Opinion

Retz v. Samson (In Re Retz)

  • 606 F.3d 1189
  • 50 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 763
  • 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11357
  • 2010 WL 2220063
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Jun 4, 2010
Status
Published
Author
Tallman
On the bench
Paez, Tallman, Smith
Cited by
496 cases
Authority
More cited than 98.7%

stating that "[a] debtor's intent need not be fraudulent to meet the requirements of § 727(a)(2)(A) [,]" and that, "[b]ecause the language of the statute is in the disjunctive it is sufficient if the debtor's intent is to hinder or delay a creditor."

How later courts described this case

  • stating that "[a] debtor's intent need not be fraudulent to meet the requirements of § 727(a)(2)(A) [,]" and that, "[b]ecause the language of the statute is in the disjunctive it is sufficient if the debtor's intent is to hinder or delay a creditor."
  • reciting the required elements of claim of false oath under section 727(a)(4)(A); Khalil v. Developers Sur. & Indent. Co. (In re Khalil), 379 B.R. 163, 176 (9th Cir. BAP 2007) (“[T]he size or nature of a single [misstatement or omission] might suffice to support a finding that a debtor knowingly and fraudulently made a false oath or account.”)
  • setting forth elements of a denial of discharge under § 727(a)(2)(B), giving great deference to bankruptcy court’s determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, and noting that debtor’s chance for a fresh start is conditioned on full and truthful disclosure
  • explaining that, “[w]hen factual findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, we give great deference to the bankruptcy court’s findings”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: BRENDON KEITH RETZ, 

Debtor,

BRENDON KEITH RETZ, No. 08-60023

Appellant, BAP No.

v. MT-07-1443-DJuPa

RICHARD J. SAMSON, Chapter 7  Bk. No.

04-60302-7-RBK

Trustee; DONALD G. ABBEY; Adv. No.

THOMAS TORNOW; AMERICAN 05-00018

EXPRESS CENTURION BANK;

WHITEFISH CREDIT UNION; GLACIER OPINION

BANK OF WHITEFISH; UNITED STATES

TRUSTEE/GREAT FALLS,

Appellees.

Appeal from the Ninth Circuit

Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

Pappas, Dunn, and Jury, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 3, 2010—Portland, Oregon

Filed June 4, 2010

Before: Richard A. Paez, Richard C. Tallman, and

Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tallman

8055

IN RE RETZ 8059

COUNSEL

Ward E. Taleff (argued), Taleff Law Offices, P.C., Great

Falls, Montana; Harold Dye, Dye & Moe, PLLP, Missoula,

Montana, for debtor-appellant Brendon Keith Retz.

8060 IN RE RETZ

Michael G. Black (argued), Black Law Office, Missoula,

Montana; Edward A. Murphy, Murphy Law Offices, PLLC,

Missoula, Montana, for appellee Donald G. Abbey.

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

Debtor-Appellant Brendon Keith Retz (“Retz”) filed for

Chapter 7 bankruptcy on February 12, 2004. On March 8,

2005, Bankruptcy Trustee Richard J. Samson (“Trustee”) and

Retz’s former business partner Donald G. Abbey (“Abbey”),

along with several banks, filed this adversary proceeding in

bankruptcy court seeking to stop Retz’s discharge. After a

five-day trial, the bankruptcy court found for the plaintiffs and

denied Retz’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(A),

(a)(2)(B), (a)(4)(A), and (a)(5). Retz then appealed to the

Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”), which

affirmed on all four grounds, any of which would have been

sufficient to deny the discharge.

Retz now appeals, arguing that the bankruptcy court and

BAP erred in denying him a general discharge because: (1)

there is insufficient evidence of his intent to hinder, delay, or

defraud his creditors because he relied in good faith on the

advice of counsel in his actions during the bankruptcy pro-

ceeding; (2) any missing documents were easily obtainable by

the Trustee; (3) one of the improper transfers did not involve

an asset of the debtor; and (4) Retz’s failure to file his tax

returns was not his fault. We affirm the bankruptcy court’s

denial of Retz’s discharge.

I

Retz formed Timberland Construction, Inc. (“TCI”) in

1994 soon after graduating from college with a degree in busi-

IN RE RETZ 8061

ness management. He was the sole shareholder of TCI, which

performed development and construction work in the White-

fish, Montana, area. For the first few years of operations Retz

kept the books for TCI and became proficient with the busi-

ness’s accounting software, Master Builder.

Abbey has been a successful California real estate investor

for over thirty-five years. He has taken part in approximately

10,000 real estate transactions and has interests in over sixty

companies. In 2001, Abbey decided to build a multi-million

dollar residence in Montana (the “Shelter Island Project”).1 In

order to maintain control of the construction process and save

money on the project, Abbey decided to form a new construc-

tion and development company with Retz.

In early 2001, Retz and TCI entered into an oral agreement

with Abbey to form Timberland Construction, LLC

(“TCLLC”). TCLLC began operations in 2001. The TCLLC

Operating Agreement, which had an effective date of July 1,

2001, was finalized and executed in March 2002 after exten-

sive negotiations. Abbey and TCI were the governing mem-

bers of TCLLC. The Operating Agreement provided that

Abbey would contribute $300,000 to TCLLC, while TCI

would contribute all its assets and liabilities. Abbey provided

the first $100,000 in approximately March 2001 and provided

the remaining $200,000 upon the execution of the Operating

Agreement in 2002.

Abbey testified that he would not have provided the final

$200,000, and in fact would have demanded the return of the

original $100,000, if the Operating Agreement had not been

signed. In contrast, Retz testified that Abbey told him the

Operating Agreement was “only for the file,” and that they

did not actually have to operate within its parameters.2 Abbey

1

Shelter Island is located in Flathead Lake, approximately forty miles

south of Whitefish, Montana.

