Opinion

Moore v. United States

  • 555 U.S. 1
  • 129 S. Ct. 4
  • 172 L. Ed. 2d 1
  • 2008 U.S. LEXIS 7437
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Oct 14, 2008
Status
Published
On the bench
Per Curiam
Cited by
81 cases
Authority
More cited than 92.5%

explaining that the Eighth Circuit should have remanded when the district court stated that “Congress [is the one] that looks at the [Guidelines and decides whether or not they should be put ... in force ...” (second alteration in original internal quotation marks omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that the Eighth Circuit should have remanded when the district court stated that “Congress [is the one] that looks at the [Guidelines and decides whether or not they should be put ... in force ...” (second alteration in original internal quotation marks omitted)
  • explaining that a challenged instruction must be evaluated in the context of other 4 instructions and the trial record as a whole, not in artificial isolation (citations omitted)
  • on the case’s second trip to the Supreme Court, the Court held that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals should have remanded the case to the district court for resentencing under Kimbrough, infra, instead of reaffirming denial of a below-Guidelines sentence based on disparate treatment of similar amounts of crack and powder cocaine, because contrary to the appellate court’s characterization of the district court’s decision on remand, the district court clearly did not believe that it was authorized to consider such a reduction, but declined to do so
  • reversing decision based on finding that the district court did not recognize authority to vary downward based on crack/powder disparity in the Guidelines

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JAMES ERIC MOORE v. UNITED STATES

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 07–10689. Decided October 14, 2008

PER CURIAM.

James Eric Moore was convicted of one count of possess

ing cocaine base with intent to distribute, a violation of 21

U. S. C. §§841(a)(1) and (b)(1). Given the quantity of crack

cocaine, the presentence report calculated that Moore’s

sentencing range under the United States Sentencing

Guidelines was 151 to 188 months. At sentencing, Moore

asked the District Court to impose a below-Guidelines

sentence in light of our decision in United States v. Booker,

543 U. S. 220 (2005), and the Guidelines’ disparate treat

ment of similar amounts of crack and powder cocaine.

The District Court refused, saying:

“With regard to the crack and powder cocaine differ

ence, that is the law. I’m applying the law as it cur

rently stands. If that is going to be changed, that is a

congressional matter. Congress is the one who looks

at the guidelines and decides whether or not they

should be put in—in force. . . . It isn’t the judges. It’s

the lawmakers, and I have taken an oath to apply the

law, and that’s what I will do in this sentencing.”

App. C to Pet. for Cert. 55–56.

The District Court sentenced Moore to 188 months of

imprisonment and six years of supervised release.

Moore appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sen

tence. United States v. Moore, 470 F. 3d 767 (2006). In

response to his claim that the District Court should have

considered the crack/powder disparity, the Court of Ap

2 MOORE v. UNITED STATES

Per Curiam

peals held that “the district court was correct in conclud

ing that ‘neither Booker nor [18 U. S. C.] §3553(a) author

izes district courts to reject’ the powder cocaine to crack

cocaine quantity ratio mandated by Congress and reflected

in the Guidelines.” Id., at 770 (quoting United States v.

Spears, 469 F. 3d 1166, 1176 (CA8 2006) (en banc)).

Moore filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. Pet.

for Cert. in Moore v. United States, No. 06–9749.

While Moore’s certiorari petition was pending, this

Court issued its opinion in Kimbrough v. United States,

552 U. S. ___ (2007), concluding that a judge “may con

sider the disparity between the Guidelines’ treatment of

crack and powder cocaine offenses” when applying 18

U. S. C. §3553(a), “even in a mine-run case.” Id., at ___,

___ (slip op., at 2, 21). We granted Moore’s petition, va

cated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Eighth

Circuit for further consideration in light of Kimbrough.

Moore v. United States, 552 U. S. ___ (2008).

On remand, without new briefing, the Eighth Circuit

affirmed again. 518 F. 3d 577 (2008). This time, the

Court of Appeals concluded that “[a]s there was then no

circuit authority to the contrary, we presume the district

court was aware that Booker granted it discretion to vary

downward based upon the impact of the crack cocaine

guidelines on this defendant, but elected not to exercise

that discretion.” Id., at 580.

Proceeding pro se, Moore again petitioned for certiorari,

arguing that the Eighth Circuit’s new characterization of

the transcript is wrong, and that it is “clear that the dis

trict court thought judges had no discre[t]ion to reject” the

Guidelines ratio. Pet. for Cert. 7. The United States

agrees that the Eighth Circuit erred, see Brief for United

States 9, and so do we.

When the District Court said that “[i]t isn’t the judges”

but Congress that “looks at the [G]uidelines and decides

whether or not they should be put . . . in force,” the court

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

Per Curiam

showed that it did not think it had the discretion later

upheld by Kimbrough. App. C to Pet. for Cert. 56. The

Eighth Circuit’s first decision recognized this, describing

the District Court as “concluding” (correctly under circuit

precedent) that it was not “authorize[d] . . . to reject” the

crack/powder disparity. Moore, 470 F. 3d, at 770 (internal

quotation marks omitted). In light of the District Court’s

comments at sentencing, the Court of Appeals should have

remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing

under Kimbrough. We express no views on how the Dis

trict Court should exercise its discretion at resentencing.

The petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of

the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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