Corley v. United States

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 07–10441. Argued January 21, 2009—Decided April 6, 2009

McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, and Mallory v. United States,

354 U. S. 449, “generally rende[r] inadmissible confessions made dur

ing periods of detention that violat[e] the prompt presentment re

quirement of [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 5(a).” United

States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 354. Rule 5(a), in turn, pro

vides that a “person making an arrest . . . must take the defendant

without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge . . . .” Congress

enacted 18 U. S. C. §3501 in response to Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U. S. 436, and some applications of the McNabb-Mallory rule. In an

attempt to eliminate Miranda, §3501(a) provides that “a confession

. . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given,” and

§3501(b) lists several considerations for courts to address in assess

ing voluntariness. Subsection (c), which focuses on McNabb-Mallory,

provides that “a confession made . . . by . . . a defendant . . . , while

. . . under arrest . . . , shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay

in bringing such person before a magistrate judge . . . if such confes

sion is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and . . .

within six hours [of arrest]”; it extends that time limit when further

delay is “reasonable considering the means of transportation and the

distance to . . . the nearest available [magistrate].”

Petitioner Corley was arrested for assaulting a federal officer at

about 8 a.m. Around 11:45 FBI agents took him to a Philadelphia

hospital to treat a minor injury. At 3:30 p.m. he was taken from the

hospital to the local FBI office and told that he was a suspect in a

bank robbery. Though the office was in the same building as the

nearest magistrate judges, the agents did not bring him before a

magistrate judge, but questioned him, hoping for a confession. At

5:27 p.m., some 9.5 hours after his arrest, Corley began an oral con

2 CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

fession that he robbed the bank. He asked for a break at 6:30 and

was held overnight. The interrogation resumed the next morning,

ending with his signed written confession. He was finally presented

to a Magistrate Judge at 1:30 p.m., 29.5 hours after his arrest, and

charged with armed bank robbery and related charges. The District

Court denied his motion to suppress his confessions under Rule 5(a)

and McNabb-Mallory. It reasoned that the oral confession occurred

within §3501(c)’s six-hour window because the time of Corley’s medi

cal treatment should be excluded from the delay. It also found the

written confession admissible, explaining there was no unreasonable

delay under Rule 5(a) because Corley had requested the break. He

was convicted of conspiracy and bank robbery. The Third Circuit af

firmed. Relying on Circuit precedent to the effect that §3501 abro

gated McNabb-Mallory and replaced it with a pure voluntariness

test, it concluded that if a district court found a confession voluntary

after considering the points listed in §3501(b), it would be admissible,

even if the presentment delay was unreasonable.

Held: Section 3501 modified McNabb-Mallory but did not supplant it.

Pp. 8–18.

(a) The Government claims that because §3501(a) makes a confes

sion “admissible” “if it is voluntarily given,” it entirely eliminates

McNabb-Mallory with its bar to admitting even a voluntary confes

sion if given during an unreasonable presentment delay. Corley ar

gues that §3501(a) was only meant to overrule Miranda, and notes

that only §3501(c) touches on McNabb-Mallory, making the rule in

applicable to confessions given within six hours of an arrest. He has

the better argument. Pp. 8–16.

(1) The Government’s reading renders §3501(c) nonsensical and

superfluous. If subsection (a) really meant that any voluntary con

fession was admissible, then subsection (c) would add nothing; if a

confession was “made voluntarily” it would be admissible, period, and

never “inadmissible solely because of delay,” even a delay beyond six

hours. The Government’s reading is thus at odds with the basic in

terpretive canon that “ ‘[a] statute should be construed [to give effect]

to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous,

void or insignificant.’ ” Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U. S. 88, 101. The Gov

ernment claims that in providing that a confession “shall not be ad

missible,” Congress meant that a confession “shall not be [involun

tary].” Thus read, (c) would specify a bright-line rule applying (a) to

cases of delay: it would tell courts that delay alone does not make a

confession involuntary unless the delay exceeds six hours. But

“ ‘Congress did not write the statute that way.’ ” Russello v. United

States, 464 U. S. 16, 23. The terms “inadmissible” and “involuntary”

are not synonymous. Congress used both in (c), and this Court

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Syllabus

“would not presume to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in

draftsmanship.” Ibid. There is also every reason to believe that

Congress used the distinct terms deliberately, specifying two criteria

that must be satisfied to prevent a confession from being “inadmissi

ble solely because of delay”: the confession must be “[1] made volun

tarily and . . . [2] within six hours [of arrest].” Moreover, under the

McNabb-Mallory rule, “inadmissible” and “involuntary” mean differ

ent things. Corley’s position, in contrast, gives effect to both (c) and

(a), by reading (a) as overruling Miranda and (c) as qualifying

McNabb-Mallory. The Government’s counterargument—that

Corley’s reading would also create a conflict, since (a) makes all vol

untary confessions admissible while (c) would leave some voluntary

confessions inadmissible—falls short. First, (a) is a broad directive

while (c) aims only at McNabb-Mallory, and “a more specific statute

[is] given precedence over a more general one.” Busic v. United

States, 446 U. S. 398, 406. Second, reading (a) to create a conflict

with (c) not only would make (c) superfluous, but would also create

conflicts with so many other Rules of Evidence that the subsection

cannot possibly be given its literal scope. Pp. 8–12.

(2) The legislative history strongly favors Corley’s reading. The

Government points to nothing in this history supporting its contrary

view. Pp. 13–15.

(3) The Government’s position would leave the Rule 5 present

ment requirement without teeth, for if there is no McNabb-Mallory

there is no apparent remedy for a presentment delay. The prompt

presentment requirement is not just an administrative nicety. It

dates back to the common law. Under Rule 5, presentment is the

point at which the judge must take several key steps to foreclose

Government overreaching: e.g., informing the defendant of the

charges against him and giving the defendant a chance to consult

with counsel. Without McNabb-Mallory, federal agents would be free

to question suspects for extended periods before bringing them out in

the open, even though “custodial police interrogation, by its very na

ture, isolates and pressures the individual,” Dickerson v. United

States, 530 U. S. 428, 435, inducing people to confess to crimes they

never committed. Pp. 15–16.

(b) There is no merit to the Government’s fallback claim that even

if §3501 preserved a limited version of McNabb-Mallory, Congress cut

it out by enacting Federal Rule of Evidence 402, which provides that

“[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by

the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these

rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court . . . .” The

Advisory Committee’s Notes expressly identified McNabb-Mallory as

a statutorily authorized rule that would survive Rule 402, and the

4 CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

Government has previously conceded before this Court that Rule 402

preserved McNabb-Mallory. Pp. 16–18.

