concluding that it wasn’t clear whether the driver of a vehicle “manifested an intent to harm [the officer] or anyone else at the scene” because “although [the officer] testified in his deposition that he saw [the driver] change gears and that he could see in [the driver’s] face what he intended . . . how close [the officer] was and what exactly he could see is disputed”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that it wasn’t clear whether the driver of a vehicle “manifested an intent to harm [the officer] or anyone else at the scene” because “although [the officer] testified in his deposition that he saw [the driver] change gears and that he could see in [the driver’s] face what he intended . . . how close [the officer] was and what exactly he could see is disputed”
- holding that an officer violated clearly established law because the record permitted the finding that the officer did “not have probable cause to believe that there was a serious threat of serious physical harm” when he used deadly force
- holding that an officer violated clearly established law when he used deadly force, in part, because it was not clear from the evidence that the plaintiff “manifested an intent to harm [the officer] or anyone else at the scene”
- finding a constitutional violation on summary judgment where officer shot driver of van and “it [was] not clear that [the driver] manifested an intent to harm [the officer] or anyone else at the scene.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 9, 2010
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
ZIA TRUST COMPANY, as Personal
Representative of Dylan Causey,
minor son of Jodie Ockle, and sole
beneficiary of Megan Dylan Causey,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 09-2006
NANCY CAUSEY; GLEN CAUSEY,
Plaintiffs-Intervenors,
v.
CARLOS MONTOYA,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
COUNTY OF DONA ANA,
Defendant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. 08-CV-00077-KBM-CG)
Kevin M. Brown (Steven L. Cash with him on the briefs), of Brown & German,
Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant–Appellant.
Richard A. Sandoval, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Before LUCERO, McKAY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
McKAY, Circuit Judge.
In this appeal, Officer Carlos Montoya asks us to reverse the district court’s
denial of his motion for summary judgment on excessive force claims brought
under 18 U.S.C. § 1983 by family members of a man Officer Montoya shot and
killed while responding to a domestic disturbance. After reviewing the facts in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we affirm the district court’s
ruling.
BACKGROUND
As an initial matter, we first address the extent of our jurisdiction in this
appeal. While a denial of summary judgment is not the type of final order
immediately appealable to this court, “we [do] have interlocutory jurisdiction
over denials of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage to the extent
that they turn on an issue of law.” Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1153
(10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). Thus, we can consider the “purely
legal question of whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff support a claim of
violation of clearly established law.” Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139,
1154 (10th Cir. 2006). However, “we are not at liberty to review a district court’s
factual conclusions, such as the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for a
jury to decide, or that a plaintiff’s evidence is sufficient to support a particular
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factual inference.” 1 Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1154. Accordingly, “[t]hose facts
explicitly found by the district court, combined with those that it likely assumed, .
. . form the universe of facts upon which we base our legal review.” Id. With the
above limitations in mind, we now set out a general description of the events at
issue based on those facts explicitly found or likely assumed by the district court
in considering Officer Montoya’s motion. As required in reviewing a motion for
summary judgment, we set out these facts “in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Estate of Larsen ex rel. Sturdivan v. Muir, 511 F.3d 1255,
1259 (10th Cir. 2008).
On the evening of July 2, 2007, Glen Causey called the Doña Ana County
Sheriff’s Department following a dispute with his adult son Megan. Officer
Montoya and a second officer, Orlando Flores, responded to the call. Dispatch
informed the two officers that Megan had mental health issues and that there were
two firearms present at the residence. Upon arriving at the scene, the two officers
were flagged down by an individual, later identified as Glen Causey. Officer
Flores parked his patrol car two houses down from the scene and approached on
1
In his brief, Officer Montoya argues that “[t]he factual disputes cited by
the [c]ourt in denying [his] motion for summary judgment are not material.”
(Appellant’s Br. at 20.) However, we decline to consider this portion of Officer
Montoya’s appeal, because, as explained above, we do not have jurisdiction over
“challenges to the district court’s findings to the extent they challenge the
existence of disputed facts for summary judgment purposes.” Walker, 451 F.3d at
1155.
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foot, while Officer Montoya parked directly in front of the Causey home (despite
having been trained not to do so).
Officer Montoya quickly exited his car, allegedly with his gun already
drawn and without saying anything to anyone at the scene. 2 An older model van
had been backing down the driveway but had gotten stuck on a pile of rocks at the
side of the driveway, either shortly before or shortly after the officers’ arrival. A
man later identified as Megan was in the driver’s seat of the van, and a child was
seated in the passenger’s seat. Under the disputed facts, Officer Montoya placed
himself anywhere between one and fifteen feet in front of the van at a sixty-five
degree angle from the passenger side; the wheels of the van were pointed towards
him. The van’s headlights were on; however, Officer Montoya had dropped his
flashlight and “it was dark with no street lights.” (Appellant’s App. at 196.)
As Montoya stood in front of the van, with Officer Flores approaching from
the driver’s side yelling for Megan to exit the vehicle, the van—although
allegedly still stuck on a pile of rocks—jumped forward about a foot. In response
Officer Montoya fired a single shot into the vehicle, hitting Megan in the neck.
2
These facts are taken, in part, from Glen Causey’s deposition testimony.
