Opinion

Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp.

  • 609 F.3d 239
  • 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11485
  • 2010 WL 2246392
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Jun 7, 2010
Status
Published
Author
Scirica
On the bench
Scirica, Barry, Smith
Cited by
605 cases
Authority
More cited than 98.9%

finding that the defendant-company “met the ‘same parties’ requirement of the claim preclusion defense because [the plaintiff] and the [defendant-company] were parties in both actions. The fact that there are additional parties in [the second action] does not affect our conclusion.”

How later courts described this case

  • finding that the defendant-company “met the ‘same parties’ requirement of the claim preclusion defense because [the plaintiff] and the [defendant-company] were parties in both actions. The fact that there are additional parties in [the second action] does not affect our conclusion.”
  • explaining that “the central purpose of the [res judicata] doctrine [is] to require a plaintiff to present all claims arising out [of] the same occurrence in a single suit” (third alteration in original) (internal quotation mark omitted)
  • concluding the “same parties or their privities” element was met because the plaintiff and the defendant-company were parties in both actions, and that additional parties were included in subsequent action did not alter conclusion
  • holding that courts interpreting state law should generally follow that state’s intermediate appellate courts unless strong evidence suggests they should not

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 08-4373

SHIRLEY SHERIDAN; JAMES W. ZIMMERMAN,

On behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,

Appellants

v.

NGK METALS CORPORATION;

CABOT CORPORATION;

SPOTTS, STEVENS & McCOY, INC.

D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-5510

(Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter)

No. 08-4374

GARY ANTHONY,

On behalf of himself and others similarly situated,

Appellant

v.

SMALL TUBE MANUFACTURING CORP.,

doing business as Small Tube Products Corp., Inc.;

ADMIRAL METALS, INC.; TUBE METHODS, INC.;

CABOT CORPORATION, Individually and

as successor in interest to Cabot Berylco, Inc.,

Kawecki Berylco Industries, Inc. and the

Beryllium Corporation c/o C.T. Corporation Systems

v.

AMETEK, INC.;

BRUSH WELLMAN INC.;

MILLENNIUM PETROCHEMICALS INC., formerly

known as National Distillers and Chemical Corporation

D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-4419

(Honorable James Knoll Gardner)

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Argued January 11, 2010

Before: SCIRICA, BARRY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

2

(Filed June 7, 2010)

RUBEN HONIK, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)

STEPHAN MATANOVIC, ESQUIRE

Golomb & Honik

1515 Market Street, Suite 1100

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19107

Attorneys for Appellants

THOMAS C. DeLORENZO, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)

RONDA K. O'DONNELL, ESQUIRE

Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin

1845 Walnut Street, 19th Floor

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103

Attorneys for Appellee, NGK Metals Corporation

NEIL S. WITKES, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)

KATHLEEN B. CAMPBELL, ESQUIRE

Manko, Gold, Katcher & Fox

401 City Avenue, Suite 500

Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania 19004

Attorneys for Appellee,

Cabot Corporation, Individually and as successor

in interest to Cabot Berylco, Inc., Kawecki Berylco

Industries, Inc. and the Beryllium Corporation

c/o C.T. Corporation Systems

3

STEPHEN J. IMBRIGLIA, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)

Gibbons

1700 Two Logan Square

18th and Arch Streets

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103

Attorney for Appellee,

Spotts, Stevens & McCoy, Inc.

SHARON F. McKEE, ESQUIRE

KENNETH J. WARREN, ESQUIRE

Hangley, Aronchick, Segal & Pudlin

One Logan Square, 27th Floor

18th and Cherry Streets

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103

Attorneys for Appellee,

Small Tube Manufacturing Corp.,

d/b/a Small Tube Products Corp., Inc.

ROCHELLE M. FEDULLO, ESQUIRE

Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker

The Curtis Center, Suite 1130 East

Independence Square West

601 Walnut Street

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106

Attorney for Appellee, Admiral Metals, Inc.

4

GREGORY W. FOX, ESQUIRE

STEPHEN M. HLADIK, ESQUIRE

DAVID C. ONORATO, ESQUIRE

Kerns, Pearlstine, Onorato & Hladik

298 Wissahickon Avenue

Upper Gwynedd, Pennsylvania 19446

Attorneys for Appellee, Tube Methods, Inc.

JOHN C. GOODCHILD III, ESQUIRE

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius

1701 Market Street

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103

Attorney for Appellee, Ametek, Inc.

DENNIS R. CALLAHAN, ESQUIRE

JENNIFER L. WEED, ESQUIRE

Ward, Greenberg, Heller & Reidy

Eight Tower Bridge, Suite 900

161 Washington Street

Conshohocken, Pennsylvania 19428

JEFFERY D. UBERSAX, ESQUIRE (ARGUED)

MICHAEL A. PLATT, ESQUIRE

Jones Day

North Point

901 Lakeside Avenue

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

Attorneys for Appellee, Brush Wellman, Inc.

5

JOSEPH M. PROFY, ESQUIRE

Blank Rome

One Logan Square

130 North 18th Street

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103-6998

Attorney for Appellee,

Millennium Petrochemicals, Inc.,

f/k/a National Distillers and Chemical Corporation

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.

This is a diversity case. In these putative class actions

seeking medical monitoring, we determine whether, under

Pennsylvania law, a person exposed to beryllium above

background levels, absent sensitization, can be at a

“significantly increased risk” of contracting chronic beryllium

disease. There are two separate appeals. Plaintiffs in each case

filed a putative class action lawsuit against multiple defendants,

alleging negligence in connection with beryllium exposure and

seeking a medical monitoring trust fund based on their increased

risk of developing chronic beryllium disease. In the first action,

No. 08-4374 (the “Anthony action”), the District Court granted

defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment. In the second

action, No. 08-4373 (the “Zimmerman action”), the District

6

Court addressed three separate legal issues—medical monitoring

under Pennsylvania law, claim preclusion, and third-party

liability—and issued final orders in favor of defendants.1 As a

consequence, neither action addresses the class certification

issues. Plaintiffs appeal. We will affirm.

I.

A.

Both cases are based on exposure to beryllium, a steel-

gray metal produced from naturally occurring beryl ore.

Beryllium is an extremely stiff, light metal with a high melting

point and excellent thermal and electrical conductivity. Because

of these properties, beryllium is used as structural material for

high-speed aircraft, missiles, space vehicles, and

communications satellites. It is also used in radiation windows

for x-ray tubes, and as a reflector and moderator in nuclear

reactors. Although it is occasionally used as a pure metal, it is

more commonly incorporated at low levels into alloys.

Beryllium is highly toxic, odorless, and tasteless.

Inhaling beryllium particles can lead to scarring of the lungs, a

condition known as chronic beryllium disease (“CBD”). CBD

1

In its first order, the court granted defendants’ motion to

dismiss plaintiff Shirley Sheridan on claim preclusion grounds,

and also granted defendant Spotts, Stevens & McCoy’s motion

for judgment on the pleadings. In its second order, the court

granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants.

7

occurs when the immune system mounts an attack against

beryllium particles that have entered the body. The lung sacs

become inflamed and fill with large numbers of white blood

cells that accumulate wherever beryllium particles are found.

The cells form balls around the particles called granulomas.

Eventually, the lungs become scarred and lose their ability to

transfer oxygen to the blood stream. This leads to shortness of

breath, chronic cough, fatigue, fever, loss of appetite, and,

potentially, death.

Although some scientific studies suggest there may be a

relationship between the level of beryllium exposure and the

likelihood of developing CBD, exposure itself appears to be

insufficient because only persons who have a particular genetic

“marker”—the Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA)-DPB1

allele—can potentially recognize beryllium in the lungs as an

antigen. This reaction is called beryllium sensitization (“BeS”).

The parties do not dispute that BeS is a necessary precursor to

CBD. BeS itself causes no abnormal lung function and requires

no treatment (i.e., it is asymptomatic). But when the reaction

leads to the formation of granulomas in the lungs, BeS has

progressed to CBD. Some studies show this temporal

progression varies—the development of CBD in a sensitized

person has ranged from months to several years. However,

some sensitized individuals have not developed CBD, and a

small percentage of them have become “desensitized.”