500 F. 3d 210, vacated and remanded.

SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS,

KENNEDY, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissent

ing opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ.,

joined.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 07–10441

_________________

JOHNNIE CORLEY, PETITIONER v. UNITED

STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[April 6, 2009]

JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question here is whether Congress intended 18

U. S. C. §3501 to discard, or merely to narrow, the rule in

McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943), and Mal

lory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449 (1957), under which an

arrested person’s confession is inadmissible if given after

an unreasonable delay in bringing him before a judge. We

hold that Congress meant to limit, not eliminate, McNabb-

Mallory.

I

A

The common law obliged an arresting officer to bring his

prisoner before a magistrate as soon as he reasonably

could. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U. S.

44, 61–62 (1991) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). This “present

ment” requirement tended to prevent secret detention and

served to inform a suspect of the charges against him, and

it was the law in nearly every American State and the

National Government. See id., at 60–61; McNabb, supra,

at 342, and n. 7.

McNabb v. United States raised the question of how to

2 CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

enforce a number of federal statutes codifying the pre

sentment rule. 318 U. S., at 342 (citing, among others, 18

U. S. C. §595 (1940 ed.), which provided that “ ‘[i]t shall be

the duty of the marshal . . . who may arrest a person . . . to

take the defendant before the nearest . . . judicial officer

. . . for a hearing’ ”). There, federal agents flouted the

requirement by interrogating several murder suspects for

days before bringing them before a magistrate, and then

only after they had given the confessions that convicted

them. 318 U. S., at 334–338, 344–345.

On the defendants’ motions to exclude the confessions

from evidence, we saw no need to reach any constitutional

issue. Instead we invoked the supervisory power to estab

lish and maintain “civilized standards of procedure and

evidence” in federal courts, id., at 340, which we exercised

for the sake of making good on the traditional obligation

embodied in the federal presentment legislation. We saw

both the statutes and the traditional rule as aimed not

only at checking the likelihood of resort to the third degree

but meant generally to “avoid all the evil implications of

secret interrogation of persons accused of crime.” Id., at

344. We acknowledged that “Congress ha[d] not explicitly

forbidden the use of evidence . . . procured” in derogation

of the presentment obligation, id., at 345, but we realized

that “permit[ting] such evidence to be made the basis of a

conviction in the federal courts would stultify the policy

which Congress ha[d] enacted into law,” ibid., and in the

exercise of supervisory authority we held confessions

inadmissible when obtained during unreasonable pre

sentment delay.

Shortly after McNabb, the combined action of the Judi

cial Conference of the United States and Congress pro

duced Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), which

pulled the several statutory presentment provisions to

gether in one place. See Mallory, supra, at 452 (describing

Rule 5(a) as “a compendious restatement, without sub

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Opinion of the Court

stantive change, of several prior specific federal statutory

provisions”). As first enacted, the rule told “[a]n officer

making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a com

plaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant

[to] take the arrested person without unnecessary delay

before the nearest available commissioner or before any

other nearby officer empowered to commit persons

charged with offenses against the laws of the United

States.” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 5(a) (1946). The rule re

mains much the same today: “A person making an arrest

within the United States must take the defendant without

unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge . . . .” Fed.

Rule Crim. Proc. 5(a)(1)(A) (2007).

A case for applying McNabb and Rule 5(a) together soon

arose in Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410 (1948).

Despite the Government’s confession of error, the D. C.

Circuit had thought McNabb’s exclusionary rule applied

only to involuntary confessions obtained by coercion dur

ing the period of delay, 335 U. S., at 411–412, and so held

the defendant’s voluntary confession admissible into evi

dence. This was error, and we reiterated the reasoning of

a few years earlier. “In the McNabb case we held that the

plain purpose of the requirement that prisoners should

promptly be taken before committing magistrates was to

check resort by officers to ‘secret interrogation of persons

accused of crime.’ ” Id., at 412 (quoting McNabb, supra, at

344). Upshaw consequently emphasized that even volun

tary confessions are inadmissible if given after an unrea

sonable delay in presentment. 335 U. S., at 413.

We applied Rule 5(a) again in Mallory v. United States,

holding a confession given seven hours after arrest inad

missible for “unnecessary delay” in presenting the suspect

to a magistrate, where the police questioned the suspect

for hours “within the vicinity of numerous committing

magistrates.” 354 U. S., at 455. Again, we repeated the

reasons for the rule and explained, as we had before and

4 CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

have since, that delay for the purpose of interrogation is

the epitome of “unnecessary delay.” Id., at 455–456; see

also McLaughlin, 500 U. S., at 61 (SCALIA, J., dissenting)

(“It was clear” at common law “that the only element

bearing upon the reasonableness of delay was not such

circumstances as the pressing need to conduct further

investigation, but the arresting officer’s ability, once the

prisoner had been secured, to reach a magistrate”); Up

shaw, supra, at 414. Thus, the rule known simply as

McNabb-Mallory “generally render[s] inadmissible confes

sions made during periods of detention that violat[e] the

prompt presentment requirement of Rule 5(a).” United

States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 354 (1994).

There the law remained until 1968, when Congress

enacted 18 U. S. C. §3501 in response to Miranda v. Ari

zona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and to the application of

McNabb-Mallory in some federal courts. Subsections (a)

and (b) of §3501 were meant to eliminate Miranda.1 See

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 435–437 (2000);

infra, at 13–14. Subsection (a) provides that “[i]n any

criminal prosecution brought by the United States . . . , a

confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is volun

tarily given,” while subsection (b) lists several considera

tions for courts to address in assessing voluntariness.2

——————

1 We rejected this attempt to overrule Miranda in Dickerson v. United

States, 530 U. S. 428 (2000).

2 In full, subsections (a) and (b) provide:

“(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by

the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e)

hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before

such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the

presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the

trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall

be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to

hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct

the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it de

serves under all the circumstances.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 5

Opinion of the Court

Subsection (c), which focused on McNabb-Mallory, see

infra, at 13–14, provides that in any federal prosecution,

“a confession made . . . by . . . a defendant therein, while

such person was under arrest . . . , shall not be inadmissi

ble solely because of delay in bringing such person before a

magistrate judge . . . if such confession is found by the

trial judge to have been made voluntarily . . . and if such

confession was made . . . within six hours [of arrest]”;

the six-hour time limit is extended when further delay

is “reasonable considering the means of transportation

and the distance to be traveled to the nearest available

[magistrate].”3

——————

“(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall

take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of

the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and

arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made

after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew

the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was

suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such

defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any

statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4)

whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of

his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such

defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and

when giving such confession.

