holding that “evidence of racial slurs or threats, though not the subject of a distinct claim, is relevant to the determination of pretext and intent”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “evidence of racial slurs or threats, though not the subject of a distinct claim, is relevant to the determination of pretext and intent”
- stating that EAJA does not set $75 per hour cap on attorneys' fees sought by government counsel
- pre-filing and pre-trial investigation of claims wholly inadequate; statistical evidence never garnered on disparate impact claims; little or no effort made to sift through claims to determine potential merit; wholesale failure to digest and analyze materials provided in discovery
- “Finally, an attorney ... must not only conduct a reasonable investigation into the facts and law before filing, but continually must review and reevaluate his position as the case develops____ This continuing obligation requires abandonment of claims ... as soon as it becomes apparent it is unreasonable to pursue them.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
OPINION AND ORDER
JAMES C. FOX, District Judge.
I. OVERVIEW AND OPENING COMMENTARY
Racism, and all its collateral effects, is a doctrine abhorrent to any modem, civilized society. “At its core, it is an act of violence — a denial of another’s right to equal dignity.”
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,
— U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 2629 , 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Unfortunately, in the not very distant past, racism “was openly acknowledged as official policy of the United States government.” R. Klu-ger,
Simple Justice
84 (1977). Laws designed to assure the inferiority of black citizens remained on the books until well into this century.
Id., Johnson v. Halifax County,
594 F.Supp. 161, 164-65 (E.D.N.C.1984)
citing Gingles v. Edmisten,
590 F.Supp. 345, 359-61 (E.D.N.C.1984),
aff'd in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 , 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986).
See also
B.D. Adams,
The Survival of Domination: Inferiorization and Everyday Life,
21-24 (1978). Indeed, discrimination as a matter of state policy continues to flourish in many parts of the world.
Fortunately, the policy of the United States government has changed. Notwithstanding that fact, however, significant effects and results of the previous policy linger. Prior state-condoned racism encouraged similar attitudes among our citizens which have persisted long after state policy has been reversed.
Snell v. Suffolk County,
611 F.Supp. 521, 530-31 (E.D.N.Y.1985), aff
'd,
782 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir.1986). Many claims of discrimination today deal with systemic, subtle and stereotypical practices which developed when overt discrimination was lawful and remain imbedded in basic institutional or organizational structures. Belton,
Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice,
34 Vand.L.Rev. 1205, 1224 (1981). To understand why this has occurred, one need only consider the definition of racial prejudice.
*1220
Invidious discrimination, in the form of racial prejudice, is the “result of subjective, irrational perceptions, which drain individuals of their dignity because of their perceived equivalence as members of a racial group.”
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb,
785 F.2d 523, 528 (4th Cir.1986) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). “Misperception lies at the heart of prejudice and the animus formed of such ignorance sows malice and hatred wherever it operates without restriction.”
Id.
at 529 .
It is not surprising that prejudice and racial stereotyping have, at times, “severely impaired the operating effectiveness of our society.” J. Levin,
The Functions of Prejudice
33 (1975). Yet, discrimination persists, in part because of its function in the lives of certain members of the minority and majority groups involved.
Snell v. Suffolk County,
611 F.Supp. at 529 . For members of the perceived majority group, prejudice may be used to displace aggression, protect self-esteem, define self-image, and reduce uncertainty about the world as they view it.
Id. citing The Functions of Prejudice
at 61-62. For members of the perceived minority group, prejudice directed against it “often exerts pressure for group cohesiveness and pride, forces emphasis in its history and achievement, and brings about the development of organizations which further its interests as a group.”
Id.
at 100.
However, racial prejudice is not strictly limited to members of the “majority.” Unfortunately, persons of any color or national origin are susceptible to the mispercep-tions and animus referred to by Judge Wilkinson. No segment of our society’s population possesses a monopoly on morality in this regard. Reverse racial discrimination by blacks against whites can be and, on occasions, has been as virulent and diseased as the discrimination by whites against blacks. One need only recall the race riots which engulfed our inner cities in the 1960’s and 1970’s to comprehend this phenomenon.
Notwithstanding the above, however, this nation can generally point with some pride to the remarkable progress that has been made in the last four decades in eliminating the effects of past discrimination. Some of the improvement is directly attributable to anti-discriminatory laws passed by Congress and the state legislatures, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, upon which this action is predicated, and the strict enforcement of those laws by the courts. But much of the change has stemmed from educative institutions substantially more powerful than the courts or the political branches of government. Progress has most significantly occurred through the schools, churches and synagogues of this nation as well as from the example of enlightened public leaders representing all aspects of our society. With notable exceptions, widespread segregation in the nation’s academic institutions, public facilities, and places of employment has ended. Racial discrimination at the ballot box, in the halls of justice, and in the legislative chambers is no longer tolerated. Equal academic and employment opportunity has become the rule rather than the exception. Racial tensions in this country, by anyone’s definition, have diminished in recent years through the persistent and cooperative efforts of hundreds of thousands of our citizens.
By the above statements, the court does not blithely suggest that racial discrimination in this nation has been eradicated. To the extent that dream can ever be realized, it certainly has not yet come true. Race remains this nation’s most divisive problem. Subtle vestiges (and some not so subtle) of heretofore overt discrimination and racism continue in many aspects and segments of our society as the frequent and disgusting marches of the Klu Klux Klan and the recent incidents in Howard Beach, New York and Forsyth County, Georgia, make all too clear.
1
Fort Bragg, North Carolina, site of the litigation at bar,
*1221
being a microcosim of that society, is not immune from this disease of the heart and mind. Nonetheless, comparing the status of race relations in the United States, in general, and at Ft. Bragg, in particular, one cannot help but notice the progress which has been achieved over the last twenty years.
2
Whatever prejudice continues to manifest itself in society at large, Congress has flatly ruled that it will not be allowed, in any form or degree, in the workplace of the United States. Prejudice, whether blatant or subtle, practiced by black or white, invoked by those wearing blue collars or white collars, or wearing officers’ uniforms or grey flannel suits, will not be tolerated when directed against employees in the workplace.
Snell v. Suffolk County,
611 F.Supp. at 531 . Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq.,
as enacted, serves as a check on the legitimate exercise of an employer’s discretion vis-a-vis the improper exercise thereof. To this end, the statute promotes the national policy of equality of treatment between persons of different races, colors, religions, sexes, and national origins. “The broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel decisions.”
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 801 , 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 , 36 L.Ed. 2d 668 (1973).
Title VII, thus, provides a comprehensive federal remedy for employees injured by the use of “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications.”
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 430-31 , 91 S.Ct. 849, 853 , 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Simply stated, Congress enacted Title VII as a broad remedial statute of the highest priority, designed “to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.”
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 418 , 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2372 , 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). Consistent with this purpose, and mindful of the crucial role played by the private litigant in the statutory scheme, many procedural provisions of the Civil Rights Act have been liberally construed by the courts in favor of the complaining employee in a determined effort to reach the merits of any cognizable allegation of discrimination.
See Love v. Pullman Co.,
404 U.S. 522, 527 , 92 S.Ct. 616, 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972);
Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.,
595 F.2d 711, 727 (D.C.Cir.1978);
Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc.,
431 F.2d 455, 462-63 (5th Cir.1970);
Dickey v. Greene,
603 F.Supp. 102, 105 (E.D.N.C.1984).
Notwithstanding all of the above, however, the mere fact that an individual may hold the keys to the courthouse door does not imply that he may enter with disregard for his actions therein or disdain for the rights of all other parties to the litigation. As the court has taken pains to note, the issue of racial discrimination in this nation is long-standing and remains a terribly serious one. Charges of racism, if proved, carry an enormously stigmatizing effect. Accordingly, such charges should only be leveled after careful investigation, thoughtful deliberation, and never without a reasonable basis in law and fact.
3
This admonition becomes increasingly true as the number and intensity of the charges increase.
Unfortunately, like all humanitarian remedies, Title VII is subject to abuse by those
*1222
for whom the remedy was recognized and enacted. It is with the greatest of disappointment that this court finds itself in the unavoidable position of having to declare that this litigation represents a paradigm of such abuse.
Harris, et al. v. Marsh,
81-60-CIV-3, and
Loftin v. Marsh,
80-168-CIV-3, are employment discrimination actions brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Harris
was filed on September 14, 1981, and was brought as a class action by plaintiffs Mattiebelle Harris, Samuel Sheppard, Sandra Blue, Edward Humphrey and Robert Evans.
Loftin
was initiated by complaint filed August 29,1980, as an individual lawsuit. The two actions were consolidated for discovery and trial on March 31,1982. Broadly stated, plaintiffs alleged that they and other black civilian employees at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, had been discriminated against in numerous employment opportunities by the defendant because of their race and color.
After an extraordinary amount of discovery was exchanged, (this exchange being generally one-sided with plaintiffs doing the discovering and defendant doing the disclosing), a hearing was held on May 17, 1983, to determine whether the litigation would proceed as a class action. After review of the extensive evidence presented, the court rendered its decision denying class certification.
Harris v. Marsh,
100 F.R.D. 315 (E.D.N.C.1983).
See also
discussion
infra
at 1227-1228. Subsequently, forty-four (44) individuals were allowed to permissively intervene into the action. Eleven (11) of the intervenors withdrew their claims prior to trial. Motions to dismiss most of the claims of the remaining plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors (hereinafter simply “plaintiffs”), on procedural grounds were denied and trial of this case began on January 23,1984. During trial, a number of plaintiffs moved to dismiss their claims and these motions were granted with prejudice upon the condition that sanctions might issue at the termination of all proceedings due to the bad-faith post-trial abandonment of claims and their frivolous nature.
The enormity of this massive litigation may be gleaned from a review of a few representative statistics. The trial of this action, prior to a July 31, 1985, final settlement which essentially dismissed with prejudice nearly all of the substantive claims at issue,
4
see
discussion
infra
at 1237, required ninety-three (93) days of testimony and evidence. Two hundred and fifty-six (256) witnesses testified during these proceedings, some more than once. At the court’s request, over thirteen thousand (13,000) select pages of transcript have been produced by a veritable host of court reporters. Over twelve hundred (1,200) exhibits were admitted into evidence, many containing fifty (50) plus pages. One hundred forty-nine (149) depositions were filed with the court and the court file in this case is now contained in fifty-eight (58) 12" x 16" boxes in a separate room of the federal courthouse in Fayetteville. The docket sheet for this litigation, now thirty-seven (37) pages in length, reflects that the court has issued ninety-five (95) written orders of substance during the course of this proceeding and the parties have filed more briefs and memoranda than the court has time or the inclination to count. In sum, this case represents an expenditure of an extraordinary amount of time and resources for all concerned, with millions of dollars spent on its defense and prosecution. It is the largest civil rights action ever tried by the Department of the Army.
The charges of discrimination in this case were nearly unlimited in their geographic and legal scope. Plaintiffs attacked, broadside, every aspect of the defendant’s merit promotion process. The judicial complaint alleged, often in scathing and conclusory terms, that defendant engaged in racially discriminatory employment practices in the following areas: (1) promotions, (2) pay for similar work by comparatively qualified black and white employees, (3) merit pay increases, (4) assignment of black employ
*1223
ees to lower level positions, (5) underrepre-sentation of black employees at higher general schedule and supervisory positions, (6) job performance evaluations, (7) discipline, (8) use of subjective employee selection criteria, (9) reductions-in-force (RIF), (10) retaliation for exercising rights under Title VII, and (11) harassment.
5
Engrafted upon these base-wide issues were the individual claims of the plaintiffs.
Two final pre-trial orders were filed in this action, totalling four hundred thirty (430) pages. Plaintiffs contended there were forty (40) legal issues to be determined at trial, with defendant arguing the existence of one hundred twelve (112) triable issues. Disregarding any allegation of discrimination for which evidence was to be introduced solely for background purposes, plaintiffs alleged one hundred fifty (150)
specific
claims for relief. Plaintiffs’ proposed list of witnesses for trial totalled two hundred seventy-five (275) while defendant’s list totalled approximately eleven hundred (1,100). Between the parties, the proposed exhibits numbered for trial was in the thousands.
Given the breadth of the charges leveled against defendant, the court doubts that any functional or geographic area of Ft. Bragg was left untouched. A review of the pleadings and discovery in this case reveals that
hundreds
of military and civilian officials were charged with racially discriminatory actions. Indeed, the allegations were stunning in their pervasiveness and tenor for nary a corner of Ft. Bragg was rendered unaffected by the claims at bar.
Considering the magnitude of this action, and its obvious potential for (1) impacting on the entire civilian personnel process at Ft. Bragg, (2) disrupting the working environment and, indeed, lives of many of the officials named in the plaintiffs’ charges of discrimination, and (3) inflaming the passions of all the participants in this litigation on both sides of the issue, the court reasonably expected plaintiffs and their counsel to not only zealously advocate their claims, but also to properly temper their enthusiasm with careful regard for the obligations of truth, candor, accuracy, and in counsel’s case, the exercise of sound professional judgment. To the court’s profound dismay, the latter corollary obligations were not fulfilled.
Although the court did not hear testimony on a number of claims initially raised due to the July, 1985, settlement of much of this case, the 93 days of testimony encompassed all the prosecuted substantive allegations of six plaintiffs, as well as testimony on a number of individual claims of other plaintiffs heard for the express purpose of determining,
inter alia,
whether sanctions for the filing of frivolous and abandoned allegations were appropriate. A review of the evidence in this case — and the court has exhaustively reviewed its trial notes, the record, the transcript and the admitted exhibits — reveals that many of the plaintiffs’ claims for relief were frivolous and without foundation.
*1224
The absolute lack of credible evidence supporting so many of the allegations heard is deeply troubling. There were claims tried where the individual plaintiff was unable to produce
any
evidence of discrimination or retaliatory conduct on the part of defendant.
See, e.g.,
Sheppard’s promotion claims under Merit Promotion Announcements 200-79 and 201-79, Blue’s promotion claims under Merit Promotion Announcements 273-79 and 303-79. To be sure, the court is cognizant of the fact that instances will occur where individuals will be passed over for a particular promotion and, in such situations, it is not an uncommon experience for that person to feel he was more deserving of the promotion or perhaps even more qualified than the selectee.
Edwards v. Marsh,
644 F.Supp. 1564 (E.D.Mich.1986). Nevertheless, because there are often a myriad of considerations that accompany a promotional decision, the burden must rest on a plaintiff to show at least some modicum of impropriety in the decision in order to raise an inference of discrimination. Yet, time after time in this case, plaintiffs’ evidence, shorn of all its incredible underpinnings, simply came down to an assertion by the plaintiff that she/he was black, the supervisor or selecting official was white, and an adverse employment action had occurred. Such minimal evidence clearly does not meet the
McDonnell Douglas
test for establishing even a
prima facie
case of disparate treatment.
See Holmes v. Bevi-lacqua,
794 F.2d 142 (4th Cir.1986)
(en
banc).
Just as disturbing, however, was the utterly incredible nature of a number of the plaintiffs’ testimony. The testimony of plaintiffs Sheppard, Blue, Ballew and Beulah Mae Harris, in particular, was astounding for its lack of candor and truthfulness. These plaintiffs consistently testified either out of shocking ignorance or stunning disregard for the veracity of their allegations.
6
Inconsistencies and evasiveness abound in their testimony and self-serving lapses of memory are fatally pervasive. Some of the factual allegations can most charitably be termed “fantasies.” The court cannot honestly recall another witness with whom it has been less favorably impressed than these four in all its years on the bench and in practice. Reading the transcript of their testimony, particularly the government’s devastating cross-examination, leads to one undeniable conclusion —on a number of occasions, Sheppard, Blue, Ballew and Harris lied.
7
In addition, contributing to plaintiffs’ problems in this litigation was their unyielding and erroneous view of what constitutes discrimination in a promotion decision. By way of example, plaintiff Sheppard testified that in a promotion action, if blacks are “underrepresented” within a particular organization based upon an undifferentiated labor market and a black is among those referred for selection, the black referee must be “strongly considered” for the position. Upon being asked how one would know if one had been “strongly considered” he testified, “If you’re not selected, you haven’t been strongly considered.”
The apparent disseminator of this view is the former Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) officer, James Canady, a witness for the plaintiffs, who incredibly testified that
*1225
it is
deliberate
discrimination if, where blacks are “underrepresented” according to the Ft. Bragg Affirmative Action Plan (AAP) and Federal Equal Opportunity Recruitment Program (FEORP), a black on the referral list is either not selected or the selecting official does not set out in writing that he has given “great weight” to the underrepresentation consideration. Cana-dy admitted on cross-examination that this view of discrimination was not written anywhere nor was he able to cite any authority for this creative proposition.
