mathis, 483 F.3d 395, 396 (5th Cir. 2007).
2
Ex parte Soffar permits Texas courts to consider a subsequent state habeas
application “if the federal court with jurisdiction over a parallel writ enters an order staying
2
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No. 08-70021
On February 17, 2004, Mathis submitted a “Motion for New Trial and for
Abatement” in federal court, seeking reconsideration of his claims and asking
the court to abate its decision pending completion of the proceedings for his
second state habeas application. On March 9, 2004, the federal district court
denied Mathis’s motion. On March 19, 2004, Mathis moved for reconsideration
of the March 9 order.3 The district court denied the motion on April 6, 2004, but,
noting its desire to “preserve Mathis’s ability to seek appellate review,”
construed his motion for reconsideration as a motion for an extension of time to
file a notice of appeal. Mathis filed a notice of appeal in this court on April 8,
2004.
In August 2004, Mathis sought a COA and filed a motion to stay the
proceedings to allow him to return to state court to raise his Atkins claim. While
the request for COA and the motion to stay were pending before this court, the
state court entered an order setting Mathis’s execution for April 20, 2005.
Mathis filed in this court a motion to stay the execution. This court denied the
request for COA, the motion to stay the proceedings, and the motion to stay the
execution on March 11, 2005. Mathis v. Dretke, 124 F. App’x 865, No. 04-70015,
2005 WL 580234 (5th Cir.) (unpublished), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1131 (2005).
Mathis then filed his third state application for habeas relief, again raising
his Atkins claim, and moved for stay of execution on April 15, 2005. The stay
was granted on April 19, 2005, and the case was remanded to the state trial
court for consideration of the Atkins claim. The state trial court held an
its proceeding to allow the habeas applicant to pursue his unexhausted claims in Texas state
court.” 143 S.W.3d at 804. Before Soffar, Texas courts routinely dismissed subsequent state
habeas applications if a federal petition was pending simultaneously, even if the federal court
stayed its proceedings. See Ex parte Powers, 487 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
3
On March 23, 2004, Mathis also filed a motion for reconsideration in the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, asking the court to reinstate his second state habeas application (which
included his Atkins claim). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the motion on April
21, 2004.
3
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No. 08-70021
evidentiary hearing in September 2005, and in January 2006 it recommended
that Mathis be denied habeas relief. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
adopted the trial court’s findings and conclusions and denied relief on September
20, 2006. Ex parte Mathis, No. WR-50772-03, 2006 WL 2706745 (Tex. Crim.
App. Sept. 20, 2006).
On September 29, 2006, Mathis filed a motion in this court for
authorization to file a successive habeas application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(3),4 which was granted on April 2, 2007. In re Mathis, 483 F.3d 395 (5th
Cir. 2007). Mathis filed his second federal application for habeas relief on April
4, 2007. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as time-barred or, in
the alternative, a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Mathis’s
Atkins claim failed on the merits.
On March 31, 2008, the district court dismissed Mathis’s petition, holding
that because he had not shown that his successive federal habeas application
satisfied 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), the court had no jurisdiction to consider the
application. Alternatively, the court held that Mathis had not complied with the
AEDPA’s one-year limitations period in filing his claim, and no basis for
equitable tolling of the limitations period exists. The district court granted a
COA. Mathis timely appealed.
II. SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)
Mathis first argues that the district court erred when it determined that
his Atkins claim did not meet the requirements for successive petitions under 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b). The district court’s dismissal of a second or successive § 2254
4
The applicable provision reads, in relevant part, “Before a second or successive
application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in
the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the
application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
4
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No. 08-70021
petition on the grounds that the motion fails to meet AEDPA’s conditions is a
legal conclusion we review de novo. See Butler v. Cain, 533 F.3d 314, 316 (5th
Cir. 2008).
A. AEDPA Requirements for Successive Petitions
AEDPA provides that a claim presented in a second or successive habeas
corpus application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 that was not presented in a prior
application shall be dismissed unless:
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no
reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)–(B); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662–63 (2001).
