The opinion
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL SHAMES and GARY
GRAMKOW, on behalf of themselves
No. 08-56750
and all persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No.
v. 3:07-cv-02174-H-
WMC
CALIFORNIA TRAVEL AND TOURISM
OPINION
COMMISSION,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
March 4, 2010—San Diego, California
Filed June 8, 2010
Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, Sidney R. Thomas and
M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Hawkins
8275
8278 SHAMES v. CALIFORNIA TRAVEL AND TOURISM
COUNSEL
Robert C. Fellmeth (argued), Center for Public Interest Law,
University of San Diego School of Law, San Diego, Califor-
nia, and Donald G. Rez (briefed), Sullivan, Hill, Lewin, Rez
& Engel, San Diego, California, for the plaintiffs-appellants.
W. Scott Cameron (argued) and Charles L. Post (briefed),
Weintraub Genshlea Chediak, Sacramento, California, and
Diane Shaw (briefed), Office of the Attorney General of the
State of California, Los Angeles, California, for the
defendant-appellee.
OPINION
HAWKINS, Senior Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs Michael Shames and Gary Gramkow
(“Plaintiffs”) appeal the dismissal of their claims against the
California Travel and Tourism Commission (“CTTC”) alleg-
ing the CTTC engaged in antitrust price-fixing in violation of
the Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and improper meeting
practices in violation of California’s Bagley-Keene Open
Meeting Act, Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 11120-11132. The district
court held the CTTC was shielded from antitrust liability
under the “state action immunity” doctrine, and declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Bagley-Keene
claim. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The CTTC is a “nonprofit mutual benefit corporation” cre-
ated by state legislation in order to expand and develop Cali-
fornia’s tourism industry. Cal. Gov’t Code § 13995.40(a). The
CTTC is governed by thirty-seven commissioners, who simul-
taneously serve as directors. § 13995.40(a)-(b).1 The Secretary
1
All sections refer to California Government Code unless otherwise
noted.
SHAMES v. CALIFORNIA TRAVEL AND TOURISM 8279
of the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency
(“Secretary”) chairs the CTTC. §§ 13995.20(k),
13995.40(b)(1). Twelve commissioners are appointed by the
governor, while the remaining twenty-four are elected by the
tourism industry itself.2 § 13995.40(b)(2)-(3).
In 2006, the passenger rental car industry proposed changes
to state bill A.B. 2592 which were subsequently enacted. See
Cal. Civil Code § 1936.01. Under the bill, the passenger rental
car industry became the fifth tourism industry category under
the CTTC scheme and agreed to pay a high assessment fee,
greatly increasing the CTTC’s budget. In exchange for this
increased funding, the passenger rental car industry was
allowed to “unbundle” fees charged to customers and itemize
such fees separately from the base rental rate. Significantly,
the adopted changes allowed the companies to “pass on some
or all of the assessment to customers.” § 13995.65(f).
Plaintiffs allege this led to the imposition of two specific
fees on rental car customers. First, pursuant to an agreement
between the passenger rental car industry and the CTTC, a
2.5% tourism assessment fee was added to the cost of a car
rental which, in turn, helped fund the CTTC. Plaintiffs allege
that the CTTC then colluded with the passenger rental car
industry, fixing rental car prices by passing on the 2.5% tour-
ism assessment fee to customers. Second, the passenger rental
car industry “unbundled” the already-existing airport conces-
sion fee charged to customers to pay airports for the right to
conduct business on airport premises; this fee has traditionally
amounted to 9% of the rental price. The bill permitted the pas-
senger rental car industry to charge this concession fee sepa-
2
The tourism industry is represented by five industry categories, one of
which is the passenger rental car industry, which was added in 2006. Each
category is allotted a number of commission seats based on the weighted
percentage of assessments paid to the CTTC by that category.
§ 13995.40(d). Unlike the other categories, the passenger rental car indus-
try is specifically limited to six commission seats regardless of the per-
centage of assessments paid to the CTTC. § 13995.40.5(a).
8280 SHAMES v. CALIFORNIA TRAVEL AND TOURISM
rately from the base rental rate. According to Plaintiffs, the
CTTC also colluded with the passenger rental car industry in
passing the 9% concession fee on to customers as an uniform
add-on charge. Plaintiffs allege that these agreements between
the rental car companies and the CTTC constituted price-
fixing of rental car rates in violation of the Sherman Act § 1.
