Rivera v. Illinois

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

RIVERA v. ILLINOIS

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

No. 07–9995. Argued February 23, 2009—Decided March 31, 2009

During jury selection in petitioner Rivera’s state-court first-degree

murder trial, his counsel sought to use a peremptory challenge to ex

cuse venire member Deloris Gomez. Rivera had already exercised

two peremptory challenges against women, one of whom was African-

American. It is conceded that there was no basis to challenge Gomez

for cause. She met the requirements for jury service, and Rivera does

not contend that she was biased against him. The trial court rejected

the peremptory challenge out of concern that it was discriminatory.

Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, and later decisions applying

Batson, parties are constitutionally prohibited from exercising per

emptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race, ethnicity, or sex.

At trial, the jury, with Gomez as its foreperson, found Rivera guilty of

first-degree murder. The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently af

firmed the conviction, holding that the peremptory challenge should

have been allowed, but rejecting Rivera’s argument that the improper

seating of Gomez was a reversible error. Observing that the Consti

tution does not mandate peremptory challenges and that they are not

necessary for a fair trial, the court held that the denial of Rivera’s

peremptory challenge was not a structural error requiring automatic

reversal. Nor, the court found, was the error harmless beyond a rea

sonable doubt. The court added that it did not need to decide

whether the trial court’s denial was “an error of constitutional di

mension” in the circumstances of Rivera’s case, a comment that ap

pears to be related to Rivera’s arguments that, even absent a free

standing constitutional entitlement to peremptory challenges, the

inclusion of Gomez on his jury violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause.

Held: Provided that all jurors seated in a criminal case are qualified

and unbiased, the Due Process Clause does not require automatic re

2 RIVERA v. ILLINOIS

Syllabus

versal of a conviction because of the trial court’s good-faith error in

denying the defendant’s peremptory challenge to a juror. Pp. 6–12.

(a) Rivera maintains that due process requires reversal whenever a

criminal defendant’s peremptory challenge is erroneously denied. He

asserts that a trial court that fails to dismiss a lawfully challenged

juror commits structural error because the jury becomes an illegally

constituted tribunal, whose verdict is per se invalid; that this is true

even if the Constitution does not mandate peremptory challenges,

since criminal defendants have a constitutionally protected liberty in

terest in their state-provided peremptory challenge rights; that the

issue is not amenable to harmless-error analysis, as it is impossible

to ascertain how a properly constituted jury would have decided his

case; and that automatic reversal therefore must be the rule as a

matter of federal law. Rivera’s arguments do not withstand scrutiny.

If a defendant is tried before a qualified jury composed of individuals

not challengeable for cause, the loss of a peremptory challenge due to

a state court’s good-faith error is not a matter of federal constitu

tional concern. Rather, it is a matter for the State to address under

its own laws. There is no freestanding constitutional right to per

emptory challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528

U.S. 304, 311. They are “a creature of statute,” Ross v. Oklahoma,

487 U. S. 81, 89, which a State may decline to offer at all, Georgia v.

McCollum, 505 U. S. 42, 57. Thus, the mistaken denial of a state

provided peremptory challenge does not, without more, violate the

Federal Constitution. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 121, n.

21. The Due Process Clause safeguards not the meticulous obser

vance of state procedural prescriptions, but “the fundamental ele

ments of fairness in a criminal trial.” Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S.

554, 563–564. Pp. 6–8.

(b) The trial judge’s refusal to excuse Gomez did not deprive Rivera

of his constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury.

Ross is instructive. There, a criminal defendant used a peremptory

challenge to rectify an Oklahoma trial court’s erroneous denial of a

for-cause challenge, leaving him with one fewer peremptory challenge

to use at his discretion. Even though the trial court’s error might

“have resulted in a jury panel different from that which would other

wise have decided [Ross’s] case,” 487 U. S., at 87, because no member

of the jury as finally composed was removable for cause, there was no

violation of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury or his

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, id., at 86–91. This

Court reached the same conclusion with regard to a federal-court

trial in Martinez-Salazar, 528 U. S., at 316. Rivera’s efforts to dis

tinguish Ross and Martinez-Salazar are unavailing. First, although

in contrast to Rivera, the Ross and Martinez-Salazar defendants did

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Syllabus

not challenge any of the jurors who were in fact seated, neither Go

mez nor any other member of Rivera’s jury was removable for cause.