Multiple studies have attempted to determine the

percentage of the population that is genetically predisposed, or

8

“susceptible,” to CBD. The results so far are inconclusive and

disputed. There are substantial disagreements between the

expert opinions in these cases: Craig S. Glazer, M.D., M.S.P.H.,

F.C.C.P., an expert for plaintiff Gary Anthony, stated that

30–40% of the population has the genetic marker, while

Lawrence H. Repsher, M.D., F.C.C.P., defendants’ expert in the

Anthony action, stated that only 1–3% of the overall population

can become sensitized—that is, only this percentage has the

genetic marker. And in another study, researchers found that

3–10% of workers exposed to occupational beryllium may

develop CBD or BeS.2 Once a person is sensitized, the data also

varies on the likelihood that person will develop CBD. While

Dr. Glazer declared that more than 50% of individuals with BeS

will develop CBD, another study found that 6–8% of persons

with BeS develop CBD each year, but refused to speculate on

the total progression rate from BeS to CBD.3

Because BeS is asymptomatic, scientists have developed

tests to determine whether a person is sensitized. Although lung

biopsies, chest x-rays, and computed axial tomography (CAT)

2

See Lisa A. Maier et al., Recent Chronic Beryllium Disease

in Residents Surrounding a Beryllium Facility, 177 Am. J. of

Respiratory and Critical Care Med., 1012, 1016 (2008).

3

Lee S. Newman et al., Beryllium Sensitization Progresses to

Chronic Beryllium Disease, 171 Am. J. of Respiratory and

Critical Care Med., 54, 58 (2005).

9

scans of the chest can be used to diagnose BeS and CBD, the

most common test for sensitization is the beryllium lymphocyte

proliferation test (“BeLPT”). Developed in its modern form in

the 1980s, the BeLPT is performed by extracting lymphocytes

from blood or lung lavage fluid and exposing them to beryllium.

If the lymphocytes proliferate in response to beryllium, then the

BeLPT is “positive,” which means that the individual’s immune

system has begun to recognize beryllium as an antigen. Due to

the risk of false positives, it is generally accepted that two

positive blood BeLPTs, or one positive BeLPT performed on

lung lavage fluid, are required to demonstrate sensitization. But

a negative BeLPT result is not necessarily indicative of future

results—the test only reflects a person’s current reaction (or lack

thereof) to beryllium.

In summary, the pathogenesis of CBD is as follows: (1)

a person is exposed to beryllium; (2) based on exposure and

one’s genetic predisposition, he may develop BeS; and (3) that

sensitization may (or may not) eventually lead to CBD.

Although BeS is a necessary precursor to CBD, the progression

rate from BeS to CBD is varied and uncertain, dependent on a

multitude of factors, many of which are unknown.

B.

Beryllium was discovered in 1798, but its use in the

United States can be traced back only to World War II and the

Cold War era, when the United States government purchased

significant quantities of the metal to produce weapons and

10

aircraft, primarily from Brush Wellman and The Beryllium

Company.4 Although the government’s need for beryllium has

declined, a private sector market has developed as

manufacturers of metal-based products such as automobiles,

golf clubs, bicycles, dental appliances, and computers have

begun to use beryllium alloys.

As early as the 1940s, workers at beryllium plants were

showing signs of CBD. Because the Atomic Energy

Commission (“AEC”) was the initial purchaser of beryllium, it

developed the first safety guidelines for beryllium use. In 1949,

it adopted a standard of 2 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m 3 )

of air averaged over an eight-hour period. See Morgan v. Brush

Wellman, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 704, 710–11 (E.D. Tenn. 2001)

(providing a brief history of the regulation of beryllium). In

1971, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration

(“OSHA”) adopted the 2 µg/m 3 standard and also recommended

a peak concentration of 25 µg/m 3 of air for a maximum duration

of thirty minutes. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000. The Department of

Energy (“DOE”) then promulgated the most recent regulations,

maintaining the exposure limit set by the AEC, but also

requiring the use of periodic medical surveillance and the

implementation of worker protection programs when the level

of airborne concentration of beryllium exceeds 0.2 µg/m 3 . 10

C.F.R. §§ 850.3, .22, .23. Other governmental agencies also

4

Cabot Corporation, a defendant in both cases, is the

successor-in-interest to The Beryllium Company.

11

have issued recommendations for beryllium levels. The

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) promulgated its own

rule, limiting exposure to 0.01 µg/m 3 of air averaged over a

thirty-day period. 40 C.F.R. § 61.32. The National Institute for

Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) has collaborated

with Brush Wellman by conducting multiple studies on exposed

employees to better understand the relationship between

beryllium exposure, the HLA-DPB1 marker, BeS, and CBD.

In addition to government standards and studies, both

private and public employers have implemented screening

programs for their employees. Brush Wellman, the predominant

producer of beryllium products in the United States today, began

providing the BeLPT to its employees at some of its beryllium

plants in the early 1990s, and created a formal screening

program in 1999. Similarly, OSHA personnel who have

participated in inspections of industries where beryllium is used

are offered the opportunity to be medically monitored for

beryllium disease.

II.

Both the Anthony action and the Zimmerman action were

filed in 2006 in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas

and were timely removed to the United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under the Class Action

Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4

(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), where Judge

Gardner presided over the Anthony action and Judge Pratter

12

presided over the Zimmerman action.5 Both courts granted

defendants’ respective motions to dismiss, for judgment on the

pleadings, and for summary judgment.6 Although we denied

plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate the Anthony and Zimmerman

appeals, our opinion resolves both actions.7

5

Although the cases present similar legal issues, they arise

out of different locations and distinct facts. With that said,

plaintiffs’ lawyers, many of the expert witnesses, and one

defendant, Cabot, are the same in each case.

6

The District Court in both proceedings—the Anthony action

and the Zimmerman action—had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1332(d)(2)(A) and 1453. Defendants in each proceeding

properly removed their respective actions under CAFA. The

court in the Zimmerman case had supplemental jurisdiction over

the third-party claims, discussed infra, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the May

21, 2008 and September 18, 2008 orders in the Zimmerman

action and the September 30, 2008 order in the Anthony action

were final orders of the District Court.

7

Judge Pratter issued a May 21, 2008 order granting (1)

Spotts, Stevens & McCoy’s motion to dismiss Zimmerman and

Sheridan’s claim, and (2) Cabot’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings against Sheridan. That order preceded Judge Pratter’s

September 18, 2008 summary judgment order and Judge

Gardner’s September 30, 2008 summary judgment order, both

13

A.

Gary Anthony worked at the U.S. Gauge Plant in

Sellersville, Pennsylvania from May 1972 to May 2004. U.S.

Gauge used beryllium-based products to manufacture various

commercial goods, causing the emission of respirable beryllium

dust, particles, and fumes in the facility. Anthony commenced

a putative class action, of which he is the sole representative,

comprising all current and former employees of U.S. Gauge who

were exposed to a beryllium-containing product at the facility

for a period of at least one month while employed there.

Defendants are U.S. Gauge’s suppliers of beryllium-based

products (Small Tube Manufacturing Corp., Admiral Metals,

Inc., Tube Methods, Inc., and Cabot Corp.), as well as three

third-party defendants.8 Anthony’s Complaint asserts a single

of which addressed the merits of the respective plaintiffs’

medical monitoring claims. But because medical monitoring is

the focus of each action, we address those claims first.

8

The third-party defendants include (1) Ametek, owner and

operator of U.S. Gauge; (2) Brush Wellman, Inc., which

allegedly provided Tube Methods with the beryllium-containing

material; and (3) Millennium Petrochemicals Inc., which is the

successor to National Distillers and Chemical Corp., a company

that entered into an asset purchase agreement with Small Tube

and agreed to defend certain product liability claims. Because

all defendants and third-party defendants joined in the motion

14

negligence claim in which he contends that members of the

proposed class were exposed to beryllium during their

employment, which resulted in an increased risk of contracting

CBD. He seeks the establishment of a medical monitoring trust

fund for the benefit of the putative class. Medical monitoring

would include testing, examination, and preventative and

diagnostic screening for BeS and CBD.

Defendants removed the action to federal court and filed

a joint motion for summary judgment. The court granted limited

discovery. Anthony presented two experts, Adam M. Finkel,

Sc.D., M.P.P., CIH, and Dr. Glazer; defendants presented one

expert, Dr. Repsher. The parties agreed on the aforementioned

pathogenesis of CBD, the fact that BeS is a necessary precursor

to developing CBD, and that two positive blood BeLPTs are

necessary to show sensitization. They also stipulated that

Anthony had taken one blood BeLPT, which was negative, and

accordingly he was not beryllium sensitized. But they disagreed

on when “significantly increased risk” attaches to persons

exposed to beryllium. The gist of Dr. Glazer’s and Dr. Finkel’s

testimony is that all individuals exposed to beryllium at above-

background levels are at a significantly increased risk and

require medical monitoring. Dr. Finkel also declared that there

is a direct relationship between the level of exposure and risk,

and that CBD is not “qualitatively different from any other

for summary judgment, we refer to them collectively as

“defendants.”

