Golden v. HELEN SIGMAN & ASSOCIATES, LTD.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 08-1506

B RUCE P. G OLDEN , individually and as

Next Friend of Dale Michelle Golden,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

H ELEN S IGMAN & A SSOCIATES, L TD., et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 05 C 0283—Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.

A RGUED S EPTEMBER 16, 2009—D ECIDED JULY 2, 2010

Before C UDAHY, W OOD , and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

W OOD , Circuit Judge. In 2004, Bruce Golden’s wife

Jody Rosenbaum filed for divorce in Illinois state court.

The proceedings that followed were fraught with

hostility as the parties engaged in a bitter dispute over

division of assets and custody of Dale, their only child.

After a year of setbacks in state court, Golden filed a multi-

2 No. 08-1506

count federal lawsuit. He seems to have named anyone

who advocated for Rosenbaum in state court as a defen-

dant, including Nancy Thomas, Rosenbaum’s friend and

neighbor; Helen Sigman, the court-appointed representa-

tive for the child; Rosenbaum’s counsel; and two of

Rosenbaum’s business associates.

The district court abstained with respect to Golden’s

claim that he owned certain copyrights, on the theory

that the ownership of assets in general would be

resolved in the state divorce proceedings; it granted

defendants’ motions to dismiss on all other counts. A

couple of years later, the district court sanctioned Golden

pursuant to F ED. R. C IV. P. 11(b)(2), requiring him to

pay defendants’ attorneys’ fees and expenses. Golden

has now appealed, and we affirm.

I

On January 18, 2005, Golden sued the defendants in

federal court, raising claims under federal copyright law,

17 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq., civil RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c)

and (d), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as a variety of state-

law theories. Golden’s allegations revolve around his

stormy divorce. He is convinced that the defendants

have acted in concert to damage his relationship with

his daughter Dale, impugn his reputation, and destroy

his financial well-being.

Golden’s complaint alleges that Rosenbaum’s attorneys

at Nadler, Pritikin & Mirabelli, LLC (collectively “Nadler”)

wrote letters defaming him and sought to disrupt his

No. 08-1506 3

business relationships. He also accused Nadler, along with

two of Rosenbaum’s business associates, of deliberately

infringing his copyright to a real estate listing system.

Sigman, Golden asserts, maligned his reputation and

abdicated her duty of neutrality by favoring Rosenbaum

in the custody proceedings. Finally, he believes that

Thomas violated his rights when, in an effort to assist

Rosenbaum’s claim for child custody, she called 911 to

report (falsely, he says) that Golden had abused his

daughter.

After Golden amended his complaint, the defendants

filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. See FED. R. C IV. P. 12(b)(6).

On November 1, 2005, the district court granted these

motions with one exception: it stayed proceedings for

Count I, which alleged copyright infringement. For

that claim, the court decided to abstain and to stay the

federal action pending the resolution of ongoing state

proceedings. In dismissing Golden’s civil RICO claim,

the court concluded that he had not properly pleaded

the requisite predicate acts and pattern of racketeering

activity necessary to state a claim. Golden was not

entitled to relief under § 1983, the court found, because

Sigman had not acted under color of state law and

she enjoyed absolute immunity from suit. As Golden’s

state-law claims were unrelated to the remaining copy-

right count, the district court relinquished supplemental

jurisdiction over them.

A month later, Nadler filed a motion for Rule 11 sanc-

tions. The magistrate judge issued a report on July 15, 2008,

4 No. 08-1506

recommending that Nadler’s motion be granted. The

following week, Sigman and Thomas jumped on the

bandwagon and filed their own motions for sanctions;

their motions were also endorsed by the magistrate

judge. Concluding that many of Golden’s positions

were wholly devoid of legal support, the district court

decided to impose sanctions against him pursuant to

F ED. R. C IV. P. 11(b)(2), in the form of attorneys’ fees. But

because the sanctions related only to certain parts of the

complaint, the district court reviewed the defendants’

billing records and ordered Golden to pay just the fees

related to the offending claims. Soon thereafter, Golden

settled with Nadler, which was voluntarily dismissed

from the case. At that point, the district court granted

Golden’s motion for a final judgment under F ED. R. C IV.