“The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be

taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the

issue of voluntariness of the confession.”

3 In full, subsection (c) provides:

“In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District

of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant

therein, while such person was under arrest or other detention in the

custody of any law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement agency, shall

not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person

before a magistrate judge or other officer empowered to commit persons

charged with offenses against the laws of the United States or of the

District of Columbia if such confession is found by the trial judge to

have been made voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession

is left to the jury and if such confession was made or given by such

person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other

6 CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

The issue in this case is whether Congress intended

§3501(a) to sweep McNabb-Mallory’s exclusionary rule

aside entirely, or merely meant §3501(c) to provide immu

nization to voluntary confessions given within six hours of

a suspect’s arrest.

B

Petitioner Johnnie Corley was suspected of robbing a

bank in Norristown, Pennsylvania. After federal agents

learned that Corley was subject to arrest on an unrelated

local matter, some federal and state officers went together

to execute the state warrant on September 17, 2003, and

found him just as he was pulling out of a driveway in his

car. Corley nearly ran over one officer, then jumped out of

the car, pushed the officer down, and ran. The agents

gave chase and caught and arrested him for assaulting a

federal officer. The arrest occurred about 8 a.m. 500 F. 3d

210, 212 (CA3 2007).

FBI agents first kept Corley at a local police station

while they questioned residents near the place he was

captured. Around 11:45 a.m. they took him to a Philadel

phia hospital to treat a minor cut on his hand that he got

during the chase. At 3:30 p.m. the agents took him from

the hospital to the Philadelphia FBI office and told him

that he was a suspect in the Norristown bank robbery.

Though the office was in the same building as the cham

bers of the nearest magistrate judges, the agents did not

bring Corley before a magistrate, but questioned him

instead, in hopes of getting a confession. App. 68–69, 83,

138–139.

——————

detention: Provided, That the time limitation contained in this subsec

tion shall not apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such

person before such magistrate judge or other officer beyond such six

hour period is found by the trial judge to be reasonable considering the

means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the nearest

available such magistrate judge or other officer.”

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 7

Opinion of the Court

The agents’ repeated arguments sold Corley on the

benefits of cooperating with the Government, and he

signed a form waiving his Miranda rights. At 5:27 p.m.,

some 9.5 hours after his arrest, Corley began an oral

confession that he robbed the bank, id., at 62, and spoke

on in this vein until about 6:30, when agents asked him to

put it all in writing. Corley said he was tired and wanted

a break, so the agents decided to hold him overnight and

take the written statement the next morning. At 10:30

a.m. on September 18 they began the interrogation again,

which ended when Corley signed a written confession. He

was finally presented to a magistrate at 1:30 p.m. that

day, 29.5 hours after his arrest. 500 F. 3d, at 212.

Corley was charged with armed bank robbery, 18

U. S. C. §2113(a), (d), conspiracy to commit armed bank

robbery, §371, and using a firearm in furtherance of a

crime of violence, §924(c). When he moved to suppress his

oral and written confessions under Rule 5(a) and McNabb-

Mallory, the District Court denied the motion, with the

explanation that the time Corley was receiving medical

treatment should be excluded from the delay, and that the

oral confession was thus given within the six-hour window

of §3501(c). Crim. No. 03–775 (ED Pa., May 10, 2004),

App. 97. The District Court also held Corley’s written

confession admissible, reasoning that “a break from inter

rogation requested by an arrestee who has already begun

his confession does not constitute unreasonable delay

under Rule 5(a).” Id., at 97–98. Corley was convicted of

conspiracy and armed robbery but acquitted of using a

firearm during a crime of violence. 500 F. 3d, at 212–213.

A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit affirmed the conviction, though its rationale for

rejecting Corley’s Rule 5(a) argument was different from

the District Court’s. The panel majority considered itself

bound by Circuit precedent to the effect that §3501 en

tirely abrogated the McNabb-Mallory rule and replaced it

8 CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

with a pure voluntariness test. See 500 F. 3d, at 212

(citing Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502

F. 2d 914 (CA3 1974)). As the majority saw it, if a district

court found a confession voluntary after considering the

points listed in §3501(b), it would be admissible, regard

less of whether delay in presentment was unnecessary or

unreasonable. 500 F. 3d, at 217. Judge Sloviter read

Gereau differently and dissented with an opinion that

“§3501 does not displace Rule 5(a)” or abrogate McNabb-

Mallory for presentment delays beyond six hours. 500

F. 3d, at 236.

We granted certiorari to resolve a division in the Circuit

Courts on the reach of §3501. 554 U. S. ___ (2008). Com

pare United States v. Glover, 104 F. 3d 1570, 1583 (CA10

1997) (§3501 entirely supplanted McNabb-Mallory);

United States v. Christopher, 956 F. 2d 536, 538–539 (CA6

1991) (same), with United States v. Mansoori, 304 F. 3d

635, 660 (CA7 2002) (§3501 limited the McNabb-Mallory

rule to periods more than six hours after arrest); United

States v. Perez, 733 F. 2d 1026, 1031–1032 (CA2 1984)

(same).4 We now vacate and remand.

II

The Government’s argument focuses on §3501(a), which

provides that any confession “shall be admissible in evi

dence” in federal court “if it is voluntarily given.” To the

Government, subsection (a) means that once a district

court looks to the considerations in §3501(b) and finds a

confession voluntary, in it comes; (a) entirely eliminates

McNabb-Mallory with its bar to admitting even a volun

tary confession if given during an unreasonable delay in

presentment.

Corley argues that §3501(a) was meant to overrule

——————

4 We granted certiorari to resolve this question once before, in United

States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350 (1994), but ultimately resolved

that case on a different ground, id., at 355–360.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 9

Opinion of the Court

Miranda and nothing more, with no effect on McNabb-

Mallory, which §3501 touches only in subsection (c). By

providing that a confession “shall not be inadmissible

solely because of delay” in presentment if “made voluntar

ily and . . . within six hours [of arrest],” subsection (c)

leaves McNabb-Mallory inapplicable to confessions given

within the six hours, but when a confession comes even

later, the exclusionary rule applies and courts have to see

whether the delay was unnecessary or unreasonable.