Mr. Causey seems to have made some statements just after the incident that are
inconsistent with his deposition testimony. However, in considering this
testimony the district court correctly noted that it was “inappropriate to weigh the
credibility of the sworn deposition testimony in evaluating entitlement to
summary judgment,” (Appellant’s App. at 195.). See Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d
1021, 1026 (10th Cir. 2000) (“It is axiomatic that a judge may not evaluate the
credibility of witnesses in deciding a motion for summary judgment.”).
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Megan then exited the van and began running towards Officer Flores, who
subdued him using a taser. Megan later died as a result of the gunshot wound to
his neck. At the time Officer Montoya shot Megan, neither he nor Officer Flores
knew who Megan was or what his role was in the domestic violence call.
Zia Trust Company brought suit against Officer Montoya and Doña Ana
County on behalf of Megan’s minor son for excessive force in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Megan’s parents later intervened in the suit. Following a
period of discovery, the parties moved for summary judgment. With respect to
qualified immunity, the court denied Officer Montoya’s motion based on its
conclusion that there were material issues of fact that could indicate that “Officer
Montoya’s use of deadly force [was] unreasonable.” (Appellant’s App. at 195.)
On appeal, Officer Montoya argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity
because his actions, when viewed under the totality of the circumstances, were
objectively reasonable.
DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment that
asserts qualified immunity de novo. See Buck v. City of Albuquerque, 549 F.3d
1269, 1277 (10th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,
the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). However, we review
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summary judgment motions raising qualified immunity differently because
“qualified immunity shields government officials . . . from liability for damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights.” Buck, 549 F.3d at 1277. Thus, in order to overcome a
motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must first show that, “[t]aken in the
light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show
the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1155
(internal quotation omitted). If the plaintiff satisfies this initial burden, then he or
she must show that the right was clearly established at the time of the violation.
Id.
The plaintiffs have alleged, inter alia, that Officer Montoya’s actions
constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We examine
excessive force claims “under the Fourth Amendment standard of objective
reasonableness.” Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 414 (10th Cir. 2004).
In determining the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct we look to the
totality of the circumstances, viewing the situation “from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). In so doing we recognize that
“officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that
are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is
necessary in a particular situation.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001).
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We may also consider a number of factors, including: “(1) whether the
officers ordered the suspect to drop his weapon, and the suspect’s compliance
with police commands; (2) whether any hostile motions were made with the
weapon towards the officers; (3) the distance separating the officers and the
suspect; and (4) the manifest intentions of the suspect.” Estate of Larsen, 511
F.3d at 1260. “The use of deadly force is justified under the Fourth Amendment
if a reasonable officer in the Defendant’s position would have had probable cause
to believe that there was a threat of serious physical harm to themselves or
others.” Walker, 451 F.3d at 1159 (internal quotations omitted).
Turning to the case at hand, we cannot say, viewing the record in a light
most favorable to the plaintiffs, that Officer Montoya acted reasonably. First,
according to Glen Causey’s testimony, Officer Montoya exited his vehicle with
his weapon already drawn and proceeded to a position in front of Megan’s van
without identifying himself as a police officer or, indeed, saying anything at all.
It is unclear, at least under the plaintiffs’ alleged facts, whether Megan even knew
that Office Montoya was a police officer. Second, although the tires of the van
were pointed toward Officer Montoya, the plaintiffs allege—and there is some
support in the record—that it was obviously stuck on a retaining wall and that the
van jumped forward less than a foot, if at all, when Megan revved the engine.
Additionally, given the lighting conditions, whether or not Officer Montoya could
even see the direction the tires were pointing is a material fact that has been hotly
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disputed. Third, according to Officer Flores’s testimony, Officer Montoya may
have been standing up to fifteen feet away from the van at the time of the
shooting. Although we have never laid down a per se rule regarding distance, we
cannot say that a van fifteen feet away, which according to the plaintiffs was
clearly stuck on a pile of rocks, gave Officer Montoya probable cause to believe
that there was a threat of serious physical harm to himself or others. Finally,
although Officer Montoya testified in his deposition that he saw Megan change
gears and that he could see in Megan’s face what he intended, as stated above,
how close Officer Montoya was and what exactly he could see is disputed.
Accordingly, reading the record in the light favorable to the plaintiffs, it is not
clear that Megan manifested an intent to harm Officer Montoya or anyone else at
the scene. Our analysis of course only accounts for the plaintiffs’ version of
events, a version which a jury may later reject. However, under this version we
agree with the district court that the plaintiffs have met their burden of showing a
constitutional violation.
Having determined the existence of a constitutional violation for purposes
of summary judgment, we must now consider whether the law was clearly
established at the time of the violation. “Ordinarily, in order for the law to be
clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on
point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have
found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Cruz v. City of Laramie, 239 F.3d
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1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). However, “[w]e do not
think it requires a court decision with identical facts to establish clearly that it is
unreasonable to use deadly force when the force is totally unnecessary to restrain
a suspect or to protect officers, the public, or the suspect himself.” Weigel v.
Broad, 544 F.3d 1143, 1154 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer
and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not
justify the use of deadly force to do so.”). Viewing the record in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, we have already determined that Officer Montoya did
not have “probable cause to believe that there was a serious threat of serious
physical harm” to himself or others. Walker, 451 F.3d at 1159. As such, Officer
Montoya violated clearly established law when he used deadly force against
Megan Causey.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district’s court denial of
Officer Montoya’s summary judgment motion.
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