P. 54(b). This timely appeal followed.

II

Golden has abandoned his civil RICO theory on appeal

and instead has concentrated on the district court’s dis-

missal of his § 1983 claim against Sigman. This court

reviews a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.

Justice v. Town of Cicero, 577 F.3d 768, 771 (7th Cir. 2009).

In assessing whether the plaintiff has stated a valid

claim for relief, we “construe the complaint in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all

well-pleaded facts alleged, and drawing all possible

inferences in her favor.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d

1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). The district court concluded

that Golden’s § 1983 claim against Sigman was a nonstarter

No. 08-1506 5

for two independent reasons: Sigman was not a state

actor, and she was absolutely immune from suit. While

Golden challenges this decision on appeal, in the district

court he repeatedly said that his acceptance of “[the

district court judge’s] ruling without seeking further

relief before her or elsewhere” should weigh against

the imposition of sanctions. Sigman interprets Golden’s

words as a waiver of his argument against dismissal of

his § 1983 claim. “[O]nce a position is announced” in

district court, Sigman contends, “backpedaling on ap-

peal cannot be allowed.” Miller v. Willow Creek Homes, Inc.,

249 F.3d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 2001).

In our view, Golden’s statement falls short of a waiver.

See United States v. Parker, 469 F.3d 1074, 1079 (7th Cir.

2006). This court has found waiver only when an at-

torney has unambiguously taken a position irreconcilable

with that presented on appeal. Miller illustrates the

point well. There the court found that the appellants had

waived their right to appeal by: (1) withdrawing a

motion for reconsideration; (2) notifying the court that

“[they were] not going to be appealing” summary judg-

ment; and (3) requesting that any related claims be

stricken from the amended complaint. See Miller, 249

F.3d at 631 (emphasizing appellants’ “clear statements

of their intent” to waive appeal). In contrast, by framing

his statement in the past tense (he “accepted” the

dismissal order), Golden did not explicitly forswear the

possibility of an appeal. Furthermore, noting that the

court dismissed his state-law claims for lack of supple-

mental jurisdiction, Golden points out that referring to

“further relief . . . elsewhere” might allude to pursuing

6 No. 08-1506

these claims in state court. We are satisfied that he

avoided waiver of appellate review.

Turning to the merits, we begin by observing that we

recently held that child representatives in Illinois are

entitled to absolute immunity. Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d

967, 970 (7th Cir. 2009) (analogizing child representatives

to guardians ad litem and court-appointed experts). But

Cooney left the door open a crack for some suits against

representatives. Immunity extends, it acknowledged,

only with respect to conduct that “occurred within the

course of [a child representative’s] court-appointed du-

ties.” Id. At the time Golden filed his lawsuit, Illinois law

made child representatives responsible for acting as the

child’s attorney, pursuing investigations into the facts,

and offering recommendations to the court. 750 ILCS

5/506(a)(3); Cooney, 583 F.3d at 969 (explaining that a

“child’s representative is a hybrid of a child’s attorney,

750 ILCS 5/506(a)(1), and a child’s guardian ad litem”).

Golden asserts that he raised allegations in his com-

plaint that Sigman engaged in misconduct that fell

outside the scope of her statutorily defined role. He

focuses on Sigman’s allegedly false and misleading com-

munications with the parties on matters related to the

custody dispute. According to Golden, Sigman falsely

told Dale that Golden was dangerous and misrepresented

facts about the proceedings to Golden. Even assuming

that this were true, however, Sigman was still carrying

out her responsibilities as a child representative; those

duties centrally include speaking with the relevant

actors about the custody proceedings and investigating

No. 08-1506 7

the facts. Id. (concluding that child representative

could not be sued based upon his conversations with a

psychiatrist regarding the children in the custody dis-

pute). In this limited capacity, her actions closely resemble

those of a guardian ad litem. Thus, she functioned as an

“arm[] of the court” and “deserve[s] protection from

harassment by disappointed litigants, just as judges do.” Id.

More problematic are Golden’s allegations that relate

to Sigman’s acts as an advocate, such as her preparation

of court orders and her efforts to eliminate the role of the

court-appointed psychiatrist. Though these tasks are

part and parcel of a child representative’s statutory

duties, they involve a form of advocacy that more

closely resembles the work carried out by a public

defender than that of a guardian ad litem. See Gardner by

Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 145-46 & n.21 (3d Cir. 1989)

(distinguishing guardian ad litem’s advocacy role from

her reporting function). Since public defenders are not

absolutely immune from suit, Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S.