Testimony similar to Sheppard’s and Canady’s can be found in plaintiff Mattie-belle Harris’ case, where she testified that in her opinion the AAP
required
the selection of a black where underrepresentation was noted. In her case, Canady went even further to suggest that in his opinion blacks should be represented throughout the workforce in the same proportions that they are found in the local
undifferentiated
labor market. To assert that any ethnic group should be represented in
skilled
positions such as engineers or physicians in proportion to their overall general representation in the community, regardless of education, experience and merit, is absurd.
See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California,
— U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1442, 1454 , 94 L.Ed.2d 615 (1987);
Hazelwood School District v. United States,
433 U.S. 299 , 308 n.13, 97 S.Ct. 2736 , 2742 n.13, 53 L.Ed.2d 768 (1977);
EEOC v. Western Electric Co.,
713 F.2d 1011 , 1018 (4th Cir.1983);
Paxon v. Union National Bank,
688 F.2d 552 , 564 (8th Cir.1982);
Woodard v. Lehman,
530 F.Supp. 139, 145 (D.S.C.1982);
Jones v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc.,
546 F.Supp. 762, 774 (M.D.N.C.1982). Canady then reiterated his view that a showing of underrepresentation obligated management to give what amounted to a preference for black applicants and, where this preference was not effected, discrimination under Title YII was presumed. These views were echoed throughout this litigation by plaintiffs and, to a great extent, their counsel. Although this concept will be discussed more thoroughly
infra,
it suffices to state that Canady’s theory is without support in the law.
See, e.g., Valentino v. United States Postal Service,
674 F.2d 56 (D.C.Cir.1982);
Frink v. United States Navy,
16 FEP Cases 67 (E.D.Pa.1977). “The fact that the [Army] itself in its Affirmative Action Plan has made comparisons to general labor force statistics to determine if minorities are underrepresented is not binding [under Title VII]. Whether or not the [Army] makes a pointless comparison to general labor force statistics, a violation of Title VII can only be established with probative statistical evidence utilizing comparisons to an
appropriate labor market.” Frink,
16 FEP Cases at 71 (emphasis added).
See generally Hazelwood School District v. United States, supra; EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,
698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir.1983),
rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,
467 U.S. 867 , 104 S.Ct. 2794 , 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984).
As to statistical evidence in general, the record is shocking not so much for what is shows as for what it fails to show. In some claims, like those of Sandra Blue, there simply was no statistical presentation made by the plaintiffs,
see
findings and conclusions
infra,
even in support of her disparate
impact
allegations. In other cases, where statistics were presented, the analysis was so fraught with inaccuracies, inconsistencies, and inappropriate methods of comparison that the evidence was rendered totally unreliable and incredible.
See, e.g.,
testimony of plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Alan Parrow in claims of Mattiebelle Harris and Samuel Sheppard.
8
*1226
Finally, the court comes to the issue which ultimately led the defendant to move, in a number of cases, for the imposition of sanctions, including attorney’s fees and costs. For various reasons, after trial of this action began, thirteen (13) plaintiffs moved to withdraw and dismiss their claims.
See
discussion
infra.
In some cases, the reasons were financial; in other cases, personal. In all cases, defendant argued that the real motive behind the plaintiffs’ respective motions was that their claims were groundless and frivolous and, as such, plaintiffs simply wanted out of the lawsuit. Thus, defendant moved the court to impose an award of fees and costs upon the plaintiffs for abuse of the judicial process which defendant claimed resulted in monetary loss to the defendant, interference with the proper defense of other claims, and a waste of judicial resources. Although many of these claims likewise were settled in July of 1985, defendant’s motion with respect to the claims of Beulah Mae Harris remains for disposition.
In addition, with respect to those plaintiffs whose cases were heard by the court, allegations of discrimination which had been set forth as claims for relief in the final pre-trial orders were abandoned prior to trial of each plaintiff’s case and never pursued. Defendant, having spent enormous amounts of time and resources preparing to defend these claims was, needless to say, perturbed by this startling change of events. So was the court, for the final pre-trial order in any case must be viewed as binding on all parties to the litigation. Defendant had a right to rely on the pretrial orders
sub judice
and to prepare accordingly. Yet, when the time came to try each plaintiff’s claims, defendant was legitimately surprised by what claims that plaintiff was not pursuing. Plaintiffs’ view appeared to be that since defendant effectively “won” on any claim not prosecuted, defendant could not be heard to complain— no harm, no foul. This cavalier attitude toward the physical and fiscal resources of the defendant and the court (which also prepared for the trial of these claims) was and remains shocking.
See
findings and conclusions
infra
at §§ VI and VII.
In sum, background claims (some never denominated as such) and claims for relief were abandoned and merged with lightening speed (time being relative in this lawsuit) at the whim of the plaintiffs and without any advance notice to defendant or the court. One was never certain, even on the eve of trial, of exactly what claims plaintiffs were pursuing, whether designated claims would be expressly waived, or whether claims, clearly designated for trial in the pre-trial order, would simply creep slowly and silently away into the night never to be heard from again. Such litigation practices are intolerable and patently unfair to the opposing party, regardless of his relative resources.
All of the above circumstances lead the court to the inexorable conclusion that as a
*1227
whole, defendant has been forced to defend an extraordinary lawsuit that was, with rare exceptions, groundless from the beginning. Plaintiffs seemingly viewed every adverse employment decision by agents of the defendant as racially motivated, regardless of the merits of the decision. This was true, even in cases where the plaintiff obviously was not qualified for the position sought, deserved the discipline rendered, or was a disruptive and unproductive employee. It is with great reluctance that the court finds it must hold that to the extent any racism was proven in this case, such discrimination was generally perpetrated by the plaintiffs upon the defendant, not the reverse, for it was the plaintiffs who consistently saw every criticism and action in a blindly racial context.
The defense and trial of this case involved an enormous expense to the taxpayers of the United States. Such a needless drain on the manpower and public coffers of this nation cannot be viewed lightly. Plaintiffs and their counsel blatantly disregarded the cost of this litigious exercise to both the defendant and to society. As a result, the most extensive, and quite probably costly, litigation this district has ever seen took place over a span of four years— litigation which will end in this court today with no real winners and some very real losers.
Although the court has touched upon some of the background of these proceedings in this opening commentary, a preface to the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the claims of plaintiff Blue and defendant’s motion for sanctions and fees against Blue and Harris is required in the form of a more detailed
II. HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
As previously noted, this action was commenced by complaint filed September 14, 1981. Plaintiffs contend that they and other similarly situated black civilian employees at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, were discriminated against and denied equal employment opportunities on the basis of race in violation of Section 717(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). Plaintiffs seek in-junctive relief, back pay, and other equitable relief for themselves and a class of all past, present and future black employees of the defendant who were employed by defendant at any time since March 24, 1972, and who were discriminatorily denied civilian employment opportunities on the basis of race.
The defendant, John O. Marsh, is Secretary of the United States Army, and in that capacity, is responsible for the various employment practices challenged at Ft. Bragg; this location being a facility of the United States Department of the Army comprising the [¶] XVIII Airborne Corps and Ft. Bragg and Tenant Units.
Ft. Bragg and neighboring Pope Air Force Base comprise one of the world’s largest military installations. Indeed, Ft. Bragg’s population of 157,000 ranks it as the fifth largest “city” in North Carolina. As might be expected, an installation of this size requires significant “support” services and, in that capacity, defendant employs approximately 4,000 civilian employees annually. The civilian employees are assigned to various units or divisions of the base and provide clerical, technical and professional assistance for the armed forces’ personnel assigned to the facility. Plaintiffs are or were all employed in this capacity.
Shortly after the initiation of this lawsuit, what was to be a long and exhausting discovery process commenced. Between November of 1981 and February of 1983, an extraordinary amount of information was exchanged between the parties with a maximum of effort and a relative minimum of motions, as evidenced by the sheer number of depositions filed with the court, documents produced in response to various requests, and interrogatories answered.
Trial was originally scheduled for May 9, 1983. On February 23, 1983, defendant requested a determination that the case not proceed as a class action. The court denied the motion, but directed plaintiffs to move for class certification by April 18,1983, and continued the trial date to August 1, 1983.
*1228
Plaintiffs properly filed their motion and defendant timely responded. A hearing was conducted on May 17, 1983, at which plaintiff adduced further evidence. Following the hearing, supplemental pleadings were filed by both sides. By order dated June 30, 1983, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion, holding that plaintiffs had failed to meet the factual burden established in
General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon,
457 U.S. 147 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 , 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982), for class claims and a memorandum opinion followed.
Harris v. Marsh,
100 F.R.D. 315 (E.D.N.C.1983).
As an initial matter, the court observed that plaintiffs’ primary challenge was to defendant’s promotional process and, absent any specific attack on an isolated, facially neutral requirement within that process, plaintiffs’ general promotion claims were most properly analyzed under the disparate treatment theory.
Id.
at 322 . Although as this case progressed, certain individual adverse impact claims arose, such as one of Blue’s claims still in issue, this finding has generally retained its validity.
9
The court’s review of the anecdotal and documentary evidence presented by the plaintiffs failed to establish “that a significant number of the alleged class members have been discriminated against in the same way as have the named plaintiffs.”
Id.
Furthermore, the court found that plaintiffs’ statistical presentation failed to raise any compelling inference of discrimination. Indeed, defendant’s unre-futed evidence demonstrated that blacks have been favored in promotions:
PROMOTION OF BLACKS AT FORT BRAGG
Blacks in Ft. Bragg Work Force Actual Promotions
1979 22.9% 21.6%
1980 22.8% 24.2%
1981 23.5% 23.9%
Id.
at 323 .
In reviewing the requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that “[p]laintiffs have offered scant evidence as to the alleged claims of fifty-five employees ... [with] most of these individuals [failing to] to present a
prima facie
case of discrimination.”
Id.
at 324 .
10
As a result, the court found that plaintiffs failed to meet the numerosity requirement.
Id.
With regard to typicality, the court held that “[t]he statistics tend to reveal that black employees at Ft. Bragg are, in general, promoted in proportion to their numbers in the work force, receive awards in that proportion, and are trained in the same manner as their counterparts.... The statistics ... suggest that [ ] discrimination is the exception rather than the rule.”
Id.
at 324-25 .
11
Accordingly, the court found that plaintiffs failed to meet the typicality and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a).
Id.
at 325 .
Immediately after class certification was denied, forty-four (44) members of the disappointed class plaintiffs sought to represent moved to intervene as party-plaintiffs.
12
Over strenuous opposition of the defendant, the court allowed the movants to permissively intervene, pursuant to Rule 24(b)(2), holding that “while classwide relief may not be available.... [t]here is a
*1229
common nucleus of law and fact among [the proposed intervenors’] claims.” Order of August 25, 1983, at 2.
See Hill v. Western Electric Co.,
672 F.2d 381 (4th Cir.1982) (holding that upon denial of class certification, motions for intervention by members of the putative class should be liberally allowed). Upon order of the court, an Amended Complaint-in-Intervention was filed on August 25, 1983, and the trial date was eventually re-scheduled for January 23, 1984.
For the next several months, discovery regarding the intervenors was conducted at a rapid pace with omnibus pre-trial motions being advanced by both sides, particularly the defendant.
13
As a result of all this activity, the court entered a responding omnibus order disposing of all pending motions at the final pre-trial conference in December of 1983. In sum, the court held that:
(1) The motion of eleven (11) intervenors for leave to withdraw as plaintiffs, filed within approximately one month of their initial motion to intervene, was allowed;
14
(2) Counsel for plaintiffs satisfactorily resolved a host of potential conflicts among the plaintiffs by agreement of various in-tervenors and named plaintiffs not to pursue fifteen (15) competing promotion claims;
15
(3) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff-intervenor Catherine Gutierrez was allowed as her claims turned out to be wholly atypical and therefore not the proper subject of permissive intervention;
(4) Although plaintiffs’ motion to compel the production of a computer readable database prepared by the defendant’s experts for trial was denied, all of the raw data upon which the base was predicated,
i.e.,
all of the relevant promotional files at Ft. Bragg, was ordered made available to the plaintiffs for inspection and copying. Of course most of this material had already been disclosed to plaintiffs long before this order;
(5) Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment against some of the claims of twelve (12) plaintiffs on grounds that these claims were previously administratively resolved and settled was denied. The court found the existence of a factual dispute as to the validity and effect of any such release,
see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36 , 94 S.Ct. 1011 , 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974), and established a procedure to hear evidence on these disputes prior to the start of each plaintiff’s claim;
16
(6) Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment against sixty-seven (67) claims of twenty-two (22) plaintiffs on grounds that these claims were not ripe,
i.e.,
that these plaintiffs filed suit prior to any final agency decision on their EEO complaints and prior to the passage of 180 days, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(e), thus, failing to exhaust their
*1230
administrative remedies, was denied.
17
The court held that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required where, as in this case, the named plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies and exhaustion by the intervenors similarly situated, would have been futile.
Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket,
720 F.2d 326 (4th Cir.1983);
Foster v. Gueory,
655 F.2d 1319 (D.C.Cir.1981);
18
(7) Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment against thirty-five (35) claims of eleven (11) plaintiffs on grounds that these claims were not presented to an EEO counselor within thirty (30) days of the alleged discriminatory act, as required by 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214 (a)(i) (1983), was denied.
19
Extending the logic of
Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, supra,
the court found that as long as the alleged act of discrimination occurred after March 3, 1980, the claim need not have been the subject of any EEO complaint. In addition, each claim in this category was held subject to equitable tolling;
20
and
(8) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment against twenty-four (24) claims of thirteen (13) plaintiffs
21
was granted on grounds that these claims arose more than thirty (30) days prior to the filing date of the administrative class complaint.
22
See
n. 18,
supra.
Upon further ruling June 30,1983, as the forward cut-off date for any claim at bar and bifurcating the trial on issues of liability and damages, the final pre-trial orders, as previously described
supra
at 1223, were filed. Trial of this action commenced, most appropriately, at high noon on January 23, 1984, in Fayetteville.
23
*1231
According to the final pre-trial orders, trial time for the claims of the remaining thirty-eight (38) plaintiffs was estimated by the parties at nine (9) weeks. This case, among others, has since convinced the court never to trust trial counsel’s view of how long their case will take. From the onset, it became apparent to everyone that this prediction of trial length was vastly understated. Significant evidentiary and procedural problems surfaced immediately, an omen of events to follow. Questions were raised concerning (1) the applicability of the forward cut-off date to allegedly on-going claims of retaliation and harassment; (2) what claims were specifically designated for relief and what claims were introduced solely for background purposes;
24
(3) the order of witnesses and the scope of their testimony; (4) the scope of cross-examination and of re-direct; (5) redaction of contested exhibits; (6) the use of cumulative and repetitive testimony; (7) the use of statistics within the Ft. Bragg AAP; (8) the evasiveness of witnesses; (9) the attempted impeachment of witnesses by collateral contradiction; (10) the admissibility and weight to be given findings and recommendations of the EEOC and the intermediate findings of the agency’s administrative bodies; (11) the admissibility of evidence of alleged discriminatory acts committed by supervisory personnel at Ft. Bragg against third party civilian employees, where the supervisor is not charged by the plaintiffs with being an alleged discriminatory official (ADO); (12) the time-consuming process of reading, line by line, portions of exhibits introduced into evidence; and (13) the admissibility, pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D), of statements offered against the defendant, made by ADO’s and non-ADO’s while employed at Ft. Bragg concerning personnel decisions rendered by that official.
In addition to these problems, simply attempting to master the merit promotion process at Ft. Bragg, the terminology employed by both civilian and military personnel at the installation, and the organizational structure of the base itself became a challenging and time-consuming, if less than exciting, daily adventure into the unknown for the court. Complicating the trial process even further was the simple fact that plaintiffs’ case was, from its initiation, poorly prepared with essential groundwork for important testimony never laid.
25
Often, testimony in plaintiffs’ case-in-chief was left hanging and wholly ambiguous until the defendant could fill in (and overrun) the gaps with his own witnesses.
All of the above factors, of course, led to an exorbitant increase in trial time per plaintiff per claim. The final pre-trial order listed nine (9) specific claims for the first plaintiff, Mattiebelle Harris. Three (3) weeks after the trial started, the court was still listening to testimony in the claim of Mattiebelle Harris. Indeed, Ms. Harris herself testified for over five (5) days.