Thus, like the Ross and Martinez-Salazar juries, Rivera’s jury was

impartial for Sixth Amendment purposes. Rivera suggests that due

process concerns persist because Gomez knew he did not want her on

the panel, but this Court rejects the notion that a juror is constitu

tionally disqualified whenever she is aware of a challenge. Second, it

is not constitutionally significant that, in contrast to Ross and Marti

nez-Salazar, the seating of Gomez over Rivera’s peremptory chal

lenge was at odds with state law. Errors of state law do not auto

matically become violations of due process. As in Ross and Martinez-

Salazar, there is no suggestion here that the trial judge repeatedly or

deliberately misapplied the law or acted in an arbitrary or irrational

manner. Rather, his conduct reflected a good-faith effort to enforce

Batson’s antidiscrimination requirements. To hold that a one-time,

good-faith misapplication of Batson violates due process would likely

discourage trial courts and prosecutors from policing a defendant’s

discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. The Fourteenth

Amendment does not compel such a tradeoff. Pp. 8–10.

(c) Rivera errs in insisting that, even without a constitutional vio

lation, the deprivation of a state-provided peremptory challenge re

quires reversal as a matter of federal law. He relies on a suggestion

in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 219, that “[t]he denial or im

pairment of the right [to exercise peremptory challenges] is reversible

error without a showing of prejudice.” This statement was disavowed

in Martinez-Salazar, see 528 U. S., at 317, n. 4. Typically, an error is

designated as “structural,” therefore “requir[ing] automatic reversal,”

only when “the error ‘necessarily render[s] a criminal trial fundamen

tally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or inno

cence.’ ” Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U. S. 212, 218–219. The mis

taken denial of a state-provided peremptory challenge does not, in

the circumstances here, constitute such an error. The automatic re

versal precedents Rivera cites are inapposite. One set of cases in

volves constitutional errors concerning the qualification of the jury or

judge. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U. S., at 86, 87. A second set of cases

involves circumstances in which federal judges or tribunals lacked

statutory authority to adjudicate the controversy, resulting in a

judgment invalid as a matter of federal law. See, e.g., Nguyen v.

United States, 539 U. S. 69. Nothing in those decisions suggests that

federal law renders state-court judgments void whenever there is a

state-law defect in a tribunal’s composition. Absent a federal consti

tutional violation, States are free to decide, as a matter of state law,

that a trial court’s mistaken denial of a peremptory challenge is re

versible error per se or, as the Illinois Supreme Court implicitly held

4 RIVERA v. ILLINOIS

Syllabus

here, that the improper seating of a competent and unbiased juror

could rank as a harmless error under state law. Pp. 10–12.

227 Ill. 2d 1, 879 N. E. 2d 876, affirmed.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 07–9995

_________________

MICHAEL RIVERA, PETITIONER v. ILLINOIS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

ILLINOIS

[March 31, 2009]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the consequences of a state trial

court’s erroneous denial of a defendant’s peremptory chal

lenge to the seating of a juror in a criminal case. If all

seated jurors are qualified and unbiased, does the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nonetheless

require automatic reversal of the defendant’s conviction?

Following a jury trial in an Illinois state court, defen

dant-petitioner Michael Rivera was convicted of first

degree murder and sentenced to a prison term of 85 years.

On appeal, Rivera challenged the trial court’s rejection of

his peremptory challenge to venire member Deloris Go

mez. Gomez sat on Rivera’s jury and indeed served as the

jury’s foreperson. It is conceded that there was no basis to

challenge Gomez for cause. She met the requirements for

jury service, and Rivera does not contend that she was in

fact biased against him. The Supreme Court of Illinois

held that the peremptory challenge should have been

allowed, but further held that the error was harmless and

therefore did not warrant reversal of Rivera’s conviction.

We affirm the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court.

The right to exercise peremptory challenges in state

2 RIVERA v. ILLINOIS

Opinion of the Court

court is determined by state law. This Court has “long

recognized” that “peremptory challenges are not of federal

constitutional dimension.” United States v. Martinez-

Salazar, 528 U. S. 304, 311 (2000). States may withhold

peremptory challenges “altogether without impairing the

constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair

trial.” Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U. S. 42, 57 (1992). Just

as state law controls the existence and exercise of peremp

tory challenges, so state law determines the consequences

of an erroneous denial of such a challenge. Accordingly,

we have no cause to disturb the Illinois Supreme Court’s

determination that, in the circumstances Rivera’s case

presents, the trial court’s error did not warrant reversal of

his conviction.