Mathis bears the burden of demonstrating that his successive federal habeas
application falls within one of the two exceptions and thus should not be
dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4); Moore v. Dretke, 369 F.3d 844, 846 n.1
(5th Cir. 2004).
B. “Previously Unavailable” Rule
Generally, Mathis relies on § 2244(b)(2)(A)—i.e., that the Atkins claim
raised in his successive federal petition relies on a new rule of constitutional law,
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was
previously unavailable.5 There is no dispute that Atkins announced a new rule
5
Before the district court, Mathis also asserted that because he is mentally retarded,
he is no longer death eligible. The district court construed this claim as an argument pursuant
5
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No. 08-70021
of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review, see Morris
v. Dretke, 413 F.3d 484, 486–87 (5th Cir. 2005), or that Mathis’s Atkins claim
was raised for the first time in federal court in the instant successive habeas
application. The issue before us is whether Mathis has demonstrated that his
Atkins claim was “previously unavailable” at the time he filed his first federal
habeas application. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2); see also In re Salazar, 443 F.3d
430, 431–32 (5th Cir. 2006) (focusing on whether a claim “was available to
[petitioner] when he filed his initial habeas application”).
We have not previously considered this issue under the circumstances
presented here. In cases before us where the applicant raises an Atkins claim
for the first time in a successive federal habeas petition, the applicant has
typically filed their federal petition before Atkins was decided, making the Atkins
rule “previously unavailable” at the time of their first federal petition. See, e.g.,
In re Wilson, 442 F.3d 872, 876 (5th Cir. 2006); In re Brown, 457 F.3d 392, 396
(5th Cir. 2006). Here, it is undisputed that Mathis filed his first federal habeas
petition in April 2003, after Atkins was decided in June 2002, yet the petition did
not include an Atkins claim.
Respondent argues that, on these facts, the Atkins rule was not “previously
unavailable” to Mathis at the time of his first federal habeas petition. At oral
argument, counsel for Mathis asserted that no federal court adopts such a
“formalistic” interpretation of “previously unavailable” as urged by Respondent.
Two sister circuits have partially addressed this issue. See In re Williams, 364
F.3d 235, 239 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 999 (2004) (construing the term
“previously” in §§ 2244(b)(2)(A) and 2244(b)(2)(B)(i), and holding that
“constitutional rules that were established at the time of the applicant’s last
to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii), regarding facts underlying the claim. On appeal, he argues
that his mental retardation should exempt him from AEDPA’s strictures altogether or, at
least, should toll the statute of limitations.
6
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No. 08-70021
[pre-filing authorization] motion were not ‘previously unavailable’”); Bennett v.
United States, 119 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 1997) (“You cannot file a successive
habeas corpus or section 2255 case on the basis of a claim that is not newly
available.”). Neither case, however, addressed Atkins claims or the particular
circumstances raised in this case. We therefore decline to adopt Respondent’s
argument.
Moreover, Mathis advances two arguments as to why his Atkins claim was
previously unavailable. First, he argues that had he attempted to exhaust his
Atkins claim in state court prior to filing his first federal habeas application, he
risked forfeiting federal review of his previously exhausted claims because of the
AEDPA statute of limitations.6 Compounding the problem, in his view, is the
Texas two-forum rule, which operated to prevent him from exhausting the claim
in state court before timely pursuing federal relief. Second, he argues, if he had
pursued his Atkins claim in a successive state habeas petition, he also risked
forfeiting federal review of his exhausted claims because, under the law in effect
at the time, it was unclear whether the successive state habeas petition would
have tolled AEDPA’s statute of limitations as to his exhausted claims. We
consider both arguments in turn.
1. Exhaustion, Statute of Limitations, and the Texas Abstention Doctrine
Mathis is correct that his Atkins claim—in an initial or a successive
federal habeas petition—is subject to AEDPA’s exhaustion and statute of
limitations requirements. See In re Wilson, 442 F.3d at 877–78; Mathis, 483
F.3d at 399. Under the AEDPA exhaustion doctrine, an applicant for federal
habeas relief must first present his claims in state court before raising them in
6
The district court incorrectly stated Mathis’s argument as follows: “Petitioner claims
that he could not have filed his otherwise available Atkins claim in his first petition because
he had not yet exhausted it.”