Faced with the intolerable prospect of trying the remainder of the case at the pace established by the Harris claims, the court, on March 20, 1984, issued a lengthy procedural order re-defining the rules of the game from that date forward.
26
Individual trial briefs were required for each plaintiff’s case. Particularized identification of claims, witnesses, their testimony, and exhibits was mandated.
27
Deadlines for proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were established. Additional pre-trial stipulations were strongly encouraged. Background organizational and com
*1232
mand structure evidence was ordered at the introduction of each claim.
Time limitations per plaintiff and written direct testimony were threatened. All ongoing evidentiary disputes were resolved, many in favor of the position advanced by the plaintiffs.
See
Order of March 20, 1984, at Section XIII, paras. C, G, L, N, and O, pp. 13-16.
28
Evidence on the claims of Mattiebelle Harris concluded on February 17,1984, and the Sheppard claims began, after a delay, on March 26, 1984.
29
The court notes that the plaintiffs’ process of abandoning claims during trial began early with the Sheppard case. Just by way of example, Sheppard alleged seven (7) claims for relief in the Final Pre-Trial Order,
see
p. 23, including claims for the discriminatory denial of Merit Promotion Announcement (MPA) 33-80, discriminatory detailing, denial of training, and evaluation. Yet, when Sheppard’s pretrial brief of March 26, 1984, was filed, only three (3) claims for relief were alleged —MPA 33-80 and the detailing, training, and evaluation claims were not among them.
See
Sheppard’s Brief at 3-4. When the omission of MPA 33-80 was brought to plaintiff’s attention, plaintiff’s counsel stated that this claim had recently been converted to a background claim. In contradiction with this statement, Sheppard was later to testify at his sanctions hearing that he assumed it was a background claim all along.
30
Although the Sheppard case proceeded at a slightly faster pace, evidence was not completed until April 18, 1984. Testimony on plaintiff Blue’s claims began on April 19, 1984. In the interim, on April 17, 1984, defendant filed his first motion for sanctions alleging abuse of judicial process by the bad-faith abandonment, without notice, of final pre-trial claims for relief in the cases of Mattiebelle Harris,
31
Sheppard, and Blue (as proposed in Blue’s pre-trial brief of April 3, 1984).
32
As defendant stated at the time:
Plaintiffs made broad allegations of racial discrimination in their initial complaint, subsequent multiple answers to defendant’s interrogatories, and several pre-trial orders. In these documents plaintiffs expanded and amplified upon their allegations and cited specific merit promotion announcements and issues which they asserted they would litigate. Plaintiffs in effect placed defendant on notice that almost every personnel action involving plaintiffs and/or intervenors would be litigated. Defendant was therefore, forced to be prepared to rebut such issues_ As can be seen, however, such allegations [with many now abandoned] were a mere smoke screen to divert the time, energies and money of the defendant away from what would turn out to be the actual issues....
Defendant bilieve [sic] that the sudden dropping of these claims damaged them_because plaintiffs either deliberately or carelessly made grandiose alle
*1233
gations without any evidentiary support. This method of recklessly making charges [ ] distracted defendant from refining their defenses on the real causes of action that plaintiffs intended to pursue. .
Plaintiffs contended that they dropped these claims pursuant to the court’s desire to speed up the litigation.
Such an excuse cannot be credited when closely scrutinized. Either plaintiffs believed these claims were meritorious to begin with, in which case it is difficult to believe that they would spontaneously drop them now solely to shorten trial time or they were deliberately inserted with the intent to mislead the defendant. ...
It is inconceivable that the plaintiffs maintained a good faith belief that they had been discriminated against in these claims but dropped them merely to shorten the proceedings....
Obviously what occurred in reality was that these were dubious claims to begin with and that they were dropped when the court required plaintiffs to further specify the facts in each and every case.... [Thus], the most baseless of these claims were quickly abandoned.
Defendant’s Memorandum of April 17, 1984, at 2-6. Unfortunately, as this opinion will later find, the court is forced to agree with much of what defendant wrote in April of 1984.
Defendant’s motion for sanctions was taken under advisement and a briefing schedule established. Shortly thereafter (April 25), trial of the Blue claims was recessed until August due to the press of other litigation and certain unavoidable and exigent personal matters.
33
On May 7, 1984, plaintiffs Jeanne Hen-don, James Fleming and Beulah Mae Harris moved for voluntary dismissal of all their claims, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 41(a)(2).
34
Plaintiffs contended that, although their claims were meritorious, various legitimate reasons now necessitated their withdrawal from the lawsuit. Hen-don asserted time, expense and health reasons. Fleming argued that he was financially unable to pursue the litigation any further and, in any event, his most important claims had been dismissed by the court in its December 8, 1983, Order.
35
Harris alleged that she was harassed and retaliated against due to her participation in this lawsuit and that she would pursue her continuing claims in this regard in another forum.
See
Findings and Conclusions
infra
at §§ VI and VII.
Defendant responded to plaintiff’s motion, arguing that plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous and pursued in bad faith. Although defendant did not oppose dismissal of the claims, defendant moved for sanctions and an award of fees and costs. On June 6, 1984, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion with prejudice,
but
expressly conditioned the dismissal by reserving its right to render a decision on defendant’s motion for sanctions and enter judgment against plaintiffs at that time.
36
*1234
Motions similar to that filed by Hendon, Fleming and Harris were subsequently filed by Violet Henderson and Leonetta Bibby on July 26, 1984, Alicia Chisholm on July 30,1984, and Carlton Giles, King Cameron, Viola McLean, Manuel Early, Jessie Williams, Nancy Alexander, and Joyce Malone on September 14, 1984. Reasons for the proposed dismissals varied with each plaintiff: some personal, some financial, some ambiguous. It would serve no useful purpose to recite them all here. Defendant filed a similar response in each case and the court issued orders identical to that filed on June 6, 1984. Sanctions hearings were eventually held in 1985 with regard to these motions to dismiss, and all of these disputes, except with respect to Blue and Beulah Mae Harris, eventually settled in July of 1985.
37
Deeply concerned about the four month delay in proceeding with the trial of Blue’s claims, the court, in an effort to effectively utilize at least a portion of this time, referred all of the collateral settlement issues which remained open after the court’s December, 1983, order to United States Magistrate Wallace Dixon for hearing as a master pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5).
38
A three day evi-dentiary hearing was subsequently held by the Magistrate in Fayetteville on the claims of plaintiffs Robert Evans and Mitchell McKeller.
39
On August 1,1984, the Magistrate issued his report concluding that neither plaintiff was barred from asserting any claim for relief as the disputed claims were never legally resolved by means of the administrative complaint process. After objections were filed by the defendant, the court indicated orally that with some modification in the Magistrate’s findings of fact, the court adopted the report’s extensive conclusions of law
in toto.
40
One other incident of significance needs to be mentioned prior to a return to the trial of Blue’s claims in August of 1984. James Canady, a witness for the plaintiffs, filed an informal EEO complaint alleging that defense counsel retaliated against him because of his testimony in this case and intimidated him during a public speech at an Army EEO seminar in May of 1984. Defense counsel emphatically denied the charge and requested an immediate eviden-tiary hearing, which the court held on June 8, 1984, in Raleigh. As a result of this hearing, the court found that defense counsel’s comments at the seminar, concerning the history of this litigation and plaintiffs’ view of the effect of AAP's, were not intended nor could they reasonably be perceived as direct or indirect threats or attempts to intimidate Canady. Indeed, Ca-nady stated at the hearing that he did not feel intimidated with regard to any future testimony. Accordingly, the court found no misconduct on counsel’s part and no threat to the integrity of the litigation.
See
Order of July 27, 1984.
On August 27, 1984, the trial resumed in Wilmington. As befits this case, testimony was soon thereafter interrupted by Hurricane Diana, which hit Wilmington in early September of 1984 not once, but twice. Thankfully, all participants to the litigation survived the lady’s double onslaught and testimony in Blue’s case was completed on
*1235
September 4, 1984.
41
I note that one good thing did come of Diana’s visit(s) to Wilmington and that was the break in trial which allowed the court to re-assess the status of the litigation, then in its ninth week. As furious acts of nature have a way of doing, hurricanes can make a person realize his own mortality. Deciding that it was quite possible I didn’t have enough time remaining in my lifetime to complete this case at the pace then in progress, the court, pursuant to Fed.R. Evid. 611(a), established time limitations for all of the remaining claims, beginning with the next plaintiff, Geraldine Ballew. Each party was allowed a total block of hours for direct and re-direct examination of their witnesses as well as cross and re-cross examination of the opposing party’s witnesses.
42
In Ballew’s case, each side was allotted twenty-three (23) hours and neither party reached their limit.
43
Evidence in the Ballew case was completed on September 14, 1984; testimony on the claims of Robert Evans began on September 17, 1984, and ran through September 21, 1984. Again, due to pending criminal litigation which has priority, trial recessed and was not resumed until February 25, 1985. In the interim, the parties filed proposed findings and conclusions with respect to completed claims, pre-trial materials for upcoming cases, and cross-motions for sanctions on a series of discovery disputes. From the events that occurred in early March of 1985, it is also apparent that counsel engaged in extensive settlement negotiations over this break, as the court had long been urging.
Trial again resumed on February 25, 1985, and quickly thereafter both the claims of Robert Evans and Mitchell McKeller were completed. As the court was preparing to hear the next series of claims, those of plaintiff Edward Humphrey, counsel informed the court that a partial settlement of this action had been reached.
44
Although the terms of the agreement took a few days to iron out, an “Agreement” was signed and filed on March 4, 1985. The terms of the accord were as follows:
(1) The defendant agreed to continue to implement its AAP and FEORP in good faith, attempting to achieve the goals and time-tables specified therein. Plaintiffs conceded, however, that both plans were based on an undifferentiated labor market
*1236
and, thus, if the goals of the plans were not met as scheduled, plaintiffs agreed not to bring a proceeding against the defendant alleging that defendant’s failure violated the agreement;
(2) All of the plaintiffs with cases remaining to be decided, except Mattiebelle Harris, Sheppard, Blue, Ballew and Evans, agreed to dismiss their claims with prejudice, as well as any pending EEO or other administrative charge or grievance which formed the predicate of the claims at bar or which were raised subsequent to June 30, 1983. In return, defendant agreed to pay the sum of $75,000.00 to the plaintiffs as a group, with certain discovery expenses incurred by the defendant set-off from that figure;
(3) Those claims heard by the court— Harris, Sheppard, Blue, Ballew and Evans —were to be adjudicated by the court, with both parties waiving any right to appteal said ruling. In addition, plaintiffs agreed not to pursue any claim for class relief or seek reconsideration of the denial of class certification;
(4) All pending motions for sanctions, filed by either party, were to be decided by the court with both sides reserving the right to appeal any decision rendered thereto; and
(5) Defendant agreed to waive any claims to costs, expenses or fees in the Ballew case. Plaintiffs agreed to the same in all cases, except those of Harris, Sheppard, Blue and Evans.
Upon filing of the “Agreement,” trial was recessed until March 11, 1985, to allow the parties to prepare for the sanctions hearings to follow. The sanctions hearings were divided and sub-divided in the following manner. First, the court entertained testimony and argument with respect to a series of cross-motions regarding alleged discovery and procedural abuses not directly linked to any individual claim. Second, defendant’s motion for sanctions, fees and costs with respect to each of the individual plaintiffs was heard in a bifurcated setting, with evidence as to “liability” in each case coming initially and evidence as to “damages,”
i.e.,
requested fees and costs, being heard last.
45
In addition, at the liability stage of the proceeding, the court specifically directed that two questions be addressed: (1) whether the claim(s) at issue were frivolous, meritless or vexatious under
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412, 421 , 98 S.Ct. 694, 700 , 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 ; and (2) whether any claims for relief designated as such in the final pre-trial order were abandoned after the start of trial and, if so, whether the abandonment occurred for a legitimate and good-faith reason.
See
Order of May 29, 1985. Defendant’s request for costs, expenses and fees against the individual plaintiffs exceeded $220,-000.00.
After expeditiously resolving most of the discovery disputes between the parties, evidence on the defendant’s motions against the individual plaintiffs began on March 11, 1985. Trial on the liability aspect of the defendant’s motions took place on March 11-15, March 26-29, and April 8-10, 1985.
46
Upon completion of the evidence, court was recessed to allow briefing by the parties, a decision by the court on the liability issues, and preparation for any required hearing on damages.
During April, May and early June, the parties filed extensive proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon review of those materials, the court’s trial notes, and significant portions of the record, the court informed counsel that it would find in favor of plaintiffs Mattiebelle Harris and Leonetta Bibby and, therefore, testimony as to damages in those cases was rendered moot. As for the remaining plaintiffs, the
*1237
court indicated to counsel that it was seriously considering imposing at least partial sanctions on a number of claims against those individuals and, potentially, against counsel. Accordingly, defendant was ordered to file a fee and cost application with the court by claim, indicating a breakdown of the reasonable hours expended by counsel and their litigation staff, as well as counsel’s hourly rate requested. Order of June 6, 1985,
citing Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886 , 104 S.Ct. 1541 , 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984);
Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424 , 103 S.Ct. 1933 , 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983);
National Association of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense,
675 F.2d 1319 (D.C.Cir.1982); and
Copeland v. Marshall,
641 F.2d 880 (D.C.Cir.1980)
(en banc
).
47
Plaintiffs were ordered to present any evidence contesting the reasonableness of the hours claimed or rate requested at the July 8 session of court.
See
Order of July 5, 1985. Plaintiffs were also ordered to present any evidence at that time indicating a financial inability to pay the requested amount.
Id.
Prior to the start of the July 8 hearings, one of the plaintiffs, Alicia Chisholm, who had retained independent counsel, reached an agreement with the defendant resolving defendant’s motion for sanctions against her. This agreement was approved by the court on July 3, 1985.
Hearings on the issue of damages were held for eight (8) days, commencing July 10, 1985. During this process, the parties were simultaneously conducting late night negotiations aimed at resolving the entire dispute. These negotiations reached fruition on July 31,1985, with the filing of the “Final Agreement,” previously mentioned in this opinion, disposing of all substantive claims, save those of Sandra Blue, and all sanctions motions, save those of Blue and Beulah Mae Harris.
48
Specifically, the Agreement dismissed with prejudice all individual and class claims of race discrimination and retaliation against the defendant, except Blue’s, which arose from plaintiffs’ employment at Ft. Bragg up to June 30, 1983, “known or unknown,” “matured or unmatured,” that were raised or could have been raised in this lawsuit under Title VII. Further, all EEO and administrative charges and grievances forming the basis of any claim at bar or raised between June 30,1983, and March 4, 1985, were dismissed. All motions for sanctions, fees, and costs were dismissed, except those against Blue and Harris. This Agreement superceded the March 4, 1985, settlement and constituted a “full and complete resolution of all matters alleged in this litigation,” except for the claims heretofore mentioned.
See also
Orders of August 6 and 7, 1985. By order of August 6, 1985, the court interpreted the Agreement as a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(h), thus, rendering the document immediately effective and obviating the need for judicial approval.
McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777
F.2d 1178, 1184-85 (7th Cir.1985);
American Cyanamid Co. v. McGhee,
317 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir.1963); Wright and Miller,
Federal Practice & Procedure:
Civil § 2363 (1971).
Following filing of the “Final Agreement,” both sides submitted numerous briefs, affidavits and materials on the remaining claims and motions at issue. Evidence was deemed closed as of August 23, 1985, and final pleadings were filed by November 5, 1985.
Accordingly, the court will now consider
seriatim
the substantive claims of plaintiff Sandra Blue and defendant’s motion for sanctions against plaintiffs Blue and Beulah Mae Harris. The credible evidence adduced at trial in this case supports the following.
III. FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO DEFENDANT’S PERSONNEL POLI
*1238
CIES AND METHODOLOGY OP PROMOTION
49
Both sides introduced extensive evidence as to the organization and promotion processes utilized at Ft. Bragg. Because knowledge of the institutional structure and the merit promotion system is vital to an informed evaluation of plaintiffs’ claims and defendant’s motion for sanctions, the court includes the following findings.
A.
Ft. Bragg’s Civilian Personnel
System
50
1. The Ft. Bragg Civilian Personnel Office (CPO) has authority and direction over employment practices at the installation subject to regulations and directives from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and Department of Defense (DOD). CPO is under the supervision of the Civilian Personnel Officer, a position held since January 27, 1980, by Jerry W. Horne, a white male. Horne, as well as a number of members of his staff, testified at length during various claims in this trial. Horne appeared to the court to be a dedicated professional and a competent manager, surrounded by an excellent, hard-working staff. The court was impressed by the CPO staff’s careful explanations of the personnel and promotion processes at Ft. Bragg and their sincere demeanor. Accordingly, the court credits the testimony of Jerry Horne and his staff with the following findings predicated, in large part, upon their testimony.