15

environmental disease, for which susceptibility is continuous

(not either/or) and for which both susceptibility and exposure

matter fundamentally.” Decl. of Dr. Finkel (Anthony action) ¶

17. In contrast, Dr. Repsher opined that given Anthony’s

negative BeLPT result and the fact that only a small percentage

of the population can become sensitized, Anthony was not at a

significantly increased risk of developing CBD. Decl. of Dr.

Repsher (Anthony action) ¶ 11.

Judge Gardner granted defendants’ summary judgment

motion against Anthony. Applying Pennsylvania law, the court

looked to the seven-element test for a medical monitoring claim

set forth in Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Army, 696

A.2d 137 (Pa. 1997), and focused on whether “as a proximate

result of the exposure,” Anthony had “a significantly increased

risk of contracting a serious latent disease.” Id. at 145. It then

looked to the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision in Pohl v.

NGK Metals Corp., 936 A.2d 43 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), alloc.

denied, 952 A.2d 678 (Pa. 2008), the only state appellate court

opinion to apply Redland Soccer to a medical monitoring claim

for exposure to beryllium. Because the plaintiffs in Pohl were

not beryllium sensitized and had not otherwise made a plausible

showing that they faced a “significantly increased risk” of

developing CBD, the Superior Court held that these plaintiffs

had failed to make a prima facie showing of their medical

16

monitoring claim under Redland Soccer. Anthony v. Small Tube

Mfg. Corp., 580 F. Supp. 2d 409, 428 (E.D. Pa. 2008).9

Judge Gardner read Pohl as a fact-specific decision, but

concluded that the expert opinions Anthony presented were

“merely assumptions and speculation, rather than opinions”

because they were not supported by data from the U.S. Gauge

Plant. Id. at 426–27. Because Anthony was not sensitized to

beryllium and had not presented alternative evidence to raise a

genuine issue of material fact regarding the risk of developing

CBD, the court granted defendants’ summary judgment motion.

Id. at 428.

B.

James Zimmerman resided within one mile of the

Reading Beryllium Facility in Muhlenberg Township,

Pennsylvania from 1977 to 1984. The facility extracted

beryllium hydroxide and manufactured products containing

beryllium from 1936 to 2000. Zimmerman, together with

Shirley Sheridan, discussed infra, commenced a putative class

action lawsuit. The Complaint is almost identical to the

Anthony Complaint—it asserts one negligence claim in which

9

The court rejected Anthony’s attempt to distinguish Pohl

based on the means of exposure—occupational exposure versus

community exposure—finding Anthony’s own experts belied

this distinction. Anthony, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 425–26. Anthony

does not raise this argument on appeal.

17

plaintiffs contend that because of their residency in close

proximity to the Reading Plant they were exposed to beryllium

particles in the ambient air. Defendants include NGK Metals

Corp., owner and operator of the Reading Plant from 1986

through 2000; Cabot Corp., owner and operator of the plant for

at least fifty years before 1986; and Spotts, Stevens & McCoy,

Inc., an engineering firm that was responsible for testing and

monitoring the levels of beryllium at the facility. Like Anthony,

Zimmerman and Sheridan seek the establishment of a medical

monitoring trust fund for themselves individually and on behalf

of a putative class, which includes all persons who resided

within a one-mile radius of the Reading Plant for at least six

months between 1950 and 2000.

Defendants removed the action to federal court, and the

parties commenced bifurcated discovery so that discovery

related to the issue of class certification would be completed

prior to merits discovery. Defendants Cabot and NGK Metals

moved for summary judgment before the court ruled on

plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.10 Zimmerman provided

10

Defendant Spotts, Stevens & McCoy had already been

dismissed from the lawsuit. See infra Part II.D. By an October

6, 2008 stipulation and order, Sheridan’s claim asserted against

NGK Metals was dismissed with prejudice because the company

did not operate the plant when she lived in the area. Similarly,

the court dismissed Sheridan’s claim against Cabot in a May 21,

2008 order, discussed infra Part II.C.

18

the opinions of several experts, including Lisa A. Maier, M.D.,

M.S.P.H., John W. Martyny, Ph.D, C.I.H., Milton Rossman,

M.D., Dr. Finkel, and Dr. Glazer, the last two of whom served

as experts in the Anthony action. Defendants did not submit

expert testimony, relying on the Pohl decision to support their

motion. The parties stipulated that Zimmerman was not

beryllium sensitized—he tested positive on a single blood

BeLPT in 2003, but in 2006 he tested negative on another blood

BeLPT and on a lavage BeLPT.

Both Dr. Maier and Dr. Glazer stated that anyone who

has lived in the area surrounding the Reading Plant is at a

significantly increased risk given the levels of beryllium in the

ambient air and documented cases of CBD in the community.

Dr. Martyny provided a general history of the Reading Plant,

information regarding background levels of beryllium emissions

in and around the facility, and reported cases of occupational

and community-based CBD. In particular, he produced samples

from the community surrounding the plant that showed the mean

concentration of beryllium in the air to be 0.0155 µg/m 3 , and the

average within the first one-half mile of the plant rising to 0.028

µg/m 3 , significantly higher than the general background level of

beryllium in the air in Pennsylvania of 0.00002 µg/m 3 . Decl. of

Dr. Martyny (Zimmerman action) ¶ 13. Dr. Finkel provided a

declaration similar to what he presented in the Anthony action,

but here he made a quantitative risk assessment based on the

aforementioned exposure data. He concluded that the risk of

contracting CBD to the members of the proposed class

19

represented by Zimmerman was 3 per 10,000, and for those

individuals who have lived near the Reading Plant for at least

ten years, the risk increased to 1 per 500. Decl. of Dr. Finkel

(Zimmerman action) ¶¶ 44–45. Dr. Rossman, who evaluated

Zimmerman for signs of beryllium-related diseases in 2006,

reported that because of Zimmerman’s abnormal pulmonary

function studies and his one positive blood BeLPT, he had

“borderline results” for which he should be tested every three to

five years for the rest of his life. Decl. of Dr. Rossman

(Zimmerman action) ¶¶ 4–5.

The court granted defendants’ summary judgment motion

against Zimmerman. Like Judge Gardner in the Anthony action,

Judge Pratter looked to Redland Soccer and Pohl to determine

whether Zimmerman had made a prima facie showing of a

medical monitoring claim. Applying Pohl, Judge Pratter said:

“[B]eryllium sensitization is the appropriate point on the

beryllium exposure-to-disease continuum where a defendant’s

liability should attach.” Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 614 F.

Supp. 2d 536, 549 (E.D. Pa. 2008). Because Zimmerman was

not sensitized, the court held that he did not present evidence

sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to his risk

of contracting CBD.

C.

Like Zimmerman, Shirley Sheridan lived near the

Reading Plant from 1951 to 1956. In 2002, Sheridan

commenced a personal injury lawsuit against Cabot in the

20

United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania, alleging negligence and strict liability, and

seeking compensatory damages for beryllium-related diseases.

The District Court granted Cabot’s motion for summary

judgment, finding that although Sheridan had been diagnosed

with CBD, she had not suffered a compensable injury under

Pennsylvania law. Sheridan v. Cabot Corp., No. Civ. A. 02-

1212, 2003 WL 22999256, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2003).

We affirmed. Sheridan v. Cabot Corp., 113 F. App’x 444 (3d

Cir. 2004).

Sheridan brings this class action lawsuit with

Zimmerman as a co-lead plaintiff and putative class action

representative, seeking a medical monitoring fund, discussed

supra. Cabot moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that

Sheridan’s claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, or

claim preclusion. The District Court granted the motion,

dismissing Sheridan’s claim against Cabot.

D.

Spotts, Stevens & McCoy is an engineering and

consulting firm that was hired by the operators of the Reading

Plant to analyze and monitor beryllium levels emitted from the

facility, and to ensure compliance with state and federal

regulations. The putative class action initiated by Zimmerman

and Sheridan asserts a claim for medical monitoring against

Spotts, Stevens & McCoy, relying on § 324A of the Restatement

21

(Second) of Torts, which imposes liability on third persons for

negligent performance of an undertaking.11

Spotts, Stevens & McCoy filed a motion to dismiss under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the Amended Complaint

failed to allege the company owed a legal duty to plaintiffs or

breached any duty. The District Court granted defendant’s

motion, finding that the Amended Complaint did not allege the

company undertook a duty to warn the residents of the

community surrounding the Reading Plant of the results of the

tests it performed for the facility’s owners and operators.

Because § 324A imposes liability on third parties only upon

their breach of a specifically undertaken duty, the court

dismissed plaintiffs’ claim against Spotts, Stevens & McCoy.