7
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No. 08-70021
a federal habeas application. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). AEDPA also provides
for a one-year limitations period to run from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing
by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise
of due diligence.
Id. § 2244(d)(1).
Mathis was also subject to Texas’s procedural rules regarding co-pending
state and federal habeas applications. Prior to February 11, 2004, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed any state habeas application without
prejudice if the applicant had a parallel application arising from the same
conviction pending in federal court, even if the federal court stayed its own
proceeding. The doctrine was referred to as the abstention doctrine or “two-
forum” rule. See, e.g., Ex parte Powers, 487 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
In this case, AEDPA’s one-year limitations period for Mathis’s first federal
habeas petition began to run when his first state habeas application was denied
on April 3, 2002. Mathis therefore had until April 3, 2003 to file a federal
petition raising any claims exhausted in the state habeas court. When the
Supreme Court decided Atkins on June 20, 2002, Mathis had over nine months
left in his AEDPA limitations period to file a federal habeas petition for his
8
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No. 08-70021
exhausted claims, but a full year remaining—until June 20, 2003—to file a
federal habeas petition for his Atkins claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C);
Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 352 (5th Cir. 2007).
Further, the Texas abstention doctrine was in effect when Mathis filed his
first federal petition in April 2003 and his second state application (raising his
Atkins claim for the first time) in June 2003. Under the doctrine, the second
state application was subject to dismissal without reaching the merits of—and
therefore exhausting—Mathis’s Atkins claim because the parallel federal habeas
litigation was pending.
The district court listed Mathis’s options in light of these procedural
requirements:
First, he could have filed an initial federal petition that included his
exhausted claims and an Atkins challenge that would surely face
problems because of section 2254(b)’s exhaustion requirements.
Second, he could have sought relief in state court on his Atkins
claim while litigating his exhausted claims in federal court, hoping
to raise an Atkins issue in a successive federal petition. Finally, he
could have exhausted his Atkins claim and then filed one
comprehensive federal petition.
Mathis selected the second option.
Mathis’s decision to file his federal habeas petition instead of exhausting
his Atkins claim in state court is the impetus for his present conundrum. When
Atkins was decided in June 2002, Mathis’s only federal filing was his motion for
appointment of counsel. Mathis’s argument assumes that, for the purposes of
the Texas two-forum rule, federal jurisdiction attached when he filed his first
motion for appointment of counsel in April 2002, after his first state habeas
petition was denied but before Atkins was decided. According to this argument,
when the Atkins rule became available in June 2002, Mathis would not have
9
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No. 08-70021
been able to exhaust the claim in a successive state petition because, under the
Texas two-forum rule, he already had a federal petition pending.
But Texas courts did not apply the two-forum rule to a state habeas
petition unless the applicant filed the federal petition before seeking state relief.
See Soffar, 143 S.W.3d at 807 (describing the history of the abstention doctrine,
and stating, “[T]his Court has dismissed state habeas corpus writ applications
when the applicant also has a writ pending in the federal courts that relates to
the same conviction or same ‘matter.’”) (emphasis added). In June 2002, Mathis
had not yet filed his federal petition; therefore he did not have “a writ pending
in the federal courts.” Mathis does not cite any authority to support the
proposition that Texas courts considered a federal petition “pending” when the
motion for appointment of counsel is filed.7 In addition, Mathis’s counsel, at oral
argument, conceded that there is no Texas case in which the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has dismissed a successive petition under the two-forum rule
if the state petition is brought before a federal petition is filed. If Mathis had
filed his successive state habeas application to exhaust his Atkins claim without
filing a federal petition, he would not have been seeking relief in two forums
simultaneously. Accordingly, the two-forum rule would not have prevented him
from exhausting his Atkins claim in state court.8
7
We note the Supreme Court’s pre-AEDPA decision in McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S.
849 (1994), in which the Court held that a capital defendant need not file a formal habeas
corpus petition in order to establish a district court’s jurisdiction to enter a stay of execution.