2

Retz admitted later that he thought the Operating Agreement was

enforceable at least to the extent of the tax consequences of the transac-

tion.

8062 IN RE RETZ

insists that he never told Retz that he did not have to abide by

the terms of the Operating Agreement.

In May 2003, Abbey ran into Retz on the “comp” floor of

the Bellagio Resort & Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada. Abbey

testified that he was shocked that someone who earned only

$40,000 a year had been given a complimentary room at the

Bellagio, and became suspicious about Retz’s behavior. He

traveled to Montana in July 2003 and spoke with representa-

tives at several local banks about Retz and TCLLC. Abbey

discovered that TCLLC had entered into partnerships and loan

agreements in violation of the Operating Agreement, which

required Abbey’s written permission.

In August 2003, Abbey brought William Matteson, an

accountant with whom Abbey had worked in California, to

Montana for the purpose of assessing TCLLC’s financial con-

dition and operations, ensuring Retz’s compliance with the

Operating Agreement, verifying that TCI had made the

required contributions to TCLLC, and investigating a draft

audit report prepared by Deloitte & Touche regarding poten-

tial overcharges on the Shelter Island Project. Matteson found

numerous accounting irregularities in the TCLLC books and

suspicious transfers between Retz and TCLLC. Retz testified

that the transfers were short term loans that he made to

TCLLC so that the company could meet its payroll obliga-

tions, followed by repayment of the loans. However, the loans

and repayments were not clearly identified in the accounting

system, and Matteson could not confirm that the amounts in

and out of the business account matched. Due to Matteson’s

discoveries, Abbey began withdrawing financial support from

TCLLC and shutting down the Shelter Island Project.

Soon thereafter, Retz learned that Abbey was planning to

file litigation against him and decided to preemptively file a

lawsuit against Abbey in state court. Abbey countersued Retz

and his brother Ryan.3 The state court appointed a receiver for

3

Several members of the Retz family are involved in the events underly-

ing this adversary proceeding. We refer to them by their first names to

avoid confusion with the Debtor-Appellant Brendon Retz.

IN RE RETZ 8063

TCLLC, effective September 3, 2003. The state court litiga-

tion was stayed when Retz filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bank-

ruptcy petition on February 12, 2004.

Following the filing of his bankruptcy petition, Retz filed

what purported to be the required financial Schedules and

Statement of Financial Affairs (“SOFA”). Retz acknowledged

at trial that the Schedules and SOFA he filed were incom-

plete, but explained that he intended to amend them at some

point, when he obtained additional information about his

debts and assets. He attended the first Meeting of Creditors

mandated by 11 U.S.C. § 341 (“§ 341 Creditors’ Meeting”)

on March 19, 2004, and answered questions posed by the

Trustee and the attending creditors. The second § 341 Credi-

tors’ Meeting took place on July 8, 2004. Retz again attended

and answered some questions posed by the Trustee and other

creditors.

On March 8, 2005, the Trustee and Abbey filed an adver-

sary proceeding in bankruptcy court seeking denial of Retz’s

discharge pursuant to various subsections of 11 U.S.C. §§ 523

and 727. The bankruptcy court held a five-day trial, April 10

and 11, and June 1, 4, and 5, 2007. Many witnesses testified,

including Retz, Abbey, the Trustee, Ryan, David Schultz (the

Retz family accountant), Matteson, and Retz’s bankruptcy

attorneys Bruce Measure and Harold Dye. At the time of trial,

nearly three years after Retz filed his bankruptcy petition,

Retz still had not filed amendments to either the Schedules or

the SOFA.4

In its written memorandum of decision the bankruptcy

court found, “after observing [Retz’s] demeanor while testify-

ing under oath and cross examination, and examination of the

4

Retz finally amended the Schedules and SOFA on August 7, 2007,

after the end of the bankruptcy court trial. The amended Schedules and

SOFA are, therefore, not part of the trial record in the adversary proceed-

ing.

8064 IN RE RETZ

transcripts of the state court hearing . . . that [Retz] is not a

credible witness.” The court then denied Retz’s discharge on

four independent grounds: (1) Retz “knowingly and fraudu-

lently, in or in connection with the case[,] made a false oath

or account” on his Schedules and SOFA by failing to disclose

income, assets, and transfers in violation of § 727(a)(4)(A);

(2) Retz sold a house allegedly belonging to TCLLC to his

brother Ryan for $60,000 under market value within one year

before filing for bankruptcy, with the intent to hinder, delay,

or defraud a creditor in violation of § 727(a)(2)(A); (3) Retz

participated in the transfer, after the date of the filing of the

bankruptcy petition, of North Forty Resort Corp. (“NFRC”)

assets to North Forty Resort, LLC, which greatly reduced the

value of the bankruptcy estate’s 6% ownership of the Corpo-

ration, with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor

in violation of § 727(a)(2)(B); and (4) Retz “failed to explain

satisfactorily . . . any loss of assets or deficiency of assets to

meet [his] liabilities” in violation of § 727(a)(5).5 The BAP

affirmed on all four grounds. Retz timely appealed. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), and we affirm.

II

We review decisions of the BAP de novo and apply the

standard of review applied by the BAP to the bankruptcy

court’s decision. Boyajian v. New Falls Corp. (In re Boya-

jian), 564 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). The BAP

reviewed the bankruptcy court decision in this case using the

following standards:

5

These statutory bases for denial correspond with the adversary pro-

ceeding’s second amended complaint: Count 9 (false oaths), Count 13

(transfer of assets before filing), Count 14 (transfer of assets after filing),

and Count 11 (failure to explain). The remaining counts under § 727 were

dismissed. Counts 1 through 8 were brought under § 523; however, the

bankruptcy court found it unnecessary to reach those counts because it

denied Retz’s discharge under § 727. Only § 727 is at issue in this appeal.