914, 921-23 (1984), child representatives may not be

protected when they function as a child’s attorney. See

Parson, 874 F.2d at 145-46 (adopting a functional ap-

proach to determining the scope of a guardian ad litem’s

absolute immunity). As the court in Cooney did not con-

front allegations implicating a child representative’s

actions as an advocate, it did not have the opportunity

to comment on this issue.

We, too, can lay it aside for another day, for a dif-

ferent reason. In our case, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

bars us from reviewing the question whether Sigman

8 No. 08-1506

violated Golden’s rights when she acted as Dale’s advo-

cate. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16

(1923); District of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462, 486 (1983). The doctrine prevents a party “com-

plaining of an injury caused by [a] state-court judg-

ment” from seeking redress in a lower federal court. See

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-92

(2005). Although we recognize that the Supreme Court

has warned against a broad reading of this doctrine, see

Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006), our case does not

present the risk of expansion that was present in

Lance. There, the Court disapproved the use of Rooker-

Feldman “where the party against whom the doctrine is

invoked was not a party to the underlying state-court

proceeding.” 546 U.S. at 464. In our case, the parties are

identical, and the only injury that Golden alleges that

he has suffered from Sigman’s supposedly biased

advocacy is the alienation of Dale’s affections and a re-

duction in his custodial rights. These harms flow directly

from the fruit of Sigman’s efforts: state-court custody

orders favorable to Rosenbaum. Golden has not alleged

a procedural harm that is separate and independent

from the state court’s custody determination. See, e.g.,

Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1005 (7th Cir. 1995) (ex-

plaining that plaintiff’s claim that his state trial

was tainted by politics was distinct from a claim that the

state-court judgment was erroneous). As Golden’s allega-

tions cannot be separated from the state court’s judg-

ment, Rooker-Feldman acts as a jurisdictional bar. We add

for the sake of completeness that even if some aspect

of these orders escapes Rooker-Feldman, after Lance, we

No. 08-1506 9

would reject Golden’s claims on the merits. The federal

court would be obliged to give full faith and credit to the

state-court judgment, see 28 U.S.C. § 1738, and we see

no reason why Golden should be entitled to reopen

matters that the state court actually resolved or could

have resolved.

All that remains of Golden’s complaint are a couple

of allegations, neither of which has merit. Golden’s

conclusory claim that Sigman helped Rosenbaum

violate court visitation orders lacks the factual specificity

required to raise it above the speculative level. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009); Brooks v.

Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581-82 (7th Cir. 2009). Similarly there

is nothing to Golden’s allegation that Sigman had

Dale’s school deny him access to Dale unless he was

accompanied by a guard. Sigman only informed Dale’s

school that Golden’s visitation rights had to be

restricted after the state court had limited Golden to

an hour a week of supervised visitation. Sigman’s com-

munications with the school, as a practical matter,

added nothing to the state court’s order, which as we

already have explained cannot be re-examined.

Having determined that absolute immunity and Rooker-

Feldman wipe out Golden’s § 1983 claim, we conclude

that the district court properly granted defendants’

motion to dismiss. Thus, there is no reason to assess

whether the district court was correct in ruling in the

alternative that Sigman was not subject to suit under

§ 1983 because child representatives are not state actors.

10 No. 08-1506

III

Golden also takes issue with the district court’s

decision to impose Rule 11 sanctions and the methodology

the court used in calculating its award of attorneys’ fees.

We review sanction rulings under Rule 11 for an abuse

of discretion. See Fabriko Acquisition Co. v. Prokos, 536

F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2008). Golden objects to the timeli-

ness of Sigman’s and Thomas’s motions for Rule 11

sanctions; he disputes the district court’s decision to

grant Rule 11 sanctions; and he takes issue with the

amount of attorneys’ fees awarded to Sigman and

Thomas as recompense for his sanctionable conduct.

We address each argument in turn.