In that case, however, the Court was interpreting 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B), which provides for
qualified legal representation in federal habeas proceedings, and held that the right to counsel
adheres prior to filing of a formal habeas petition. 512 U.S. at 854–57. In contrast, here we
examine a very different question under a different legal framework: when, for the purposes
of the Texas abstention doctrine, Texas courts deemed a federal petition “pending.”
8
In addition, the two-forum rule was modified on February 11, 2004, when the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals decided to permit consideration of a subsequent state writ “if the
federal court having jurisdiction over a parallel writ enters an order staying all of its
proceeding for the applicant to return to the appropriate Texas court to exhaust his state
remedies.” Soffar, 143 S.W.3d at 807.
10
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No. 08-70021
We recognize that Mathis faced conflicting choices when deciding whether
and how to pursue habeas relief. As the district court correctly noted, “Had
[Mathis] filed his Atkins claim in his initial [federal] petition, the rule in Rose v.
Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), mandated that it was subject to dismissal as a
‘mixed petition,’ that is, one raising both exhausted and unexhausted claims.”
Yet we have also said that Lundy “would have little meaning if it could be
avoided by withholding unexhausted claims.” Crone v. Cockrell, 324 F.3d 833,
838 (5th Cir. 2003). If Mathis had included his unexhausted Atkins claim in his
first federal petition, he—and petitioners in like circumstances—had options
available: “They may withdraw a mixed petition [i.e., one containing exhausted
and unexhausted claims], exhaust the remaining claims, and return to district
court with a fully exhausted petition. . . . [I]n such circumstances the later filed
petition would not be ‘second or successive.’” Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147,
154 (2007) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485–86 (2000)). In that case,
Mathis could have withdrawn his first federal petition and would not have been
subject to AEDPA’s successive petition requirements when he returned to
federal court after exhausting the Atkins claim.
Mathis’s predicament was further aggravated because he filed his federal
petition on the last day of the AEDPA limitations period, failed to attempt to
exhaust his Atkins claim before doing so, and failed to include the claim even
though it relied on a constitutional rule in effect for at least nine months before
he filed the petition.9
9
We note that Congress determined that a one-year limitations period was reasonable
for federal habeas petitioners. See 141 CONG . REC . S7803–05, S7877 (1995) (approving
one-year limitations period to curb abuse of the writ of habeas corpus). In this case, Mathis’s
decision to file on the last day of the AEDPA limitations period, combined with his failure to
attempt exhaustion and his failure to include the Atkins claim in the federal petition,
contributed to his present procedural quagmire.
11
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No. 08-70021
Accordingly, we hold that Mathis’s habeas litigation strategy choice to
withhold an Atkins claim from the initial federal petition, while simultaneously
acting so late as to preclude exploration of other relief, did not make the Atkins
rule “previously unavailable” to him within the meaning of § 2244(b)(2)(A).
2. Successive State Habeas Petitions and Statutory Tolling
In his second argument, Mathis urges that if he had pursued his Atkins
claim in a successive state habeas petition before filing his first federal habeas
petition, he also risked forfeiting federal review of his exhausted claims because
the law was not clear at the time of his first federal habeas petition as to
whether the AEDPA statute of limitations would have been tolled on his
exhausted claims.
Under AEDPA’s timeliness requirements, “[t]he time during which a
properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with
respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted
toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
The tolling provision does not state expressly whether the limitations period is
tolled as to exhausted claims while a petitioner seeks state habeas relief as to
new claims. Rather, “the express language of section § 2244(d)(2) makes clear
that tolling is appropriate, without regard to the nature of the claims in the state
pleading, as long as the state application challenged ‘the pertinent judgment.’”
R. H ERTZ & J. L IEBMAN, 1 F EDERAL H ABEAS C ORPUS P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE
§ 5.2b n.56 (5th ed. 2005).
Mathis urges this court to look to the “unsettled” law in effect in
2002—when Atkins was decided—to determine whether his successive state
habeas petition would have been deemed “properly filed” within the meaning of
§ 2244(d)(2) such that the AEDPA statute of limitations would be tolled. But the
cases governing our circuit at the time are not helpful to his argument. At the
time, the law of our circuit included Villegas v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 467 (5th Cir.