IN RE RETZ 8065

(1) the [bankruptcy] court’s determinations of the

historical facts are reviewed for clear error; (2) the

selection of the applicable legal rules under § 727 is

reviewed de novo; and (3) the application of the

facts to those rules requiring the exercise of judg-

ments about values animating the rules is reviewed

de novo.

Searles v. Riley (In re Searles), 317 B.R. 368, 373 (B.A.P. 9th

Cir. 2004) (relying upon Murray v. Bammer (In re Bammer),

131 F.3d 788, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)). A court’s

factual determination is clearly erroneous if it is illogical,

implausible, or without support in the record. United States v.

Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261-62 & n.21 (9th Cir. 2009) (en

banc) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S.

564, 577 (1985)) (explaining that the clearly erroneous stan-

dard of review is an element of the clarified abuse of discre-

tion standard).

Those objecting to discharge “bear[ ] the burden of proving

by a preponderance of the evidence that [the debtor’s] dis-

charge should be denied.” Khalil v. Developers Sur. & Indem.

Co. (In re Khalil), 379 B.R. 163, 172 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007),

aff’d, 578 F.3d 1167, 1168 (9th Cir. 2009) (expressly adopt-

ing the BAP’s statement of applicable law). “In keeping with

the ‘fresh start’ purposes behind the Bankruptcy Code, courts

should construe § 727 liberally in favor of debtors and strictly

against parties objecting to discharge.” Bernard v. Sheaffer

(In re Bernard), 96 F.3d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). This

does not alter the burden on the objector, but rather means

that “actual, rather than constructive, intent is required” on the

part of the debtor. In re Khalil, 379 B.R. at 172. When factual

findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility

of witnesses, we give great deference to the bankruptcy

court’s findings, because the bankruptcy court, as the trier of

fact, had the opportunity to note “variations in demeanor and

tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understand-

ing of and belief in what is said.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575.

8066 IN RE RETZ

III

A

[1] Section 727(a)(4)(A) states: “The court shall grant the

debtor a discharge, unless . . . the debtor knowingly and

fraudulently, in or in connection with the case[,] made a false

oath or account.” 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A). “A false state-

ment or an omission in the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules or

statement of financial affairs can constitute a false oath.” In

re Khalil, 379 B.R. at 172. “The fundamental purpose of

§ 727(a)(4)(A) is to insure that the trustee and creditors have

accurate information without having to conduct costly investi-

gations.”6 Id. (quoting Fogal Legware of Switz., Inc. v. Wills

(In re Wills), 243 B.R. 58, 63 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999)).

To prevail on this claim, a plaintiff must show, by a pre-

ponderance of the evidence, that: “(1) the debtor made a false

oath in connection with the case; (2) the oath related to a

material fact; (3) the oath was made knowingly; and (4) the

oath was made fraudulently.” Roberts v. Erhard (In re Rob-

erts), 331 B.R. 876, 882 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (citing In re

Wills, 243 B.R. at 62). A finding of fraudulent intent is a find-

ing of fact reviewed for clear error. First Beverly Bank v.

Adeeb (In re Adeeb), 787 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th Cir. 1986).

1

[2] The first element that must be proven to deny discharge

under § 727(a)(4)(A) is the existence of a false oath in con-

nection with the bankruptcy case. In re Roberts, 331 B.R. at

6

We note that this purpose is alone sufficient to rebut Retz’s argument

on appeal that the Trustee could have obtained the missing documents and

tracked the missing funds on his own. Retz essentially dumped 28,000

pages of largely unorganized documents on the Trustee after repeated

requests to explain his convoluted financial affairs. The Trustee should not

have to conduct his own costly and ultimately fruitless investigation with-

out the debtor’s help.

IN RE RETZ 8067

882; see also 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A). The bankruptcy court

found numerous errors and omissions in Retz’s Schedules and

SOFA, which can qualify as false oaths under § 727(a)(4)(A).

See In re Khalil, 379 B.R. at 172. The parties are familiar with

the facts of the case and both the lengthy bankruptcy court

opinion and the BAP opinion contain more complete discus-

sions of the false oaths in the Schedules and SOFA. We dis-

cuss only some of the more significant errors and omissions

here.

[3] There is no real dispute in this case that at the time

Retz signed his incomplete Schedules and SOFA declaring,

under penalty of perjury, that they were true and correct, he

well knew that they were not true and correct. Retz admitted

that he knew the Schedules and SOFA were incomplete when

they were signed and filed, as did his attorney. Further, he did

not even read the Schedules and SOFA before signing them.

Retz omitted from his Schedules valuable watches, a bank

account, a 1984 Cadillac, a 2002 Audi purchased through

TCI, and the sale of a helicopter and hangar. He also failed

to list any income from 2003 or the beginning of 2004. Retz

argues on appeal that he was unable to establish his income

for 2003 and 2004 because TCLLC had yet to complete its tax

returns for those years. As this issue is not dispositive, we

have not considered the missing income information in our

decision.

Retz conceded at trial that, three years later, he still had not

made a complete response to the Trustee with respect to

SOFA Question 3a, payments to creditors, Question 3b, pay-

ments to insiders, and Question 10, other transfers. Informa-

tion that should have been listed in response to Question 3a

includes the disclosure of Retz’s prepayment of his home

mortgage with the proceeds from the sale of his helicopter and

hangar just before he petitioned for bankruptcy. In response

to Question 3b, Retz should have listed at least two pre-

petition transactions involving his father, Robert Retz: a

8068 IN RE RETZ

check to Robert dated March 17, 2003, for $38,287.30; and a

check to Robert dated September 23, 2003, in the amount of

$12,181.00.