I

Rivera was charged with first-degree murder in the

Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. The State alleged

that Rivera, who is Hispanic, shot and killed Marcus Lee,

a 16-year-old African-American, after mistaking Lee for a

member of a rival gang.

During jury selection, Rivera’s counsel questioned pro

spective juror Deloris Gomez, a business office supervisor

at Cook County Hospital’s outpatient orthopedic clinic.

App. 32–33. Gomez stated that she sometimes interacted

with patients during the check-in process and acknowl

edged that Cook County Hospital treats many gunshot

victims. She maintained, however, that her work experi

ence would not affect her ability to be impartial. After

questioning Gomez, Rivera’s counsel sought to use a per

emptory challenge to excuse her. Id., at 33. At that point

in the jury’s selection, Rivera had already used three

peremptory challenges. Two of the three were exercised

against women; one of the two women thus eliminated was

African-American. Illinois law affords each side seven

peremptory challenges. See Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 434(d) (West

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Opinion of the Court

2006).

Rather than dismissing Gomez, the trial judge called

counsel to chambers, where he expressed concern that the

defense was discriminating against Gomez. App. 34–36.

Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), and later

decisions building upon Batson, parties are constitution

ally prohibited from exercising peremptory challenges to

exclude jurors on the basis of race, ethnicity, or sex. With

out specifying the type of discrimination he suspected or

the reasons for his concern, the judge directed Rivera’s

counsel to state his reasons for excusing Gomez. Counsel

responded, first, that Gomez saw victims of violent crime

on a daily basis. Counsel next added that he was “pulled

in two different ways” because Gomez had “some kind of

Hispanic connection given her name.” App. 34. At that

point, the judge interjected that Gomez “appears to be an

African American”—the second “African American female”

the defense had struck. Id., at 34–35. Dissatisfied with

counsel’s proffered reasons, the judge denied the challenge

to Gomez, but agreed to allow counsel to question Gomez

further.

After asking Gomez additional questions about her work

at the hospital, Rivera’s counsel renewed his challenge.

Counsel observed, outside the jury’s presence, that most of

the jurors already seated were women. Counsel said he

hoped to “get some impact from possibly other men in the

case.” Id., at 39. The court reaffirmed its earlier ruling,

and Gomez was seated on the jury.

Rivera’s case proceeded to trial. The jury, with Gomez

as its foreperson, found Rivera guilty of first-degree mur

der. A divided panel of the Appellate Court of Illinois

rejected Rivera’s challenge to the trial judge’s Batson

ruling and affirmed his conviction. 348 Ill. App. 3d 168,

810 N. E. 2d 129 (2004).

The Supreme Court of Illinois accepted Rivera’s petition

for leave to appeal and remanded for further proceedings.

4 RIVERA v. ILLINOIS

Opinion of the Court

221 Ill. 2d 481, 852 N. E. 2d 771 (2006). A trial judge, the

court held, may raise a Batson issue sua sponte only when

there is a prima facie case of discrimination. Concluding

that the record was insufficient to evaluate the existence

of a prima facie case, the court instructed the trial judge to

articulate the bases for his Batson ruling and, in particu

lar, to clarify whether the alleged discrimination was on

the basis of race, sex, or both. 221 Ill. 2d, at 515–516, 852

N. E. 2d, at 791.

On remand, the trial judge stated that prima facie

evidence of sex discrimination—namely, counsel’s two

prior challenges to women and “the nature of [counsel’s]

questions”—had prompted him to raise the Batson issue.

App. 136. Counsel’s stated reasons for challenging Gomez,

the judge reported, convinced him that that “there had

been a purposeful discrimination against Mrs. Gomez

because of her gender.” Id., at 137.

The case then returned to the Illinois Supreme Court.

Although that court disagreed with the trial judge’s as

sessment, it affirmed Rivera’s conviction. 227 Ill. 2d 1,

879 N. E. 2d 876 (2007). The Illinois High Court con

cluded “that the record fails to support a prima facie case

of discrimination of any kind.” Id., at 15, 879 N. E. 2d, at

884. Accordingly, the court determined, the trial judge

erred, first in demanding an explanation from Rivera’s

counsel, and next, in denying Rivera’s peremptory chal

lenge of Gomez. Ibid.

Even so, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Rivera’s

ultimate argument that the improper seating of Gomez

ranked as “reversible error without a showing of preju

dice.” Id., at 16, 879 N. E. 2d, at 885 (quoting Swain v.

Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 219 (1965)). Citing this Court’s

guiding decisions, the Illinois court observed that “the

Constitution does not confer a right to peremptory chal

lenges.” 227 Ill. 2d, at 17, 879 N. E. 2d, at 885 (quoting

Batson, 476 U. S., at 91). Although “peremptory chal

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 5

Opinion of the Court

lenges are ‘one means of assuring the selection of a quali

fied and unbiased jury,’ ” the court explained, they are not

“indispensable to a fair trial.” 227 Ill. 2d, at 16, 879 N. E.

2d, at 885 (quoting Batson, 476 U. S., at 91).

Accordingly, the court held, the denial of Rivera’s per

emptory challenge did not qualify as a structural error

requiring automatic reversal. See 227 Ill. 2d, at 19–20,

879 N. E. 2d, at 887 (citing Washington v. Recuenco, 548

U. S. 212, 218–219 (2006)). The court saw no indication

that Rivera had been “tried before a biased jury, or even

one biased juror.” 227 Ill. 2d, at 20, 879 N. E. 2d, at 887.

In that regard, the court stressed, Rivera did “not suggest

that Gomez was subject to excusal for cause.” Ibid.

Relying on both federal and state precedents, the court

proceeded to consider whether it was “clear beyond a

reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found

[Rivera] guilty absent the error.” Id., at 21, 879 N. E. 2d,

at 887 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 18

(1999)). After reviewing the trial record, the court con

cluded that Gomez’s presence on the jury did not prejudice

Rivera because “any rational trier of fact would have

found [Rivera] guilty of murder on the evidence adduced

at trial.” 227 Ill. 2d, at 26, 879 N. E. 2d, at 890.

Having held the error harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt, the court added that it “need not decide whether

the erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge is an error

of constitutional dimension in these circumstances.” Id.,

at 27, 879 N. E. 2d, at 891. This comment, it appears,

related to Rivera’s arguments that, even absent a free

standing constitutional entitlement to peremptory chal

lenges, the inclusion of Gomez on his jury violated his

Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.

We granted certiorari, 554 U. S. __ (2008), to resolve an

apparent conflict among state high courts over whether

the erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge requires

automatic reversal of a defendant’s conviction as a matter

6 RIVERA v. ILLINOIS

Opinion of the Court

of federal law. Compare Angus v. State, 695 N. W. 2d 109,

118 (Minn. 2005) (applying automatic reversal rule); State

v. Vreen, 143 Wash. 2d 923, 927–932, 26 P. 3d 236, 238–

240 (2001) (same), with People v. Bell, 473 Mich. 275, 292–

299, 702 N. W. 2d 128, 138–141 (2005) (rejecting auto

matic reversal rule and looking to state law to determine

the consequences of an erroneous denial of a peremptory

challenge); 227 Ill. 2d., at 15–27, 879 N. E. 2d, at 884–891

(case below). We now affirm the judgment of the Supreme

Court of Illinois.

II

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

Rivera maintains, requires reversal whenever a criminal

defendant’s peremptory challenge is erroneously denied.

Rivera recalls the ancient lineage of the peremptory chal

lenge and observes that the challenge has long been

lauded as a means to guard against latent bias and to

secure “the constitutional end of an impartial jury and a

fair trial.” McCollum, 505 U. S., at 57. When a trial court

fails to dismiss a lawfully challenged juror, Rivera asserts,

it commits structural error: the jury becomes an illegally

constituted tribunal, and any verdict it renders is per se

invalid. According to Rivera, this holds true even if the

Constitution does not itself mandate peremptory chal

lenges, because criminal defendants have a constitution

ally protected liberty interest in their state-provided per

emptory challenge rights. Cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S.

387, 393 (1985) (although “the Constitution does not re

quire States to grant appeals as of right to criminal defen

dants,” States that provide such appeals “must comport

with the demands of the Due Process and Equal Protection

Clauses”).

The improper seating of a juror, Rivera insists, is not

amenable to harmless-error analysis because it is impossi

ble to ascertain how a properly constituted jury—here, one

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 7

Opinion of the Court

without juror Gomez—would have decided his case. Thus,

he urges, whatever the constitutional status of peremptory

challenges, automatic reversal must be the rule as a mat

ter of federal law.