III.

The principal question presented by these appeals is

whether Anthony and/or Zimmerman can sustain their medical

monitoring claims under Pennsylvania law.12 In Simmons v.

11

Plaintiffs’ initial claim against Spotts, Stevens & McCoy

was for common law negligence, which the District Court

dismissed for failure to state a claim because it did not allege the

firm owed a legal duty to plaintiffs. The court granted plaintiffs

leave to amend the Complaint.

12

We exercise plenary review over a district court’s decision

granting summary judgment. See Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms,

22

Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232, 240 (Pa. 1996), the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court recognized the viability of a medical monitoring

cause of action. Although the court held that a claim for

damages based solely on increased risk and fear of developing

a disease is too speculative and “contrary to the established

jurisprudence of th[e] Commonwealth,” it stated that “recovery

for medical monitoring is appropriate and just.” Id. In Redland

Soccer the court articulated the elements of a common law claim

Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is

proper “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials

on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “A motion for

summary judgment will not be defeated by ‘the mere existence’

of some disputed facts, but will be denied when there is a

genuine issue of material fact.” Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle &

Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986)). We draw all

inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.

A plaintiff, however, cannot avert summary judgment by resting

on the allegations in his pleadings, but rather must present

evidence from which a jury could find in his favor. See

Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex. rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252

(3d Cir. 1999).

Because plaintiffs bring only state law claims, we apply

Pennsylvania’s substantive law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,

304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).

23

for medical monitoring. Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff

must prove each of the following seven factors:

(1) exposure greater than normal background

levels; (2) to a proven hazardous substance; (3)

caused by the defendant’s negligence; (4) as a

proximate result of the exposure, plaintiff has a

significantly increased risk of contracting a

serious latent disease; (5) a monitoring procedure

exists that makes the early detection of the disease

possible; (6) the prescribed monitoring regime is

different from that normally recommended in the

absence of the exposure; and (7) the prescribed

monitoring regime is reasonably necessary

according to contemporary scientific principles.

Redland Soccer, 696 A.2d at 145–46.13 Expert testimony is

13

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court articulated several

reasons for recognizing medical monitoring claims: (1)

monitoring “promote[s] early diagnosis and treatment of disease

or illness resulting from exposure to toxic substances caused by

a tortfeasor’s negligence”; (2) it allows recovery for the

expenses of such monitoring, which “avoids the potential

injustice of forcing an economically disadvantaged person to

pay for expensive diagnostic examinations necessitated by

another’s negligence”; (3) it “affords toxic-tort victims, for

whom other sorts of recovery may prove difficult, immediate

compensation for medical monitoring needed as a result of

24

required to prove these elements. Id. The focus in these appeals

is on factor four: whether plaintiffs in each action have a

“significantly increased risk” of contracting CBD.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not considered a

medical monitoring claim for exposure to beryllium (or a toxin

that creates increased risk of a disease with a similar

pathogenesis to CBD), but in 2007 the Pennsylvania Superior

Court squarely addressed this issue in Pohl. The facts in Pohl

are similar to those in the Zimmerman action: three plaintiffs

living near the aforementioned Reading Plant brought a class

action lawsuit against NGK Metals and Cabot, alleging

negligence and seeking a medical monitoring trust fund on

behalf of all residents who resided within a six-mile radius of

the Reading Plant for at least six continuous months between

1950 and 1989. Pohl v. NGK Metals Corp., No. 0733, 2003 WL

24207633, at *6 (C.P. Phila. July 9, 2003). Testimony indicated

that the class may have consisted of over 200,000 persons. Id.

at *8. The state trial court denied class certification, explaining

exposure”; (4) “it furthers the deterrent function of the tort

system by compelling those who expose others to toxic

substances to minimize risks and costs of exposure”; and (5) it

furthers an “important public health interest in fostering access

to medical testing for individuals whose exposure to toxic

chemicals creates an enhanced risk of disease.” Redland Soccer,

696 A.2d at 145 (quoting Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.,

858 P.2d 970, 976–77 (Utah 1993) (internal citations omitted)).

25

that “[s]ince only susceptible persons can develop CBD at a

given dose, because of their own immunological response to

particles of beryllium, the issue of increased risk is not common

to the class.” Id. at *10. After the Superior Court affirmed, 863

A.2d 1239 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), alloc. denied, 872 A.2d 1200

(Pa. 2005), plaintiffs proceeded in their individual capacities.

Plaintiffs were not sensitized to beryllium—two of them had

tested negative on a BeLPT, and the other did not take the test.

The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, stating that plaintiffs had not “presented evidence that

exposure to beryllium without the allergic immune response puts

one at risk for CBD.” Pohl v. NGK Metals Corp., No. 0733,

slip. op. at 4 (C.P. Phila. June 22, 2006), available at 2006 WL

3898323 (as an appendix).

On appeal, plaintiffs argued the trial court erred in

finding that only sensitized individuals are at risk, especially in

light of contradictory testimony by Dr. Maier, one of plaintiffs’

experts, who testified that someone exposed to beryllium can be

“susceptible” to CBD without being sensitized, and that

susceptibility alone places a person at risk. Pohl, 936 A.2d at

48. The Superior Court affirmed, holding that plaintiffs had not

met their burden of showing they were at a “significantly

increased risk” of contracting CBD. The court detailed

testimony from each of plaintiffs’ three witnesses. Although Dr.

Maier stated that susceptible individuals are still at risk, she also

conceded that BeS is a necessary precursor to developing CBD,

id. at 50, and “admitted she could not positively determine

26

whether [plaintiffs] were susceptible to beryllium,” id. at 51.

Dr. Martyny, plaintiffs’ second expert, testified that exposure to

beryllium at above-normal background levels creates a risk, but

he could not determine whether the risk was “significant.” Id.

Plaintiff’s third expert, Dr. Rossman, testified that 1–3% of an

exposed population might develop BeS, and about half of those

will contract CBD. Id.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that “[the]

record provides no support for [plaintiffs’] contention that they

are sensitive [sic] to beryllium or face a significantly increased

risk of contracting CBD.” Id. Moreover, “[e]ven if a test were

available to prove [plaintiffs] are susceptible to beryllium,” the

court found that “no expert testimony supports [plaintiffs’]

claim that susceptibility, absent beryllium sensitivity, creates a

significantly increased risk of contracting CBD.” Id. Because

of “expert testimony, as well as [plaintiffs’] failure to

demonstrate beryllium sensitivity through positive BeLPT

results,” the court found plaintiffs did not prove they were at “a

significantly increased risk of developing CBD,” and thus did

not present sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie cause

of action for medical monitoring. Id. at 51–52. But the court

explicitly stated plaintiffs could “bring another action for

medical monitoring if and when they have a positive BeLPT or

develop CBD.” Id. at 52 n.3. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court

denied allocatur. 952 A.2d 678 (Pa. 2008).

Interpreting Pohl is central to these appeals. Defendants

in both actions argue Pohl held, as a matter of Pennsylvania law,

27

that only persons with BeS are at a significantly increased risk

of developing CBD. They rely on the undisputed testimony

presented in the state court proceeding—that CBD is an

immunological disease, and that only a small percentage of the

population with the known genetic marker (the HLA-DPB1

allele) is at risk of becoming sensitized. Plaintiffs contend Pohl

is neither controlling nor persuasive because it was a fact-

specific decision in which the state court dismissed the three

plaintiffs’ claims based on their failure of proof.14

14

Judge Gardner in the Anthony action and Judge Pratter in

the Zimmerman action interpreted Pohl in slightly different

ways, but the distinction is not one of substance. Judge Gardner

explained in a footnote how his interpretation differs from that

of Judge Pratter:

I . . . believe that Pohl implies that if in a

future case there were a bona fide dispute

between competing experts concerning whether or

not a plaintiff could show a significantly

increased risk of CBD in the absence of a positive

BeLPT for beryllium sensitization, it would be for

the jury to decide, and summary judgment would

be inappropriate.

Therefore, I concluded that in the future

the trial court must adjudicate anew on a case-by-

case basis whether or not to grant summary

judgment in beryllium medical monitoring cases,

based upon the unique facts and testimony

28

Pennsylvania trial courts have had occasion to interpret

the scope of the Pohl opinion. The Philadelphia County Court

of Common Pleas created a specialized docket for beryllium

exposure medical monitoring cases, which included thirty-one

cases brought by fifty plaintiffs who had been exposed to

beryllium but were not sensitized.15 Judge Tereshko issued an

opinion on January 18, 2008, dismissing the claims of four of

these plaintiffs. See Schlott v. NGK Metals Corp., No. 1247,

slip. op. (C.P. Phila. Jan. 18, 2008). He interpreted Pohl as

holding “that exposure or susceptibility does not create a

presented, including any relevant expert scientific

evidence.