There were also a series of transfers in September 2003

from Retz’s credit cards to NFRC, a corporation owned and

operated by the Retz family, totaling approximately $160,000.

Retz later took this money from the NFRC account for his

personal and business use, was advised by counsel that such

an action was likely in violation of the credit card companies’

merchant agreements, and paid the money back with the help

of his father, who loaned him $80,000 to make up the amount

that Retz had apparently already spent. Retz was unable to

explain where the missing $80,000 went. He testified that he

may have written a $30,000 check to himself, and that he

“might have cashed it, or something.” He also speculated that

some of the money went into TCI for payroll and business

expenses, while some of it likely went to his and his wife

Misty’s monthly expenses, which were high. The Trustee tes-

tified that to the extent these transfers might have been prefer-

ential, the failure to timely disclose them permitted the statute

of limitation to run on the Trustee’s ability to attempt to avoid

those actions.

[4] As to Question 10, numerous contributions Retz made

to, and distributions he received from, TCI and TCLLC were

not listed. As discussed above, it was impossible to determine

whether the amounts Retz had received from TCI and TCLLC

matched the amounts he had provided to the companies. This

evidence is sufficient to support the bankruptcy court’s find-

ing that Retz made false oaths on his Schedules and SOFA.

2

[5] Section 727(a)(4)(A) requires that the relevant false

oath relate to a material fact. In re Roberts, 331 B.R. at 882;

see also 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A). “A fact is material ‘if it

bears a relationship to the debtor’s business transactions or

IN RE RETZ 8069

estate, or concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings,

or the existence and disposition of the debtor’s property.’ ” In

re Khalil, 379 B.R. at 173 (quoting In re Wills, 243 B.R. at

62). An omission or misstatement that “detrimentally affects

administration of the estate” is material. In re Wills, 243 B.R.

at 63 (citing 6 Lawrence P. King et al., Collier on Bankruptcy

¶ 727.04[1][b] (15th ed. rev. 1998)).

[6] Retz’s errors and omissions in his Schedules and SOFA

related to his assets, property, and business dealings. Further,

the Trustee testified that Retz’s incomplete and erroneous

Schedules and SOFA interfered with administration of the

estate, making it almost impossible to reconstruct his financial

affairs. The bankruptcy court correctly concluded that Retz’s

false oaths related to material facts.

3

[7] The third element required by § 727(a)(4)(A) is that the

debtor act knowingly in making the false oath. In re Roberts,

331 B.R. at 882; see also 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A). “A debtor

‘acts knowingly if he or she acts deliberately and conscious-

ly.’ ” In re Khalil, 379 B.R. at 173 (quoting In re Roberts, 331

B.R. at 883). Retz deliberately and consciously signed the

Schedules and SOFA knowing that they were incomplete.

Furthermore, he admitted at trial that even if all the informa-

tion from his worksheets had been included in the Schedules

and SOFA they still would have been incomplete.7 This is suf-

ficient to support the bankruptcy court’s finding that Retz

acted knowingly.

4

Finally, the bankruptcy court found that Retz’s fraudulent

7

Retz’s attorney acknowledged that some items that were listed in

Retz’s worksheets did not make it to the Schedules and SOFA through

clerical error.

8070 IN RE RETZ

intent, establishing the fourth element of a § 727(a)(4)(A) vio-

lation, was shown “by a pattern of falsity, his reckless indif-

ference to and disregard of the truth, and demonstrated by his

course of conduct.” Retz challenges this finding, arguing that

he did not intend to defraud his creditors and that his good

faith reliance on the advice of his counsel demonstrates his

lack of fraudulent intent.

[8] To demonstrate fraudulent intent, Abbey and the

Trustee bore the burden of showing that: “(1) [Retz] made the

representations [e.g., a false statement or omission in bank-

ruptcy schedules]; (2) . . . at the time he knew they were false;

[and] (3) . . . he made them with the intention and purpose of

deceiving the creditors.” In re Khalil, 379 B.R. at 173 (quot-

ing In re Roberts, 331 B.R. at 884) (second and third alter-

ations in original). Intent is usually proven by circumstantial

evidence or by inferences drawn from the debtor’s conduct.

Devers v. Bank of Sheridan, Mont. (In re Devers), 759 F.2d

751, 753-54 (9th Cir. 1985); see also In re Roberts, 331 B.R.

at 884. Reckless indifference or disregard for the truth may be

circumstantial evidence of intent, but is not sufficient, alone,

to constitute fraudulent intent. In re Khalil, 379 B.R. at

173-75.

[9] “Generally, a debtor who acts in reliance on the advice

of his attorney lacks the intent required to deny him a dis-

charge of his debts.” In re Adeeb, 787 F.2d at 1343. “How-

ever, the debtor’s reliance must be in good faith.” Id. The

advice of counsel is not a defense when the erroneous infor-

mation should have been evident to the debtor. Boroff v. Tully

(In re Tully), 818 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1987). “A debtor

cannot, merely by playing ostrich and burying his head deeply

enough in the sand, disclaim all responsibility for statements

which he has made under oath.” Id.

[10] Retz argues that he was unaware of many of the errors

and omissions in his Schedules and SOFA because he signed

the forms in blank and relied upon his attorney to fill in the

IN RE RETZ 8071

correct information. Retz cannot escape the bankruptcy

court’s finding of fraudulent intent by his reliance on the

advice of his counsel. First, Retz’s attorney, Harold Dye, tes-

tified that he did not advise Retz to sign the Schedules and

SOFA without reading them. Retz’s argument highlights the

reason that the debtor is required to attest that he has read the

Schedules and SOFA: to ensure to the greatest extent possible

that the information turned over to the bankruptcy court is

accurate. See In re Searles, 317 B.R. at 378 (“The continuing

nature of the duty to assure accurate schedules of assets is

fundamental because the viability of the system of voluntary

bankruptcy depends upon full, candid, and complete disclo-

sure by debtors of their financial affairs.”).