E.g.,
Testimony of Ronald Woodard, Kathryn Hamilton, Jean Byrd, Laura Howard, and John Parham.
51
2. CPO’s authority includes:
(a) the administration of all legal, regulatory and procedural controls, established within the federal personnel system, effecting apportionment, assignment and separation of civilian employees at the installation;
(b) the assignment of positions to appropriate grades;
(c) approval of training requests for civilian employees in non-governmental facilities;
(d) serving as the principal contact point for conducting business with the civilian labor union on base; and
(e) providing personnel management advice and assistance to senior staff and line managers in areas such as: (1) management-employee relations; (2) leave administration; (3) employee discipline; (4) the merit promotion selection process; and (5) administration of negotiated labor contracts.
3. CPO consists of a Technical Services Office and four functional divisions: Recruitment and Placement, Management-Employee relations, Position Management and Classification, and Training and Development.
4. The Technical Services Office analyzes directives by the command structure and outside federal agencies; provides expert assistance in the implementation of regulatory requirements affecting civilian personnel administration; coordinates internal audits of personnel actions and civilian personnel records; processes personnel actions; develops systems for data collection; and maintains official personnel folders (OPF’s) for all civilian employees.
52
5. The Recruitment and Placement Division analyzes civilian personnel staffing requirements and determines sources of potential employees to meet staffing needs; administers all in-service placement; provides assistance to managers in meeting staffing needs; and advises employees regarding opportunities for advancement, development and relocation.
6. The Management-Employee Relations Division assists management in its day-to-day relations with employees and the employee labor union. The Division is
*1239
responsible for dealing with adverse personnel actions, developing policies on grievances and appeals by employees, enhancing employee-management communications, and advising managers and supervisors on their responsibilities for counselling and evaluating employees.
7. The Position Management and Classification Division advises management on the establishment and maintenance of Ft. Bragg’s position structure. The Division classifies and evaluates all civilian positions and determines the structure’s effectiveness in light of the installation’s changing physical, manpower, and fiscal needs.
8. The Training and Development Division provides technical advice and assistance to all levels of management concerning the determination of training needs, sources of training, presentation of training programs, and evaluation of results.
9. In addition, CPO, in accordance with DOD and OPM regulations, conducts a continuing recruitment program for minorities and women designed to eliminate their “under-representation” in various categories of employment in the civilian work force at the installation. It is clear from the record that Ft. Bragg has long made a significant commitment in the area of equal employment opportunity. In addition to having a formalized AAP and FEORP, Ft. Bragg has developed a number of credible and seemingly effective individual programs to assist minorities.
(a)The
Worker Trainee Program
is used to employ individuals at levels lower than trainee levels. In this program, individuals are usually recruited from outside the normal recruiting process. It is specifically designed to assist those individuals with no skills and enhances affirmative action goals by providing increased opportunities for the employment of underrepresented groups;
(b) The
Career Intern Program
allocates positions to train individuals in certain career fields, particularly career management occupations, which tend to lead to higher level positions within the Department of the Army. The entry level of these positions is usually GS-5 with a target level of GS-9;
(c) The
Student Employment Program
is a series of programs designed to meet affirmative action goals by acquainting temporary employees with permanent employment opportunities;
53
and
(d) The
Upward Mobility Program
is an integral part of Ft. Bragg’s AAP and provides accelerated developmental opportunities to lower level employees. Since one of the major impediments to promotions is that the experiences gained in low grade positions fail to meet the entrance requirements for positions with career potential, the Upward Mobility Program provides for selection criteria in a number of designated vacancies, to be expressed in terms of employee interest in a career field, likelihood of success in an intensive training setting, and sufficient potential to learn the duties of the target job.
10. Defendant’s FEORP, (PX13) consists of external and internal recruiting and staffing strategies designed to accomplish affirmative action goals. A key element of the FEORP is the assessment of “under-representation” which serves to trigger targeted recruiting efforts. “Underrepre-sentation” is defined as the disparity between the participation rate of a racial group by sex in the appropriate civilian labor force and its participation in the agency work force.
See
EEOC Management Directive (MD) 707. For the relevant multi-year FEORP, generalized civilian labor force (CLF) statistics were used to compute underrepresentation.
54
As EEOC MD 707 states, “under law, FEORP determinations of underrepresentation are based
*1240
on
undifferentiated
CLF data.” (emphasis added).
55
Thus, “underrepresentation” determinations in the FEORP (and AAP), based on CLF data, are made without regard to the availabilities of minorities and women in the labor force identified as having (or potentially having) the skills needed to perform in various occupations and grade levels. In other words, the FEORP simply compares black representation in virtually all job groups to the percentage of the black population in the North Carolina workforce. Accordingly, for many jobs that require skills held statistically less often by blacks, there will appear to be FEORP underrepresentation, when, in fact, the utilization of blacks at Ft. Bragg may be at parity, or above, compared to the qualified (and relevant) labor markets. Given this use of statistics, no valid conclusion of underrepresentation for Title VII purposes can be made simply by referring to either the AAP or the FEORP.
56
B.
The Merit Promotion Process at Ft.
Bragg
57
11. There are essentially two types of promotion at Ft. Bragg: competitive and non-competitive. Promotions at Ft. Bragg are generally awarded in accordance with the base Merit Promotion Plan; however, there are instances in which positions must be filled by other non-competitive methods. The following placement actions are
excluded
from the competitive merit promotion procedures by OPM and DOD directives and are considered mandatory in that when a vacancy arises for which a registrant in any of the programs listed below is qualified and available, that registrant must be offered the position:
(a) placement actions required in connection with a RIF;
(b) placement of individuals having statutory, regulatory, or administrative reemployment or restoration rights, or to whom a like employment obligation exists
(e.g.,
employees returning from overseas assignment);
(c) placement of Priority 1, 2 and 3 employees registered in the DOD Stopper List
(e.g.,
DOD employees separated, or about to be separated or downgraded through no fault of their own);
(d) placement of an individual directed by an appropriate outside authority, provided the placement does not violate law or existing regulation
(e.g.,
placement ordered by OPM, EEOC, or the courts);
(e) promotion to positions upgraded without significant changes in duties and responsibilities on the basis of either a new classification standard or the correction of a classification error.
12. In addition, the following “special consideration” placement actions are likewise exceptions to competitive procedures. Unlike the placement actions listed above, placement in the following categories is
not
mandatory; however, consideration of employees in the following categories precedes all efforts to fill the vacancy by competitive means:
(a) repromotion of an employee to grade(s) or position(s) from which the employee was demoted without personal cause;
58
*1241
(b) priority consideration of any employee after failure to receive proper consideration;
59
(c) former employees on Reemployment Priority Lists
{e.g.,
former employees separated in a RIF);
(d) medical reassignment eligibles.
13. The decision to utilize a non-competitive method for promotion is made by the supervisor or manager requesting the position and the CPO. This choice of method used to fill the position is
not
excessively subjective, rather it is based on specific, detailed and mandatory federal personnel and DOD directives. No evidence was adduced to support the plaintiffs’ position that the decision to use one method over another was “often made with the purpose and intent of discriminating against black employees.” Final Pre-Trial Order at 11.
14. The present merit promotion procedures became effective in June of 1982 and are set forth in Ft. Bragg’s Recruitment and Placement Plan. Prior to that time, the procedures were slightly different and were set forth in the Civilian Personnel Policy and Procedures Manual, Chapter III — Merit Promotion and Internal Placement Plan. The following discussion focuses first on the merit promotion process prior to 1982, since most of Blue’s and Harris’ claims of discrimination fall within that time frame. The June, 1982, changes will then be briefly examined in order to complete the overview of the Ft. Bragg promotion process.
15. To initiate a competitive promotion, a supervisor or manager requests that a vacant position be filled by forwarding to CPO a general position description on a Standard Form (SF)-52. The SF-52 is then routed through the appropriate manpower and budget office for a determination that the position is authorized and funded. Subsequently, the request is sent to CPO’s Position Management and Classification Division, where a classification specialist reviews the initial job description to ensure that it accurately describes the .job, that job is properly classified under OPM regulations, and that it is assigned the proper federal personnel grade. As a final preliminary step, the request goes to the Recruitment and Placement Division of CPO, where it is assigned to a staffing specialist servicing the organization from which the request originated. Assuming that all noncompetitive mandatory and non-mandatory priority placements have been cleared, the merit promotion process begins.
16. There are three (3) principal tasks involved in the merit promotion process: job analysis and preparation of a job announcement, evaluation of applications, and selection.
17. A CPO staffing specialist writes a vacancy announcement by first referring to the position description and setting forth the “minimum qualification standards” for that position as established by OPM Handbooks X-118 and X-118-C. Minimum OPM qualification standards are used to determine basic eligibility for a position. Every candidate who meets or exceeds the minimum requirements is deemed “eligible” for the position; any candidate who does not meet these standards is deemed ineligible for further consideration. In some instances, a particular job or job environment necessitates an additional basic or minimum qualification requirement that must be met if minimum satisfactory performance is to result,
e.g.,
fluency in a foreign language or willingness to travel. These additional basic requirements are called “selective placement factors.”
18. The next step for the staffing specialist involves discussions with subject matter experts (generally the manager or supervisor requesting the position) in order to develop a series of “High Qualifying Criteria” (HQC) for the position. Prior to 1982, OPM regulations required that evalu
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ation methods be designed to identify “highly qualified” and “best qualified” eli-gibles. The Merit Promotion and Internal Placement Plan of the Civilian Personnel Policy and Procedures Manual defined “highly qualified” candidates as “those eligible candidates whose experience, training and potential substantially exceed the qualification standards for the position ... to a degree that indicates they are likely to perform in a superior manner.” Thus, the HQC for a position amounted to the four or five principal and specific requirements for the position. Prior to the release of any job announcement, all HQC were independently reviewed by CPO to determine that they were job-related.
19. Upon the development of all of the above information, the job opening is posted in a document entitled “Merit Promotion Vacancy Announcement,” which is distributed in all areas open to consideration,
e.g.,
post-wide, DOD-wide, etc. Information contained in Merit Promotion Vacancy announcements includes,
inter alia,
the job title, location, announcement number (MPA #), area of consideration, closing date for applications, job description, minimum standards of eligibility, including all general and specialized experience required, HQC, and the methods of evaluation that will be utilized to review all applications.
See, e.g.,
DX205 and 210. Again, contrary to plaintiffs’ pre-trial argument, no evidence was introduced establishing even one incident of discriminatory failure to post a vacancy announcement.
20. Generally, prior to June of 1982, a person applied for a vacancy by filling out a one-page, pre-printed form with blocks for basic information such as name, social security number and MPA number.
See, e.g.,
DX305 at 15 and 19. In addition, although it remains unclear to the court whether this was required, most applicants attached a qualifications statement (SF-171) to their application or, where appropriate, updated their existing SF-171 in their OPF.
21. After consideration for the vacancy closes, all applications are reviewed by the assigned CPO staffing specialist to determine whether the applicant meets the minimum eligibility requirements for the position. As previously stated, all those applicants who are determined to be qualified are designated as “eligible.” There is no limit on the number of applicants who may be so designated. If an applicant is deemed “not qualified” or “ineligible,” s/he is so informed.
Id.
at 10-11.
22. The personnel staffing specialist’s job of determining an applicant’s basic eligibility is not merely mechanical. The determination involves judgment and discretion as to whether the applicant’s qualifications are comparable or equal to the basic qualifications. The matching-up of what is an applicant’s SF-171 with the general X-118 and 118-C requirements obviously involves the exercise of some professional judgment. Nonetheless, this process is similar to that used at most federal agencies and the court finds no evidence that staffing specialists abused their discretion in performing this responsibility nor has there been any credible showing of discriminatory evaluation by CPO in this regard.
23. All applicants determined to be eligible by the staffing specialist are referred to a rating and ranking panel which, prior to June of 1982, rated applicants as Qualified, Highly Qualified and Best Qualified, ranked the applicants and determined which applicants to refer to the selecting official.
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These panels are made up of subject-matter experts in the functional area of the job vacancy. Panel members are required to have personal knowledge of the job requirements, and must be employed at a grade level equal to or higher than the job being filled. Assisting the rating and ranking panel in performing its job is a CPO staffing specialist.
61
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24. Prior to June of 1982, the rating and ranking panel basically performed three (3) tasks. First, the panel reviewed each applicant’s OPF to determine whether the applicant met the HQC. If an applicant failed to meet any HQC, that information was noted on the panel’s rating sheet and no further consideration was given to that applicant.
62
25. All applicants meeting the HQC and, thus, determined to be “highly qualified,” were then rated and ranked by the panel in the following manner. Applicants were ranked based on evidence in their OPF of:
(a) experience
(b) supervisory appraisals
(c) education and training; and
(d) awards.
However, these factors were not all equally weighted. Weights were assigned to each criterion, points given to each candidate for each criterion, and results combined to determine a final numerical rating for each applicant.
The weighting process was predicated on a crediting plan developed for each vacancy by the CPO staffing specialist, in conjunction with subject matter experts, prior to the time the panel convened. The crediting plan is the yardstick the panel used in order to determine the points that would be given to each candidate for each criterion. For example, three levels of quality were usually identified for each item of specialized experience and points were assigned under the “experience” factor based on the number of years experience that was required and the quality level the applicant was determined by the panel to possess. Additional points in that category would then be added for each year of experience above the minimum that the applicant possessed.
63
26. Once each “highly qualified” candidate received a rating, the scores were then placed in numerical order, ranking the applicants high to low. However, not every candidate on this list was subsequently referred to the selecting official. Two rules in effect until 1982 specifically limited the number of referees.
First, 1975 OPM regulations (FPM 335.3-7) allowed only for the referral of three (3) to five (5) “best qualified” candidates and up to a maximum of ten (10) if meaningful distinctions between the candidates’ scores could not be made. In addition, consistent with OPM guidelines, the negotiated Contract Agreement between management and labor at Ft. Bragg, in effect from August, 1974, to May, 1978, limited the “best qualified” list to five (5) candidates for a single vacancy and allowed the addition of only one (1) name to the best qualified list for each additional vacancy. PX33(b) at 31. When the labor contract was re-negotiated in 1978, the new 1978-1982 Agreement eliminated the Rule of Five and replaced it with a Rule of Ten — only the top ten (10) candidates could be referred for any single vacancy.
64
PX33(b) at 39.
The second rule limiting the number of referees also stemmed from the 1978 Contract Agreement, which mandated that the “best qualified” list include only those candidates who received 85% of the score of the top qualified candidate.
Id.
Plaintiffs contend that both the Rule of Ten and the 85% Rule were applied in a discriminatory manner and effected an adverse impact on black applicants. Evidence on this issue was taken in the cases of both Blue and Ballew and the court’s findings and conclusions appear
infra.
27. Once the ranking was completed, the CPO staffing specialist prepared a form entitled “Referral and Selection Register” (DA Form 2600) listing the names of
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those found “best qualified” alphabetically. Neither the scores given to the candidates nor their race were placed on the DA Form 2600, which was then given to the selecting official.
65
See, e.g.,
DX205 at 103.
28. Upon receipt of the Referral and Selection Register, the selecting official may select any of the persons listed on the Register. From 1974 to 1978, the selecting official was required to interview all referred candidates, if available, unless a statement of personal knowledge of qualifications of each referred candidate was submitted by the selecting official. The 1978 Contract Agreement required the selecting official interview all referred candidates, if available, but eliminated the personal knowledge statement previously allowed. PX33(b) at 39.
29. Prior to 1982, the selecting official received guidance from CPO in interviewing techniques, if requested, and was always strongly encouraged to (1) review the OPF’s of the referees, (2) conduct a structured interview of the referees and (3) consider affirmative action objectives. The 1978 Contract Agreement required that the selecting official state his or her reasons for selection on the DA Form 2600 which was returned to CPO post-selection.
Id.
Thus, after completion by the selecting official, all Selection Registers included the name of the selectee, the merit factors considered by the selecting official in making his/her selection, the reasons for the selection, whether each candidate was interviewed, and the date of selection.
See, e.g.,
DX205 at 103. Plaintiffs contend that the selecting official was vested with too much discretion under the pre-1982 system and that the standards for selection were vague and excessively subjective.
See
Final Pre-Trial Order at 16. The court’s findings on this issue are set forth later in this opinion.