Plaintiffs also claim the CTTC committed a host of Bagley-
Keene Open Meeting Act violations, specifically, failing to
adhere to detailed notice requirements and impermissibly
holding closed session meetings.
Granting the CTTC’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
district court dismissed all claims against the CTTC, finding
it was entitled to state action immunity from antitrust liability
and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining Bagley-Keene Act state law claim. The district
court also held that the dismissed claims against the CTTC
were adequately severable from the pending claims against
the passenger rental car companies and entered final judgment
for the CTTC.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the dismissal of the antitrust claim against the
CTTC de novo. Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232
F.3d 979, 984 (9th Cir. 2000). Because the appeal is from an
order granting a motion to dismiss, we assume the factual
allegations of the complaint to be true. Id. We review a dis-
trict court’s decision whether to retain jurisdiction over sup-
plemental claims when the original federal claims are
dismissed for an abuse of discretion. Tritchler v. County of
Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2004).
DISCUSSION
I. State Action Immunity from Antitrust Liability
We assume without deciding that the Plaintiffs’ allegations
that the CTTC conspired with the passenger rental car compa-
SHAMES v. CALIFORNIA TRAVEL AND TOURISM 8281
nies to pass on CTTC tourism assessments, enforcing the
agreement against non-complying rental car companies, and
turning the 9% airport concession fee into a rate hike, suffi-
ciently allege an antitrust violation under the Sherman Act
§ 1. We need not consider the legality of the alleged conduct;
we are instead called to determine whether the district court
nonetheless properly dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claim against
the CTTC because the agency’s alleged conduct qualifies for
“state action immunity.”
The Supreme Court introduced the doctrine of “state action
immunity” in Parker v. Brown, when it held that the Sherman
Act did not apply to state anticompetitive conduct. 317 U.S.
341, 350-52 (1943). The Court reasoned that the Sherman Act
was primarily concerned with individual anticompetitive
action, not states acting in their sovereign capacity. Id.
[1] The Court revisited the doctrine in California Retail
Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97 (1980) (“Midcal”), when a wholesale wine distributor
challenged California’s wine resale statutes. The statutes
required wine producers to file price schedules with the state;
however, the wine dealers themselves set the prices without
any state oversight or control. Id. at 99-101. The Court estab-
lished a two-pronged test to determine when state involve-
ment in anticompetitive conduct can render a party eligible
for immunity: (1) the challenged restraint must be “one
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state poli-
cy”; and (2) the policy must be “actively supervised” by the
state itself. Id. at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court held that although California’s legislative policy clearly
stated and allowed resale price maintenance, satisfying the
first prong of the test, the price maintenance system failed the
second prong because the State did not “actively supervise”
the conduct of the wine dealers. Id. at 105-06. With these
principles in mind, we turn to their application in this case.
8282 SHAMES v. CALIFORNIA TRAVEL AND TOURISM
A. Midcal’s First Prong: “Clearly Articulated and
Affirmatively Expressed as State Policy”
1. Specific Authorization vs. Reasonably Foresee-
able
As a preliminary matter, we must first resolve a dispute
among the parties over the proper standard in evaluating Mid-
cal’s first prong. Plaintiffs argue that the district court
wrongly applied a lesser “foreseeability” standard in place of
Midcal’s “clear articulation” requirement, which, they argue,
requires a more specific or express authorization of any anti-
competitive conduct.
[2] The CTTC, however, correctly points out that the
Supreme Court has not required express authorization of par-
ticular anticompetitive acts and has applied state action immu-
nity when the actions were a foreseeable result of a broader
statutory authorization. For example, in City of Columbia v.
Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991)
(“Omni”), a billboard company sued the city for passing an
ordinance effectively preventing the company from entering
the billboard market. Id. at 368-69. The city allegedly passed
the ordinance to favor the existing billboard company, a local
company with deep roots in the community. Id. at 367. The
Court held that the city’s actions were nonetheless entitled to
Parker state action immunity because they were an “autho-
rized implementation of state policy.” Id. at 370-71. The
Court reasoned that the city acted within its state-given
authority to pass a zoning ordinance, and that suppression of
competition was a foreseeable consequence of passing such
an ordinance. Id. at 373. The Court rejected “the contention
that this requirement can be met only if the delegating statute
explicitly permits the displacement of competition,” and held
that “[i]t is enough . . . if suppression of competition is the
‘foreseeable result’ of what the statute authorizes.” Id. at 372-
73.
SHAMES v. CALIFORNIA TRAVEL AND TOURISM 8283
Similarly, in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, neigh-
boring towns filed suit against the City of Eau Claire, arguing
that the city held an unlawful monopoly over sewage treat-
ment services. 471 U.S. 34, 37 (1985). The Court held that the
city’s actions were immunized because they were a “foresee-
able result” of the state legislature’s statutory authorization to
municipalities to provide (or refuse to provide) sewage ser-
vices to unincorporated areas. Id. at 42. The Court again noted
that a legislature need not expressly state in the statute or leg-
islative history that it intends for the action to have anticom-
petitive effects, so long as the legislature had contemplated
the action that was taken. Id. (“We think it is clear that anti-
competitive effects logically would result from this broad
authority to regulate”). The Court also rejected the contention
that the city needed to show the state had “compelled” it to
act. Id. at 45; see also So. Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v.
United States, 471 U.S. 48, 58 (1985) (“The Midcal test does
not expressly provide that the actions of a private party must
be compelled by a State in order to be protected from the fed-
eral antitrust laws.”) (emphasis added).
In contrast, Plaintiffs here rely principally on one of our
previous decisions, Columbia Steel Casting Co., Inc. v. Port-
land Gen. Electric Co., 111 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 1997). In
Columbia Steel, two utility companies agreed not to compete
with each other in providing service within certain territories,
and argued that the Oregon Public Utilities Commission
(“OPUC”) had authorized their non-competitive conduct
when it previously approved a property exchange, rendering
them eligible for state-action immunity. Id. at 1433-36. We
held that the companies’ actions did not qualify for state
action immunity because the OPUC “did not specifically and
clearly authorize[ ] by the relevant statutory process” their
anticompetitive conduct. Id. at 1441 (citation omitted). Rea-
soning that when OPUC approved the property exchange, it
acted only pursuant to its authority to approve sales and
leases, and not pursuant to statutes giving it the authority to
displace competition, we determined OPUC did not “clearly
8284 SHAMES v. CALIFORNIA TRAVEL AND TOURISM
articulate” a state policy to displace competition. Id. at 1437.
Indeed, the City of Portland had specifically considered and
declined to approve the establishment of exclusive territories
for the utilities, and the OPUC-approved agreement purported
to comply with and implement the city’s decision. Id. at 1433-
34.
In addressing the companies’ argument that their conduct
was a foreseeable result of OPUC’s property-exchange
approval, we held that “foreseeability” could not be substi-
tuted for Midcal’s “clear articulation” requirement. Id. at
1443. However, Plaintiffs attempt to read this statement a bit
too broadly, for in Columbia Steel we also indicated that fore-
seeability would apply in a situation in which anticompetitive
conduct was “ ‘authorized, but not compelled.’ ” Id. at 1444
(quoting Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 36) (emphasis removed).
In those situations, the foreseeability approach is used to
determine the reach of the antitrust immunity (since not every
action by a state actor will necessarily be immune). See id. at
1443 (citing Medic Air Corp. v. Air Ambulance Auth., 843
F.2d 1187, 1189 (9th Cir. 1988)). Thus, Columbia Steel did
not reject a foreseeability test, but clarified when it is applica-
ble. See Redwood Empire Life Support v. County of Sonoma,
190 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying “logical and fore-
seeable result” test post-Columbia Steel).3
[3] Thus, in light of these precedents, the standard to apply
in analyzing whether the CTTC’s alleged conduct was pursu-
ant to a “clearly articulated” state policy is to examine
whether the agency acted pursuant to its statutory authority,
and, if so, whether the anticompetitive conduct was foresee-
able given that statutory authorization.