[11] More importantly, the bankruptcy court explicitly

found that Retz did not rely on Dye’s advice in good faith.

This finding is not clearly erroneous. The court properly noted

that the significant number of falsehoods and omissions,

together with the failure to amend the Schedules and SOFA

in the three years between the petition and trial, can constitute

reckless indifference to the truth, which is evidence of fraudu-

lent intent. See In re Khalil, 379 B.R. at 173-75; see also Mar-

tin Marietta Materials Sw., Inc. v. Lee (In re Lee), 309 B.R.

468, 477 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2004). The fact that Retz signed

the forms in blank reflects this same reckless indifference to

the truth, which adds to the circumstantial evidence of fraudu-

lent intent. See Kavanagh v. Leija (In re Leija), 270 B.R. 497,

504 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that signing of forms in

blank was “at best, recklessly indifferent”). Considering the

significant number of omissions and errors, the large mone-

tary value of many of the omitted transfers, and the fact that

Retz signed the Schedules and SOFA without reading them,

the bankruptcy court’s finding that Retz had the requisite

fraudulent intent was not illogical, implausible, or without

support in the record. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 577.

[12] The bankruptcy court correctly held that Retz made

many false oaths on his Schedules and SOFA, that the false

8072 IN RE RETZ

oaths related to material facts, and that they were made know-

ingly and fraudulently. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4)(A); see also

In re Roberts, 331 B.R. at 882. We, therefore, affirm the

bankruptcy court’s denial of Retz’s discharge pursuant to

§ 727(a)(4)(A).

B

[13] The bankruptcy court also denied Retz’s discharge

under both subsections of § 727(a)(2). That section states:

The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless

. . . the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or

defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged

with custody of property under this title, has trans-

ferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed,

or has permitted to be transferred, removed,

destroyed, mutilated, or concealed[,] (A) property of

the debtor, within one year before the date of the fil-

ing of the petition; or (B) property of the estate, after

the date of the filing of the petition.

11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2). A party seeking denial of discharge

under § 727(a)(2) must prove two things: “(1) a disposition of

property, such as transfer or concealment, and (2) a subjective

intent on the debtor’s part to hinder, delay or defraud a credi-

tor through the act [of] disposing of the property.” Hughes v.

Lawson (In re Lawson), 122 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 1997).

A debtor’s intent need not be fraudulent to meet the

requirements of § 727(a)(2). Because the language of the stat-

ute is in the disjunctive it is sufficient if the debtor’s intent is

to hinder or delay a creditor. In re Bernard, 96 F.3d at 1281.

Furthermore, “lack of injury to creditors is irrelevant for pur-

poses of denying a discharge in bankruptcy.” Id. at 1281-82

(quoting In re Adeeb, 787 F.2d at 1343).

IN RE RETZ 8073

In examining the circumstances of a transfer under

§ 727(a)(2), certain “badges of fraud” may support a finding

of fraudulent intent.

These factors, not all of which need be present,

include (1) a close relationship between the trans-

feror and the transferee; (2) that the transfer was in

anticipation of a pending suit; (3) that the transferor

Debtor was insolvent or in poor financial condition

at the time; (4) that all or substantially all of the

Debtor’s property was transferred; (5) that the trans-

fer so completely depleted the Debtor’s assets that

the creditor has been hindered or delayed in recover-

ing any part of the judgment; and (6) that the Debtor

received inadequate consideration for the transfer.

Emmett Valley Assocs. v. Woodfield (In re Woodfield), 978

F.2d 516, 518 (9th Cir. 1992).

1

The bankruptcy court held that Retz’s sale of the house at

650 Woodside Lane, Whitefish, Montana, to his brother Ryan

constituted a transfer of property, within one year prior to the

filing of the bankruptcy petition, with an intent to hinder,

delay, or defraud creditors sufficient to deny discharge under

§ 727(a)(2)(A). Retz argues that he arranged the sale more

than a year before filing for bankruptcy and that he had no

intent to defraud his creditors.

The facts surrounding the transfer of 650 Woodside are rel-

atively complex and support the bankruptcy court’s finding

that Retz’s actions regarding TCLLC, his creditors, and his

properties evidenced Retz’s fraudulent intent. Lot 6 of the

Woodside subdivision, commonly referred to as 650 Wood-

side, was one of the properties that TCI should have contrib-

uted to TCLLC pursuant to Retz’s business arrangement with

Abbey and the TCLLC Operating Agreement. Retz testified

8074 IN RE RETZ

that although he did not transfer the deed from TCI to

TCLLC, the property was placed on TCLLC’s books in July

2001.

In the fall of 2001, once construction was finished on the

house, Retz and Misty moved into 650 Woodside. They did

not pay rent. Retz testified that he spoke with Abbey about

paying rent and Abbey allegedly told him not to worry about

it, stating: “Don’t be ridiculous. Just put a cup at the back

door and stick a quarter in it for your uncle Don every now

and then.” Abbey testified to the contrary that he told Retz

that the house should be sold for a profit and that if Retz

wanted to live in it, he should pay rent.