30. As a result of the adoption of the 1982 Recruitment and Placement Plan and re-negotiation of the Labor Contract Agree-
merit,
the following changes occurred in the merit promotion process at Ft. Bragg:
(a) The “highly qualified” category of eligibility was eliminated. In preparing the Vacancy Announcement, instead of developing HQC, the staffing specialist now identifies the four or five major functions to be performed on the job and, further, identifies the “knowledge, skills, and abilities” (KSA’s) required to perform those functions. The post-1982 Vacancy Announcements thus contain the OPM minimum eligibility requirements, in terms of general and specialized experience, and a list of the KSA’s necessary for the job.
See, e.g.,
DX230 at 6.
(b) In applying for the merit promotion vacancy, all applicants must fill out a basic application form
together with
supplemental experience sheets on which the applicant must demonstrate how s/he possesses the KSA’s for the job.
Id.
at 17-25.
(c) Basic eligibility is still determined by the staffing specialist, but the rating and ranking panel now determines the “best qualified” candidates by use of a crediting plan developed for each vacancy which evaluates the candidate’s possession of the required KSA’s and other characteristics, as evidenced by the rating elements,
e.g.,
training, awards, etc. This rating process scores each applicant on a matrix, assigning to each KSA a point value between one (1) and four (4), representing the degree to which the KSA is possessed.
Id.
at 26.
(d) The “best qualified” applicants’ names are then placed on the DA Form 2600 in alphabetical order, as before, without scores or any race identifier. Furthermore, the 1982 Plan eliminated the 85% Rule and placed no limit on the minimum or maximum number of candidates referred to a selecting official. The number referred is determined by the rating panel and staffing specialist who consider the scores of the candidates and the breakpoints or gaps between the scores.
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(e) Accompanying the DA Form 2600 when given to the selecting official is a Disposition Form from CPO which clearly indicates,
inter alia,
that for the selection, the selecting official should (1) review the OPF’s of all referees, (2) conduct a structured interview for each referee, (3) articulate the specific reasons for his selection, and (4) consider all affirmative action obligations. The selecting official then makes his/her selection from among the “best qualified” list based on the requirements of the position, impression of the applicants during interview, and other job-related factors, including “underrepresentation” considerations as expressed in the AAP and FEORP.
Plaintiffs contend that even after the 1982 changes, defendant’s merit promotion plan remained “vague, subjective and susceptible of discriminatory manipulation” in virtually every phase of the process. Final Pre-Trial Order at 16-18. Because all of Blue’s substantive claims and most of Harris’ claims arise under the pre-June, 1982 process, the court need not and will not make any findings in this regard, except as are narrowly required to deal with defendant’s motion for sanctions against Blue and Harris for their post-June, 1982, claims.
31. Training, awards, and supervisory appraisals play a part in the merit promotion process as previously described, whether as a factor in the auditing plan utilized by a rating panel to determine the “best qualified” candidates or, post-June, 1982, as part of the determination of the level of each KSA reached by the applicant. However, the court notes that training, awards and supervisory appraisals play a minor role in the promotion process compared to job related experience and do not come into play at all until the applicant has met the minimum OPM eligibility requirements.
32. As for training, defendant's policy is to provide all training required, within physical and fiscal constraints, to assure maximum efficiency of civilian employees in the performance of their officially assigned duties and to encourage employees in their efforts for self-improvement. Training requests are initiated by supervisors and forwarded to CPO, which conducts a review of the employee’s eligibility for training. Evidence at trial indicated the denial of training opportunities to certain plaintiffs,
e.g.,
Mattiebelle Harris, but said denials were invariably grounded upon legitimate fiscal or regulatory reasons. No credible evidence was adduced by plaintiffs creating even an inference of discrimination in their respective denial of training claims.
33. There are two types of incentive awards at Ft. Bragg — honorary and cash awards. The Awards Program provides a means of demonstrating the high value the supervisor places on superior performance, exceptional achievement, and constructive ideas. Honorary awards include DOD, Department of the Army and Presidential awards. Cash awards include Sustained Superior Performance Awards (SSPA’s) and Quality Step Increases (QSI’s). The SSPÁ is awarded to GS and WG employees for individual performance for a period of at least twelve (12) months given in recognition of high-level performance significantly above that ordinarily found by employees in that position. QSI’s are recognition for GS employees whose performance is of such a high quality above that ordinarily found in the type position concerned that special salary recognition is warranted. An employee may receive only one (1) cash award within any given thirty-six (36) month period. The award process is initiated by the employee’s supervisor. The court received no credible evidence supporting plaintiffs’ pre-trial contention that supervisors engaged in “racially motivated denials of awards.” Final Pre-Trial Order at 18.
34. Like incentive awards, there are two types of appraisals given to civilian employees at Ft. Bragg: (1) annual performance appraisals and (2) supervisory appraisals of current performance. The annual performance appraisal is what it purports to be — an annual evaluation of performance, written by the employee’s first-line supervisor, and reviewed by the second-line supervisor, that becomes a permanent part of the employee’s OPF. Prior to
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1982, only three (3) ratings were possible. Outstanding, Satisfactory and Unsatisfactory.
See, e.g.,
DX201 at 141. The new system, General Performance Appraisal System (GPAS), contains five (5) possible ratings: Exceptional, Highly Successful, Fully Successful, Marginal and Unsatisfactory. Each rating is tied to accomplishment of job standards and performance in a number of job elements.
Id.
at 122-25.
A supervisory appraisal of current performance is a rating rendered in connection with an employee’s promotion application and is placed in an employee’s OPF for one year. The form consists of two (2) parts. Part I is a listing of twenty (20) “attributes,”
e.g.,
“takes initiative,” “works well under pressure,” etc. A grade of A, B, C, D or E (“A” being the highest) is then assigned for the employee’s performance of each attribute or, if the attribute is not required in the job, an “N” is assigned. Part II of the form is a statement of overall performance. Six (6) options are available to the supervisor;
e.g.,
“[h]as little of what it takes to do an acceptable job” (lowest) and “[t]he very highest level of performance” (highest).
Id.
at 135-37.
With rare exception, the court received little credible evidence indicating discriminatory use of either appraisal method. Evaluations, in the court’s estimate, tended to be accurate and well supported by the employee’s work record. In some instances, the employee received a very high overall rating but complained that the rating was discriminatory because it did not give her a perfect or maximum score.
E.g.,
claim of Mattiebelle Harris. The court can say with great confidence that none of the plaintiffs appearing before it were deserving of a “perfect” employee performance score. As for Blue’s substantive allegation in this regard, findings of fact are set forth,
infra,
at pp. 128-33.
35. Plaintiffs also contend that Ft. Bragg’s disciplinary system “puts black employees at the mercy of their individual supervisors and invites discriminatory application.” Final Pre-Trial Order at 20. Disciplinary action is divided into two (2) categories: formal and informal. Informal discipline includes oral reprimands, the most common of the disciplinary actions taken by supervisors at Ft. Bragg, which may be undocumented or documented by a supervisor’s “Memorandum for Record” (MFR),
see, e.g.,
DX267, or an entry on the employee’s “Employee Records Card” (SF-7B or “Seven Card”).
See, e.g.,
DX237. The main purpose of informal discipline is to make certain the employee understands what is required of him or her in an attempt to immediately correct the problem before it worsens, thus, precluding the need for more drastic action at a later time.
Formal disciplinary action consists of written reprimands,
see, e.g.,
DX237, suspensions and removals. A schedule of punishments for certain offenses is outlined in the federal personnel manual.
Disciplinary actions have no effect on an employee’s promotion prospects at any stage of the process shy of the selecting official’s review of the applicant’s OPF. The rating and ranking panel does not consider discipline nor does CPO in screening for minimum eligibility requirements. However, a selecting official clearly has the right to consider any disciplinary action recorded in an applicant's OPF. Notwithstanding that fact, not a single incident of discriminatory discipline was proved at trial by credible evidence. Indeed, in a number of cases, disciplinary actions taken against particular plaintiffs were extremely lenient and fully justified on their face by the employee’s conduct.
See, e.g.,
claims of Sandra Blue, findings,
infra,
at § IV.
36. As for defendant’s RIF policies and procedures, the court incorporates by reference its description of the process set forth in
Harris v. Marsh,
100 F.R.D. at 319 . After hearing considerable testimony in this aspect of Ft. Bragg’s personnel policies during the claims of Mattiebelle Harris, the court finds its pre-trial statement of defendant’s methodology remains correct. No substantive claim regarding a discriminatory RIF remains at issue and no evidence was adduced at trial indicating that RIF’s were systematically effected, in practice, in a discriminatory manner. Notwithstanding that general statement, the court
*1247
notes that Mattiebelle Harris’ individual RIF claim was a close issue and one in which the plaintiff clearly presented a
pri-ma facie
case of discriminatory application.
37. With rare exception, the court finds that plaintiffs were not limited intentionally nor affected adversely in their employment opportunities at Ft. Bragg on the basis of race.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT FOR PLAINTIFF SANDRA BLUE’S CLAIMS OF DISCRIMINATION
The court received evidence in connection with the claims of Sandra Blue on April 19-25 and August 27-September 4, 1984.
66
Based on the credible evidence adduced at trial, the pleadings, briefs and arguments of counsel, the court makes the following findings of fact:
Plaintiffs Complaints of Discrimination
1. Sandra Blue is a black citizen of the United States and now a resident of the state of California. At the time this litigation was instituted, she was a resident of Cumberland County, North Carolina, employed at Ft. Bragg in a civilian capacity.
2. Blue filed an informal complaint of discrimination in December, 1979, an informal complaint of discrimination in April, 1980, and thereafter a formal complaint of discrimination in June, 1980, and July, 1982. Blue’s complaints of discrimination related to an alleged discriminatory denial of promotion, discriminatory supervisory appraisal, and discriminatory discipline and harassment. PX6(a) and 6(b). Plaintiffs Harris and Sheppard filed their formal class charge of discrimination on May 15, 1980. PX1. Accordingly, this proceeding was instituted more than 180 days after plaintiff’s various EEO charges were filed. Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies under Title VII and has timely instituted this proceeding.
3. Plaintiffs’ complaint initiating this action, filed September 1,1981, simply says “Ms. Blue has been limited in employment and promotion opportunities by the defendants (sic) because of her race.” Complaint at 2. The extensive and general violations of law alleged in the complaint to have been committed against all black civilian employees, including Blue, are set forth in this opinion
supra
at pp. 10-11 and need not be repeated here. It is reasonable to assume that the defendant prepared his defense to meet each of these allegations with respect to Blue.
4. According to the Final Pre-Trial Order, filed December 8,1983, plaintiff specifically contends she was discriminatorily denied the following positions: Dental Assistant, MPA # 285-78; Dental Assistant, MPA #273-79; Dental Assistant, MPA # 274-79; Dental Assistant, MPA # 277-79; Dental Assistant, MPA # 303-79; Dental Assistant, MPA # 440-80; and Dental Assistant, MPA #67-83. In addition, plaintiff claims she was discriminatorily denied equal training and opportunities for details to job-positions which would enhance her ability to promote, discriminatorily disciplined, given discriminatory evaluations of her job performance, and harassed due to her efforts to enforce and exercise her rights under Title VII. Final Pre-Trial Order at 23-24. In sum, the Final Pre-Trial Order lists elev
*1248
en (11) particularized claims for relief for Blue.
5. In plaintiffs Pre-Trial Brief, filed with the court on April 3, 1984, plaintiff listed only the following claims for relief:
1. whether Sandra Blue was diserimi-natorily denied promotion to the job position announced under Merit Promotion Announcement No. 273-79 because of her race and color.
2. whether Sandra Blue was discrimi-natorily denied the job position announced under Merit Promotion Announcement No. 303-79 because of her race and color, because of the defendant’s discriminatory use of the “85% Rule” for referral of candidates for promotion which impacted adversely on minority candidates and was not validated, and in retaliation for Blue’s efforts to challenge defendant’s racially discriminatory employment practices. Brief at 3.
Aside from the obvious abandonment of a number of claims for relief set forth in the Final Pre-Trial Order, plaintiff’s PreTrial Brief itself is inconsistent. On page 2 of the same brief, plaintiff states she “is seeking relief” for the additional claims of (1) denial of promotion under MPA 273-79 because of retaliation; (2) denial of promotion under MPA 273-79 because she was adversely affected by the 85% Rule; and (3) denial of promotion under MPA 303-79, in part, because of a discriminatory supervisory appraisal given to plaintiff in retaliation for her prior complaints of racial discrimination.
See also
Court’s Discussion with Counsel at 244-251; plaintiffs’ November 19, 1984, Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Sandra Blue at 3-4.
6. From the pre-trial pleadings, trial, and post-trial briefs and argument, the court finds plaintiff’s final claims for relief to be decided in this litigation are:
(a)whether plaintiff was given a discriminatory supervisory appraisal in December, 1979, because of her race (disparate treatment);
(b) whether plaintiff was discriminatorily denied promotion to the job position announced in MPA 273-79 because of her race (disparate treatment);
(c) whether plaintiff was discriminatorily denied promotion to the job position announced in MPA 303-79 because of her race (disparate treatment);
(d) whether plaintiff was discriminatorily denied promotion under MPA 303-79 because of the effect of the “85% Rule” (disparate impact);
(e) whether plaintiff was discriminatorily denied promotion under either MPA 273-79 or 303-79 in retaliation for plaintiff’s efforts to challenge defendant’s alleged discriminatory employment practices; and
(f) whether plaintiff was discriminatorily denied promotion under either MPA 273-79 or 303-79 because of the excessive subjectivity of the defendant’s merit promotion process or a particular component of that process.
Plaintiffs Employment History
7. Plaintiff was employed by defendant from July 30, 1973, through July, 1983. Upon application in July of 1973, Blue received a temporary appointment as a Nursing Assistant, GS-4, at Womack Army Hospital at Ft. Bragg. She was later converted to career status on September 23, 1973.
8. Blue became dissatisfied with the evening hours of her nursing positon at Ft. Bragg and sought to move into the dental field because it offered more regular hours. In July of 1975, plaintiff applied for and was selected as a Dental Assistant, GS-3. Blue had no prior experience or training in the dental field and, thus, accepted the demotion in grade in order to learn the skills of a new career field.
67
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9. On September 19, 1976, Blue was promoted to Dental Assistant, GS-4, under MPA 129-76. From May of 1976 through the end of her employment with the defendant in 1983, plaintiff rotated through the various departments at Dental Clinic # 6 (DC-6) at Ft. Bragg. Blue terminated her service with Ft. Bragg as a Dental Assistant, GS-4, Step 7, having remained in her current grade since her initial promotion in 1976.
68
10. At the time of Blue’s promotion to GS-4 in 1976, there were fifty-two (52) dental assistants at Dental Activities (DENTAC). Sixteen (16), or 31%, were black. The breakdown was as follows: 0 white and 1 black GS-5, 22 white and 11 black GS-4’s, and 14 white and 3 black GS~3’s. When Blue terminated her employment in 1983, 29% of all dental technicians and assistants in DENTAC were black, with the following breakdown: 37 whites and 18 black GS-4’s, 13 white and 3 black GS-5’s, and 18 white and 8 black GS-6’s.
69
11. Prior to plaintiff’s employment with the defendant, Blue worked as an obstetrics (OB) technician at a private hospital (St. Luke’s) in Newberg, New York, after having undergone a one year program of combined work and study. Blue's testimony that she served three (3) years as an OB technician, from 1966 to 1969, (Test, of Blue at 345) was in direct contradiction to a previous qualifications statement she had entered in her OPF, on which she listed only two (2) years experience as an OB Technician.
See
DX201 at 84. Further, there is some considerable doubt about the type of schooling Blue received in New York, whether the program was accredited, the exact positions plaintiff held at the hospital
(see, id.,
where Blue states she served as a “Nurse’s Assistant” and at 104, “Nurse’s Aide”) and the experience she gained. Blue’s testimony in this regard is, at best, inconclusive.
12. Blue also worked as a laundry worker, WG-2, at West Point Academy from July 6, 1970, through June 14, 1973, and concurrent with her employment at the Academy, as a part-time bar-maid from March, 1971, to September, 1971. Academically, plaintiff has completed the eleventh grade of high school. Incident to her federal employment, Blue has taken a number of training and correspondence courses.
13. At all times during her employment at Ft. Bragg, Blue received “satisfactory” annual performance appraisals until the rating system was changed.
70
In 1982, under the new system, she received a “fully successful” rating.
