Boyle v. United States

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BOYLE v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 07–1309. Argued January 14, 2009—Decided June 8, 2009

The evidence at petitioner Boyle’s trial for violating the Racketeer In

fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision forbidding

“any person . . . associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the ac

tivities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or

participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s

affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity,” 18 U. S. C.

§1962(c), was sufficient to prove, among other things, that Boyle and

others committed a series of bank thefts in several States; that the

participants included a core group, along with others recruited from

time to time; and that the core group was loosely and informally or

ganized, lacking a leader, hierarchy, or any long-term master plan.

Relying largely on United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 583, the

District Court instructed the jury that to establish a RICO associa

tion-in-fact “enterprise,” the Government must prove (1) an ongoing

organization with a framework, formal or informal, for carrying out

its objectives, and (2) that association members functioned as a con

tinuing unit to achieve a common purpose. The court also told the

jury that an association-in-fact’s existence is often more readily

proved by what it does than by abstract analysis of its structure, and

denied Boyle’s request for an instruction requiring the Government

to prove that the enterprise had “an ascertainable structural hierar

chy distinct from the charged predicate acts.” Boyle was convicted,

and the Second Circuit affirmed.

Held:

1. An association-in-fact enterprise under RICO must have a

“structure,” but the pertinent jury instruction need not be framed in

the precise language Boyle proposes, i.e., as having “an ascertainable

structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity

2 BOYLE v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

in which it engages.” Pp. 4–12.

(a) In light of RICO’s broad statement that an enterprise “in

cludes any . . . group of individuals associated in fact although not a

legal entity,” §1961(4), and the requirement that RICO be “liberally

construed to effectuate its remedial purposes,” note following §1961,

Turkette explained that “enterprise” reaches “a group of persons asso

ciated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of con

duct,” 452 U. S., at 583, and “is proved by evidence of an ongoing or

ganization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various

associates function as a continuing unit.” Ibid. Pp. 4–5.

(b) The question presented by this case is whether an associa

tion-in-fact enterprise must have “an ascertainable structure beyond

that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it en

gages.” Pet. for Cert. i. This question can be broken into three parts.

First, the enterprise must have a “structure” that, under RICO’s

terms, has at least three features: a purpose, relationships among the

associates, and longevity sufficient to permit the associates to pursue

the enterprise’s purpose. See Turkette, 452 U. S., at 583. The in

structions need not actually use the term “structure,” however, so

long as the relevant point’s substance is adequately expressed. Sec

ond, because a jury must find the existence of elements of a crime be

yond a reasonable doubt, requiring a jury to find the existence of a

structure that is ascertainable would be redundant and potentially

misleading. Third, the phrase “beyond that inherent in the pattern of

racketeering activity” is correctly interpreted to mean that the enter

prise’s existence is a separate element that must be proved, not that

such existence may never be inferred from the evidence showing that

the associates engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. See ibid.

Pp. 6–8.

(c) Boyle’s argument that an enterprise must have structural fea

tures additional to those that can be fairly inferred from RICO’s lan

guage—e.g., a hierarchical structure or chain of command; fixed roles

for associates; and an enterprise name, regular meetings, dues, es

tablished rules and regulations, disciplinary procedures, or induction

or initiation ceremonies—has no basis in the statute’s text. As

Turkette said, an association-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing

unit that functions with a common purpose. The breadth of RICO’s

“enterprise” concept is highlighted by comparing the statute with

other federal laws having much more stringent requirements for tar

geting organized criminal groups: E.g., §1955(b) defines an “illegal

gambling business” as one that “involves five or more persons who

conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such

business.” Pp. 8–10.

(d) Rejection of Boyle’s argument does not lead to a merger of the

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Syllabus

§1962(c) crime and other federal offenses. For example, proof that a

defendant violated §1955 does not necessarily establish that he con

spired to participate in a gambling enterprise’s affairs through a pat

tern of racketeering activity. Rather, that would require the prosecu

tion to prove either that the defendant committed a pattern of §1955

violations or a pattern of state-law gambling crimes. See §1961(1).

Pp. 10–11.

(e) Because RICO’s language is clear, the Court need not reach

Boyle’s statutory purpose, legislative history, or rule-of-lenity argu

ments. Pp. 11–12.

2. The instructions below were correct and adequate. By explicitly

telling jurors they could not convict on the RICO charges unless they

found that the Government had proved the existence of an enterprise,

the instructions made clear that this was a separate element from

the pattern of racketeering activity. The jurors also were adequately

told that the enterprise needed the structural attributes that may be

inferred from the statutory language. Finally, the instruction that an

enterprise’s existence “is oftentimes more readily proven by what it

does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure” properly con

veyed Turkette’s point that proof of a pattern of racketeering activity

may be sufficient in a particular case to permit an inference of the

enterprise’s existence. P. 12.

