The opinion
FILED
JUL 30 2010
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DIANA JEAN STEINMETZ, No. 09-35657
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:08-cv-05485-BHS-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
CITY OF CAMAS, OFFICER KYLE
ISAAK, OFFICER DEBRAH FARLAND,
and SGT. SHYLA NELSON,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 16, 2010
Seattle, Washington
Before: RYMER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and HART, District Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable William Hart, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
Diana Rain Steinmetz appeals the summary judgment in favor of the
officers involved in her arrest. As they are entitled to qualified immunity, we
affirm.
Courts consider two questions in deciding qualified immunity:
(1) whether the facts taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury
show the officer’s conducted violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the
right was clearly established in light of the specific context of the case. Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). We believe this case is best resolved by
considering step two of the inquiry, that is, whether the right was clearly
established. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 812 (2009). The dispositive
query is “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202.
A reasonable officer in Isaak’s shoes would not have believed that
probable cause to arrest Steinmetz was lacking. See RCW 10.31.100(2)(c).
Steinmetz admitted to clawing her husband’s neck; Earl called 911; Earl had
visible claw marks on his neck; Steinmetz lacked any injury similar to his; and her
husband’s story was clearer and more consistent than hers. A reasonable officer
would not have believed that probable cause was dissipated because Steinmetz
wanted an officer to talk to a third-party, who had no percipient knowledge of the
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incident, over the telephone. Nor would Isaak have been alerted by clearly
established law that, given probable cause to believe Steinmetz had assaulted her
husband, he was nevertheless obliged to investigate whether an affirmative defense
was applicable. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1032 (9th Cir. 2003)
(arresting officer not required to investigate and determine that an affirmative
defense is inapplicable before arresting a person for whom there is otherwise
probable cause to arrest). While a reasonable officer would not have relied just on
Earl’s claim to being the victim of a crime, see Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp.
Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001), Isaak didn’t do this; he interviewed
both parties, twice, and considered their relative injuries as well as the coherency
of their accounts.
In sum, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because it would
not have been clear to them they lacked probable cause or failed to conduct an
adequate investigation.
Given this disposition, we do not need to reach any issue arising out of
the Release and Dismissal Agreement.
AFFIRMED.
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