Opinion

Mapp v. Uphoff

  • 199 F.3d 1220
  • 1999 Colo. J. C.A.R. 108
  • 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34334
  • 1999 WL 1268340
Court
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Filed
Dec 30, 1999
Status
Published
Author
Murphy
On the bench
Ebel, Lucero, Murphy
Cited by
301 cases
Authority
More cited than 99.2%

holding that a prisoner’s claim that he was denied adequate and timely medical assistance did not reflect "mere disagreement with his medical treatment,” and that "the fact that he has seen numerous doctors [does not] necessarily mean that he received treatment for serious medical needs, i.e., that treatment was prescribed at all or that prescribed treatment was provided”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that a prisoner’s claim that he was denied adequate and timely medical assistance did not reflect "mere disagreement with his medical treatment,” and that "the fact that he has seen numerous doctors [does not] necessarily mean that he received treatment for serious medical needs, i.e., that treatment was prescribed at all or that prescribed treatment was provided”
  • noting that “[d]elays that courts have found to violate the Eighth Amendment have frequently involved life-threatening situations and instances in which it is apparent that delay would exacerbate the prisoner’s medical problems,” and that “[t]he Eighth Amendment also protects against future harm to an inmate”
  • explaining that the fact that a petitioner received some medical care does not preclude him from claiming under the Eighth Amendment that he did not receive adequate medical care
  • holding that allegations that officials failed to provide insulin prescribed by prison doctor was sufficient to state claim for deliberate indifference

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

PUBLISH

DEC 30 1999

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

TENTH CIRCUIT

MAE LEE HUNT; LINDA VISSAT,

Co-Administrators of the Estate of

Jody Mapp,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. No. 98-8073

JUDY UPHOFF, individually and in

her official capacity as Wyoming

Department of Corrections Director;

JAMES FERGUSON, individually

and in his official capacity as

Wyoming Department of Corrections

State Penitentiary Warden; JIM

DAVIS, individually and in his

official capacity as Wyoming

Department of Corrections State

Penitentiary Health Care

Administrator; JOHN PEERY,

individually and in his official

capacity as Wyoming Department

of Health Services Administrator;

DR. ENGLESJERD, in his individual

capacity and as Wyoming Department

of Corrections State Penitentiary

Medical Doctor; DR. PAUL LONG,

in his individual capacity and as

Wyoming Department of Corrections

State Penitentiary Medical Doctor;

DR. ZANNY REIMER, individually

and in his official capacity as

Wyoming Department of Corrections

Honor Conservation Camp Doctor;

DR. MIKE JORDING, individually

and in his official capacity as

Wyoming Department of Corrections

Honor Conservation Camp Doctor;

DR. KENNETH WILLIAM

SCHULZE, individually and in his

official capacity as Wyoming

Department of Corrections State

Penitentiary Medical Doctor,

Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING

(D.C. No. 97-CV-268)

Submitted on the briefs:

Walter Urbigkit of Frontier Law Center, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for

Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Lori L. Gorseth, Office of the Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming,

for Defendants-Appellees.

Before EBEL , LUCERO , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

MURPHY , Circuit Judge.

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This appeal is taken from an order of the district court dismissing a verified

civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 by Jody Mapp, who

was at the time an inmate at the Wyoming State Penitentiary. 1

In his complaint,

Mr. Mapp sought damages and injunctive relief, alleging the denial of medical

care in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

See Appellant’s App., Vol. I at 1-14. Specifically, he contended that prison

officials had shown deliberate indifference to two serious medical needs--diabetes

and hypertension. See id. at 5. The magistrate judge, upon determining that

Mr. Mapp had alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury, 2

granted leave

to proceed in forma pauperis in December of 1997. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Mr. Mapp filed numerous subsequent pleadings, including an application

for a temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction, see Appellant’s App.,

Vol. I at 43-50; a motion for limited discovery, see id. at 51-52; a request for

production of documents (primarily those relating to his and other inmates’

medical care), see id. at 81-85; a “request for judicial notice,” and an addendum

1

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.

2

The magistrate judge also found that Mr. Mapp had on three or more prior

occasions, while incarcerated, brought an action or appeal that was subsequently

dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. See Appellant’s App., Vol. I

at 38.

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thereto, detailing his inability to secure needed medical treatment and the

consequences, which included temporary blindness, denial of insulin for over

a year, and improper diet, see id. at 86-101; and an opening brief, see id.

at 105-116. He also filed several affidavits in support of his claims, see id.

at 26-32, 120-21, 130-37.

In March of 1998, Mr. Mapp moved for a court ordered physical

examination. See id. at 117-119. In his accompanying affidavit, he claimed that

his life was in danger because of the indifference of defendants to his medical

problems. Mr. Mapp also expressed fear of losing his sight, potential limb

amputations, and heart problems associated with the diabetes and hypertension.

See id. at 120-121.

Also in March, the magistrate judge granted Mr. Mapp’s motion to compel

discovery. See id. at 122-23. That order was vacated a week later with the

notation that defendants had not been served with the complaint, see id. at 125,

which was the last action taken by the magistrate judge in this case. The

following month Mr. Mapp underwent quadruple open heart bypass surgery. See

id. at 196.