Corley has the better argument.

A

The fundamental problem with the Government’s read

ing of §3501 is that it renders §3501(c) nonsensical and

superfluous. Subsection (c) provides that a confession

“shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay” in pre

sentment if the confession is “made voluntarily and . . .

within six hours [of arrest].” If (a) really meant that any

voluntary confession was admissible, as the Government

contends, then (c) would add nothing; if a confession was

“made voluntarily” it would be admissible, period, and

never “inadmissible solely because of delay,” no matter

whether the delay went beyond six hours. There is no way

out of this, and the Government concedes it. Tr. of Oral

Arg. 33 (“Congress never needed (c); (c) in the [G]overn

ment’s view was always superfluous”).

The Government’s reading is thus at odds with one of

the most basic interpretive canons, that “ ‘[a] statute

should be construed so that effect is given to all its provi

sions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous,

void or insignificant . . . .’ ” Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U. S. 88,

101 (2004) (quoting 2A N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory

Construction §46.06, pp.181–186 (rev. 6th ed. 2000)).5 The

——————

5 The dissent says that the antisuperfluousness canon has no place

here because “there is nothing ambiguous about the language of

§3501(a).” Post, at 2 (opinion of ALITO, J.). But this response violates

10 CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Government attempts to mitigate its problem by rewriting

(c) into a clarifying, if not strictly necessary, provision:

although Congress wrote that a confession “shall not be

inadmissible solely because of delay” if the confession is

“made voluntarily and . . . within six hours [of arrest],” the

Government tells us that Congress actually meant that a

confession “shall not be [involuntary] solely because of

delay” if the confession is “[otherwise voluntary] and . . .

[made] within six hours [of arrest].” Thus rewritten, (c)

would coexist peacefully (albeit inelegantly) with (a), with

(c) simply specifying a bright-line rule applying (a) to

cases of delay: it would tell courts that delay alone does

not make a confession involuntary unless the delay ex

ceeds six hours.

To this proposal, “ ‘[t]he short answer is that Congress

did not write the statute that way.’ ” Russello v. United

States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v.

Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 773 (1979)). The Government

may say that we can sensibly read “inadmissible” as “in

voluntary” because the words are “virtually synonymous

. . . in this statutory context,” Brief for United States 23,

but this is simply not so. To begin with, Congress used

——————

“the cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole,” King v. St.

Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221 (1991). Subsection 3501(a) seems

clear only if one ignores the absurd results of a literal reading, infra, at

11–12, and only until one reads §3501(c) and recognizes that if (a)

means what it literally says, (c) serves no purpose. Even the dissent

concedes that when (a) and (c) are read together, “[t]here is simply no

perfect solution to the problem before us.” Post, at 4. Thus, the dis

sent’s point that subsection (a) seems clear when read in isolation

proves nothing, for “[t]he meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or

phrases may only become evident when placed in context.” FDA v.

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 132 (2000). When

subsection (a) is read in context, there is no avoiding the question,

“What could Congress have been getting at with both (a) and (c)?” The

better answer is that Congress meant to do just what Members explic

itly said in the legislative record. See infra, at 13–15.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 11

Opinion of the Court

both terms in (c) itself, and “[w]e would not presume to

ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in draftsman

ship.” Russello, supra, at 23. And there is, in fact, every

reason to believe that Congress used the distinct terms

very deliberately. Subsection (c) specifies two criteria that

must be satisfied to prevent a confession from being “in

admissible solely because of delay”: the confession must be

“[1] made voluntarily and . . . [2] within six hours [of

arrest].” Because voluntariness is thus only one of several

criteria for admissibility under (c), “involuntary” and

“inadmissible” plainly cannot be synonymous. What is

more, the Government’s argument ignores the fact that

under the McNabb-Mallory rule, which we presume Con

gress was aware of, Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441

U. S. 677, 699 (1979), “inadmissible” and “involuntary”

mean different things. As we explained before and as the

Government concedes, McNabb-Mallory makes even vol

untary confessions inadmissible if given after an unrea

sonable delay in presentment, Upshaw, 335 U. S., at 413;

Tr. of Oral Arg. 33 (“[I]t was well understood that

McNabb-Mallory . . . excluded totally voluntary confes

sions”). So we cannot accept the Government’s attempt to

confuse the critically distinct terms “involuntary” and

“inadmissible” by rewriting (c) into a bright-line rule doing

nothing more than applying (a).

Corley’s position, in contrast, gives effect to both (c) and

(a), by reading (a) as overruling Miranda and (c) as quali

fying McNabb-Mallory. The Government answers, how

ever, that accepting Corley’s argument would result in a

different problem: it would create a conflict between (c)

and (a), since (a) provides that all voluntary confessions

are admissible while Corley’s reading of (c) leaves some

voluntary confessions inadmissible. But the Government’s

counterargument falls short for two reasons. First, even if

(a) is read to be at odds with (c), the conflict is resolved by

recognizing that (a) is a broad directive while (c) aims only

12 CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

at McNabb-Mallory, and “a more specific statute will be

given precedence over a more general one . . . .” Busic v.

United States, 446 U. S. 398, 406 (1980). Second, and

more fundamentally, (a) cannot prudently be read to

create a conflict with (c), not only because it would make

(c) superfluous, as explained, but simply because reading

(a) that way would create conflicts with so many other

rules that the subsection cannot possibly be given its

literal scope. Subsection (a) provides that “[i]n any crimi

nal prosecution brought by the United States . . . , a con

fession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntar

ily given,” and §3501(e) defines “confession” as “any

confession of guilt of any criminal offense or any self

incriminating statement made or given orally or in writ

ing.” Thus, if the Government seriously urged a literal

reading, (a) would mean that “in any criminal prosecution

brought by the United States . . . , [‘any self-incriminating

statement’ with respect to ‘any criminal offense’] . . . shall

be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.” Thus

would many a Rule of Evidence be overridden in case after

case: a defendant’s self-incriminating statement to his

lawyer would be admissible despite his insistence on

attorney-client privilege; a fourth-hand hearsay statement

the defendant allegedly made would come in; and a defen

dant’s confession to an entirely unrelated crime committed

years earlier would be admissible without more. These

are some of the absurdities of literalism that show that

Congress could not have been writing in a literalistic

frame of mind.6

——————

6 The dissent seeks to avoid these absurd results by claiming that

“§3501(a) does not supersede ordinary evidence Rules,” post, at 10, but

its only argument for this conclusion is that “there is no reason to

suppose that Congress meant any such thing,” post, at 9. The dissent is

certainly correct that there is no reason to suppose that Congress

meant any such thing; that is what our reductio ad absurdum shows.