12
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No. 08-70021
1999), where we held that a successive state habeas application was “properly
filed” under § 2244(d)(2), even though it had been dismissed as an abuse of the
writ under Texas law,10 and therefore tolled the AEDPA limitations period.
After Villegas’s successive state application was dismissed as an abuse of the
writ, he filed a federal habeas application; the state moved to dismiss as time-
barred. 184 F.3d at 468. The district court rejected the petitioner’s tolling
argument, and held that the petition was not “properly filed” within the meaning
of § 2244(d)(2). Id. We held that “a ‘properly filed application’ for § 2244(d)(2)
purposes is one that conforms with a state’s applicable procedural filing
requirements.” Id. at 470. We defined “procedural filing requirements” as
“prerequisites that must be satisfied before a state court will allow a petition to
be filed and accorded some level of judicial review,” such as rules governing
notice and time, and also “a requirement that the petitioner obtain judicial
authorization for the filing.” Id. at 470 n.2. We also noted that Texas sought to
“discourage successive petitions by limiting the availability of relief”—for
example, by permitting the filing of a successive petition but then requiring
judicial consideration of the application to determine whether sufficient facts
were alleged for the court to address the merits of the claims. Id. at 472 n.3.
Moreover, soon after Villegas, the Supreme Court held that, for the
purposes of § 2244(d)(2), “[a]n application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and
acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing
filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (citing Villegas, 184 F.3d at
469–70, inter alia). The Artuz Court distinguished conditions to pre-filing (for
example, time limits or form of the document) from conditions to obtaining relief:
10
During the relevant time period, Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure precluded a grant of relief based on a successive petition unless the petitioner
demonstrated facts sufficient to fit within a statutory exception allowing relief. TEX . CODE
CRIM . PROC . art. 11.07 § 4(a) (West 1999).
13
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“[T]he question whether an application has been ‘properly filed’ is quite separate
from the question whether the claims contained in the application are
meritorious and free of procedural bar.” Id. In other words, as a later Court
decision noted, “state procedural bars ‘prescribing a rule of decision for a court’
confronted with certain claims previously adjudicated or not properly presented
are not ‘filing’ conditions.” Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (citing
Artuz, 531 U.S. at 10–11).11
In this case, Mathis’s successive state habeas petition would have been
“properly filed” under Artuz and Villegas even if it had been dismissed as an
abuse of the writ under Texas’s capital habeas statute. Like the non-capital
habeas statute in Villegas, the Texas capital habeas statute provided that a
court could not consider a subsequent state habeas application unless the
application contained specific facts establishing that the claims presented could
not have been presented in a previous application because the legal or factual
basis was not available at the time of the previous application. T EX. C ODE C RIM.
P ROC. art. 11.071 § 5(a) (West 1999). If the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had
determined that the requirements of section 5(a) were not met, the court would
have dismissed the application as an abuse of the writ. Id. § 5(c). Under Artuz,
these provisions are conditions to obtaining relief, not filing conditions. 531 U.S.
11
Mathis argues that Pace abrogated Villegas, citing Wardlaw v. Cain, 541 F.3d 275
(5th Cir. 2008). Although we held in Wardlaw that Pace had abrogated Smith v. Ward, 209
F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2000), Pace did not affect Villegas. See Wardlaw, 541 F.3d at 279. The
cases of Ward, Pace, and Wardlaw involved petitioners whose applications had been dismissed
as untimely, and “time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions.” Pace, 544 U.S. at
417. But Pace only affirmed the “obvious distinction between time limits, which go to the very
initiation of a petition . . . and the type of ‘rule of decision’ procedural bars at issue in Artuz,
which go to the ability to obtain relief.” Id. In Villegas, 184 F.3d at 473, we held that an
application dismissed as an abuse of the writ—a classic “procedural bar”—was nevertheless
“properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). That decision is wholly consistent with
Pace. Because Article 11.071 § 5 is substantially identical to Article 11.07 § 4, Villegas
controls here.