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In August, the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a

claim for relief and for failure to pay the filing fee, 3

having determined that

Mr. Mapp’s allegations amounted to a mere disagreement as to his medical

treatment, not giving rise to a constitutional cause of action. See id. at 145-151.

Mr. Mapp filed a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), along with a statement of disputed facts, an affidavit and

a memorandum, see id. at 152-172, arguing that the district court had improperly

resolved disputed issues of fact. He also tendered an amended complaint.

Mr. Mapp died in the prison infirmary on October 31, 1998, of acute blockage of

the coronary artery bypass graft. See Appellant’s Br. at 4. The district court

subsequently denied the motion to alter or amend and leave to submit an amended

complaint. See id. at Appendices E and F.

We have substituted the co-administrators of Mr. Mapp’s estate as

appellants. We review the dismissal of Mr. Mapp’s complaint de novo. See

Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t of Corrections , 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999)

(holding standard of review of complaint dismissed under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is de novo).

3

The claims dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee involved alleged

complications from a cyst removal and a 1996 head injury, both of which the

district court determined failed to show imminent danger of serious injury.

-5-

Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is

proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on

the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an

opportunity to amend. In determining whether dismissal is proper,

we must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and we must

construe those allegations, and any reasonable inferences that might

be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Further, we must liberally construe the allegations of a pro se

complaint.

See id. (citations omitted).

Here, the district court recognized that Mr. Mapp had alleged that his

medical needs were serious, but concluded that Mr. Mapp had “failed to allege

a factual basis to establish that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

health.” See Appellant’s App., Vol. I at 148. We disagree. Mr. Mapp alleged

that a heart attack he suffered in August of 1997 and the subsequent bypass

surgery were caused by the inadequate treatment he received for his diabetes and

hypertension. See id. at 140-41. He alleged that in June of 1996 he was denied

insulin by a doctor even though it had been earlier prescribed for him by another

prison doctor. See id. at 130. He further claimed that this denial lasted over a

year, see id. at 131, and that he was only able to obtain it as a result of an

apparent heart attack in 1997, see id. The district court so noted in the statement

that “he [Mr. Mapp] states that Dr. Long did not believe there was a need for

insulin, but that he [Mr. Mapp] was later given insulin.” See id. at 149.

However, Mr. Mapp further contended that once he was released from the hospital

-6-

back to the prison (apparently after a three-day stay), insulin was again denied

him. See id. at 131.

Mr. Mapp also alleged that certain medically recommended procedures

were not performed, see id. at 118, 132; that he was denied proper diagnosis and

treatment because of the lack of a primary care physician employed at the prison,

see id. at 135; that special diets prescribed for him were not provided, see id.

at 135-36; that prescribed medication was confiscated by prison officials, see id.

at 136; and that he was not treated for elevated blood sugar (caused by the

diabetes) or his chronic hypertension, see id. at 108.

We cannot agree with the district court that the facts as alleged by

Mr. Mapp, which we must at this stage of the proceedings accept as true, reflect

a “mere disagreement with his medical treatment,” not giving rise to a

constitutional claim. See id. at 149. Nor does the fact that he has seen numerous

doctors necessarily mean that he received treatment for serious medical needs,

i.e., that treatment was prescribed at all or that prescribed treatment was provided.

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment when they act deliberately and indifferently to serious

medical needs of prisoners in their custody. This is true whether the indifference

is manifested by prison doctors responding to the prisoner’s needs or by guards’

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intentionally delaying or denying access to medical care that has been prescribed.

See Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 104-106 (1976).

Deliberate indifference has both an objective and subjective component.

See Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The medical need must be

sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component, see id. We have held that

a medical need is sufficiently serious “if it is one that has been diagnosed by

a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay

person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Ramos v.

Lamm , 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980) (further quotation omitted).

In terms of the subjective component, i.e., the requisite deliberate

indifference, a plaintiff must establish that defendant(s) knew he faced a

substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk, “by failing to take reasonable

measures to abate it.” See Farmer , 511 U.S. at 847. The Eighth Amendment also

protects against future harm to an inmate. See Helling v. McKinney , 509 U.S. 25,

33 (1993).

Under these standards, delay in providing medical care may

constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g. , Thomas v.

Town of Davie , 847 F.2d 771, 772-73 (11th Cir. 1988) (concluding

that an automobile accident victim stated an Eighth Amendment

claim against police officers for delay in obtaining medical care

when the victim obviously needed immediate medical attention

and his condition was deteriorating). Delays that courts have

found to violate the Eighth Amendment have frequently involved

life-threatening situations and instances in which it is apparent that

delay would exacerbate the prisoner’s medical problems. See Hill v.

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Dekalb Regional Youth Detention Center , 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 &

n. 21 (11th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). Officials may also be held

liable when the delay results in a lifelong handicap or a permanent

loss. See id. at 1188.

See Grant v. Bernalillo County Detention Ctr. , No. 98-2193, 1999 WL 157415

at **2 (10th Cir. March 23, 1999) (unpublished disposition).

On the present state of the record, without any response by the defendants,

we cannot conclude that Mr. Mapp failed to allege sufficient facts to state an

Eighth Amendment claim.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED, and the

matter is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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