Sigman and Thomas delayed filing their Rule 11 motions

for approximately a year after they filed their motions

to dismiss. Golden submits that this lassitude should

have led to a dismissal of the request. Sigman and

Thomas counter that Golden forfeited this argument by

failing to raise the issue of timeliness until his motion to

reconsider the district court’s order granting Rule 11

sanctions. See Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Sumitomo Corp. of

Am., 971 F.2d 1332, 1336 (7th Cir. 1992). We agree with

Sigman and Thomas that Golden failed to preserve this

line of argument. Nor is Golden’s misstep excusable.

The question is not a pure issue of law; rather it depends

centrally on the facts, some of which are contestable.

Cf. Matter of Reese, 91 F.3d 37, 39 (7th Cir. 1996) (acknowl-

edging that forfeiture may be forgiven for pure legal

questions). Moreover, it does not appear as though the

district court ever addressed the timeliness of Sigman’s

No. 08-1506 11

and Thomas’s motions. Cf. Alicia-Hernandez v. The Catholic

Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2003) (con-

cluding that party had not forfeited argument when

the district court gave full consideration to the issue in

question).

Even if Golden had not forfeited his timeliness chal-

lenge, the question whether to grant sanctions would

have been one for the district court’s discretion. The

district court would not have been compelled to accept

Golden’s characterization of the delay as a full year.

Indeed, that assertion turns out to be weak upon closer

examination. In order to come up with a year, one

needs to rely on the date when Golden’s original com-

plaint was filed, in January 2005. But he amended that

complaint twice, adding claims against Thomas and

altering the claims he had brought against Sigman. The

district court would therefore have been well within its

rights to look at the time between the date when the

defendants filed their respective motions to dismiss

(May 20, 2005, for Thomas and July 5, 2005, for Sigman)

and the date of the Rule 11 motions. Viewed that way, it

appears that Thomas waited only four months to serve

her Rule 11 motion and 13 months to file it, while

Sigman delayed service for just two months and filed 11

months later. Both Rule 11 motions were filed with the

court well before the district court entered final judg-

ment in 2008.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in tol-

erating this delay. Not only did Sigman and Thomas file

their motions before final judgment, they both complied

12 No. 08-1506

with Rule 11’s “safe-harbor provision” by serving Golden

with their motions before the case was dismissed. See

F ED . R. C IV. P. 11(c)(2); cf. F ED. R. C IV. P. 11 1993 Advisory

Committee’s Notes (tying the need to file Rule 11 motion

before the conclusion of the case to respect for the safe-

harbor provision). Golden had ample opportunity to

withdraw his offending pleadings, as he was served

more than a month before the district court dismissed

the complaint. Moreover, Golden’s claim of prejudicial

delay rings hollow given that he had threatened earlier

to seek sanctions against Sigman for her premature

service of a Rule 11 motion.

Even if the motions were timely, Golden contends that

the district court erred in granting Sigman’s and Thomas’s

request for sanctions. The district court concluded

that sanctions were warranted for everything in the

complaint except the § 1983 claim against Sigman and

two of the state-law claims against Thomas.

With regard to Golden’s state-law claims against

Sigman, the district court decided to impose sanctions

because Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 157 (7th Cir. 1994),

clearly granted Sigman absolute immunity under Illinois

law. Golden argues that his failure to abide by Scheib

should not be held against him as he did not uncover

the case during the course of his reasonable pre-filing

inquiry. Not surprisingly, the district court rejected the

idea that poor legal research could amount to an excuse,

pointing out that a simple natural language search of

“absolute immunity” and “guardian ad litem” in Westlaw

would immediately have uncovered the case. While

No. 08-1506 13

Golden might not be expected to have access to the judi-

ciary’s research tools, this does not excuse bringing a

federal lawsuit in reliance on research tools unable to

locate controlling precedent. The district court was on

firm ground when it concluded that a reasonable search

would have uncovered the Schieb decision, which

had been out for eleven years at the time Golden filed

his suit. See Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880

F.2d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).

Nor do we have any trouble reconciling the district

court’s decision to impose sanctions for Golden’s state-

law claims with its conclusion that sanctions were not

warranted for the § 1983 claim. With respect to the latter

claim, the district court took into account the fact that

this court had not yet, at that point, granted guardians

ad litem absolute immunity from suit. This, too, was a

reasonable call. Though Scheib suggested that Golden’s

suit was probably doomed, it dealt only with the doctrine

of absolute immunity under Illinois state law.