But that leaves the dissent saying, “§3501(a) must be read literally”

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 13

Opinion of the Court

B

As it turns out, there is more than reductio ad absur

dum and the antisuperfluousness canon to confirm that

subsection (a) leaves McNabb-Mallory alone, for that is

what legislative history says. In fact, the Government

concedes that subsections (a) and (b) were aimed at

Miranda, while subsection (c) was meant to modify the

presentment exclusionary rule. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38 (“I will

concede to you . . . that section (a) was considered to over

rule Miranda, and subsection (c) was addressed to

McNabb-Mallory”). The concession is unavoidable. The

Senate, where §3501 originated, split the provision into

two parts: Division 1 contained subsections (a) and (b),

and Division 2 contained subsection (c). 114 Cong. Rec.

14171 (1968). In the debate on the Senate floor immedi

ately before voting on these proposals, several Senators,

including the section’s prime sponsor, Senator McClellan,

explained that Division 1 “has to do with the Miranda

decision,” while Division 2 related to Mallory. 114 Cong.

Rec. 14171–14172. This distinct intent was confirmed by

the separate Senate votes adopting the two measures,

Division 1 by 55 to 29 and Division 2 by 58 to 26, id., at

14171–14172, 14174–14175; if (a) did abrogate McNabb-

Mallory, as the Government claims, then voting for Divi

sion 2 would have been entirely superfluous, for the Divi

sion 1 vote would already have done the job. That aside, a

sponsor’s statement to the full Senate carries considerable

weight, and Senator McClellan’s explanation that Division

1 was specifically addressed to Miranda confirms that (a)

and (b) were never meant to reach far enough to abrogate

——————

(rendering §3501(c) superfluous), “but not too literally” (so that it would

override other Rules of Evidence). The dissent cannot have it both

ways. If it means to profess literalism it will have to take the absurdity

that literalism brings with it; “credo quia absurdum” (as Tertullian

may have said). If it will not take the absurd, then its literalism is no

alternative to our reading of the statute.

14 CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

other background evidentiary rules including McNabb-

Mallory.

Further legislative history not only drives that point

home, but conclusively shows an intent that subsection (c)

limit McNabb-Mallory, not replace it. In its original draft,

subsection (c) would indeed have done away with McNabb-

Mallory completely, for the bill as first written would have

provided that “[i]n any criminal prosecution by the United

States . . . , a confession made or given by a person who is

a defendant therein . . . shall not be inadmissible solely

because of delay in bringing such person before a [magis

trate] if such confession is . . . made voluntarily.” S. 917,

90th Cong., 2d Sess., 44–45 (1968) (as reported by Senate

Committee on the Judiciary); 114 Cong. Rec. 14172. The

provision so conceived was resisted, however, by a number

of Senators worried about allowing indefinite presentment

delays. See, e.g., id., at 11740, 13990 (Sen. Tydings) (the

provision would “permit Federal criminal suspects to be

questioned indefinitely before they are presented to a

committing magistrate”); id., at 12290 (Sen. Fong) (the

provision “would open the doors to such practices as hold

ing suspects incommunicado for an indefinite period”).

After Senator Tydings proposed striking (c) from the bill

altogether, id., at 13651 (Amendment No. 788), Senator

Scott introduced the compromise of qualifying (c) with the

words: “ ‘and if such confession was made or given by such

person within six hours following his arrest or other de

tention.’ ” Id., at 14184–14185 (Amendment No. 805).7

The amendment was intended to confine McNabb-Mallory

to excluding only confessions given after more than six

hours of delay, see 114 Cong. Rec. 14184 (remarks of Sen.

Scott) (“My amendment provides that the period during

——————

7 The proviso at the end of (c) relating to reasonable delays caused by

the means of transportation and distance to be traveled came later by

separate amendment. 114 Cong. Rec. 14787.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 15

Opinion of the Court

which confessions may be received . . . shall in no case

exceed 6 hours”), and it was explicitly modeled on the

provision Congress had passed just months earlier to

govern presentment practice in the District of Columbia,

Title III of An Act Relating to Crime and Criminal Proce

dure in the District of Columbia (D. C. Crime Act),

§301(b), 81 Stat. 735–736, see, e.g., 114 Cong. Rec. 14184

(remarks of Sen. Scott) (“My amendment is an attempt to

conform, as nearly as practicable, to Title III of [the D. C.

Crime Act]”). By the terms of that Act, “[a]ny statement,

admission, or confession made by an arrested person

within three hours immediately following his arrest shall

not be excluded from evidence in the courts of the District

of Columbia solely because of delay in presentment.”

§301(b), 81 Stat. 735–736. Given the clear intent that

Title III modify but not eliminate McNabb-Mallory in the

District of Columbia, see, e.g., S. Rep. No. 912, 90th Cong.,

1st Sess., 17–18 (1967), using it as a model plainly shows

how Congress meant as much but no more in §3501(c).

In sum, the legislative history strongly favors Corley’s

reading. The Government points to nothing in this history

supporting its view that (c) created a bright-line rule for

applying (a) in cases with a presentment issue.

C

It also counts heavily against the position of the United

States that it would leave the Rule 5 presentment re

quirement without any teeth, for as the Government again

is forced to admit, if there is no McNabb-Mallory there is

no apparent remedy for delay in presentment. Tr. of Oral

Arg. 25. One might not care if the prompt presentment

requirement were just some administrative nicety, but in

fact the rule has always mattered in very practical ways

and still does. As we said, it stretches back to the common

law, when it was “one of the most important” protections

“against unlawful arrest.” McLaughlin, 500 U. S., at 60–

16 CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

61 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). Today presentment is the

point at which the judge is required to take several key

steps to foreclose Government overreaching: informing the

defendant of the charges against him, his right to remain

silent, his right to counsel, the availability of bail, and any

right to a preliminary hearing; giving the defendant a

chance to consult with counsel; and deciding between

detention or release. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 5(d); see also

Rule 58(b)(2).