Rivera’s arguments do not withstand scrutiny. If a

defendant is tried before a qualified jury composed of

individuals not challengeable for cause, the loss of a per

emptory challenge due to a state court’s good-faith error is

not a matter of federal constitutional concern. Rather, it

is a matter for the State to address under its own laws.

As Rivera acknowledges, Brief for Petitioner 38, this

Court has consistently held that there is no freestanding

constitutional right to peremptory challenges. See, e.g.,

Martinez-Salazar, 528 U. S., at 311. We have character

ized peremptory challenges as “a creature of statute,” Ross

v. Oklahoma, 487 U. S. 81, 89 (1988), and have made clear

that a State may decline to offer them at all. McCollum,

505 U. S., at 57. See also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S.

474, 482 (1990) (dismissing the notion “that the require

ment of an ‘impartial jury’ impliedly compels peremptory

challenges”). When States provide peremptory challenges

(as all do in some form), they confer a benefit “beyond the

minimum requirements of fair [jury] selection,” Frazier v.

United States, 335 U. S. 497, 506 (1948), and thus retain

discretion to design and implement their own systems,

Ross, 487 U. S., at 89.1

Because peremptory challenges are within the States’

province to grant or withhold, the mistaken denial of a

state-provided peremptory challenge does not, without

more, violate the Federal Constitution. “[A] mere error of

state law,” we have noted, “is not a denial of due process.”

——————

1 See Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Court Or

ganization 2004, pp. 228–232 (2006) (Table 41), http://www.ojp.usdoj.

gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sco04.pdf (as visited Mar. 27, 2009, and available in

Clerk of Court’s case file) (detailing peremptory challenge rules by

State).

8 RIVERA v. ILLINOIS

Opinion of the Court

Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 121, n. 21 (1982) (internal

quotation marks omitted). See also Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U. S. 62, 67, 72–73 (1991). The Due Process Clause,

our decisions instruct, safeguards not the meticulous

observance of state procedural prescriptions, but “the

fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial.”

Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 563–564 (1967).

The trial judge’s refusal to excuse juror Gomez did not

deprive Rivera of his constitutional right to a fair trial

before an impartial jury. Our decision in Ross is instruc

tive. Ross, a criminal defendant in Oklahoma, used a

peremptory challenge to rectify the trial court’s erroneous

denial of a for-cause challenge, leaving him with one fewer

peremptory challenge to use at his discretion. The trial

court’s error, we acknowledged, “may have resulted in a

jury panel different from that which would otherwise have

decided [Ross’s] case.” 487 U. S., at 87. But because no

member of the jury as finally composed was removable for

cause, we found no violation of Ross’s Sixth Amendment

right to an impartial jury or his Fourteenth Amendment

right to due process. Id., at 86–91.

We encountered a similar situation in Martinez-Salazar

and reached the same conclusion. Martinez-Salazar, who

was tried in federal court, was entitled to exercise peremp

tory challenges pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 24(b). His decision to use one of his peremptory

challenges to cure the trial court’s erroneous denial of a

for-cause challenge, we held, did not impair his rights

under that Rule. “[A] principal reason for peremptories,”

we explained, is “to help secure the constitutional guaran

tee of trial by an impartial jury.” 528 U. S., at 316. Hav

ing “received precisely what federal law provided,” and

having been tried “by a jury on which no biased juror sat,”

Martinez-Salazar could not “tenably assert any violation

of his . . . right to due process.” Id., at 307, 317.

Rivera’s efforts to distinguish Ross and Martinez

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 9

Opinion of the Court

Salazar are unavailing. First, Rivera observes, the defen

dants in Ross and Martinez-Salazar did not challenge any

of the jurors who were in fact seated. In contrast, Rivera

attempted to exercise a peremptory challenge against a

specific person—Gomez—whom he perceived to be unfa

vorable to his cause. But, as Rivera recognizes, neither

Gomez nor any other member of his jury was removable

for cause. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. Thus, like the juries in

Ross and Martinez-Salazar, Rivera’s jury was impartial

for Sixth Amendment purposes. Rivera suggests that due

process concerns persist because Gomez knew he did not

want her on the panel. Gomez, however, was not privy to

the in camera discussions concerning Rivera’s attempt to

exercise a peremptory strike against her. See, supra, at 3.

We reject the notion that a juror is constitutionally dis

qualified whenever she is aware that a party has chal

lenged her. Were the rule otherwise, a party could cir

cumvent Batson by insisting in open court that a trial

court dismiss a juror even though the party’s peremptory

challenge was discriminatory. Or a party could obtain a

juror’s dismissal simply by making in her presence a

baseless for-cause challenge. Due process does not require

such counterintuitive results.