14
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No. 08-70021
at 10–11. Therefore, Mathis’s successive state petition, even if dismissed as an
abuse of the writ, would be deemed “properly filed” such that the AEDPA statute
of limitations would have tolled while it was pending in state court.12 See id.
The law of this circuit was sufficiently clear as to whether a successive
state petition would have tolled the AEDPA statute of limitations. Mathis offers
no cogent argument to excuse his failure to include his Atkins claim in his first
federal petition when that claim was available to him for nine months after
Atkins was decided. Because the claim was available, we hold that he has not
made the requisite showing under § 2244(b)(2)(A).
III. TIMELINESS
The district court also held that, assuming Mathis’s successive federal
petition complied with § 2244(b)(2), the petition did not comply with § 2244(d)(1),
AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. We review de novo an order dismissing
12
Mathis appears to argue that there is a statutory time limitation on all habeas
applications (initial or successive) under Article 11.071 such that his petition would have not
been deemed “properly filed” for AEDPA tolling purposes. The limits in section 4 of the Texas
capital habeas statute do not state whether they are applicable to initial or subsequent habeas
applications. See TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC . art. 11.071 § 4(a) (West 1999) (“An application for
a writ of habeas corpus . . . must be filed in the convicting court not later than the 180th day”
after appointment of counsel or “not later than the 45th day” after the state’s original brief is
filed on direct appeal, “whichever date is later.”). However, at least one Texas court has held
that the time limitations of section 4 are applicable solely to initial petitions. See Ex parte
Reedy, 282 S.W.3d 492, 495 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing § 4(e) of article 11.071 for the
proposition that “failure to timely file initial post-conviction application for writ of habeas
corpus constitutes a waiver of all grounds for relief that were available to the applicant before
the last date on which an application could be timely filed”) (emphasis added, internal
quotation marks omitted). The latter interpretation is reasonable: the initial petition is filed
in the convicting court and the time limits are tied to proceedings in the convicting court. In
contrast, capital successive state petitions are returnable to the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, who decides in the first instance whether the petition meets threshold requirements
before it can be considered on the merits by the convicting court. See TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC .
art. 11.071 § 5. Mathis’s case clearly plays this out—his third state habeas petition was filed
in April 2005, nearly six years after his conviction became final, yet was not dismissed as
untimely. Moreover, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the petition met the
requirements of section 5 because the Atkins claim presented therein was not previously
available to Mathis when he filed his first state petition.
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a habeas petition as time-barred under AEDPA. Starns v. Andrews, 524 F.3d
612, 617 (5th Cir. 2008).
A. AEDPA Statute of Limitations
First, we examine whether Mathis’s successive federal habeas application
raising an Atkins claim was timely under AEDPA. AEDPA’s one-year
limitations period for Mathis’s federal habeas petition raising an Atkins claim
began to run on June 20, 2002, when Atkins was decided. See § 2244(d)(1)(C);
Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 352 (5th Cir. 2007). Mathis therefore had
until June 20, 2003 to file a federal habeas petition for his unexhausted Atkins
claim.
As we noted, Mathis filed his first federal petition on April 3, 2003,
without raising his Atkins claim. The federal habeas petition did not toll the
AEDPA statute of limitations. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181–82
(2001).
Mathis’s successive state petition raising his Atkins claim, however, tolled
the one-year statute of limitations. § 2244(d)(2). Therefore, the limitations
period tolled from June 20, 2003 until April 22, 2004, the day after the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals denied Mathis’s motion for reconsideration of its
denial of his second state petition. See Windland v. Quarterman, 578 F.3d 314,
317 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Applying the plain language of the statute, we hold that
a state petition for habeas relief is ‘pending’ for AEDPA tolling purposes on the
day it is filed through (and including) the day it is resolved.”).
But Mathis filed the state petition on June 20, 2003, the last day of the
AEDPA limitations period for his Atkins claim. He thus had only one day left
in his AEDPA limitations period, making his successive federal petition raising
an Atkins claim due on April 23, 2004. Instead, Mathis’s successive federal
petition currently before us was filed well past the deadline. Accordingly, the
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successive federal petition is time-barred unless Mathis can establish that he is
entitled to equitable tolling.