71
In addition, plaintiff received four (4) official
72
and one (1) unofficial letters of appreciation and commendation for her services between 1976 and early 1979 while employed at DC-6.
Background Evidence and Claims Not Designated for Relief
14. The organizational structure of the dental clinics in DENTAC, and particularly DC-6, is generally undisputed. The Non-Commissioned Officer-In-Charge (NCOIC) of the clinic was plaintiffs "technical" supervisor;
i.e.,
s/he would give assignments, approve leave, maintain time cards, propose discipline, render performance evaluations, etc. In carrying out these duties, the NCOIC routinely consulted with the dentists for whom the dental assistants
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and staff actually worked.
73
The clinic Officer-In-Charge (OIC) was responsible for the overall operation of the clinic and was the second-line supervisor of the civilian dental assistants and staff.
74
The OIC set the policies for the clinic and the NCOIC’s job was to ensure the OIC’s directives were carried out. The OIC was also the first-line supervisor of the dentists. The clinic OIC reported to the DENTAC Commander.
75
The commander was in charge of all Dental Activities and, as such, was the third-line supervisor of all civilian employees at each clinic. Generally, the DENTAC Commander, in consultation with appropriate subordinates, made the promotion selections within DENTAC. Finally, with respect to the relationship between the dental assistants and the dentists, contrary to the plaintiff’s testimony, it is clear that the assistants worked
for
the dentists, not
with
them as equal participants, providing care for each patient. If a dentist gave an order to an assistant, it was expected to be carried out; unfortunately, plaintiff was very selective in her application of this principle.
15. Blue claims that numerous NCOIC’s, OIC’s and dentists were involved in a “conspiracy” against her during much of her employment at DC-6. She attempted to adduce evidence to support this allegation and stated that such evidence was offered for background purposes to demonstrate the discriminatory animus of a number of her superiors. Included within this conspiracy and named as alleged discriminatory officials (ADO’s) were SGT. Wayne Jones (black), SGT. Tuanquin, COL. Pa-quette, MJR. Sykes (black), SGT. Matlock (black), LTC. Cressler,
76
Joseph Vincent, CPT. Richard Howell, Dr. Joseph Harmon, Jean Byrd of CPO and “DENTAC Management.”
See, e.g.,
Test, of Blue at 87, 102, 104, 118, and 138-40. In addition, where testimony of witnesses conflicted with Blue’s, she simply claimed these witnesses were lying, either to support the conspiracy or for other discriminatory or personal reasons. Included within this category were,
inter alia,
SGT. Jones, MJR. Sykes, SSG Ramos, CPT. Howell, Dr. Harmon and Anita Hutchins.
See, e.g.,
Test, of Blue at Vol. VII, pp. 84-89, 100-01.
Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, the court finds the record is void of any credible evidence supporting the existence of a conspiracy against the plaintiff. Far from being the best dental assistant in DC-6, as plaintiff claimed, nearly all of plaintiff’s peers and supervisors painted a similar portrait of her, generally describing Blue as unprofessional, discourteous, confrontative, borderline insubordinate, average in her skills, and as an employee who had the ability to do a much better job if she had ever cared to do so.
See
Findings of Fact 30-48
infra.
Detailed evidence to support each of these characterizations was presented at trial.
Id.
Blue was, as defense counsel stated in his opening argument, (Loewenberg at 603), a “problem child” that management constantly had to deal with in a careful, by-the-rules manner. Plaintiff may indeed have been discriminated against by her peers and superiors, but it was due to her own personality, her conduct, her attitude and her performance —not because she was black.
16. Blue claimed that she first encountered racial problems in 1978 with LTC Cressler (white) OIC, and his NCOIC, SGT Ramos (Hispanic). Specifically, she testified that Cressler once said, after hearing that plaintiff had complained to the labor union about an annual performance ap
*1251
praisal, that he “would crucify anyone that ever went to the Union or EEO.”
In the only substantial finding of fact the court will make in favor of the plaintiff on a background claim or claim for relief, the court finds the above statement was uttered in part by Cressler.
77
The court finds Cressler stated he “would crucify anyone that ever went to the union.” For this statement, Cressler should have been reprimanded and was not.
Notwithstanding that finding, however, the statement by Cressler clearly had no effect upon any action by the plaintiff, upon any promotion attempt by the plaintiff, and there is not a shread of evidence to suggest the statement was racially motivated.
Both Blue and her co-plaintiff and witness, Geraldine Ballew, admitted, when confronted with their own affidavits, that neither had previously alleged that Cres-sler had ever mentioned the “EEO” in his statement.
See
PX365(d) at 3-5.
78
This exaggeration by both witnesses at trial seriously undercuts their credibility with regard to the incident in general and certainly taints their conclusory statements to the effect that Cressler’s comment was racially motivated.
Furthermore, Blue and Ballew immediately went to the Union office about the statement and their testimony at trial was that the matter was settled to their satisfaction. The fact that Blue and Ballew were not intimidated by the statement is evidenced by the fact that they immediately went to the Union to report the incident and, further, by the twelve (12) to fifteen (15) subsequent grievances and complaints plaintiff admits having filed with the Union and the EEO office. The record is void of any evidence that Cressler later retaliated against Blue in any manner for her exercising her right to file grievances and complaints of discrimination.
17. Blue’s only other allegation regarding Cressler concerned entries made on her “7 Card” following her refusal to sign her performance appraisal. But even plaintiff admitted at trial that this problem was resolved to her satisfaction after a grievance was filed. At most, these two incidents can be seen as evidence of a personality conflict between Cressler and Blue, but again, the court repeats, no evidence of discrimination can be found in the record. Indeed, Cressler was simply part of a lengthy list of peers and superiors, black and white, who suffered through personality problems with Blue. Cressler may not have handled either situation well, but that does not make him a racist or mandate a finding that his actions were racially motivated. There simply is no evidence in the record that Cressler treated Blue, Ballew or any other black employee differently on the basis of race. Ironically, Blue all but admitted this fact during cross-examination when she stated that she did not remember if Cressler had discriminated against her. Test, of Blue at 139.
79
Later plaintiff changed her testimony and stated that Cressler
may
have discriminated against her and, finally, after defense counsel referred the plaintiff to her pre-trial deposition, plaintiff stated that she wanted to amend her answer to state that Cressler did discriminate against her.
Id.
at 163 and 171-72.
80
*1252
18. Blue also complained about the treatment accorded her by SSG Ramos, an NCOIC at DC-6. Plaintiff claimed that on one occasion he used profanity with her and that as a result of the incident, he was required to attend an EEO class on human relations. Test, of Blue at Vol. VII, pp. 33-39.
Ramos’ version of the incident was much different and the court finds Ramos to be an extremely credible witness. Ramos testified that he directed Blue to work with a dentist (Dr. Lamb) and that she refused. Test, of Ramos at 1355-57. He asked her two or three more times and she still refused. He admits that after her final refusal he was frustrated and while walking away from her uttered the words “damn it.”
81
He testified that she began to dial the telephone and yelled something to him. He instructed her to make the call later and to get to work.
Ramos also atempted to discuss the incident with her later in the day and during the discussion she shouted that she “worked for the United States Government, not him.”
Id.
at 1359-60.
See also
Test, of Kurz at 1098.
82
Ramos then proposed a letter of reprimand for Blue.
Id.
Ramos emphatically denies that he was ever required to take a human relations course due to this incident. Test, of Ramos at 1375. The court finds this clearly to be the case. Even plaintiff later confessed that her earlier testimony might have been mistaken as she based that testimony primarily on (1) part of an overheard conversation between Ramos and Cressler and (2) her assumption that since she had demanded Ramos take the course in her initial grievance about the incident, he must have been required to take it. Test, of Blue at Vol. VII, pp. 77-84 and 103-04.
83
*1254
19. Again, despite her complaints about Ramos, Blue admitted on cross-examination that Ramos did not discriminate against her on the basis of race.
84
Test, of Blue at 140. Thus, as with the background evidence offered against Cressler, the court finds no basis for inferring that the actions of Ramos were motivated by a racial animus.
20. As further background evidence, Blue testified about COL. Paquette and SGT. Vincent, who occupied the positions of OIC and NCOIC, respectively, during approximately the same period of time (1979-80). Testimony concerning these two officials is important since they were involved in the alleged discriminatory annual appraisal for which Blue seeks relief.
Blue claimed that Paquette (white) treated blacks differently than whites. She charged that he treated them like “nothing” and “looked down his nose at them.” Test, of Blue at 29. In support of this allegation, plaintiff testified that she observed Paquette treat a black NCOIC, SGT. Wayne Jones, poorly and that Paquette refused to promote a black sergeant, Linda Garner, to NCOIC.
21. The two alleged victims of Pa-quette’s discriminatory actions testified in this case. In stark contrast to Blue’s version, both Jones and Garner stated that Paquette treated them no differently than he treated anyone else, although Garner admitted that she and Paquette had non-racially based differences of opinion. Furthermore, Garner said that she voluntarily chose to forego the NCOIC position at DC-6 to obtain more chair-side experience as a dental therapy assistant (DTA) and that the only reason she raised the question about becoming NCOIC at all was because Blue and Ballew pressured her into it. Test, of Garner at 1700-01 and 1711-12. The court finds both Garner and Jones were extremely credible witnesses, particularly Jones, who was on the witness stand for over two days and whose testimony was extraordinarily candid and honest under very difficult circumstances.
22. In addition, two other factors are salient with respect to plaintiff’s claim that Paquette refused to promote Garner on the
*1255
basis of race. First, a black (Jones) was placed in the position that Blue claims Pa-quette discriminatorily denied to Garner. Second, Gamer had just completed DTA School and by regulation was required to spend two years at chairside.
Based on all of the above, the court finds that plaintiffs opinion with respect to Pa-quette is predicated on nothing more than pure conjecture. The court specifically credits the testimony of Garner and Jones and finds absolutely no evidence that Pa-quette treated DC-6 employees differently on the basis of race.
23.Blue related two incidents involving Vincent, the white NCOIC, that she contends demonstrated his discriminatory animus. The court notes that these events took place after the alleged discriminatory appraisal had been rendered by Vincent and Paquette in 1979.
The first incident occurred on April 3, 1980. Blue testified she had parked adjacent to the back entrance to DC-6 and Vincent told her to move her car. She admitted she told him she would only do so when a space became available. Blue claimed that within a few minutes Vincent presented her with a statement of counseling for her refusal to obey his order. She refused to sign the statement and Vincent allegedly recorded the matter on her “7 card.”
Blue claimed Vincent’s actions were discriminatory because a few days earlier Ann Randall, a white dental assistant, had parked in the same place, and though she refused to immediately move her car, no disciplinary action was taken against her. Blue testified further that she had not been previously told she could not park in the spot, nor area was a for supply vehicles only.
24. Plaintiffs testimony about the April 3, 1980, incident is in
severe
conflict with that of numerous witnesses. First, there is absolutely no doubt that Blue had been told on a number of prior occasions she was not to park in the fire lane or the area adjacent to the exit.
See, e.g.,
Test, of Vincent at 1472-74; Test, of Martha Soeh-ren at 1071-72; Test, of Kurz at 1100; Test, of Roach at 1763; Test, of Jones at 661 .
85
Yet, Blue consistently and directly disobeyed the continuing directives of her OIC’s and NCOIC’s in this regard (as did Ballew). Second, Randall flatly denied ever being directed to move her car because it was parked adjacent to an exit. Test, of Randall at 1408. Randall’s testimony is corroborated by Vincent who stated that he had no recollection of ever requiring Randall to move her car.
86
If Randall parked her car by the exit, it occurred one time and she immediately moved it to a proper parking area without an order from Vincent. Test, of Vincent at 1492-93. The court finds Randall to be a credible witness.
25. What adds significantly to the credibility of Vincent and Randall with regard to the parking incident, is that despite the prior warnings and the April, 1980, counseling, Blue incredibly continued to defy command orders not to park in the fire lane area. If anything, her decisions to park illegally became more flagrant. Sergeant Jones stated that he had problems with Blue parking adjacent to the exit before Vincent became NCOIC and also after Vincent left the clinic. Jones notes that for as long as he was at DC-6,
all
employees had
*1256
been
routinely
reminded not to park adjacent to that exit.
See, e.g.,
Test, of Jones at 659-664 (“[T]he only people that I had problems with parking there was Ms. Blue and Ms. Ballew.”); Test, of Matlock at 1130-31; Test, of Hutchinson at 1675-76 (Blue stated at staff meetings “she would park where she wanted to park.”); Test, of COL. Soehren at 1723-27.
26. In sum, a host of witnesses, including one OIC and three NCOIC’s, established that warnings continued after the April, 1980, incident, yet Blue continued to park her car in blatant disregard of instructions. The evidence relating to the parking incident hardly established a racial animus on the part of Vincent. On the contrary, it indicates a contemptuous disregard for authority on the part of Blue.
87
From the evidence, it is clear that more severe disciplinary action than was ever taken against Blue (and Ballew) would have been warranted. Vincent, Jones, Matlock, Soehren and others showed excessive restraint in their handling of Blue’s deliberate misconduct.
27. The other incident Blue related about Vincent occurred the day after the confrontation over parking. Blue claimed that she had been assisting in the treatment of a black patient and that the patient needed help in getting to her car after treatment. Blue testified she escorted the patient out of the building and that while she was answering the patient’s questions Vincent called from an upstairs window for her to come inside. She admitted she ignored him and continued her conversation. Blue claimed when she did return inside Vincent counseled her about being absent from her duty station and made an entry about the incident on her “7-card.”
In addition, Blue claimed Vincent had observed her similarly escort white patients to their cars and had never questioned or stopped her about those instances. Thus, plaintiff felt Vincent had discriminated against her on the basis of race.
28.Vincent admitted he counselled Blue on this occasion, but denied that race had anything to do with it. He stated Blue was only counselled because she had left the next patient alone in the dental chair when she went outside,
88
and because she compounded the problem by ignoring his request to come back inside to her work site.
29. The conflicting evidence concerning this incident reveals far less about any possible discriminatory animus on the part of Vincent than it does about the propensity of the plaintiff to ignore the rules of and authority at DC-6. The court finds it probable that the events of April 4, 1980, were simply a continuation of the confrontation between Blue and Vincent from the day before, with both parties acting out of anger and frustration. Vincent’s decision to counsel Blue, whether the most appropriate response to the situation or not, certainly was not without some justification. It is not discrimination when a supervisor decides to act firmly, even if a more lenient response might have avoided further confrontation.
30. Blue next testified about her black OIC, MJR. Sykes, and one of the NCOIC’s that served with him, SGT. Tuanquin. Blue stated that Sykes, like the black NCOIC Jones, is an “Uncle Tom” who harassed her solely because of her involvement in this litigation. Test, of Blue at 87 and 102. As an initial matter, while the court recognizes that persons of the same race may discriminate against each other, that did not occur in this case. Sykes, like Jones, was an extraordinarily credible witness. Indeed, these two witnesses received the highest credibility ratings on a rating scale kept by the court throughout the trial. The court seriously doubts that ei
*1257
ther man has ever acted in a discriminatory manner toward any employee, black or white, civilian or military.
Notwithstanding Blue’s name-calling, the lack of evidence to support any allegation against either officer is total. The real problem lay not with Sykes and Jones, but with Blue in her attitude, her conduct, and her personality. Perhaps better than anyone who testified, Sykes summed up what it was like having to work with Blue at DC-6:
A: [i]f she’s told to do something by her doctor who was supervising her, she’d say, no, I won’t do it; then the NCOIC would have to come and tell her, do it, or the doctor would come to me, as has been done on occasion, and say, why won’t Ms. Blue come to work, she’s supposed to be at the chair working with me and she’s not;
So I’d have to say, well, go back and tell her that she is supposed to be there working with you.
So she just required constant guidance and she just taxes you, taxing to the spirit is what she is. You always had to prod her to do what she was told.
Q. How does Ms. Blue take criticism?
A. Not well. She is usually defensive about it, she just doesn’t take criticism well. It’s just a matter, whenever she is corrected the person who is correcting her is always wrong. It’s one of those things, if you’re black you’re going to be an Uncle Tom; if you’re white, you’re going to be prejudiced. You can’t win.
Test, of Sykes at 1191-92.
31.Blue claimed that shortly after Sykes arrived at DC-6, he called her into his office and questioned her about her involvement in this lawsuit. He allegedly told her that he was aware she was prohibited from discussing the details, but he wanted to inform her that she was wasting her time because “you can’t fight the government.” Sykes denies ever making this statement or questioning plaintiff about the case at bar. Reviewing the testimony, the demeanor, and the motive and its Sykes’ testimony and finds plaintiff’s version unworthy of belief.