Golden’s state-law claims against Thomas, the district

court explained, were sanctionable because well-estab-

lished Illinois case law gave her absolute immunity from

civil liability for making a 911 call. Approaching the

matter from a different perspective, Golden objects that

the district court should not have imposed sanctions

after dismissing the state-law claims for lack of supple-

mental jurisdiction. But, as the Supreme Court explained

in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990), Rule

11 sanctions address a collateral issue; the violation is

complete when the offending paper is filed, and the court

14 No. 08-1506

remains empowered to address the violation even after

the action is dismissed. Id. at 395.

Closer to the merits, Golden argues that Thomas does

not enjoy absolute immunity for making a false 911 call

since it was recently made a crime to make such a call

in Illinois. See 50 ILCS 750/15.2; 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(12);

Chicago Municipal Code § 8-4-145. Before false 911 calls

were criminalized, Illinois courts expansively interpreted

absolute immunity to protect even statements made

with malice. See Vincent v. Williams, 664 N.E.2d 650, 655

(Ill. App. Ct. 1996). He cites no Illinois authority, how-

ever, suggesting that Illinois courts would circumscribe

the scope of the immunity from civil suit in light of the

new criminal statute. Criminal sanctions can coexist

peacefully with the absence of civil liability. In

fact in this situation, Illinois courts might worry that eli-

minating immunity would open the doors to frivolous

lawsuits, which would have a chilling effect on 911 calls.

Golden contends that his claims were not frivolous

because, in his view, the Illinois and municipal statutes

criminalizing false 911 calls created an implied private

cause of action. See 50 ILCS 750/15.2; 720 ILCS 5/26-

1(a)(12); Chicago Municipal Code § 8-4-145. Thomas

counters that Golden forfeited this argument by

making only a brief reference to it in his motion to recon-

sider the judge’s order granting sanctions. See Havoco,

971 F.2d at 1336 (holding argument forfeited if raised

for the first time in a motion to reconsider). We agree

with Thomas that the point is too undeveloped to war-

rant attention here; in any event, we consider it unlikely

No. 08-1506 15

that Illinois would recognize an implied private action

under these circumstances. See Corgan v. Muehling, 574

N.E.2d 602, 609 (Ill. 1991); see also Tanya S. ex rel. Doe 1 v.

N. Cent. Behavioral Health Sys., Inc., 816 N.E.2d 4, 7-8

(Ill. App. Ct. 2004).

Finally, Golden contests the manner in which the

district court calculated the attorneys’ fees and expenses

it ordered Golden to pay. Since the district court sanc-

tioned Golden for only some of the theories he ad-

vanced, it was required to apportion the attorneys’

fees awarded so as to avoid penalizing Golden for

others that fell above the Rule 11 bar. See Divane v. Krull

Elec. Co., 319 F.3d 307, 315 (7th Cir. 2003). This is not

always an easy task. Thus, “where ‘the [movant’s] claims

of relief . . . involve a common core of facts or [are] based

on related legal theories,’ so that ‘much of counsel’s time

will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole,

making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a

claim-by-claim basis, . . . the district court should focus on

the significance of the overall relief obtained by the

[movant] in relation to the hours reasonably expended on

the litigation.’ ” Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 988 (7th

Cir. 1988) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435

(1983)). Given the fact-intensive nature of this inquiry,

district courts enjoy a great deal of discretion in formu-

lating and applying a fee calculation methodology.

Ustrak, 851 F.2d at 988.

In this case, the district court employed a simple “count-

counting” methodology to compute the amount of attor-

neys’ fees and expenses. Under this approach, it examined

16 No. 08-1506

the attorneys’ billing statements and included hours

billed for work related to sanctioned claims and excluded

time spent defending against nonsanctioned counts. The

remaining billing entries did not specify whether the

work was devoted to sanctioned or nonsanctioned counts.

For these fees, the district court divided the total dollar

amount by the number of claims brought against an

individual defendant and then multiplied the resulting

figure by the number of counts for which Golden was

sanctioned. In the end, the court ordered Golden to pay

$16,060.23 to Sigman and $10,856.00 to Thomas.