B. Equitable Tolling
Mathis argues that, even if his successive petition is untimely, the district
court erred when it denied equitable tolling to his Atkins claim, because (1) it
failed to consider his dilemma created by the Texas two-forum rule and (2) he
should be entitled to equitable tolling based upon his mental retardation.13 The
district court’s decision regarding equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of
limitations is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Stone v. Thaler, — F.3d —, 2010
WL 3034809, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2010).14 Nonetheless, “[w]e must be
cautious not to apply the statute of limitations too harshly.” Fisher v. Johnson,
174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999).
Recently, the Supreme Court confirmed the holding of this and other
circuits that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and
may be equitably tolled. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2561 (2010). A
habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows “‘(1) that he
ha[d] been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 2562 (quoting
Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). “Courts must consider the individual facts and
circumstances of each case in determining whether equitable tolling is
appropriate.” Alexander v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 2002).
1. Diligence
13
Mathis argued to the district court that he was unable to pursue his Atkins claim in
state court because Texas did not appoint him an attorney immediately after Atkins was
decided. He does not raise this argument on appeal.
14
But see Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that de novo
review applies where district court denies equitable tolling as a matter of law).
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We have stated that “‘[e]quity is not intended for those who sleep on their
rights.’” In re Wilson, 442 F.3d at 875 (quoting Fisher, 174 F.3d at 715). The
diligence required for equitable tolling purposes, however, is “‘reasonable
diligence,’ not ‘maximum feasible diligence.’” Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565
(quoting Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 326 (1996) and Starns, 524 F.3d at
618).
Based on our review of the record, Mathis exhibited a pattern of diligently
pursuing his rights in state and federal court, despite procedural difficulties.
Mathis filed his first federal habeas petition in an attempt to pursue relief on his
exhausted claims in April 2003. In June 2003, his appointed federal counsel
filed the second state habeas application asserting Atkins, even though it was
ultimately futile because of the Texas two-forum rule. When the two-forum rule
was modified in Soffar, Mathis immediately acted to preserve his state Atkins
claim by requesting a stay and abeyance from the district court. Mathis not only
continued to pursue relief from the district court, by filing motions for
reconsideration and appealing the denial thereof, he also moved—albeit
unsuccessfully—for reconsideration in the Texas state court of the denial of his
second state habeas petition. Once the state issued an order of execution in
January 2005, Mathis’s focus shifted to staying the execution. As soon as his
motion to stay execution was denied, Mathis filed his third state petition
including his Atkins claim in April 2005, just days before his scheduled
execution. When the third state application was denied on the merits, Mathis
filed his motion for authorization with this court within one week of the state
court’s order of denial. He also filed his successive federal petition within two
days of this court’s grant of authorization.
Far from sleeping on his rights, Mathis sought relief in multiple tribunals
in an effort to raise his Atkins claim. Under the circumstances, Mathis’s actions
were more than reasonably diligent. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2562.
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2. Extraordinary Circumstances
Although Mathis makes colorable arguments to demonstrate diligence, he
must also show “that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and
prevented timely filing.” Id.