32. Blue also contends Sykes discrimi-natorily disciplined her for disrupting a clinic meeting. Blue testified she wanted to make a phone call just before the start of a meeting and Sykes prevented her from doing so. When she persisted, believing Sykes had changed his mind and would now allow her to call, he haled her into his office to discuss the incident. Plaintiff also claimed other employees were allowed to make such phone calls and that she was singled out in this instance for unjustified discipline. Sykes subsequently presented Blue with a proposed letter of reprimand. PX188(g).
33. Blue’s recollection of this incident was at sharp variance with that of Sykes and other employees who attended the meeting. Sykes testified that Blue attempted to use the phone
during
the meeting, that he stopped her, and requested she wait until the meeting was over. Blue responded that it was an important call and started to dial the telephone again. For the second time, Sykes asked Blue to wait, but she flatly ignored him and started to dial the phone a third time. At that point, Sykes interrupted her and directed her to go with him to his office because of the disruption the incident was causing at the meeting. After reviewing what had occurred, Sykes proposed the letter of reprimand. Test, of Sykes at 1189; PX188(g).
34. The substance of Sykes’ testimony was corroborated by witnesses Hutchinson and Roach, both of whom attended the meeting and were co-workers of Blue. Test, of Hutchinson at 1668-69; Test, of Roach at 1783-84 and 1793. The court credits the testimony of Sykes, Hutchinson and Roach and finds the plaintiff’s actions were not only disruptive and discourteous, but unprofessional as well.
Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory manner that Sykes took reprisals against her because of her participation in this litigation and that his proposed reprimand in this instance was an example of his actions against her. In fact, however, the evidence
*1258
showed exactly the opposite. Sykes proposed to reprimand her precisely because she deserved it. Plaintiff was insubordinate; she disobeyed her OIC’s order, disrupted the meeting, and embarrased Sykes. Frankly, plaintiffs allegations against Sykes in this instance (at trial and in pretrial grievances) provide just another glaring example of the consistent pattern and practice plaintiff engaged in of harassing management officials while using race as a subterfuge. Plaintiffs claim against Sykes is nothing short of frivolous.
35. Sykes acknowledged that the DEN-TAC Commander (who had only been at Ft. Bragg a few weeks) chose not to finalize the reprimand. PX188(a). However, the fact that the reprimand was not finalized does not mean the events did not occur, or that there was not ample evidence to support the proposed discipline — there clearly was. Many factors may influence a decision to settle a dispute as was done here. Indeed, the testimony of COL. Jacobsen, the deputy DENTAC Commander, reveals that during his meeting with Blue, she did not dispute the facts related by Sykes; rather, she simply felt she should not be reprimanded. Test, of Jacobsen at 1415-16. Jacobsen stated that he supported the reprimand.
Id.
Colonel Brown, the new DENTAC commander eventually found that “although ... management's position was meritorious and procedurally sound ...,” PX188(a), and that the proposed reprimand was warranted, enough time had already been consumed in dealing with the matter and the reprimand should not now be enforced.
36. Like so many of the incidents that Blue attributed to racial animus, the events involving Sykes reveal far more about Blue's personality, attitude and demeanor than they do about the ADO's racial animus, The court is convinced that Sykes was an honest and professional OIC, who was motivated solely by his responsibilities to keep order in the dental clinic and to provide competent care for all patients. What these incidents reveal is that
any
attempt to effectively supervise the plaintiff was deemed by her to be discrimination and never an honest or reasonable attempt to provide direction and guidance.
37.One other major incident involving Sykes was discussed at some length, for background purposes, and the court finds plaintiff's testimony describing the incident to be such a perfect example of the frustrating, evasive and inconsistent nature of her testimony throughout the trial (as well as that of Ballew), that portions of the transcript are duplicated herein. Setting the scene, on December 17,1982, Blue filed an EEO complaint (PX6(b)) alleging that Sykes had retaliated against her because of her continued participation in this litigation. Plaintiff's statement at the time was as follows:
A. On or about 1 May 1981 a Formal Class Action Complaint of discrimination was filed with the District Court in Fay-etteville, N.C., alleging a continuing pattern of race discrimination by past and present officials and other agents of the Department of Army and Fort Bragg. Such complaint is in pre-litigation stages.
B. On or about 1 May 1981 I joined the Class as an agent representative of the claims of the Class.
C. On or about 12 May 1982 a newspaper article was posted in my work location, Dental Clinic # 6,
such article, at enclosure 1 hereto, clearely states my involvement as
agent of the Class.
D. On the date the article was posted the Clinic Officer in charge, Major F. Sykes, became visibly upset, called a group meeting of Clinic employees and made statements to the group concerning
persons, (visitors) coming to the clinic in retaliation to the
Complaint.... no one was to talk to them but rather they (visitors), should be referred to his, (Sykes’) office....
******
F. Following my joining the Class I was, on 25 July 1982, the subject of a proposed disciplinary action. Such discipline, initiated by Major Sykes was rescinded through a Union grievance. Such proposed discipline was a reprisal against me as stated above.
*1259
PX6(b) at 2 (emphasis in original). This complaint was signed by Blue on the date it was filed.
38. Plaintiffs testimony at trial (on cross-examination) concerning her complaint follows, in pertinent part, and the credibility level of the evidence is self-apparent:
(Document handed to the witness)
“Q. I believe that is a complaint that you filed on December 17, 1982, is that correct?
“A. Yes. I didn’t file it, that was the day I—
“Q. —Signed it.
“A. No. that was the day I complained over an incident. I had a complaint after that.
“Q. Now, you allege in your complaint that on or about, Your Honor, I’m looking at not an exhibit, a complaint that she filed, a newspaper article was posted at my work location, Dental Clinic No. 6, an enclosure here, that clearly states my involvement as agent of the class. Do you recall that?
“A. (No response).
“Q. And then you said that Major Sykes, on the date the article was posted the clinic officer in charge, Major Sykes became visibly upset. And it’s your testimony that Major Sykes became upset because you were part of this class action, right?
“A. I don’t think he was upset with me, he was upset that there was a class action suit going on at Fort Bragg. I’m not saying he was upset with me personally.
“Q. Well, let me ask you, when you say in the complaint, became visibly upset, what did you think that Major Sykes was upset about?
“A. That there was such a lawsuit going on at Fort Bragg and that possibly someone would be coming around asking questions.
“Q. But you did allege that Major Sykes discriminated against you, didn’t you?
“A. Right.
“Q. you Sykes disciplined you as a result of your involvement in the class action, don’t you, Ms. Blue?
“A. I don’t remember if that’s part of that one or not. I’d have to read it.
(Counsel confer)
“Q. I want to show you a copy of your complaint, this is her very own complaint, Your Honor.
“MR. CHAMBERS: We have an exhibit 6-B, Your Honor, that I think is the same as the charge; you’re not showing her the whole file, are you?
“MR. LOEWENBERG: No, I’m just showing her that charge.
(Document handed to the witness)
“Q. You notice, Ms. Blue, looking at page 2 of Plaintiff’s 6-B, do you see the page, facts bearing on my complaint are as follows?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And if you look at E and F; do you see that?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And then you notice, look at F, it says, filing my complaint on July 25, 1982, I was the subject of discipline. Do you see that?
“A. Right.
“Q. Now, I take it that it’s your testimony, your opinion that Dr. Sykes waited almost a year; by the way, Your Honor, the copy that she has and the copy of 6-B are not quite the same. I can approach the bench and show you. I think they made corrections.
“THE COURT: Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6-B?
“MR. LOEWENBERG: Yes. Maybe I can ask a couple of questions, Your Honor, to clarify the matter.
“THE COURT: All right.
“Q. Ms. Blue, if you look on that second page, on A, B and C, your copy has some penciled or handwritten item?
"A. Yes.
*1260
“Q. And let me show you the Plaintiff’s 6-B where those marks are not made, do you see that?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Now, tell me, which is the correct version, which is correct, do you know?
“A. I don’t know.
“MR. CHAMBERS: Do you mean which date is correct?
“MR. LOEWENBERG: You see, on the handwritten copy, it says, on or about 14 September ’81 the newspaper article was posted; in the copy that has no corrections it says, on or about May 12, 1982.
“MR. CHAMBERS: May 1st.
“Q. Which is correct, Ms. Blue?
“A. Which what is correct? I have ’81 on both. I don’t have a ’82.
“Q. Plaintiff’s 6-B.
“A. This says ’81 on both.
“Q. On C? Look at the letter C.
“A. That says '82.
“Q. Look at the copy that is handwritten, it says 14 September '81.
“A. I didn’t write it here.
“Q. Is the copy 6-B correct?
“A. I’d have to look at my notes. I don’t know.
“Q. You don’t have any idea when that newspaper article appeared, do you?
“A. Not without looking at my notes.
“Q. Which notes would you like to look at?
“A. The ones pertaining to ’81 and '82.
“Q. Go ahead and look at them.
“A. You have them, don’t you?
(Documents handed to the witness)
“MR. LOEWENBERG: I will assist you just a little bit; I believe the lawsuit was filed in September of ’81.
“A. It’s ’81 then.
“Q. Well, I’m asking you. If you’d like to agree with me, that would be fine. Why don’t you look at your notes and see if you can find it.
“A. I don’t believe the '82 date is the correct one.
“Q. You don’t believe the handwritten copy is correct?
“A. I don’t know if that’s the correct one. I know the ’82 date is wrong.
“Q. Is wrong?
“A. Uh-huh.
“Q. Now, which note did you look at, by the way, when you were looking at them?
“A. I wasn’t looking at anything, I was just thinking in my head.
“Q. You said you wanted to look at your notes. Now, I wonder if you could tell me which notes would assist you in finding the date?
“A. I don’t have any notes for ’81.
“Q. Although you said you had to look at your notes to help you decide?
“A. Well, like I said, I didn’t know which years I didn’t write and which years I did and which months I wrote. No, I don't know everything that’s in my notebook to my memory.”
# # * # # >9
“Q. So you wanted to look at your notes to see if that would refresh you?
“A. Yes.
“Q. September ’81 was the right date, wasn’t it?
“A. I don’t know if that was the right date.
“Q. You know the other one is wrong, don’t you?
“A. (No response)
“Q. You know the ’82 date you see is wrong, don’t you, Ms. Blue?
“A. I don’t know that for a fact, no.
“Q. You don’t know that for a fact?
“A. No.
“Q. Moving along to E and F, I take it your testimony is that this article was posted in September ’81 or thereabout and that Dr. Sykes waited from September '81 to July 25th then to impose discipline as a reprisal, impose discipline on you as a reprisal?
*1261
“A. Excuse me. Dr. Sykes was not working in our clinic when that notice was posted on the bulletin board.
“Q. He was not working in your clinic?
“A. No. That’s some kind of an error.
“Q. Ms. Blue, look at D then. It says, on the date the article was posted the clinic officer in charge, Major F. Sykes, became visibly upset.
“Now, you say he wasn’t even there?
“A. Right, he wasn’t there when it was posted, no.
“Q. Well, I’m a little confused. Why did you write that he became upset?
“A. Well, see, I didn’t write this. I gave information to my representative and then I was out of town, then I moved out of the state, and what I know of it is that the article was posted before Major Sykes, that somehow or other something came up about the class act, the lawsuit, and he went up to the bulletin board where it was posted and then he was, there was something about him finding out about this lawsuit and then he was visibly upset about it, but he did not, he was not in the clinic when the article was posted because I didn’t even post the article.
“Q. Well, let’s go back over that. You stated you were what, out of state?
“A. This is ahm, an amendment or something that had to do with my complaint because before it was finished I moved out of the state and I left authorization for my union representative to carry on with my EEO complaint.
“Q. Now, where did you move to?
“A. San Francisco, California.
“Q. Okay. So you moved out to San Francisco, California in something like July, 1983, right?
“A. Right.
“Q. Okay. Now, the date of this complaint, is December 17, 1982.
“A. Yeah. But it didn’t just go one, two, three, I mean, there were periods of time that they would go over this and they’d send something back to us and we’d send something to them and by ’83 of June I was gone, so I didn’t get paperwork.
“Q. Let me understand your testimony. Do you have Plaintiff’s 6-B in front of you, Ms. Blue?
“Now, that complaint is dated December 17, 1982. Right?
“A. Right.
“Q. And your signature appears to the right of that?
“A. Right.
“Q. And this is your complaint, right?
“A. Right.
“Q. And then we turn to the second page and you say, somebody wrote on your complaint here, typed, on the date the article was posted and the clinical officer in charge, Major Sykes, became visibly upset.
“A. Well, he misunderstood what I said.
“Q. Who misunderstood?
“A. My representative.
“Q. Who is that?
“A. Mr. Ron Witiak.
“Q. Mr. Witiak typed all this up?
“A. He was my representative so this is where it came from.
“Q. Did you read this?
“A. I haven’t, this is the first I’ve seen of it. Because like I said, I was gone. When I left it was still in the stages of being investigated by Mr. Cortis.
“Q. So you signed a blank complaint?
“A. No, no, no. This is my original complaint here.
“Q. That’s the front page, right? But the second page, was that done after-wards?
“A. No, I’m not saying that either.
“Q. Well, did you read the second page before you signed the first one?
“A. This has been amended to many times. I wrote first page. I know things have been amended because. I was getting correspondence back and forth. I don’t know if that’s the original or what.
“Q. Let me call your attention to block ten. Look at block ten. It has A, do you
*1262
see that, block 10? I was issued a proposed letter. Do you see that, Ms. Blue?
“A. No, I don’t.
“Q. Block 10, first page. [Court: this block establishes that the complaint has an “attached sheet.”]
“A. And you said A or B?
“Q. A, Block 10.
“A. Don’t have a A.
“Q. I think you’re looking at the second page, Ms. Blue.
“A. First page, okay.
“Q. Do you see Block 10?
“A. Block 10.
“Q. Do you see No. A?
“A. Okay.
“Q. Turn to the second page, B; then C.
“A. Uh-huh.
“Q. Okay. Now when you signed this complaint did it only have one page?
“A. No.
“Q. Had two pages?
“A. Yeah or more.
“Q. Well, actually had four pages, isn’t that true?
“A. It might’ve had more than that. I’m telling you it was amended several times.
“Q. Now, let me ask you this, you say that when the article was posted, you’re shaking your head.
“A. Because I did not say that.
“Q. I see. I haven’t finished my question, but tell me what you didn’t say.
“A. I didn’t say when the article was posted Major Sykes got visibly upset.
“Q. Okay. My question was, you say that’s not correct, and that was because Major Sykes was not there, is that your testimony?
“A. He wasn’t there when that article was posted. It was posted before he even came to our clinic.
“Q. Okay. The article was posted before he came to the clinic.
“A. Right.
“Q. Turning to C then, it says 14 September ’81, is that when the article was posted?
“A. Here it was 12 May ’82 on my C.
“Q. Look at the other one.
“A. On or about, it has 12 May '82 crossed out and then parentheses 14 September ’81.
“Q. I’m asking you, Ms. Blue, which date is correct?
“A. Which date what was correct?
“Q. Approximately when was it posted? Do you understand my question?
“A. When was the article posted approximately?
“Q. Approximately?
“A. Sometime during, I don’t know when the article was posted. Somebody posted it though.
“Q. So you don’t know which date is correct, right?
“A. Right.
“Q. And you in fact didn’t prepare this?
“A. I gave my side of what was going on and it was typed up by someone else.
“Q. Now, when was it that Major Sykes who is black got visibly upset, when was that?
“A. After being at the clinic for a while and finding out about the lawsuit; when it was exactly I do not know.
“Q. So, could you look at page 2 of this complaint and tell me what is incorrect about the complaint that you would not have said?
“A. Which one am I looking at?
“Q. Page 2.
“A. Either?
“Q. It doesn’t matter. What else is incorrect about those allegations?
“A. Nothing that I can see.
“Q. Nothing else besides that?
“A. That I can tell, no.
“Q. Do you remember the month when this happened, by the way, Ms. Blue?
“A. The month what happened?
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“Q. Major Sykes got upset?
“A. I just said I didn’t know. I couldn’t remember.”
******
“Q. Okay. Before I get into that I want to ask you one other thing. You remember on yesterday you said that you had never seen your EEO complaint that you filed and that you were gone at the time, do you recall that?
“A. No, I didn’t say I never saw it, I never saw the amended ones.
“Q. Well, what amended complaints did you file and when?
“A. I didn’t file a amended complaint; I’m saying when I filed the complaint it was amended after I was gone.