3
The foreseeability test understandably had little application in Colum-
bia Steel because, as discussed above, the Portland City Council had not
authorized exclusive service areas for the utilities, but actually specifically
disapproved the utilities’ attempt to establish exclusive territories, and
approved only the exchange of utilities’ properties. 111 F.3d at 1433-44.
SHAMES v. CALIFORNIA TRAVEL AND TOURISM 8285
2. Application of the Reasonably Foreseeable Test
[4] The California Legislature explicitly authorized tour-
ism assessment fees on passenger car rentals for the funding
of California tourism: “[t]he California Travel and Tourism
Commission shall submit a referendum to the passenger rental
car industry as soon as possible . . . [it] shall propose an
assessment level upon the passenger rental car industry.”
§ 13995.92(a). The CTTC was to be the beneficiary of the
tourism assessment fee, and was authorized to collect the
assessments from the rental car companies. §§ 13995.65-73,
.92. The statute expressly allows the fees to be “passed on”
to customers: “[a]n assessed business may pass on some or all
of the assessment to customers.” § 13995.65(f) (emphasis
added). Another statute explicitly recognizes that assessment
fees are “the charge[s] collected by a rental company from a
renter that ha[ve] been established by the [CTTC] pursuant to
Section 13995.65 of the Government Code.” Cal. Civ. Code
§ 1936.01(a)(3) (emphasis added).
Although Plaintiffs emphasize that the provisions at issue
here do not require the fees to be passed on to consumers,
both the Supreme Court and this circuit have made clear that
for state action immunity to apply, the anticompetitive con-
duct need not be compelled by the state. Town of Hallie, 471
U.S. at 45 (“compulsion is simply unnecessary”); Hass v.
Oregon State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The
legislature need not detail or compel the specific anti-
competitive actions at issue, nor need it explicitly state that it
expects the regulated party ‘to engage in conduct that would
have anticompetitive effects.’ ”) (quoting Town of Hallie, 471
U.S. at 42). Indeed, the legislature need not even “expressly
permit the challenged conduct.” Hass, 883 F.2d at 1457 (cit-
ing So. Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 63-65)).
Thus, the critical issue is not whether the alleged conduct
here was compelled, but whether it was authorized.4 Plaintiffs
4
We grant Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice regarding arguments
raised by the CTTC in related case In re Tourism Assessment Fee Litiga-
8286 SHAMES v. CALIFORNIA TRAVEL AND TOURISM
argue that the statutory language permitting the pass through
(“may pass some or all”) should be read not as authorizing an
anticompetitive agreement to pass the fees on, but as an indi-
cation that the legislature intended for the individual car com-
panies to make the decision whether to pass the fee on to
consumers.
[5] However, the provisions here are comparable to those
in which courts have found anticompetitive conduct legisla-
tively authorized but not compelled. Similar to the statutes in
Town of Hallie, which granted authority to the cities to handle
sewage service, but which did not expressly mention anticom-
petitive, monopolistic conduct, 471 U.S. at 41-42, the statutes
in the current case grant authority to the passenger rental car
companies to “pass on” assessment fees, and allow the CTTC
to enforce and collect those fees, even if they do not expressly
mention anticompetitive conduct. § 13995.65(f), .71. Like-
wise, in Hass, we held that the Oregon State Bar was autho-
rized to establish a minimum legal malpractice insurance
requirement and require attorneys to purchase such coverage
from the State Bar, even though the statute did not contain
such a requirement and granted only general authority to do
“whatever is necessary and convenient” to implement mal-
practice coverage. 883 F.2d at 1458-59.
Moreover, the history underlying the legislation at issue
here strongly suggests that the legislature envisioned the fee
being uniformly passed on to rental car customers. The pro-
posed bill A.B. 2592 increased the assessment against rental
car companies only if the bill also amended the companies’
ability to separately itemize the rate, airport concession fee,
and tourism commission assessment. Calif. Bill Analysis,
tion, No. 08-CV-1796-MMA (S.D. Cal.). However, this does not impact
the result in this case, as we conclude the CTTC does not take flatly con-
tradictory positions in the two cases regarding whether its actions were
authorized versus compelled.