Second, it is not constitutionally significant that the

seating of Gomez over Rivera’s peremptory challenge was

at odds with state law. The defendants in Ross and Mar

tinez-Salazar, Rivera emphasizes, were not denied their

peremptory-challenge rights under applicable law—state

law in Ross and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

in Martinez-Salazar. But as we have already explained,

supra, at 7–8, errors of state law do not automatically

become violations of due process. As in Ross and Marti

nez-Salazar, there is no suggestion here that the trial

judge repeatedly or deliberately misapplied the law or

acted in an arbitrary or irrational manner. Martinez-

Salazar, 528 U. S., at 316; Ross, 487 U. S., at 91, n. 5.

10 RIVERA v. ILLINOIS

Opinion of the Court

Rather, the trial judge’s conduct reflected a good-faith, if

arguably overzealous, effort to enforce the antidiscrimina

tion requirements of our Batson-related precedents. To

hold that a one-time, good-faith misapplication of Batson

violates due process would likely discourage trial courts

and prosecutors from policing a criminal defendant’s

discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. The Four

teenth Amendment does not compel such a tradeoff.

Rivera insists that, even without a constitutional viola

tion, the deprivation of a state-provided peremptory chal

lenge requires reversal as a matter of federal law. We

disagree. Rivera relies in part on Swain, 380 U. S. 202,

which suggested that “[t]he denial or impairment of the

right [to exercise peremptory challenges] is reversible

error without a showing of prejudice.” Id., at 219. We

disavowed this statement in Martinez-Salazar, observing,

albeit in dicta, “that the oft-quoted language in Swain was

not only unnecessary to the decision in that case . . . but

was founded on a series of our early cases decided long

before the adoption of harmless-error review.” 528 U. S.,

at 317, n. 4. As our recent decisions make clear, we typi

cally designate an error as “structural,” therefore “re

quir[ing] automatic reversal,” only when “the error ‘neces

sarily render[s] a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or

an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.’ ”

Recuenco, 548 U. S., at 218–219 (quoting Neder, 527 U. S.,

at 9). The mistaken denial of a state-provided peremptory

challenge does not, at least in the circumstances we con

front here, constitute an error of that character.

The automatic reversal precedents Rivera cites are

inapposite. One set of cases involves constitutional errors

concerning the qualification of the jury or judge. In Bat

son, for example, we held that the unlawful exclusion of

jurors based on race requires reversal because it “violates

a defendant’s right to equal protection,” “unconstitution

ally discriminate[s] against the excluded juror,” and “un

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 11

Opinion of the Court

dermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of our system

of justice.” 476 U. S., at 86, 87. Similarly, dismissal of a

juror in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510

(1968),2 we have held, is constitutional error that requires

vacation of a death sentence. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481

U. S. 648 (1987). See also Gomez v. United States, 490

U. S. 858, 876 (1989) (“Among those basic fair trial rights

that can never be treated as harmless is a defendant’s

right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge or jury.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

A second set of cases involves circumstances in which

federal judges or tribunals lacked statutory authority to

adjudicate the controversy. We have held the resulting

judgment in such cases invalid as a matter of federal law.

See, e.g., Nguyen v. United States, 539 U. S. 69 (2003);

Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U. S. 461 (1974). Nothing in these

decisions suggests that federal law renders state-court

judgments void whenever there is a state-law defect in a

tribunal’s composition. Absent a federal constitutional

violation, States retain the prerogative to decide whether

such errors deprive a tribunal of its lawful authority and

thus require automatic reversal. States are free to decide,

as a matter of state law, that a trial court’s mistaken

denial of a peremptory challenge is reversible error per se.

Or they may conclude, as the Supreme Court of Illinois

implicitly did here, that the improper seating of a compe

tent and unbiased juror does not convert the jury into an

ultra vires tribunal; therefore the error could rank as

harmless under state law.

In sum, Rivera received precisely what due process

required: a fair trial before an impartial and properly

——————

2 Under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968), “a sentence of

death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it

was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they

voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscien

tious or religious scruples against its infliction.” Id., at 522.

12 RIVERA v. ILLINOIS

Opinion of the Court

instructed jury, which found him guilty of every element of

the charged offense.

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme

Court of Illinois is

Affirmed.