Anthony, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 424 n.50. But immediately after

making this distinction, Judge Gardner stated that “because

plaintiff has no possibility of being diagnosed with CBD, he

cannot show that as a proximate result of his exposure to

beryllium, he has a significantly increased risk of contracting

CBD, a latent disease.” Id. at 425. He found that Pohl was

“premised upon the scientific fact that individuals who are not

sensitized to beryllium cannot be diagnosed with CBD,” and that

the science had not changed. Id. Thus, as an undisputed

scientific conclusion, Judge Gardner’s interpretation appears to

have the same practical effect as that of Judge Pratter.

15

Many of the parties and their lawyers in the state trial court

proceedings are the same as those involved in the actions

presented here.

29

significantly increased risk of contracting CBD.” Id. at 2. He

went on to find that plaintiffs had “nothing additional to offer .

. . which would support their claim that exposure is sufficient to

satisfy the requirement that Plaintiffs are at a significantly

increased risk [of developing] beryllium disease.” Id. at 3.

Three months later, Judge Tereshko issued twenty-seven orders

granting summary judgment to defendants on the remaining

cases for the same reasons set forth in his January 18 opinion.

After these plaintiffs appealed, the court issued a second opinion

pursuant to Pa. R. App. P. 1925(a), reaffirming its earlier

decision and stating: “As was established in Pohl, exposure to

beryllium without proof of sensitization does not create a

significantly increased risk of contracting CBD.” Anastasio v.

NGK N. Am., No. 0116, 2009 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 52, at

*10 (C.P. Phila. Jan. 6, 2009). These cases are pending before

the Pennsylvania Superior Court.

A.

Our role in diversity cases is to apply state law. “A

federal court under Erie is bound to follow state law as

announced by the highest state court.” Edwards v. HOVENSA,

LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 2007). As noted, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet determined whether

exposure to beryllium, absent sensitization, can cause a

significantly increased risk of contracting CBD under

Pennsylvania law, so we must predict the position the court

would take on this issue. See id. “Where an intermediate

appellate state court rests its considered judgment upon the rule

30

of law which it announces, that is a datum for ascertaining state

law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is

convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the

state would decide otherwise.” Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v.

Chappell, 407 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting West v.

Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940)). “This standard

places a significant constraint on us . . . .” Jewelcor Inc. v.

Karfunkel, 517 F.3d 672, 676 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008). Unlike our

role in interpreting federal law, we may not “act as a judicial

pioneer” in a diversity case. City of Phila. v. Lead Indus. Ass’n,

994 F.2d 112, 123 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, “[w]hen a

state’s highest court denies review, the policy reasons for

following an intermediate court decision (absent compelling

evidence to the contrary) are strengthened.” Budget Rent-A-Car,

407 F.3d at 174 n.7. The application of an intermediate

appellate court decision to actions in lower state courts provides

an additional reason for federal courts to abide by the decision,

as it promotes consistency of law and principles of comity. Cf.

West, 311 U.S. at 236 (explaining that the “obvious purpose” of

Erie and the Rules of Decision Act, which Erie interprets, “is to

avoid the maintenance within a state of two divergent or

conflicting systems of law”); City of Phila., 994 F.2d at 123

(“Federalism concerns require that we permit state courts to

decide whether and to what extent they will expand state

common law.”).

Pohl is the highest Pennsylvania court to directly address

a medical monitoring claim for exposure to beryllium. The

31

Pennsylvania Supreme Court twice denied allocatur, and Pohl

has been applied to at least fifty persons in thirty-one cases in

the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, with a

consolidated appeal pending in the Superior Court. At this

point, plaintiffs have not presented “persuasive data” that the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court would decide otherwise.

Accordingly, we apply Pohl.

Although the opinion suggests that future developments

in science’s understanding of the effects of beryllium exposure

and its relationship with CBD may result in a different outcome,

see Pohl, 936 A.2d at 51 (“This record provides no support for

[plaintiffs’] contention that they are sensitive [sic] to beryllium

or face a significantly increased risk of contracting CBD.”), it

drew a line along the exposure-to-disease continuum at

sensitization. Contrary to both Anthony’s and Zimmerman’s

contentions, Pohl was not based only on a lack of proof; it was

based on plaintiffs’ failure to meet the requisite threshold for

establishing significantly increased risk due to (1) the

undisputed facts about beryllium exposure, BeS, and CBD, and

(2) plaintiffs’ inability to demonstrate a significant increase in

risk before sensitization. The lack of proof in Pohl which

Anthony and Zimmerman allege they have corrected is in fact

the Pohl plaintiffs’ inability to prove sensitization itself. See

Pohl, 936 A.2d at 49 (“[Defendants] insist, absent positive

results from the BeLPT, [plaintiffs] lack evidence they are

sensitized; thus, [plaintiffs] cannot show they face a

significantly increased risk of contracting CBD. [Defendants]

32

suggest this lack of proof led the trial court to deny class

certification . . . . We agree.”).

B.

Anthony contends the District Court prematurely granted

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. According to

Anthony, the court dismissed his claim only because he did not

provide specific exposure levels at the U.S. Gauge facility,

implying that if he had the opportunity to present this data, the

court would have denied defendants’ motion. Defendants

characterize the court’s decision differently, focusing on CBD’s

pathogenesis and highlighting the fact that because Anthony is

not sensitized, he cannot develop CBD at this time.

Anthony attempts to highlight the factual differences

between the opinions of defendants’ expert, Dr. Repsher, and

those of his experts, Dr. Glazer and Dr. Finkel. While Dr.

Repsher opined that only 1–3% of the general population can

develop CBD, Dr. Glazer stated that 30–40% of the population

can develop BeS, and that CBD will develop in more than half

of those individuals. Although this data shows the gaping holes

in the current state of scientific research, as well as the

substantial factual disagreements between scientists, it is not

material to this appeal. The parties stipulated that Anthony has

not developed BeS, and we do not know whether he has the

genetic marker associated with CBD. Anthony must prove there

is a genuine issue of material fact as to his risk of developing

CBD absent sensitization. This background data, most of which

33

was also cited in Pohl, 936 A.2d at 50–51, is not relevant to

Anthony’s individual risk.16

Dr. Finkel engaged in a quantitative risk analysis to

consider the relationship between beryllium exposure and CBD.

He contradicted Dr. Repsher’s declaration that only a small

portion of an exposed population is at risk of contracting CBD

as a result of genetic predisposition.17 Regardless, because he

contended that up to 50% of the population is genetically

predisposed to recognizing beryllium as an antigen, he believes

that “not much is lost (in terms of over-inclusiveness) by

defining the high-risk residents to include some people who may

only be at risk because of extremely high exposures.” Decl. of

Dr. Finkel (Anthony action) ¶ 17. These statements do not add

to the evidence plaintiffs presented in Pohl, and do not create a

material issue of fact regarding Anthony’s individual risk.

Moreover, as explained by the District Court, Anthony’s

experts did not provide any other specific information as to his

16

Anthony also challenges Dr. Repsher’s declaration under

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579

(1993), and Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The

District Court rejected Anthony’s arguments. We see no error,

but in any case the Daubert ruling is not relevant in this appeal.

17

In the next subsection, we discuss and reject this portion of

Dr. Finkel’s declaration because (1) it is not supported by any

evidence, and (2) Pohl rejected it.

34

risk of contracting CBD, and so the court granted defendants’

motion for summary judgment. Anthony now contends he did

not provide this information—that is, exposure data from the

U.S. Gauge Plant—because he was unable to take discovery

from the plant’s operators. A district court shall “give a party

opposing summary judgment an adequate opportunity to obtain

discovery.” Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 139 (3d

Cir. 1988). We review for abuse of discretion. Bradley v.

United States, 299 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2002).

The court did not prematurely grant defendants’ motion.

Anthony filed an emergency motion for leave to take limited

discovery in order to respond to defendants’ summary judgment

motion, which the District Court granted. Anthony subsequently

conducted extensive discovery—his counsel subpoenaed records

from Brush Wellman regarding its employee screening program

and deposed Dr. Repsher—before filing his brief in opposition

to the motion. But Anthony did not file an affidavit under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(f) stating that he needed to conduct additional

discovery. “We have made clear that, in all but the most

exceptional cases, failure to comply with Rule 56(f) is fatal to a

claim of insufficient discovery on appeal.” Bradley, 299 F.3d

at 207. Regardless of this data, Anthony cannot prevail because

under Pohl the threshold increase in risk to establish a medical

monitoring claim under Redland Soccer remains at sensitization,

a point along the exposure-to-disease continuum that Anthony

has not reached.