In a world without McNabb-Mallory, federal agents

would be free to question suspects for extended periods

before bringing them out in the open, and we have always

known what custodial secrecy leads to. See McNabb, 318

U. S. 332. No one with any smattering of the history of

20th-century dictatorships needs a lecture on the subject,

and we understand the need even within our own system

to take care against going too far. “[C]ustodial police

interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and pressures

the individual,” Dickerson, 530 U. S., at 435, and there is

mounting empirical evidence that these pressures can

induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess

to crimes they never committed, see, e.g., Drizin & Leo,

The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World,

82 N. C. L. Rev. 891, 906–907 (2004).

Justice Frankfurter’s point in McNabb is as fresh as

ever: “The history of liberty has largely been the history of

observance of procedural safeguards.” 318 U. S., at 347.

McNabb-Mallory is one of them, and neither the text nor

the history of §3501 makes out a case that Congress

meant to do away with it.

III

The Government’s fallback claim is that even if §3501

preserved a limited version of McNabb-Mallory, Congress

cut out the rule altogether by enacting Federal Rule of

Evidence 402 in 1975. Act of Jan. 2, Pub. L. 93–595, 88

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 17

Opinion of the Court

Stat. 1926. So far as it might matter here, that rule pro

vides that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as

otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United

States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other

rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statu

tory authority.” The Government says that McNabb-

Mallory excludes relevant evidence in a way not “other

wise provided by” any of these four authorities, and so has

fallen to the scythe.

The Government never raised this argument in the

Third Circuit or the District Court, which would justify

refusing to consider it here, but in any event it has no

merit. The Advisory Committee’s Notes on Rule 402,

which were before Congress when it enacted the Rules of

Evidence and which we have relied on in the past to inter

pret the rules, Tome v. United States, 513 U. S. 150, 160

(1995) (plurality opinion), expressly identified McNabb-

Mallory as a statutorily authorized rule that would sur

vive Rule 402: “The Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure

in some instances require the exclusion of relevant evi

dence. For example, . . . the effective enforcement of . . .

Rule 5(a) . . . is held to require the exclusion of statements

elicited during detention in violation thereof.” 28 U. S. C.

App., pp. 325–326 (citing Mallory, 354 U. S. 449, and 18

U. S. C. §3501(c)); see also Mallory, supra, at 451 (“Th[is]

case calls for a proper application of Rule 5(a) of the Fed

eral Rules of Criminal Procedure . . .”). Indeed, the Gov

ernment has previously conceded before this Court that

Rule 402 preserved McNabb-Mallory. Brief for United

States in United States v. Payner, O. T. 1979, No. 78–

1729, p. 32, and n. 13 (1979) (saying that Rule 402 “left to

the courts . . . questions concerning the propriety of ex

cluding relevant evidence as a method of implementing

the Constitution, a federal statute, or a statutorily author

ized rule,” and citing McNabb-Mallory as an example).

The Government was right the first time, and it would be

18 CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

bizarre to hold that Congress adopted Rule 402 with a

purpose exactly opposite to what the Advisory Committee

Notes said the rule would do.

IV

We hold that §3501 modified McNabb-Mallory without

supplanting it. Under the rule as revised by §3501(c), a

district court with a suppression claim must find whether

the defendant confessed within six hours of arrest (unless

a longer delay was “reasonable considering the means of

transportation and the distance to be traveled to the near

est available [magistrate]”). If the confession came within

that period, it is admissible, subject to the other Rules of

Evidence, so long as it was “made voluntarily and . . . the

weight to be given [it] is left to the jury.” Ibid. If the

confession occurred before presentment and beyond six

hours, however, the court must decide whether delaying

that long was unreasonable or unnecessary under the

McNabb-Mallory cases, and if it was, the confession is to

be suppressed.

In this case, the Third Circuit did not apply this rule

and in consequence never conclusively determined

whether Corley’s oral confession “should be treated as

having been made within six hours of arrest,” as the Dis

trict Court held. 500 F. 3d, at 220, n. 7. Nor did the Cir

cuit consider the justifiability of any delay beyond six

hours if the oral confession should be treated as given

outside the six-hour window; and it did not make this

enquiry with respect to Corley’s written confession. We

therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and

remand the case for consideration of those issues in the

first instance, consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 07–10441

_________________

JOHNNIE CORLEY, PETITIONER v. UNITED

STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

[April 6, 2009]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE

SCALIA, and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.

Section 3501(a) of Title 18, United States Code, directly

and unequivocally answers the question presented in this

case. After petitioner was arrested by federal agents, he

twice waived his Miranda1 rights and voluntarily con

fessed, first orally and later in writing, that he had par

ticipated in an armed bank robbery. He was then taken

before a Magistrate Judge for an initial appearance. The

question that we must decide is whether this voluntary

confession may be suppressed on the ground that there

was unnecessary delay in bringing petitioner before the

Magistrate Judge. Unless the unambiguous language of

§3501(a) is ignored, petitioner’s confession may not be

suppressed.

I

Section 3501(a) states: “In any criminal prosecution

brought by the United States . . ., a confession . . . shall be

admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.”

Applying “settled principles of statutory construction,”

“we must first determine whether the statutory text is

plain and unambiguous,” and “[i]f it is, we must apply the

——————

1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966).

2 CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

statute according to its terms.” Carcieri v. Salazar, 555

U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 7). Here, there is nothing

ambiguous about the language of §3501(a), and the Court

does not claim otherwise. Although we normally presume

that Congress “means in a statute what it says there,”

Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253–254

(1992), the Court today concludes that §3501(a) does not

mean what it says and that a voluntary confession may be

suppressed under the McNabb-Mallory rule.2 This super

visory rule, which requires the suppression of a confession

where there was unnecessary delay in bringing a federal

criminal defendant before a judicial officer after arrest,

was announced long before 18 U. S. C. §3501(a) was

adopted. According to the Court, this rule survived the

enactment of §3501(a) because Congress adopted that

provision for the sole purpose of abrogating Miranda and

apparently never realized that the provision’s broad lan

guage would also do away with the McNabb-Mallory rule.

I disagree with the Court’s analysis and therefore respect

fully dissent.

II

A

The Court’s first and most substantial argument in

vokes “the antisuperfluousness canon,” ante, at 12, under

which a statute should be read, if possible, so that all of its

provisions are given effect and none is superfluous. Ante,

at 9–12. Section 3501(c) provides that a voluntary confes

sion “shall not be inadmissible solely because of the delay”

in bringing the defendant before a judicial officer if the

defendant is brought before a judicial officer within six

hours of arrest. If §3501(a) means that a voluntary con

fession may never be excluded due to delay in bringing the

——————

2 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v.