SHAMES v. CALIFORNIA TRAVEL AND TOURISM 8287
Senate Floor, 2005-2006 Regular Session, Assembly Bill
2592, August 24, 2006 (“Calif. Bill Analysis”).5 In an initial
statement of reasons accompanying the proposed amend-
ments, the Business, Transportation and Housing Agency,
Office of Tourism indicated the significance of this pass-
through provision:
If the ability to pass the assessment on to the con-
sumer was prohibited, the passenger car rental indus-
try would have to pay the assessment from its
revenues and it would affect net profit. This was not
the intent of the legislation.
Title 10, Chap. 7.65, §§ 5350-5358.1, Passenger Car Rental
Industry Tourism Assessment, Initial Statement of Reasons,
p.2, available at http://www.visitCalifornia.de/media/
uploads/files/InitialStatementofReasons.RentalCar
Assessment.pdf.
Several provisions refer to the tourism fee being collected
“from the renter,” and the Legislature also gave an express
grant of state antitrust immunity to state actors complying
with the enabling statute, also demonstrating that anticompeti-
tive conduct was foreseeable at the time the provisions were
enacted. § 13995.90. The legislature was also expressly
advised of the likely impact to consumers: in opposition to the
bill, the Center for Public Interest Law warned that the bill
would lead to an “industry-wide price hike” because compa-
nies would “merely maintain their current price levels, but
instead of including the airport concession fee in the initial
charge, it is now added on at the end, on top of a charge that
historically included it.” Calif. Bill Analysis, A.B. 2592 Sen-
ate, 8/24/2006; see Springs Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Rancho
Mirage, 745 F.2d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1984) (a sufficiently
5
As the district court observed, “there would have been little reason for
the rental car industry to propose the amendments to A.B. 2592 if they
would be unable to recoup the cost of increasing the CTTC’s budget.”
8288 SHAMES v. CALIFORNIA TRAVEL AND TOURISM
articulated state policy exists if the challenged restraint is a
“necessary or reasonable consequence” of engaging in the
authorized activity) (internal quotation marks, citation and
emphasis omitted).
[6] Plaintiffs suggest that the statute nonetheless does not
authorize the alleged group anticompetitive conduct orches-
trated with the help of the CTTC. However, in Omni the
Supreme Court was clear that there is no “conspiracy” excep-
tion to state action immunity, noting that “it is both inevitable
and desirable that public officials often agree to do what one
or another group of private citizens urges upon them” and that
otherwise a conspiracy exception would “virtually swallow up
the Parker rule.” 499 U.S. at 374-75. Thus, any claim of col-
lusion or conspiracy between the CTTC and the passenger
rental car companies would not defeat immunity, so long as
the CTTC otherwise qualifies for state action immunity.
Because there is a clear grant of authority permitting the pass-
through of the assessments to rental car customers, as well as
evidence that an industry-wide add-on was “surely within the
contemplation of the legislature,” Springs Ambulance, 745
F.2d at 1273, the CTTC’s alleged conduct in facilitating this
result was at the very least a “foreseeable consequence of the
legislative grant of authority.” Hass, 883 F.2d at 1459.
We therefore affirm the district court’s conclusion that the
CTTC’s alleged anticompetitive conduct constitutes an autho-
rized and reasonably foreseeable result, and thus satisfies
Midcal’s first prong of being pursuant to a “clearly articulated
state policy.”
B. Midcal’s Second Prong: Active State Supervision
Midcal’s second prong ensures that private price-fixing
agreements with little or no state involvement do not displace
“the national policy in favor of competition.” 445 U.S. at 106.
The Court was primarily concerned that without adequate
state supervision, private parties would act to further their
SHAMES v. CALIFORNIA TRAVEL AND TOURISM 8289
own interests as opposed to the interests of the state. Id.; see
also Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988) (stating that
without active state supervision, “there is no realistic assur-
ance that a private party’s anticompetitive conduct promotes
state policy, rather than merely the party’s individual inter-
ests”).
[7] However, when municipalities or other state entities (as
opposed to purely private actors) are acting under the direc-
tion of state law, the Court has held that they do not need to
satisfy Midcal’s active state supervision prong. Town of Hal-
lie, 471 U.S. at 46. In Town of Hallie, the Court reasoned that
where a municipality is concerned, there is very little danger
“that it is involved in a private price-fixing arrangement,”
which removes the need for the state to supervise its “execu-
tion of . . . a properly delegated function.” Id. at 47 (emphasis
omitted). In a footnote, the Court also suggested that the same
rationale would apply to state agencies. Id. at 46 n.10.