35

C.

As noted, Zimmerman brings his class action individually

and on behalf of a putative class consisting of all persons who

resided within a one-mile radius of the Reading Plant for at least

six months during the time period between 1950 and 2000. The

facts underlying his action are similar to those under which

Anthony’s case arose—both plaintiffs represent putative classes

consisting of persons exposed to beryllium in the ambient air,

are seeking to establish a medical monitoring trust fund, and are

not sensitized to beryllium. But Zimmerman’s appeal presents

a closer question for two reasons. First, Zimmerman tested

positive to a blood BeLPT in 2003, before twice testing negative

in 2006. His expert, Dr. Rossman, declared that Zimmerman’s

2003 positive BeLPT as well as abnormal pulmonary function

studies showed “borderline results” for which he recommended

Zimmerman undergo repeat breathing studies within six months

and beryllium proliferation studies every three to five years for

the rest of his life. Decl. of Dr. Rossman (Zimmerman action)

¶¶ 4–5. Second, Zimmerman’s experts have presented data on

specific exposure levels around the Reading Plant and the

number of documented cases of CBD in the community. Dr.

Martyny declared that the average concentration of beryllium in

the area surrounding the plant was 0.0155 µg/m 3 , well above the

background level throughout the rest of Pennsylvania,18 and that

18

The record seems to indicate that the data on the

background levels is from the 1950s or 1960s.

36

in a 1969 investigation 92 cases of CBD were reported among

both residents and workers in the vicinity of the Reading Plant.

Decl. of Dr. Martyny (Zimmerman action) ¶¶ 13–14. More

recently, a study showed that at least eight residents within 1.05

miles of the Reading Plant have been diagnosed with CBD.19

Dr. Finkel used this data to engage in a quantitative risk

analysis, finding that the risk of contracting CBD to Zimmerman

and members of his proposed class was at least 3 per 10,000.

Like Anthony, Zimmerman argues Pohl is not

controlling. He contends sensitization does not create or

increase risk, but instead manifests the already-existing risk in

a way for which one can test (via the BeLPT). In other words,

sensitization is only a marker along the continuum between

exposure and disease. Because of the advent of the BeLPT,

which is the predominant means of testing for whether one’s

body has begun reacting to beryllium exposure, Zimmerman

argues the importance of sensitization as a risk indicator has

been unnecessarily heightened. Beginning with the trial court’s

denial of the motion for class certification in Pohl, 2003 WL

24207633, at *12, sensitization has, in Zimmerman’s view,

incorrectly been labeled as “the point” along the exposure-to-

disease continuum at which significant risk attaches. See

Zimmerman Oral Argument Trans. 15–16. According to

Zimmerman, more than 50% of individuals with BeS will go on

to develop CBD, with an average rate of 6–8% per year; at least

19

Maier et al., supra note 3, at 1016.

37

3 per every 10,000 people in the putative class will develop

CBD; and there is a correlation between exposure and risk, as

evidenced in one study that found 14.3% of machinists

developed BeS compared to only 1.2% of employees with

relatively less beryllium exposure.20 Thus, Zimmerman argues,

risk is created by heightened exposure, well before and

independent of sensitization.21

20

Statement of Work: Collaboration on Worker Screening at

the Brush Wellman Plants in Tucson, Arizona and Elmore,

Ohio. See also Newman et al., supra note 3, at 56 (finding that

of individuals already sensitized to beryllium, those who

progressed to CBD were more likely to be machinists); Decl. of

Dr. Glazer (Anthony action) ¶ 10 (stating that some employees

at beryllium manufacturing facilities with relatively less

exposure, like security guards and administrative personnel,

have developed CBD).

21

Both Zimmerman and Anthony argue BeS itself is a

“serious latent disease” under Redland, or at least the beginning

stage of the development of the disease. First, they cite to the

2004 Newman study, supra note 3, which found that BeS

progresses to CBD at a rate of 6–8% per year. Second, they

reference an Eleventh Circuit decision in which the court held

that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether BeS

is a compensable injury under Georgia law. Parker v. Brush

Wellman, 230 F. App’x. 878, 884 (11th Cir. 2007). But cf. Paz

v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 555 F.3d 383, 394–98 (5th

38

From Zimmerman’s perspective, exposure to beryllium

is analogous to exposure to other toxins, such as asbestos and

polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Defendants contend CBD’s

immunological nature distinguishes beryllium from other toxins,

which do not invoke an allergic response in only a subset of

susceptible persons and instead have a more linear exposure-to-

Cir. 2009) (holding that BeS is not a compensable injury under

Mississippi law).

Plaintiffs’ arguments miss the mark. The 2004 study was

inconclusive—it could not determine whether all individuals

with BeS will eventually develop CBD, nor did it attempt to

determine the relationship between the level of exposure and the

rate of progression from BeS to CBD. The Parker decision

interpreted Georgia law, but we are bound by Pennsylvania law,

and Pohl appears to have rejected this argument. Although the

court was presented with an expert opinion stating that BeS can

“develop[ ] with [CBD] or before it,” 936 A.2d at 50, it did not

recognize BeS as a disease under Pennsylvania law. BeS seems

to be similar to asymptomatic pleural thickening caused by

asbestos exposure, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held

was not a compensable injury. See Simmons, 674 A.2d at 237.

Just as asymptomatic pleural thickening does not entail

“disabling consequences or physiological dysfunction,” id. at

236, so too does BeS—itself an asymptomatic condition—not

cause physical impairment or require treatment.

39

disease relationship. 22 But Zimmerman posits that the

immunological aspect of CBD is simply another element of

uncertainty, which discounts risk by the percentage of the

population that is not genetically susceptible to beryllium, and

that exposure itself is correlated with risk.

Zimmerman cites a Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

decision, which focused on the issue of “significantly increased

risk” in the context of exposure to PCBs. See Foust v. Se. Pa.

Transp. Auth., 756 A.2d 112 (Pa. Commw. 2000). In Foust, the

court affirmed the certification of plaintiffs’ class, and in so

doing held that proof of a significantly increased risk of

contracting a serious latent disease under Redland Soccer will

not necessarily require an individual inquiry into each plaintiff’s

particular characteristics. The decision relied on testimony of

experts who stated that exposure to a toxic substance above

some threshold level places an individual at a significantly

increased risk of contracting disease. Id. at 119–20.

Here, Dr. Finkel provided similar statements based on his

quantitative risk assessment, concluding that the beryllium level

in the ambient air in the community surrounding the Reading

Plant was over the threshold for establishing significantly

22

Dr. Glazer’s testimony in one of the post-Pohl actions now

pending before the Pennsylvania Superior Court supports this

distinction. See Deposition of Dr. Glazer, at 177–78, Harris v.

NGK N. Am., Inc., No. 04388 (C.P. Phila. Dec. 13, 2007).

40

increased risk.23 But as he conceded in his declaration, the legal

threshold that constitutes a “significant” increase in risk is not

a scientific question. Decl. of Dr. Finkel (Zimmerman action)

¶ 32. And whatever the requisite threshold is, Pohl rejected Dr.

Finkel’s assertion that mere exposure reaches it.

Dr. Finkel also opined that

the various genetic “markers” that appear to have

some association with the propensity to develop

23

He stated:

Based on my scientific understanding of the risk

of contracting beryllium disease as a function of

duration and intensity of exposure, I can state to

a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the

members of the proposed class face a significantly

increased risk of contracting CBD . . . .

The most important determinant of the risk of

CBD is the duration and intensity of exposure to

beryllium in the environment (or workplace).

Although science may come to understand in the

future that only “susceptible” persons are at

substantially elevated risk relative to the

remainder of the population, at the present time

there is no basis for concluding that persons “non-

susceptible to CBD” exist or can be exposed with

impunity.

Decl. of Dr. Finkel (Zimmerman action) ¶¶ 40–41.

41

CBD . . . do not begin to establish that CBD is

qualitatively different from any other

environmental disease for which susceptibility is

continuous (not either/or) and for which both

susceptibility and exposure matter fundamentally.

Id. ¶ 20. To the extent Dr. Finkel argues the presence of the

HLA-DPB1 marker is merely an effect modifier, as opposed to

a sine qua non of contracting CBD, Pohl rejected this

proposition: “CBD affects between one and three percent of

those exposed to beryllium, because only those individuals with

a specific immune response or allergy to beryllium can develop

the disease. Thus, even those workers at [plaintiffs’] plant with

enormous exposure to beryllium . . . cannot develop the disease

if they lack the immunologic response to beryllium.” 936 A.2d

at 45. Without scientific data that might support Dr. Finkel’s

hypothesis, the District Court properly did not consider this

testimony in its analysis. “A court may conclude that there is

simply too great an analytical gap between the data and opinion

proffered.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).