On July 3, 2002, TCI—not TCLLC, the purported owner of

the property—deeded 650 Woodside to Retz and Misty. Retz

explained that he exchanged 650 Woodside, at cost, for a

piece of property across the street that he owned personally,

665 Woodside. Later, Retz and Misty decided they wanted to

build a house at 665 Woodside so they purchased it back from

TCLLC at the same price for which it had been exchanged a

few months before. Retz testified that Abbey verbally con-

sented to the transfer of 650 Woodside. However, he con-

cedes that Abbey never consented in writing, as required by

the Operating Agreement. Abbey testified that he had no

knowledge of the transfer until long after it was complete.

The bankruptcy court found that Abbey did not tell Retz he

could live at 650 Woodside without paying rent and that

Abbey had not consented to the transfer of 650 Woodside

from TCLLC to Retz. In rejecting Retz’s version of the facts,

the bankruptcy court observed that the “testimony by [Retz]

regarding Abbey’s nonchalance about his business affairs is

fantastic, and wholly inconsistent with the evidence of

Abbey’s business practices in dozens of companies.” The

bankruptcy court also noted that Retz’s testimony that the two

men had a verbal agreement not to abide by the Operating

IN RE RETZ 8075

Agreement was in direct contradiction to the Agreement’s

integration clause.8

In May 2002, Retz invited his brother Ryan to move back

to Whitefish from Boise, Idaho, to work for TCLLC. As an

inducement for Ryan to accept the job, Retz promised to sell

him 650 Woodside for a good price. Ryan moved into 650

Woodside in July 2003. Retz ordered an appraisal so that

Ryan could secure financing; the appraised value as of July

25, 2003, was $220,000. Retz and Ryan then executed a buy-

sell agreement for 650 Woodside in November 2003, which

they backdated to July 20, 2003. The sale price was $160,000.

The bankruptcy court made several adverse findings of fact

relating to the sale of 650 Woodside. First, the court found

that the sale was within one year of Retz filing his petition for

bankruptcy, relying on the date of the buy-sell agreement,

rather than the date Retz told Ryan he could get him a good

deal on the house. Relying on the date of the buy-sell agree-

ment is rational and supported by the record, particularly

because the bankruptcy court found Retz’s testimony gener-

ally not credible. Second, the bankruptcy court held that the

sale was unquestionably a transfer within the meaning of

§ 727(a)(2). Retz does not appear to challenge this finding on

appeal. Third, the court described four badges of fraud present

in the transaction: that Retz (1) had a close relationship with

the transferee, Ryan; (2) sold the house during pending state

court litigation involving one of his most significant creditors,

Abbey; (3) was in poor financial condition at the time of the

sale; and (4) received inadequate consideration by selling the

house for $60,000 less than the appraised value. See In re

Woodfield, 978 F.2d at 518.

8

The integration clause reads: “This Agreement and the other written

agreements entered into concurrently herewith constitute the complete and

exclusive statement of agreement among the Members and Governing

Members with respect to the subject matter herein and therein and replace

and supercede all prior written and oral agreements or statements by and

among the Members and Governing Members or any of them.”

8076 IN RE RETZ

Retz’s reliance on attorney Dye’s advice that the sale was

legally proper is insufficient to vitiate the fraudulent intent

evidenced by these badges of fraud. Dye testified that Retz

told him the state court had authorized the sale to go forward,

but Retz failed to tell Dye that the state court did not know

that the sale was to Retz’s brother for $60,000 under market

value. Furthermore, although Dye was aware that Ryan was

purchasing 650 Woodside, he did not know that it had been

appraised at $60,000 over the sale price. Reliance on the

advice of counsel is not a viable defense to a claim of fraud

when the debtor has not made full disclosure of the relevant

facts to counsel. See Adell v. John Richards Homes Bldg. Co.

(In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co.), 439 F.3d 248, 260

(6th Cir. 2006) (“[A] client reasonably relies on an attorney’s

advice only when the client provides to the attorney all of the

pertinent facts in the client’s possession.”). The bankruptcy

court’s decision is also supported by Retz’s lack of candor

with the state court and with his own attorney regarding the

sale of 650 Woodside, which is further evidence of his fraud-

ulent intent.

[14] The bankruptcy court’s determination that the sale of

650 Woodside was a transfer within a year before filing for

bankruptcy, made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud

a creditor is not clearly erroneous. The record demonstrates

that Retz improperly purchased 650 Woodside from TCLLC

for cost, rather than selling it for profit to benefit the business.

He then sold it to his brother for $60,000 under market value

only a few months before he filed for bankruptcy. Retz failed

to inform the state court investigating the propriety of the

transfer of 650 Woodside that the arranged sale was to his

brother for well below market value. It is hard to believe that

an educated and experienced business owner like Retz would

have found this information irrelevant to the state court’s con-

cerns regarding TCLLC’s financial losses related to the

house. Retz also failed to tell his attorney that the sale was for

well below market value. This evidence supports a finding of

fraudulent intent in the transfer of 650 Woodside, and we

IN RE RETZ 8077

affirm the bankruptcy court’s denial of Retz’s discharge under

§ 727(a)(2)(A).

2

The bankruptcy court also denied Retz’s discharge under

§ 727(a)(2)(B) due to his participation in the transfer of

NFRC assets belonging to the bankruptcy estate, without

notice to the Trustee, with the intent to hinder, delay, and

defraud creditors.

The Retz family owned a bed and breakfast resort called

North Forty Resort, which was owned by NFRC. Retz’s par-

ents, Robert and JoEllen, owned 82% of NFRC, and Retz,

Ryan, and their brother Eric each owned 6%. Retz was a

director and vice president of NFRC from its inception in

1993. When they first opened the resort, Retz performed the

bookkeeping, maintained the ledger, wrote checks, paid bills,

and compiled financial statements and balance sheets for its

operation. Although he claimed that he later had no role in the

finances of the resort, Retz had access to NFRC’s bank

accounts in September 2003 when he removed cash from the

accounts for his personal use.