United States, 354 U. S. 449 (1957).

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

ALITO, J., dissenting

defendant before a judicial officer, the Court reasons, then

§3501(c), which provides a safe harbor for a subset of

voluntary confessions (those made in cases in which the

initial appearance occurs within six hours of arrest), is

superfluous.

Canons of interpretation “are quite often useful in close

cases, or when statutory language is ambiguous. But we

have observed before that such ‘interpretative canon[s are]

not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted

by the legislature.’ ” United States v. Monsanto, 491 U. S.

600, 611 (1989) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472

U. S. 675, 680 (1985)). Like other canons, the antisuper

fluousness canon is merely an interpretive aid, not an

absolute rule. See Connecticut Nat. Bank, 503 U. S., at

254 (“When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then,

this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is com

plete’ ”). There are times when Congress enacts provisions

that are superfluous, and this may be such an instance.

Cf. id., at 253 (noting that “[r]edundancies across statutes

are not unusual events in drafting”); Gutierrez de Martinez

v. Lamagno, 515 U. S. 417, 445–446 (1995) (SOUTER, J.,

dissenting) (noting that, although Congress “indulged in a

little redundancy,” the “inelegance may be forgiven” be

cause “Congress could sensibly have seen some practical

value in the redundancy”).

Moreover, any superfluity created by giving subsection

(a) its plain meaning may be minimized by interpreting

subsection (c) to apply to confessions that are otherwise

voluntary. The Government contends that §3501(c),

though inartfully drafted, is not superfluous because what

the provision means is that a confession is admissible if it

is given within six hours of arrest and it is otherwise vol

untary—that is, if there is no basis other than prepre

sentment delay for concluding that the confession was

coerced. Read in this way, §3501(c) is not superfluous.

The Court rejects this argument on the ground that

4 CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

“ ‘Congress did not write the statute that way,’ ” ante, at

10, and thus, in order to adhere to a narrow reading of

§3501(c), the Court entirely disregards the unambiguous

language of §3501(a). Although §3501(a) says that a

confession is admissible if it is “voluntarily given,” the

Court reads that provision to mean that a voluntary con

fession may not be excluded on the ground that the confes

sion was obtained in violation of Miranda. To this read

ing, the short answer is that Congress really did not write

the statute that way.

As is true with most of the statutory interpretation

questions that come before this Court, the question in this

case is not like a jigsaw puzzle. There is simply no perfect

solution to the problem before us.

Instead, we must choose between two imperfect solu

tions. The first (the one adopted by the Court) entirely

disregards the clear and simple language of §3501(a), rests

on the proposition that Congress did not understand the

plain import of the language it used in subsection (a), but

adheres to a strictly literal interpretation of §3501(c). The

second option respects the clear language of subsection (a),

but either accepts some statutory surplusage or interprets

§3501(c)’s reference to a voluntary confession to mean an

otherwise voluntary confession. To my mind, the latter

choice is far preferable.

B

In addition to the antisuperfluousness canon, the Court

relies on the canon that favors a specific statutory provi

sion over a conflicting provision cast in more general

terms, ante, at 11, but that canon is inapplicable here. For

one thing, §3501(a) is quite specific; it specifically provides

that if a confession is voluntary, it is admissible. More

important, there is no other provision, specific or general,

that conflicts with §3501(a). See National Cable & Tele

communications Assn., Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U. S.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 5

ALITO, J., dissenting

327, 335–336 (2002) (“It is true that specific statutory

language should control more general language when there

is a conflict between the two. Here, however, there is no

conflict” (emphasis added)). Subsection (c) is not conflict

ing because it does not authorize the suppression of any

voluntary confession. What the Court identifies is not a

conflict between two statutory provisions but a conflict

between the express language of one provision (§3501(a))

and the “negative implication” that the Court draws from

another (§3501(c)). United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511

U. S. 350, 355 (1994). Because §3501(c) precludes the

suppression of a voluntary confession based solely on a

delay of less than six hours, the Court infers that Con

gress must have contemplated that a voluntary confession

could be suppressed based solely on a delay of more than

six hours. The Court cites no authority for a canon of

interpretation that favors a “negative implication” of this

sort over clear and express statutory language.

C

The Court contends that a literal interpretation of

§3501(a) would leave the prompt presentment require

ment set out in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a)(1)

“without any teeth, for . . . if there is no McNabb-Mallory

there is no apparent remedy for delay in presentment.”

Ante, at 15. There is nothing strange, however, about a

prompt presentment requirement that is not enforced by a

rule excluding voluntary confessions made during a period

of excessive prepresentment delay. As the Court notes,

“[t]he common law obliged an arresting officer to bring his

prisoner before a magistrate as soon as he reasonably

could,” ante, at 1, but the McNabb-Mallory supervisory

rule was not adopted until the middle of the 20th century.

To this day, while the States are required by the Fourth

Amendment to bring an arrestee promptly before a judi

cial officer, see, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,

6 CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

500 U. S. 44, 56 (1991), we have never held that this con

stitutional requirement is backed by an automatic exclu

sionary sanction, see, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U. S.

586, 592 (2006). And although the prompt presentment

requirement serves interests in addition to the prevention

of coerced confessions, the McNabb-Mallory rule provides

no sanction for excessive prepresentment delay in those

instances in which no confession is sought or obtained.

Moreover, the need for the McNabb-Mallory exclusion

ary rule is no longer clear. That rule, which was adopted

long before Miranda, originally served a purpose that is

now addressed by the giving of Miranda warnings upon

arrest. As Miranda recognized, McNabb and Mallory

were “responsive to the same considerations of Fifth

Amendment policy” that the Miranda rule was devised to

address. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 463 (1966).

In the pre-Miranda era, the requirement of prompt

presentment ensured that persons taken into custody

would, within a relatively short period, receive advice

about their rights. See McNabb v. United States, 318

U. S. 332, 344 (1943). Now, however, Miranda ensures

that arrestees receive such advice at an even earlier point,

within moments of being taken into custody. Of course,

arrestees, after receiving Miranda warnings, may waive

their rights and submit to questioning by law enforcement

officers, see, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U. S. 452,

458 (1994), and arrestees may likewise waive the prompt

presentment requirement, see, e.g., New York v. Hill, 528

U. S. 110, 114 (2000) (“We have . . . ‘in the context of a

broad array of constitutional and statutory provisions,’

articulated a general rule that presumes the availability of

waiver, . . . and we have recognized that ‘the most basic

rights of criminal defendants are . . . subject to waiver’ ”).