In Hass, we relied on that footnote in Town of Hallie to
hold that the Oregon State Bar did not need to satisfy Mid-
cal’s active state supervision prong to qualify for state action
immunity. 883 F.2d at 1459-61. We reasoned that the Oregon
State Bar was similar in nature to a municipality, noting that
the Oregon State Bar’s purpose in benefitting the public
through regulating lawyers, combined with its records and
accounts being open for public inspection and subject to
audits, pointed to it being a public body. Id. at 1459-60.
Likewise, here, the CTTC is not a private party, but a state
agency created by statute, designed to promote tourism which
the California legislature found is “vital” to the state’s econ-
omy. § 13995.1(d)(1). The CTTC was organized to promote
a state purpose, namely to increase travel and tourism in the
state of California. § 13995.41. The CTTC and the Oregon
State Bar in Hass also share organizational similarities in that
they are both subject to independent audits, must give public
8290 SHAMES v. CALIFORNIA TRAVEL AND TOURISM
notice of their meetings, and benefit “the public interest.”
Hass, 883 F.2d at 1460; §§ 13995.40, .50.
Plaintiffs contend, however, that even if the CTTC is a state
agency “for some purposes,” it is still industry-controlled, and
thus is distinguishable from Hass. However, the CTTC is not
entirely controlled by industry, as it has twelve governor-
appointed commissioners and a governor-appointed Secretary.
Although there are twenty-four industry-appointed commis-
sioners, these positions come from five different tourism
industry categories whose interests will not always align, and
the passenger car rental industry itself is limited to only six
commissioners. § 13995.40.5(a). See Hass, 883 F.2d at 1460
(noting that only three of the fifteen members of the Oregon
State Bar were nonlawyers).
Moreover, the CTTC is also under the oversight of the state
via a gubernatorially-appointed Secretary. The Secretary has
the power to remove elected commissioners found guilty of
“abuse of office or moral turpitude.” § 13395.40(e). Addition-
ally, the Secretary holds veto power over the CTTC in various
circumstances, including the use of state funds and situations
in which the Secretary determines there is a conflict of inter-
est. § 13995.51(b). The CTTC’s annual marketing plan must
be reviewed and approved by the Secretary before adoption,
and may only be overridden by a three-fifths majority vote.
§ 13995.45(d).
[8] Despite the mix of public and private interests at play,
looking at the totality of the circumstances, the CTTC pos-
sesses enough of the qualities of a state agency, coupled with
state oversight in the form of the governor-appointed commis-
sioners and Secretary, to hold that the CTTC is analogous to
the Oregon State Bar in Hass and also exempt from Midcal’s
“active state supervision” requirement. We therefore affirm
the district court’s determination that the CTTC is entitled to
state action immunity from antitrust suit.
SHAMES v. CALIFORNIA TRAVEL AND TOURISM 8291
II. Bagley-Keene Act
The California Legislature enacted the Bagley-Keene Open
Meeting Act to ensure that state bodies conduct open and pub-
lic meetings, specifically by implementing detailed notice
requirements and limiting closed sessions. §§ 11120-11132;
S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Peevey, 74 P.3d 795, 797 (Cal. 2003).
The district court initially heard the Bagley-Keene Act claim
alongside the federal antitrust claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a). After dismissing the antitrust claim against the
CTTC, the district court dismissed the Bagley-Keene Act
claim without prejudice.
[9] Dismissal of the claim was not an abuse of discretion
in these circumstances. Tritchler, 358 F.3d at 1153. The dis-
trict court properly exercised its discretion and declined to
employ supplemental jurisdiction, reasoning that it had
already “dismissed the only federal claim against the CTTC,”
and noting that the Act “may implicate questions better
addressed by the California courts in the first instance.” See
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), (3); Bryant v. Adventist Health
Sys./West, 289 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
dismissal of the antitrust price-fixing and Bagley-Keene Act
claims. All pending motions not otherwise disposed of herein
are denied as moot.