On July 6, 2004, the Trustee requested by letter that Retz

provide him with information regarding NFRC. Retz

responded more than three months later in a letter dated Octo-

ber 27, 2004, that the Trustee’s request was very broad and

that he would respond only to more specific questions the

Trustee might have about NFRC. In the interim, NFRC sold

all of its assets on September 17, 2004, to North Forty Resort,

LLC. Retz’s mother, JoEllen, is the sole member of North

Forty Resort, LLC. As a result of the transfer, NFRC now

holds as its only asset a promissory note in the amount of

$850,000, payable in thirty years with interest at 6%. The

Trustee learned of the transfer on September 20, 2004, even

though the estate held Retz’s 6% of NFRC, and should have

been consulted before the transfer.

8078 IN RE RETZ

Retz and several of his family members testified that the

purpose of the NFRC sale was to protect his father’s capital

loss carryover that would be lost on his father’s death.

Because Robert was suffering from terminal cancer, the time

for completing the transfer was necessarily short. However,

the Retzes did hire an accountant, David Schultz, to advise

them regarding the transfer. Schultz prepared a draft docu-

ment discussing the financial and tax goals of the Retz family

related to the transfer. At trial, he testified that Retz was

involved in the discussions regarding the memorandum. One

of the listed goals of the transfer was to: “Minimize exposure

to possible creditors of Brendon that survive the bankruptcy.”

The bankruptcy court acknowledged that the transfer of the

NFRC assets included a legitimate purpose, preserving Rob-

ert’s tax loss benefits. However, the court stated that Retz’s

6% interest in NFRC was unquestionably property of the

estate and the sale was a disposition of property.

Finally, the court found that Retz had the requisite intent to

hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors. Both Schultz and Eric

testified that Retz was involved in the discussions leading up

to Schultz’s memorandum, which listed as a goal of the trans-

fer minimizing NFRC’s exposure to Retz’s creditors. The

court found that this goal alone was sufficient to satisfy the

intent requirement.

The bankruptcy court also found that Retz’s delay in

responding to the Trustee’s questions regarding NFRC and his

evasiveness in giving the Trustee full information regarding

NFRC was evidence of fraudulent intent. The court found

three badges of fraud in the NFRC transaction: (1) Retz’s

close relationship with the transferee, an entity owned and

controlled by his mother; (2) the transfer occurred during the

pendency of Retz’s bankruptcy; and (3) Retz was insolvent at

the time of the transfer. See In re Woodfield, 978 F.2d at 518.

[15] Retz presents several arguments on appeal contesting

the bankruptcy court’s findings. First, Retz argues that he was

IN RE RETZ 8079

not involved in the transfer of the NFRC assets, which was

spearheaded by his father Robert. Second, he contends that it

was NFRC’s attorney, not Retz, who had a duty to inform the

Trustee, a minority shareholder, of the sale. Third, Retz states

that the Trustee lost no value after the transfer because NFRC

retained assets equal in value to those it transferred. Finally,

he argues that he no longer held an interest in NFRC at the

time of the transfer because the shares belonged to the estate.

This argument appears to relate to the requirement under

§ 727(a)(2) that the relevant property have been transferred.

However, as discussed more fully below, § 727(a)(2)(B) spe-

cifically governs transfers of property belonging to the estate.

[16] Retz’s effort to disclaim responsibility for the transfer

is unavailing. Two witnesses testified that Retz was involved

in planning the transfer with his father. Only Retz’s self-

serving testimony rebutted the adverse evidence presented at

trial. The bankruptcy court found his testimony not credible,

and we give great deference to the bankruptcy court’s deter-

minations regarding the credibility of witnesses. See Ander-

son, 470 U.S. at 575. The evidence, thus construed against

him, supports the bankruptcy court’s determination that Retz

was involved in the transfer.

[17] Regarding Retz’s responsibility to inform the Trustee

of the transfer of NFRC assets, it is true that NFRC’s attorney

likely had a duty to inform the Trustee, as a minority share-

holder, of the transfer. However, the Trustee had specifically

asked Retz for information regarding NFRC, which Retz

failed to provide in a timely fashion. As a debtor in bank-

ruptcy proceedings, Retz had a duty to share full information

with the Trustee, completely separate from any duty owed to

the Trustee as a minority shareholder. See generally Grogan

v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991) (stating that the

Bankruptcy Act “limits the opportunity for a completely

unencumbered new beginning to the honest but unfortunate

debtor” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re

Wills, 243 B.R. at 63 (“[T]he opportunity to obtain a fresh

8080 IN RE RETZ

start is . . . conditioned upon truthful disclosure.” (quoting

Aubrey v. Thomas (In re Aubrey), 111 B.R. 268, 274 (B.A.P.

9th Cir. 1990))). Further, Retz’s failure to inform the Trustee

of the transfer is circumstantial evidence of his intent to hin-

der, delay, or defraud creditors, because there is no other rea-

sonable explanation for Retz’s delay.

Retz’s argument that the Trustee lost no value as a result

of the transfer of NFRC’s stock is unrelated to whether there

was a transfer and whether Retz intended to hinder, delay, or

defraud the Trustee and his creditors by engaging in the trans-

fer. Furthermore, “lack of injury to creditors is irrelevant for

purposes of denying a discharge in bankruptcy.”9 In re Ber-

nard, 96 F.3d at 1281-82 (quoting In re Adeeb, 787 F.2d at

1343).

Finally, Retz’s statement that he no longer owned an inter-

est in NFRC and that the transfer, therefore, cannot be held

against him, is nonsensical. Section 727(a)(2)(B) allows a

court to deny discharge when a debtor “has permitted to be

transferred . . . property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2).