“Q. Who amended your complaint?
"A. Ron Witiak, my representative.
“Q. Okay. Now, when you say Ron Witiak amended your complaint, you’re referring to the letter that he sent to Pat Crain? Is that what you’re talking about?
“A. I don’t know.
“Q. Well, what are you talking about when you say he amended it?
“A. I don’t know if that is the one he amended or what. I know he had amended part of my EEO complaint and then he did some more amending after I was gone.
"Q. Let me just ask you, you had seen the—
“A. —The original.
“Q. You didn’t see the original?
“A. I saw the original.
“Q. So-
“A. —And it was later amended.
“Q. In fact, you gave a statement, didn’t you?
“A. Gave a statement to who?
“Q. Beula [sic] Mae Harris.
“A. I gave her plenty of statements, yes.
“Q. You gave her a statement about this complaint?
“A. She was my representative.
“Q. And in was no discrimination, didn’t she?
“A. She didn’t tell me that.”
******
“Q. Now, Ms. Blue, did you get a copy of the letter that Witiak sent to Patricia Crain?
“A. I may have.
“Q. You may have?
“A. (No response).
“Q. Well, let me show you the letter that is dated December 29, 1982, and ask you if that is the letter that Witiak sent to the union, sent to Patricia Crain about correcting those dates?”
******
“A. Possibly, but like I said before, the article was posted before Major Sykes even came to the clinic.
“Q. But we’re talking about the fact that you said yesterday you were gone when all this happened, and if you notice the date on that letter, it’s 29 December 1982 and you were there?
“A. That was one of the amendments. I didn’t say I was gone through all the amendments.
“Q. What amendments are you talking about? Who filed an amended complaint?
“A. I said Mr. Ron Witiak filed amendments after I was gone also.
“Q. You mean he filed and you—
“A.
—He had a notarized statement to act on my behalf.
“Q. And you didn’t even see these statements?
“A. I couldn’t see them if I wasn’t here.
“Q. Well, let’s look at this letter here. You were there when that letter was written weren’t you?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Now if you turn to the next page of that document you gave a statement to George Portis, didn’t you?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And that statement was given to Mr. Portis who investigated the complaint for USACARA?
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“A. Right.
“Q. Do you remember when you gave that statement?
“That is Defendants’ 257, your Honor.
“A. (No response)
“Q. You signed that statement in March 1982, isn’t that true?
“A. Was it March? I don’t know if it was March or April, I can’t recall.
“Q. Look on page 42 which is page 14 of your affidavit; the 30th day of March?
“A. Okay, yeah.
“Q. Are you saying that after USA-CARA did its investigation you changed the complaint, is that what you’re saying?
“Is that what you’re telling this Court?
“A. Did I change the complaint?
“Q. Yes. Did Mr. Witiak change your complaint after USACARA did its investigation?
“A. There was amendment to this, also.
“Q. I’d like you to answer my question. Are you—
“A. —Yes.
“Q. I see. And where is that recorded and with whom?
“A. I don’t know. He sent it up to whoever he was supposed to send it to.
“Q. What did you amend in the complaint? What did you tell Mr. Witiak he should do, what did you authorize Mr. Wit-iak to do that you hadn’t done before?
“A. To act on my behalf while I was gone.
“Q. That isn’t what I'm asking you, Ms. Blue. I’m asking you what did you want him to do to change the complaint that you hadn’t done before? What did you ask him to add?
“A. To add? I told him to subtract.
“Q. What did you tell him to subtract.
“A. Major Sykes was not in the building when the article was posted.
“Q. I see. So that is the one thing you told him to do, that is one thing you told Ron Witiak that he should see is deleted from your complaint.
“Now, if you look at that letter that I just showed you from Mr. Witiak on December 29th, doesn’t he in fact do that in there?
“It’s on page 28.
“A. I have that page. I am still saying that the article was not in the building. What I’m saying is he became upset when investigations were starting toward the class complaint. The article had been posted on the bulletin board long before he came.”
Test, of Blue at 121-133 and 163-170. For other examples of plaintiff’s extraordinary testimony,
see
pp. 95-101, 156-61 and 172-74 of the transcript.
39. Blue’s testimony regarding SGT Tu-anquin was sketchy and strained. He rendered an annual performance rating of the plaintiff in July of 1982, finding her “fully successful” under the new GPAS.
89
Blue felt she deserved the highest rating possible. Blue testified that when she received the rating she questioned Tuanquin about it and asked whether he had checked with all the doctors that she worked with prior to signing the appraisal. She claims he said no. Subsequently, plaintiff filed an EEO complaint about the rating, (PX6(b)), contending that the rating was unfairly low because of her race.
90
40. In contrast to Blue’s evidence, Sykes, once again, provided a very cogent explanation of the rating.
91
He pointed out that the GPAS was a new system and that both he, as reviewer, and Tuanquin, as rater, had procedural difficulties with the form. In fact, he stated the rating complained of by Blue was one of the first to be conducted under the new system and it
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had to be redone at once. stated that Tuanquin asked him for input and that he was aware of at least one or two other doctors who were asked about Blue’s performance. Finally, Sykes explained that he agreed with the rating because contrary to Blue’s assessment of herself as the “best” dental assistant from the day she arrived to the day she left, Blue was only an average employee, in terms of career skills, and that was accurately reflected in her rating.
See
Test, of Sykes at 1233-39.
41. Two other points regarding the July, 1982, rating demand mention. First, as Sykes pointed out, Tuanquin had rated other black employees at DC-6 higher than Blue and higher than some whites at the clinic. Test, of Sykes at 1238-29. Second, the “fully successful” rating was entirely consistent with
every
other annual performance rating Blue received at Ft. Bragg. Prior to 1982, Blue had been rated “satisfactory,” the middle grade on a three-grade scale, in all her annual performance appraisals. A number of these appraisals pre-dated any informal or formal allegation of discrimination by Blue and were never the subject of a grievance or complaint. “Fully Successful” under the present GPAS system totally equates to a “Satisfactory” rating under the old system.
42. In conclusion, the court cannot attribute any racial animus to the rating rendered by NCOIC Tuanquin. Rather, Sykes’ testimony persuasively explained the limited procedural irregularities that occurred in developing the plaintiff’s rating and demonstrated the fact that rating was accurate.
43. Finally, for background purposes, the court finds plaintiff’s problems with her supervisors and co-employees at DC-6 stemmed not from any racial bias on their part, but rather from plaintiff’s personality, her unique view of a supervisory-subordinate relationship, and her narrow vision that seemingly saw all employment disappointments or adversities solely in racial terms, yet attributed any favorable consideration she received as being merely her just dues. Plaintiff, in fact, performed her job duties properly, even very but only when she wanted to do so. On a number of occasions, Blue was simply unreliable and unproductive. In sum, the court finds that plaintiff believed she should be allowed to freely challenge authority because she is black, with the result being inexcusable conduct directed against supervisors, dentists, and co-employees alike — conduct which could not be condoned if DC-6 was to perform its function. Examples of testimony supporting this finding follow
seriatim.
44. Martha Soehren testified that Blue had a terrible attitude and that she did not enjoy working with her. She testified that she observed occasions where Blue disagreed with an NCOIC, actively solicited a letter of appreciation from a dentist, was loud and obnoxious in the clinic, disrupted clinic operations, and slammed doors and acted in an unprofessional manner. Test, of Soehren at 1070-76. Although the court recognizes that Soehren is the wife of COL. Soehren, an ADO, the court credits this portion of Soehren’s testimony. The probative value of the evidence increases because it is consistent with the testimony of a number of other disinterested witnesses.
45. SSG Ramos testified that Blue often read newspapers and magazines while assisting patients, refused to clean around her dental chair area as all dental assistants were required to do, never volunteered for assignments, showed little initiative, left patients alone in the dental chair so she could smoke a cigarette or take a break, and exhibited little or no respect for his authority. Test, of Ramos at 1357-62. Blue was a “freelance dental assistant [who] did what she wanted whenever she wanted.”
Id.
at 1357. The court fully credits Ramos’ testimony.
46. Like Ramos, SGT. Kurz (a DTA) testified that plaintiff read newspapers while assisting patients and rarely volunteered for any assignments. Test, of Kurz at 1094-1101. Carolyn Cave, a dental assistant, testified that plaintiff was not professional in her conduct, acted condescendingly to CPT. Howell, a dentist, while he was suturing a patient, and observed
*1266
Blue and Ballew yelling at each other across the bay area of the clinic in front of a number of patients. Test, of Cave at 1555. Although the court does not credit all of Cave’s testimony,
92
again the court finds this aspect of her testimony unimpeachable and fully corroborated by a host of witnesses.
47.CPT. Howell testified that plaintiff refused to assist him on a least two or three occasions, a situation shocking to him given his capacity as plaintiff’s superior and a dentist at DC-6. The court recognizes that Howell’s testimony, as well as that of some other witnesses, refers to incidents occurring after the promotion claims at issue.
See also, e.g.,
Test, of Jones and Harmon. Accordingly because of its remoteness in time to plaintiff's conduct in 1979, it has minimal substantive relevance, if any, as to Blue’s competence, skills and even attitude at that time. Subsequent acts rarely show lack of animus at a previous time, particularly as the time gap between events increases. Indeed, if plaintiff had been discriminated against in 1978, 1979 or 1980, her later conduct, no matter how bad, could not be used against her as employees understandably turn bitter and hostile if they have previously been mistreated by their employer.
Notwithstanding that fact, Howell’s testimony is very relevant on the issue of plaintiff’s credibility, as Blue specifically denied ever not assisting Howell or any dentist, denied any unprofessional conduct, denied all acts of misconduct and insubordination, cast herself in the light of being the best dental assistant at DC-6 throughout her tenure, and charged a number of post-1979 NCOIC’s, OIC’s and dentists with being ADO’s. Thus, as to credibility, the court considers the post 1979/1980 testimony relevant and findings of fact on those incidents are therefore included herein.
48. SGT. Jones testified that plaintiff was a good dental assistant, when she performed her job, but that encouraging her to properly perform her job was the difficult part. Blue generally had a bad work attitude, rarely volunteered, left patients in the dental chair on occasion, was late to work a number of times, fell asleep while at work on one occasion, refused to clean her dental chair area, and watched a television she brought to work
while
tending to patients.
See generally
all of Jones’ testimony. As for the number of times Jones had to counsel, discipline or talk to Blue about her conduct, Jones stated “I couldn’t write all the statements concerning the issues and times that I had to deal with Ms. Blue, and I mean, I would have a big book, and there’s no way I could keep up with them.”
Id.
at 903-04.
93
49. Other DTA’s and dental assistants fully corroborated the above testimony. Ann Randall stated that plaintiff read newspapers and watched television while assisting patients, left patients alone in her dental chair, refused to clean her chair area, refused to work with certain dentists because they were slow and complained of working at the front desk (reception) area of the clinic because “it was not in her job description.” Test, of Randall at 1383-90. The result of Blue’s (and Ballew’s similar) conduct was a “tension-filled” atmosphere between plaintiff and the dentists.
Id.
at 1385.
Marilyn Roach testified that plaintiff was disrespectful to supervisors, read newspapers and magazines while patients were in her dental chair, refused to clean her chair area, interrupted staff meetings and was less than punctual. Test, of Roach at 1758-65. Although Roach’s testimony was more general in nature, lacking details in certain aspects, the basis of the testimony was not impeached.
*1267
Similar evidence can be found in Suzanne McPherson’s testimony at 1615-16, Anita Hutchin’s testimony at 1656-57 (told CPT. Howell he was “stupid” while patient was in dental chair), MJR. Sykes’ testimony at 1189 (played on intercom like a child), and Dr. Harmon’s testimony at 1797-1800 (plaintiff rude to patients, refused to pull medical records when requested by dentist, and rebutted Harmon’s advice to a patient.)
94
50. Referring back to plaintiff’s claim of conspiracy, the court simply cannot ignore the overwhelming weight of the evidence and accept at face value plaintiff’s unsubstantiated, self-serving, contradictory, and inconsistent claims of discrimination. Blue may sincerely believe that nearly all her co-workers and supervisors, be they black or white, colluded against her because of her race, but credible evidence to support any such allegation is non-existent.
Claims for Relief
The court will first consider the 1979 supervisory appraisal and then the two merit promotion attempts.
A.
The 1979 Supervisory Appraisal of Current Performance
51. Blue claimed that she was an outstanding dental assistant; indeed, as indicated, she testified that she was the best dental assistant at DC-6.
95
She also testified that the supervisory appraisal of December 1979
96
was the worst rating she ever received. She contended that her inability to be promoted was in part due to this appraisal. Blue testified she believed the rating was motivated by discrimination for two reasons: (1) because COL. Pa-quette had discriminated against other blacks and he was “behind” the rating, and (2) because whites received higher ratings. According to plaintiff, since she was the best assistant at DC-6, it follows that her rating had to be discriminatory.
52. The appraisal rated Blue on twenty (20) attributes, grading “A” (highest) to “E” (lowest) with “N” meaning not relevant.
See
Finding of Fact #34, Section III,
supra.
Blue received two B’s, eleven C’s, five D’s and two N’s. The court notes that C means the employee requires “about the same supervision as others.” All told, the appraisal indicated a satisfactory, but certainly not exceptional performance by the employee. The rating was signed by then SFC Vincent, NCOIC, and reviewed by Paquette, OIC.
53. As previously discussed, Blue’s “evidence” that Paquette discriminated against other blacks was completely negated by the testimony of the alleged victims of his discriminatory actions. Furthermore, Blue seemed to attribute the rating, in large part, to Paquette, when he was only the reviewer, not the rating supervisor. PX181(h)(l). Vincent testified he was responsible for the rating, as plaintiff’s NCOIC, and that the rating was prepared only after a meeting with all the dentists at DC-6. Their opinions were substantially relied upon since they observed Blue’s professional abilities first-hand. Test, of Vincent at 1478-86 and 1507-08. He recollected that some dentists would have rated Blue higher in certain categories, and others lower, but the end product was generally a consensus opinion.
Id.
In rating Blue, Vincent and the panel of dentists followed the instructions set forth on the rating sheets and exercised their best professional opinion concerning her skills and job performance.
Id.
54. Vincent denied that race played any factor at all in the evaluation. He also pointed out that at the time Blue first complained of the appraisal, she said it was in retaliation for her Union activities, not because of race, and that race only became an issue months later.
Id.
at 1508.
See
*1268
also
PX181(h)(l) at 3 — the appraisal— where plaintiff commented “I disagree with every part of this appraisal.... I feel this appraisal is in reprisal for my Union activities.”
55. Ernest Carter, the EEO counselor who investigated plaintiffs complaint about the appraisal, testified that Paquette unflinchingly adhered to his position that the appraisal was fair and accurate. Test, of Carter at 508. Carter also stated that he interviewed SGT. Jones, the NCOIC at DC-6 both before and after Vincent and that Jones would have rated Blue higher in three (3) areas: “Accepts responsibility for assigned work”; “Ability to present ideas logically, clearly and concisely in writing”; and “ability to present ideas orally.” However, Jones testified that Carter apparently did not understand the nature of Jones’ comments. Jones testified he agreed with the rating and that all he meant was that Blue would not hesitate to express her opinions, orally or in writing, about her supervisors, dentists, and co-workers.
See, e.g.,
Test, of Jones at 757-58 and 978-81. He also pointed out that he would have given Blue a lower rating on cooperativeness. In support of his opinion, Jones cited numerous instances where Blue refused to do what he asked, claimed she was not required to perform a certain task, or was disruptive and contentious throughout the clinic.
See generally
Jones’ testimony.
56. In addition, Blue testified that the discriminatory nature of the appraisal was allegedly exposed because two less competent white employees were rated higher: Martha Soehren and Randall. At the outset, the court finds it difficult to compare Blue with Soehren, since Soehren was the clinic receptionist, not a dental assistant. Little meaningful comparison can be made when the job responsibilities are so dissimilar.
However, even if the two could be compared, the comparison would not favor Blue. The opinion of all supervisors and employees who testified on the issue was that Soehren was an excellent and cooperative receptionist.
E.g.,
Test, of Morgan at 1307-09; Jones at 743-44 . Unlike Blue. there was no evidence of any personality conflict or attitude problem on the part of Soehren.
57. Evidence concerning Randall is more probative. Blue offered nothing more than her opinion that she was a better assistant than Randall. Rebutting Blue’s opinion was the testimony of a number of dentists, supervisors and co-workers, all of whom stated that Randall was a better dental assistant than Blue, despite cer
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