Golden criticizes the district court’s “count-counting”

methodology on the grounds that it bore too weak a

relation to the time records and resulted in an unrea-

sonably large award—seven-eighths of the total bill—even

though the six state-law claims were dismissed with

little effort. The district court, however, was not com-

pelled to accept Golden’s evaluation of the records. For

example, the court may have thought that Golden

was exaggerating the ease with which the state-law

claims were thrown out; Sigman devoted considerable

attention in her filings to the question of absolute im-

munity and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It also could

have reasonably rejected Golden’s contention that the

“count-counting” approach was improper because his

claims did not revolve around a “common core of facts.” Id.

at 988. Viewed more generally, Golden’s claims arose

out of a related series of events arising out of Sigman’s

involvement with the child custody proceedings in state

court.

No. 08-1506 17

Golden also argues that Sigman’s counsel should not

have received $3,095 for litigating the Rule 11 motion

and the fee petition. In attacking the total spent on the

Rule 11 motion, however, the most that Golden can

show is that this court once found that $4,354 was too

much for the preparation of a motion for sanctions. See

Budget Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Consolidated Equity LLC,

428 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 2005). Nothing in the Budget

opinion, however, was intended to set $4,354 as an

outer limit for fees; these matters depend heavily on the

particular circumstances of each case. The district court’s

decision here lay well within the bounds of its discretion,

especially given the lengthy and often frivolous filings

Golden submitted.

Switching over to Thomas’s fee award, Golden con-

tends that Thomas was awarded an unreasonably large

amount of fees given that she allegedly responded to his

state-law claims only with a few brief mentions of her

immunity to suit. If that were so, he might have a point.

But the record tells a different story. Thomas produced six

substantive filings that discussed both immunity and

claim-specific defenses. Golden also asserts that Thomas

charged too much for litigating her Rule 11 motion and

her fee petition: a total of $4,892.50. Assuming that

Golden’s calculation is correct, Thomas received only

half of that amount ($2,446.25) under the district court’s

methodology. In addition, a large amount of Thomas’s

counsel’s time was spent responding to Golden’s numer-

ous objections. As for the hours spent on the fee petition,

the record reveals that Thomas’s counsel billed five-and-a-

half associate hours and a half an hour of partner time.

18 No. 08-1506

Applying the “count-counting” methodology, the district

court awarded only three hours of fees. This is nothing

like Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 987-88 (7th Cir. 1988),

in which the court rejected the plaintiff’s request for

fees where the hours spent on the fee petition constituted

a fourth of the total hours billed. Here, the number of

attorney-hours associated with Thomas’s fee petition

amounted to only six percent of the total time billed.

The district court was entitled to treat this as a rea-

sonable charge. See, e.g., Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d

767, 777 (7th Cir. 1988).

Diving into the minutia of the billing records supplied by

Sigman’s and Thomas’s attorneys, Golden also raises a

host of minor quibbles with particular billing entries.

As “neither the stakes nor the interest in uniform deter-

mination are so great as to justify microscopic appellate

scrutiny” of attorneys’ billing records, we see no value

in explicitly addressing each of Golden’s objections.

Ustrak, 851 F.2d at 987. We have reviewed the record

thoroughly and are satisfied that the district court’s

award of attorneys’ fees accurately reflects the data

contained in the billing records. We therefore uphold

the district court’s decision ordering Golden to pay

$16,060.23 to Sigman and $10,856.00 to Thomas.

IV

Both Sigman and Thomas have asked this court to

impose sanctions on Golden for pursuing an appeal

that clearly lacked merit. Federal Rule of Appellate Pro-

cedure 38 provides that a court of appeals may impose

No. 08-1506 19

sanctions for a frivolous appeal. We have held that an

appeal qualifies as frivolous if either “the result is obvi-

ous” or “the appellant’s argument is wholly without

merit.” Wiese v. Community Bank of Cent. Wis., 552 F.3d

584, 591 (7th Cir. 2009). Although Golden raised a good

number of frivolous points on appeal, he also drew this

court’s attention to a number of issues that could not be

dismissed out of hand. While it is a closer call than it

should be, we elect not to impose Rule 38 sanctions.

***

We A FFIRM the judgment of the district court.

7-2-10