holding that state officers were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions did not violate clearly established law
How later courts described this case
- holding that state officers were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions did not violate clearly established law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 17 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRONCHE JOHNSON, No. 08-16466
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:04-CV-01783-FCD-
KJM
v.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MEMORANDUM *
CORRECTIONS; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Frank C. Damrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 25, 2010 **
Before: CANBY, THOMAS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Bronche Johnson, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging prison officials
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
violated his rights by disciplining him for refusing to comply with prison hair
grooming regulations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo, Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2002), and we affirm.
The district court properly entered summary judgment on Johnson’s claims
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) based
on qualified immunity because the pertinent law was not clearly established in
2003 and 2004, at the time the alleged violations occurred. See Pearson v.
Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 822 (2009) (holding that state officers were entitled to
qualified immunity because their actions did not violate clearly established law);
see also Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 997 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2005) (“There
exists little Ninth Circuit authority construing RLUIPA.”).
We do not consider arguments not raised in the opening brief, or raised for
the first time on appeal. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
Johnson’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
2 08-16466