As Pohl recites, only a small subset of an exposed

population (those who carry the genetic marker) is at risk of

developing CBD; thus, the issue presented here is

distinguishable from Foust. Unlike exposure to beryllium, the

evidence presented on PCBs in Foust seems to indicate that all

persons are at risk of developing disease from exposure

alone—that is, there is no known genetic predisposition that

affects risk. Foust, 756 A.2d at 119. The linear relationship

42

between PCB exposure and disease allowed the Pennsylvania

Commonwealth Court in Foust to generalize risk based on PCB

exposure levels alone. Under Pohl, the relationship between

beryllium exposure and CBD is relatively non-linear, making

generalized risk assessments inappropriate.

The essence of Zimmerman’s arguments, which are

supported by expert testimony, is that risk of contracting CBD

develops through beryllium exposure alone, independent of

sensitization. Zimmerman contends the concept of sensitization,

although important to understanding the pathogenesis of the

disease, is not an indicator of risk. See, e.g., Decl. of Dr. Finkel

(Zimmerman action) ¶ 20 (“[T]he dubious assertion that ‘only

susceptible people can develop CBD’ is irrelevant to human risk

assessment, even if it were true.”); Decl. of Dr. Rossman

(Zimmerman action) ¶ 7 (“I can categorically state that one does

not need to be diagnosed with BeS in order to be considered

significantly at risk for contracting CBD.”); Decl. of Dr. Glazer

(Zimmerman action) ¶ 17 (“All [members of the proposed class]

are at a significantly increased risk for the development of

beryllium related health effects.”). But nearly identical

testimony was presented in Pohl by experts Zimmerman uses in

his case. Dr. Martyny “opined with a reasonable degree of

scientific certainty that each of the [plaintiffs] . . . was at a

significantly increased risk of contracting CBD as a result of

exposure to beryllium in Reading . . . .” Brief for Appellants at

13–14, Pohl v. NGK Metals Corp., No. 2083 EDA 2006 (Pa.

Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2007), 2007 WL 2721323. Similarly, Dr.

43

Maier explained that each plaintiff was at a significantly

increased risk of developing CBD due to beryllium exposure,

and that once a person has been exposed, his risk of developing

CBD remains with him for life. Id. at 14–15 (citing Maier

Affidavit). After considering these expert opinions, the Superior

Court in Pohl found that plaintiffs had still failed to make a

prima facie showing of significantly increased risk under

Redland Soccer.24

The Pohl court did not dismiss plaintiffs’ claims based

only on a failure of proof; it dismissed after holding that the risk

threshold under the fourth element of the Redland Soccer test,

given the current state of scientific knowledge on the

relationship between beryllium exposure and disease, fell on

sensitization. For these reasons, Zimmerman has failed to

present sufficient evidence that “as a proximate result of the

exposure,” he “has a significantly increased risk of contracting”

CBD. Redland Soccer, 696 A.2d at 145–46.

24

Both plaintiffs’ references to Brush Wellman’s, OSHA’s,

and other governmental agencies’ medical monitoring programs

are also unavailing. They are helpful to understand the effects

of beryllium exposure, but they do not aid us in defining what

constitutes a “significantly increased risk” under Pennsylvania

law.

44

IV.

Sheridan contends the District Court erred in granting

Cabot’s motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(c) on the grounds of res judicata, or claim

preclusion.25 “[A] final judgment on the merits of an action

precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that

were or could have been raised in that action.” Churchill v. Star

Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 194 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Rivet v.

Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 473 (1998)). To succeed in

the assertion of the defense, the defendant must show there has

been “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit

involving; (2) the same parties or their privies; and (3) a

subsequent suit based on the same causes of action.” Id.

(quoting United States v. Athlone Indus., Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 984

25

Judgment on the pleadings “will not be granted unless the

movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains

to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir.

2008) (quoting Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863

F.2d 289, 290–91 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted)). We exercise plenary review over a district

court’s decision granting a motion for judgment on the

pleadings, and “view the facts presented in the pleadings and the

inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Jablonski, 863 F.2d at

290–91) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

45

(3d Cir. 1984)). We “[do] not apply this conceptual test

mechanically,” but “focus on the central purpose of the doctrine,

to require a plaintiff to present all claims arising out [of] the

same occurrence in a single suit.” Id. (quoting Athlone, 746 F.2d

at 984). In so doing, we avoid piecemeal litigation and conserve

judicial resources. See id.

In 2002, Sheridan brought a personal injury action

against Cabot for negligence and strict liability, alleging that her

exposure to beryllium near the Reading Plant from 1951 to 1956

caused her to contract CBD. She sought compensatory and

punitive damages. The District Court granted Cabot’s motion

for summary judgment, finding that although Sheridan had been

diagnosed with CBD, she had not suffered a compensable injury

under Pennsylvania law. Sheridan v. Cabot Corp. (Sheridan I),

No. Civ. A. 02-1212, 2003 WL 22999256, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa.

Mar. 12, 2003) (citing Simmons, 674 A.2d at 237), aff’d, 113 F.

App’x 444 (3d Cir. 2004). Sheridan then initiated this putative

class action as a lead plaintiff against Cabot, among other

defendants, for medical monitoring (Sheridan II). The

underlying facts supporting her allegation of negligence are the

same as those in Sheridan I—that she was exposed to beryllium

particles emitted from the Reading Plant as a result of living in

the surrounding community, which can cause CBD and other

adverse beryllium health effects.

The Sheridan II court granted Cabot’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings, finding that Sheridan’s claim against

it is barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. Specifically, the

46

court held that (1) Cabot had obtained a judgment on the merits

against Sheridan in Sheridan I; (2) Sheridan and Cabot were

parties to both actions; and (3) Sheridan’s claim was based on

the same cause of action as Sheridan I. We agree.

First, the Sheridan I court’s dismissal of Sheridan’s

negligence and strict liability claims was “on the merits.”

Sheridan contends that because the court held she did not suffer

a compensable injury, it did not reach the merits of her case.

The Sheridan I court implied that because Sheridan’s personal

injury claim had not yet ripened, she could properly initiate a

second personal injury action if and when she begins to suffer

a “compensable injury.” Sheridan I, 2003 WL 22999256, at

*4–5. It also noted that Sheridan’s statute of limitations period

had “not begun to run, much less expired.” Id. at *5 n.2.

Sheridan cites the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which

states, in part:

A valid and final personal judgment for the

defendant, which rests on the prematurity of the

action or on the plaintiff’s failure to satisfy a

precondition of suit, does not bar another action

by the plaintiff instituted after the claim has

matured, or the precondition has been satisfied,

unless a second action is precluded by operation

of the substantive law.

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 20(2) (1982). Just as

cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, lack of venue, improper

47

service, and improper joinder do not bar another action after a

claim has matured, so too, Sheridan argues, does her claim in

Sheridan I not bar a subsequent claim after the initial action has

“matured.” But because her claim in Sheridan II is simply

seeking another form of relief—medical monitoring instead of

compensatory damages—based on the same underlying factual

averments, her initial claim in Sheridan I has not matured.

Accordingly, § 20(2) of the Restatement does not apply, and the

Sheridan I court’s decision was on the merits.26

Second, Cabot has met the “same parties” requirement of

the claim preclusion defense because Sheridan and the company

26

By stating that Sheridan can bring a second personal injury

claim if and when she suffers a “compensable injury,” the

Sheridan I court seems to have implicitly recognized the “two-

disease” rule under Pennsylvania law, which permits a plaintiff

to commence separate causes of action for each exposure-based

disease she develops. See Simmons, 674 A.2d at 237; see also

Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 981 A.2d 198, 206–07 (Pa.

2009) (applying Simmons). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court

adopted this rule so that plaintiffs would not be forced to

“establish all future harm that may result from the contraction of

. . . . [a] latent disease[] which do[es] not surface until years

after the initial exposure. Simmons, 674 A.2d at 237. But here

Sheridan does not contend she has contracted a new or separate

disease. Accordingly, the “two-disease” rule does not apply to

her claim.

48

were parties in both actions. The fact that there are additional

parties in Sheridan II does not affect our conclusion. See

Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 119 (3d Cir. 1988) (“The

essence of the cause of action . . . is not altered by the addition

of more parties.”).