It seems unlikely that many arrestees who are willing to

waive the right to remain silent and the right to the assis

tance of counsel during questioning would balk at waiving

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 7

ALITO, J., dissenting

the right to prompt presentment. More than a few courts

of appeals have gone as far as to hold that a waiver of

Miranda rights also constitutes a waiver under McNabb-

Mallory. See, e.g., United States v. Salamanca, 990 F. 2d

629, 634 (CADC), cert. denied, 510 U. S. 928 (1993);

United States v. Barlow, 693 F. 2d 954, 959 (CA6 1982),

cert. denied, 461 U. S. 945 (1983); United States v. Indian

Boy X, 565 F. 2d 585, 591 (CA9 1977), cert. denied, 439

U. S. 841 (1978); United States v. Duvall, 537 F. 2d 15, 23–

24, n. 9 (CA2), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 950 (1976); United

States v. Howell, 470 F. 2d 1064, 1067, n. 1 (CA9 1972);

Pettyjohn v. United States, 419 F. 2d 651, 656 (CADC

1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 1058 (1970); O’Neal v. United

States, 411 F. 2d 131, 136–137 (CA5), cert. denied, 396

U. S. 827 (1969). Whether or not those decisions are

correct, it is certainly not clear that the McNabb-Mallory

rule adds much protection beyond that provided by

Miranda.

D

The Court contends that the legislative history of §3501

supports its interpretation, but the legislative history

proves nothing that is not evident from the terms of the

statute. With respect to §3501(a), the legislative history

certainly shows that the provision’s chief backers meant to

do away with Miranda,3 but the Court cites no evidence

that this was all that §3501(a) was intended to accom

plish. To the contrary, the Senate Report clearly says that

§3501(a) was meant to reinstate the traditional rule that a

——————

3 At argument, the Government conceded “that section (a) was con

sidered to overrule Miranda and subsection (c) was addressed to

McNabb-Mallory.” See Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. It is apparent that the

attorney for the Government chose his words carefully and did not

concede, as the Court seems to suggest, that subsection (a) was in

tended to do no more than to overrule Miranda or that subsection (c)

was the only part of §3501 that affected the McNabb-Mallory rule.

8 CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

confession should be excluded only if involuntary, see

S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 38 (1968) (Senate

Report), a step that obviously has consequences beyond

the elimination of Miranda. And the Senate Report re

peatedly cited Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964), as

an example of an unsound limitation on the admission of

voluntary confessions, see Senate Report 41–51, thus

illustrating that §3501(a) was not understood as simply an

anti-Miranda provision. Whether a majority of the Mem

bers of the House and Senate had the McNabb-Mallory

rule specifically in mind when they voted for §3501(a) is

immaterial. Statutory provisions may often have a reach

that is broader than the specific targets that the lawmak

ers might have had in mind at the time of enactment.

The legislative history relating to §3501(c) suggests

nothing more than that some Members of Congress may

mistakenly have thought that the version of §3501 that

was finally adopted would not displace the McNabb-

Mallory rule. As the Court relates, the version of §3501(c)

that emerged from the Senate Judiciary Committee would

have completely eliminated that rule. See ante, at 12–13.

Some Senators opposed this, and the version of this provi

sion that was eventually passed simply trimmed the rule.

It is possible to identify a few Senators who spoke out in

opposition to the earlier version of subsection (c) and then

voted in favor of the version that eventually passed, and it

is fair to infer that these Senators likely thought that the

amendment of subsection (c) had saved the rule. See 114

Cong. Rec. 14172–14175, 14798 (1968). But there is no

evidence that a majority of the House and Senate shared

that view, and any Member who took a few moments to

read subsections (a) and (c) must readily have understood

that subsection (a) would wipe away all non-constitution

ally based rules barring the admission of voluntary confes

sions, not just Miranda, and that subsection (c) did not

authorize the suppression of any voluntary confessions.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 9

ALITO, J., dissenting

The Court unjustifiably attributes to a majority of the

House and Senate a mistake that, the legislative history

suggests, may have been made by only a few.

E

Finally, the Court argues that under a literal reading of

§3501(a), “many a rule of evidence [would] be overridden

in case after case.” Ante, at 12. In order to avoid this

absurd result, the Court says, it is necessary to read

§3501(a) as merely abrogating Miranda and not

the McNabb-Mallory rule. There is no merit to this

argument.4

The language that Congress used in §3501(a)—a confes

sion is “admissible” if “voluntarily given”—is virtually a

verbatim quotation of the language used by this Court in

describing the traditional rule regarding the admission of

confessions. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S.

503, 513 (1963) (“ ‘ In short, the true test of admissibility is

that the confession is made freely, voluntarily and without

compulsion or inducement of any sort.’ ” (quoting Wilson v.

United States, 162 U. S. 613, 623 (1896))); Lyons v. Okla

homa, 322 U. S. 596, 602 (1944); Ziang Sung Wan v.

United States, 266 U. S. 1, 15 (1924); Bram v. United

States, 168 U. S. 532, 545 (1897). In making these state

ments, this Court certainly did not mean to suggest that a

voluntary confession must be admitted in those instances

in which a standard rule of evidence would preclude ad

mission, and there is no reason to suppose that Congress

meant any such thing either. In any event, the Federal

——————

4 Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, cases in which one of the stan

dard Rules of Evidence might block the admission of a voluntary

confession would seem quite rare, and the Court cites no real-world

examples. The Court thus justifies its reading of §3501, which totally

disregards the clear language of subsection (a), based on a few essen

tially fanciful hypothetical cases that, in any event, have been covered

since 1975 by the Federal Rules of Evidence.

10 CORLEY v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., dissenting

Rules of Evidence now make it clear that §3501(a) does

not supersede ordinary evidence Rules, including Rules

regarding privilege (Rule 501), hearsay (Rule 802), and

restrictions on the use of character evidence (Rule 404).

Thus, it is not necessary to disregard the plain language of

§3501(a), as the Court does, in order to avoid the sort of

absurd results to which the Court refers.

For all these reasons, I would affirm the decision of the

Court of Appeals, and I therefore respectfully dissent.