“The doctrine of equitable tolling is applied restrictively and, as we have
held repeatedly, is entertained only in cases presenting ‘rare and exceptional
circumstances where it is necessary to preserve a plaintiff's claims when strict
application of the statute of limitations would be inequitable.’” In re Wilson, 442
F.3d at 875 (quoting Fierro v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 674, 682 (5th Cir. 2002)).15
Mathis argues that the Texas two-forum rule presents the “rare and
exceptional circumstance” sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. We have
addressed this argument in a similar context. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 442 F.3d
at 875–78; In re Hearn, 376 F.3d 447, 455–57 (5th Cir. 2004). In In re Wilson,
Wilson’s initial federal habeas proceeding was still pending before this court,
which prevented him from timely filing his subsequent state habeas petition to
exhaust his Atkins claim. 442 F.3d at 874. We considered his untimely
successive habeas application and concluded that “the Texas two-forum rule
reasonably caused [Wilson] to delay filing a state habeas [petition] leaving
himself only one day after the state court ruling to obtain authorization and file
15
We have applied equitable tolling where the district court has done something to
mislead the petitioner into believing that his petition is due after the limitations period has
expired. Compare Prieto v. Quarterman, 456 F.3d 511, 514–15 (5th Cir. 2006) (equitable tolling
applied where petitioner requested and received extension of time from district court before
deadline to file habeas petition and relied in good faith on that extension) and United States
v. Patterson, 211 F.3d 927, 931–32 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying equitable tolling where district
court granted pro se prisoner’s request to dismiss petition without prejudice so that prisoner
could retain counsel and refile petition later), with Fierro, 294 F.3d at 682–84 (refusing to
apply equitable tolling where district court issued scheduling order at government’s request
setting deadline for habeas petition outside limitations period, because the scheduling order
was requested and issued after the limitations period had expired and thus neither the request
nor the order could have contributed to Fierro’s failure to file within the limitations period).
Mathis has presented no evidence here that he was somehow misled by the representations
of the district court or of this court.
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a federal habeas petition.” Id. at 878. We therefore held that Wilson
demonstrated “rare and extraordinary circumstances that justify equitable
tolling of the limitations period.” Id. And in In re Hearn, we considered an
untimely successive habeas application brought by a pro se prisoner whose
counsel had withdrawn representation upon denial of his first federal habeas
petition. 376 F.3d at 454. We concluded that Texas’s habeas abstention
procedure and the unavailability of qualified habeas counsel after the disposition
of his initial petition denied Hearn an opportunity to sufficiently investigate his
Atkins claim. Id. Accordingly, we held that equitable tolling was appropriate.
Id. at 456–57.16
In both cases, the procedural posture and some other circumstance outside
the petitioner’s control, in addition to the Texas two-forum rule, warranted
equitable tolling. Wilson and Hearn’s initial federal habeas petitions were either
filed or pending appeal when Atkins was decided; the Atkins claim could not be
raised before or during federal review; and each petitioner would be faced with
procedural hurdles to raising the claim subsequently in state or federal court.
In contrast, Atkins was decided nine months before Mathis filed his first federal
habeas petition. While the Texas two-forum rule heavily influenced Mathis’s
litigation strategy, it did not present the same “Hobson’s choice” as present in
Wilson and Hearn. 442 F.3d at 878.
Instead, Mathis’s case is similar to In re Lewis, where the petitioner
waited until the last day of the one-year limitations period to file his successive
habeas application in federal court. 484 F.3d 793, 795 (5th Cir. 2007). Lewis
then argued that the Texas two-forum rule precluded him from timely filing his
16
On petition for rehearing, we limited our opinion to cases in which the petitioner
lacks counsel, but reiterated that equitable tolling applied “because of the combination of the
problem created by the Texas two-forum rule . . . and the withdrawal of petitioner’s counsel.”
In re Hearn, 389 F.3d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
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federal petition raising an Atkins claim. Id. at 797. We concluded that while the
Texas two-forum rule “temporarily postponed” Lewis’s ability to file his Atkins
claim in state court, it did not prevent him from filing his Atkins claim in state
court within the one-year period. Id. at 797–98. As with Lewis, the Texas two-
forum rule did not prevent Mathis from pursuing habeas relief on his Atkins
claim within the statute of limitations. Atkins was available to Mathis for nine
months before he pursued the claim in state court. Based on the facts of
Mathis’s case, the Texas two-forum rule does not present the rare and
extraordinary circumstance sufficient to warrant equitable tolling.
Accordingly, we hold that Mathis is not entitled to equitable tolling, and
the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant equitable
tolling.
IV. CONCLUSION
We hold that Mathis’s successive federal habeas petition did not meet the
standard under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) and therefore must be dismissed. Even
if the petition met the standard, we hold that the petition was time-barred under
AEDPA’s statute of limitations, and the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied equitable tolling.
AFFIRMED.
21