Third, the medical monitoring claim in Sheridan II is

based on the same cause of action asserted in Sheridan I. We

take a “broad view” of what constitutes the same cause of

action. Churchill, 183 F.3d at 194; Athlone, 746 F.2d at 984;

see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1) (“[A] claim

extinguished [by the doctrine of claim preclusion] includes all

rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with

respect to all or any part of the transaction . . . out of which the

action arose.”). “Rather than resting on the specific legal theory

invoked, res judicata generally is thought to turn on the essential

similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various

legal claims . . . .” Athlone, 746 F.2d at 983–84 (quoting Davis

v. U.S. Steel Supply, 688 F.2d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc))

(emphasis in Athlone omitted). Multiple factors guide our

analysis under the essential similarity test: “(1) whether the acts

complained of and the demand for relief are the same . . . ; (2)

whether the theory of recovery is the same; (3) whether the

witnesses and documents necessary at trial are the same . . . ;

and (4) whether the material facts alleged are the same.” Id. at

984 (internal citations omitted). It is not dispositive that a

plaintiff asserts a different theory of recovery or seeks different

relief in the two actions. Id.

49

Here, although the Athlone factors point in both

directions, the factual assertions are indistinguishable. Sheridan

correctly notes that the demand for relief is different in each

case. In Sheridan I, she alleged the beryllium emissions actually

caused her to develop CBD and sought compensatory and

punitive damages. In contrast, she contends in Sheridan II that

the beryllium exposure merely increased her risk of contracting

CBD and seeks medical monitoring instead of damages. She

would have had to produce medical testimony in Sheridan I to

prove the beryllium exposure was responsible for causing CBD,

while in Sheridan II she needs to produce testimony showing

only that she was at an increased risk of contracting the disease.

But this does not change the fact that the underlying assertions

giving rise to each claim were the same. The beryllium

emissions from the Reading Plant and the allegation that Cabot

is responsible for these omissions have not changed between

Sheridan I and II.

Sheridan’s attempts to circumvent the identical nature of

the events giving rise to the causes of action are unavailing.

First, she references the fact that additional parties and claims

are involved in Sheridan II. But as previously mentioned, other

parties asserting new claims in the first or second action do not

affect a claim preclusion analysis with respect to the parties

involved in both proceedings. Second, Sheridan contends that

members of the proposed class who are at risk of developing

CBD cannot have their medical monitoring claims barred. This

is true as applied to any individual who has not already litigated

50

the same cause of action. Only Sheridan is barred from bringing

a medical monitoring claim. Third, Sheridan seems to argue that

because she was already “injured,” it was not possible for her to

bring a claim to merely monitor her “already-existing injuries”

in Sheridan I. Only after the Sheridan I court held that she had

not suffered a compensable injury did she think she had a

medical monitoring claim. But Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) permits a

party to join “independent or alternative claims.” Sheridan

cannot dispute that she could have asserted a medical

monitoring claim as an alternative to her negligence and strict

liability claims. Cf. Simmons, 674 A.2d at 240 (“Although we

hold that awarding damages for the increased risk and fear of

cancer is contrary to the established jurisprudence of this

Commonwealth, we find that recovery for medical monitoring

is appropriate and just.”).

Barring Sheridan’s medical monitoring claim against

Cabot is consistent with the purpose of claim preclusion, namely

finality and avoidance of piecemeal litigation. Because the

underlying assertions in each action are the same, and because

Sheridan could have brought a medical monitoring claim in

Sheridan I, the District Court properly granted Cabot’s motion

for judgment on the pleadings.

V.

We now turn to whether the District Court correctly

granted Spotts, Stevens & McCoy’s motion to dismiss based on

Zimmerman’s and Sheridan’s failure to plead facts that give rise

51

to a medical monitoring claim.27 Under Redland Soccer, a

plaintiff must prove negligence, among other elements, in order

to prevail on a common law medical monitoring claim.28 696

A.2d at 145. Plaintiffs argue that Spotts, Stevens & McCoy’s

alleged negligence in analyzing and monitoring beryllium levels

at the Reading Plant rendered it liable under § 324A of the

Restatement (Second) of Torts. This provision, which governs

27

We exercise plenary review over district court orders

dismissing claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Reviewing

such an order, we accept as true all allegations in the plaintiff’s

complaint as well as all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

from them, and we construe them in a light most favorable to the

non-movant.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir.

2008). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --

- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556).

28

Even if plaintiffs were able to establish a prima facie case

for negligence, they would still need to prove the other elements

in Redland Soccer, particularly the “significantly increased risk”

element, discussed supra.

52

liability to a third party for negligent performance of an

undertaking, states:

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for

consideration, to render services to another which

he should recognize as necessary for the

protection of a third person or his things, is

subject to liability to the third person for physical

harm resulting from his failure to exercise

reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if

(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care

increases the risk of such harm, or

(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty

owed by the other to the third person, or

(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance

of the other or the third person upon the

undertaking.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965). Pennsylvania

has adopted § 324A. See Cantwell v. Allegheny County, 483

A.2d 1350, 1353 (Pa. 1984).

For liability to be imposed under § 324A, “the defendant

specifically [must have] undertaken to perform the task that [it]

is charged with having performed negligently.” Patentas v.

United States, 687 F.2d 707, 716 (3d Cir. 1982). In other words,

the defendant must have assumed an affirmative duty to be

liable to third parties for negligently performing that duty. See

Evans v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 398 F.2d 665, 667 (3d Cir. 1968)

53

(“It is well-settled under Pennsylvania law . . . that plaintiff must

prove, inter alia, the existence of a duty owed to him and a

breach thereof . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The scope of this rule, known as the “good samaritan

doctrine,” is measured by the scope of the defendant’s

undertaking. Patentas, 687 F.2d at 716. Even if a particular

injury is foreseeable, see Cantwell, 483 A.2d at 1353–54 (stating

that § 324A “is essentially a requirement of foreseeability”), a

defendant must still have a specific duty to prevent the injury,

see Breiner v. C&P Home Builders, Inc., 536 F.2d 27, 31 (3d

Cir. 1976) (“Foreseeability of injury, however, in the absence of

a duty to prevent that injury, is an insufficient basis on which to

rest liability.” (citing Evans, 398 F.2d at 667)). In addition to

proving the defendant owed a duty to exercise reasonable care,

the plaintiff must also show that one of the three causation

requirements in § 324A has been met. See Patentas, 687 F.2d

at 716 (“Section 324A specifies three circumstances in which

the injury may be proximately caused by the negligent

performance of an undertaking.”).

Boiled down to its core, plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint

contends that Spotts, Stevens & McCoy breached its duty of

reasonable care by failing to warn members of the community

surrounding the Reading Plant of the beryllium emissions from

the facility. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63–64. But the Amended

Complaint also states that “Spotts, Stevens & McCoy was paid

by the Reading Plant operators, defendants herein, to test,

sample, analyze, and monitor . . . the levels of beryllium . . . .

54

[and] Spotts, Stevens & McCoy was responsible for advising

defendants herein . . . .” Id. ¶ 58. Accordingly, for Spotts,

Stevens & McCoy to be liable under § 324A, plaintiffs must

prove this specific duty was performed negligently. If plaintiffs

had asserted that Spotts, Stevens & McCoy negligently

performed the tasks it actually undertook—that is, testing,

analyzing, and monitoring the levels of beryllium, and reporting

those tests to the owner and operator of the facility—then the

assertions would sufficiently establish a claim under § 324A.

But plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint makes no such allegations.

In order for Spotts, Stevens & McCoy to have negligently failed

to warn plaintiffs of harmful beryllium exposures, it must have

undertaken the responsibility of making that warning.

Plaintiffs’ reference to Farabaugh v. Pennsylvania

Turnpike Commission, 911 A.2d 1264, 1277 (Pa. 2006), where

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that there is a “social

duty” on parties “to perform their contractual obligations so as

not to injure third parties,” is inapposite. In Farabaugh, the

plaintiff alleged the defendant had failed to exercise reasonable

care in performing the services owed under its contract. Id.

Here, however, plaintiffs do not allege Spotts, Stevens &

McCoy negligently performed its contractual duties.

The flaw in the Amended Complaint is its failure to

match an allegation of a specific duty owed to plaintiffs with an

allegation of negligent performance of that duty. By failing to

make this connection, plaintiffs cannot succeed in establishing

55

liability under § 324A.29 Accordingly, the District Court

properly granted Spotts, Stevens & McCoy’s motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

VI.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District

Court’s judgments on appeal in both the Anthony and

Zimmerman actions.

29

Because plaintiffs have not identified a duty that Spotts,

Stevens & McCoy owed them, we need not determine the

subsequent question of whether they have proven proximate

cause under § 324A.

56

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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