Thus, it makes no difference that the NFRC stock belonged

to the estate, rather than to Retz. Retz can be held responsible

for any transfer of that property that is accomplished in order

to hinder, delay, or defraud the Trustee or a creditor.10 See id.

9

The transfer likely did cause NFRC’s stock to lose value, because the

only property held by NFRC after the transfer was an unsecured promis-

sory note on which no principal payment was due for thirty years, and on

which interest was due, beginning at the end of the sixth year, “only as

Buyer’s net profits allow.”

10

A single sentence in Retz’s opening brief on appeal implies that the

transfer of NFRC’s assets to the North Forty Resort, LLC, was not a trans-

fer of property under Hansen v. Moore (In re Hansen), 368 B.R. 868

(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007). The only explication of this argument is that “Han-

sen did not hold a transfer of the assets of a corporation in which a debtor

is a minority shareholder is a transfer of the debtor’s property.” The fact

that Hansen dealt with a different factual scenario than the current case is

hardly support for an argument that there was no transfer of assets in this

IN RE RETZ 8081

[18] Considering all the evidence presented at trial regard-

ing the transfer of NFRC assets, the bankruptcy court’s find-

ing that Retz intended to hinder, delay, or defraud his

creditors by completing the transfer is not illogical, implausi-

ble, or without support in the record. See Anderson, 470 U.S.

at 577.

C

[19] The final ground upon which the bankruptcy court

rested its denial of Retz’s discharge is § 727(a)(5). Section

727(a)(5) states: “The court shall grant the debtor a discharge,

unless . . . the debtor has failed to explain satisfactorily,

before determination of denial of discharge under this para-

graph, any loss of assets or deficiency of assets to meet the

debtor’s liabilities.” 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5).

Under § 727(a)(5) an objecting party bears the initial

burden of proof and must demonstrate: (1) debtor at

one time, not too remote from the bankruptcy peti-

tion date, owned identifiable assets; (2) on the date

the bankruptcy petition was filed or order of relief

granted, the debtor no longer owned the assets; and

(3) the bankruptcy pleadings or statement of affairs

do not reflect an adequate explanation for the dispo-

sition of the assets.

Olympic Coast Invest., Inc. v. Wright (In re Wright), 364 B.R.

51, 79 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2007); see also In re Devers, 759

F.2d at 754 (concluding that debtors could be denied dis-

charge under § 727(a)(5) where they failed to offer a “satis-

case. In fact, the briefing itself describes the actions taken by NFRC as a

transfer of assets. We are satisfied, based on the facts found by the bank-

ruptcy court, that Retz was sufficiently involved in the transfer of the

NFRC assets for this transaction to qualify as a disposition of estate prop-

erty under § 727(a)(2).

8082 IN RE RETZ

factory explanation” for the “disappearance” of a tractor they

had owned that they did not produce for repossession). Once

the creditor has made a prima facie case, the debtor must offer

credible evidence regarding the disposition of the missing

assets. In re Devers, 759 F.2d at 754.

Whether a debtor has satisfactorily explained a loss of

assets is a question of fact for the bankruptcy court, over-

turned only for clear error. Hawley v. Cement Indus., Inc. (In

re Hawley), 51 F.3d 246, 248 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)

(citing Chalik v. Moorefield (In re Chalik), 748 F.2d 616, 619

(11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)). “A debtor’s failure to offer a

satisfactory explanation when called on by the court is a suffi-

cient ground for denial of discharge under [§] 727(a)(5).” In

re Devers, 759 F.2d at 754.

The inadequacy of Retz’s Schedules and SOFA is dis-

cussed above. In particular, large amounts of money were

transferred into and out of Retz’s personal bank accounts, and

he very rarely had any explanation for where the money went.

There is also evidence in the record that Retz went on a

spending spree just before filing for bankruptcy to benefit

both himself and TCI, purchasing computers, office furniture,

servers, luxury cars, a helicopter and hangar, and making

gambling trips where he lost thousands of dollars. The pur-

chases for TCI are particularly troubling, because Retz indi-

cated at the first § 341 Creditors’ Meeting that the company

was essentially inactive once his business relationship with

Abbey broke down. Furthermore, after describing the pur-

chases made on behalf of TCI at trial, Retz stated that he did

not know where excess loan proceeds and credit card funds

purportedly used to effect these purchases went.

Retz argues that he should not be penalized for the lack of

records because all the documents were in the hands of the

Receiver or Trustee, or were readily obtainable by them. Retz

is essentially contending that the Trustee is obligated to inves-

tigate complex financial transactions and unfinished books

IN RE RETZ 8083

without any help from the debtor. He also implies that he was

unable to obtain documents held by the Receiver and Trustee.

However, he had the right to compel production of any neces-

sary documents under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure

2004(c).

[20] Retz fails to explain how the Trustee should have

found the relevant information, if Retz himself was unable to

discover it in the 28,000-plus pages of records he provided to

the Trustee. “A petitioner cannot omit items from his sched-

ules, force the trustee and the creditors, at their peril, to guess

that he has done so—and hold them to a mythical requirement

that they search through a paperwork jungle in the hope of

finding an overlooked needle in a documentary haystack.” In

re Tully, 818 F.2d at 111. As the BAP so succinctly noted, “In

the end, there simply is no basis in the voluminous but never-

theless woefully incomplete record before the bankruptcy

court from which anyone could explain satisfactorily Retz’s

deficiency of assets to meet his liabilities. Retz certainly has

not done so.” The record amply supports the judgment entered

against Retz.

IV

The decision of the bankruptcy court and the BAP to deny

Retz’s discharge is AFFIRMED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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