283 Fed. Appx. 825, affirmed.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,

and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.

STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, J., joined.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 07–1309

_________________

EDMUND BOYLE, PETITIONER v. UNITED

STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 8, 2009]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

We are asked in this case to decide whether an associa

tion-in-fact enterprise under the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §1961 et

seq., must have “an ascertainable structure beyond that

inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it

engages.” Pet. for Cert. i. We hold that such an enterprise

must have a “structure” but that an instruction framed in

this precise language is not necessary. The District Court

properly instructed the jury in this case. We therefore

affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I

A

The evidence at petitioner’s trial was sufficient to prove

the following: Petitioner and others participated in a

series of bank thefts in New York, New Jersey, Ohio, and

Wisconsin during the 1990’s. The participants in these

crimes included a core group, along with others who were

recruited from time to time. Although the participants

sometimes attempted bank-vault burglaries and bank

robberies, the group usually targeted cash-laden night

2 BOYLE v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

deposit boxes, which are often found in banks in retail

areas.

Each theft was typically carried out by a group of par

ticipants who met beforehand to plan the crime, gather

tools (such as crowbars, fishing gaffs, and walkie-talkies),

and assign the roles that each participant would play

(such as lookout and driver). The participants generally

split the proceeds from the thefts. The group was loosely

and informally organized. It does not appear to have had

a leader or hierarchy; nor does it appear that the partici

pants ever formulated any long-term master plan or

agreement.

From 1991 to 1994, the core group was responsible for

more than 30 night-deposit-box thefts. By 1994, petitioner

had joined the group, and over the next five years, he

participated in numerous attempted night-deposit-box

thefts and at least two attempted bank-vault burglaries.

In 2003, petitioner was indicted for participation in the

conduct of the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of

racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §1962(c);

conspiracy to commit that offense, in violation of §1962(d);

conspiracy to commit bank burglary, in violation of §371;

and nine counts of bank burglary and attempted bank

burglary, in violation of §2113(a).

B

In instructing the jury on the meaning of a RICO “en

terprise,” the District Court relied largely on language in

United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576 (1981). The court

told the jurors that, in order to establish the existence of

such an enterprise, the Government had to prove that:

“(1) There [was] an ongoing organization with some sort of

framework, formal or informal, for carrying out its objec

tives; and (2) the various members and associates of the

association function[ed] as a continuing unit to achieve a

common purpose.” App. 112. Over petitioner’s objection,

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Opinion of the Court

the court also told the jury that it could “find an enterprise

where an association of individuals, without structural

hierarchy, form[ed] solely for the purpose of carrying out a

pattern of racketeering acts” and that “[c]ommon sense

suggests that the existence of an association-in-fact is

oftentimes more readily proven by what it does, rather

than by abstract analysis of its structure.” Id., at 111–

112.1

Petitioner requested an instruction that the Govern

ment was required to prove that the enterprise “had an

ongoing organization, a core membership that functioned

as a continuing unit, and an ascertainable structural

——————

1 The relevant portion of the instructions was as follows:

“The term ‘enterprise’ as used in these instructions may also include

a group of people associated in fact, even though this association is not

recognized as a legal entity. Indeed, an enterprise need not have a

name. Thus, an enterprise need not be a form[al] business entity such

as a corporation, but may be merely an informal association of indi

viduals. A group or association of people can be an ‘enterprise’ if,

among other requirements, these individuals ‘associate’ together for a

purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. Common sense sug

gests that the existence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes more

readily proven by what it does, rather than by abstract analysis of its

structure.

“Moreover, you may find an enterprise where an association of indi

viduals, without structural hierarchy, forms solely for the purpose of

carrying out a pattern of racketeering acts. Such an association of

persons may be established by evidence showing an ongoing organiza

tion, formal or informal, and . . . by evidence that the people making up

the association functioned as a continuing unit. Therefore, in order to

establish the existence of such an enterprise, the government must

prove that: (1) There is an ongoing organization with some sort of

framework, formal or informal, for carrying out its objectives; and (2)

the various members and associates of the association function as a

continuing unit to achieve a common purpose.

“Regarding ‘organization,’ it is not necessary that the enterprise have

any particular or formal structure, but it must have sufficient organiza

tion that its members functioned and operated in a coordinated manner

in order to carry out the alleged common purpose or purposes of the

enterprise.” App. 111–113 (emphasis added).

4 BOYLE v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

hierarchy distinct from the charged predicate acts.” Id., at

95. The District Court refused to give that instruction.

Petitioner was convicted on 11 of the 12 counts against

him, including the RICO counts, and was sentenced to 151

months’ imprisonment. In a summary order, the Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction but

vacated the sentence on a ground not relevant to the

issues before us. 283 Fed. Appx. 825 (2007). The Court of

Appeals did not specifically address the RICO jury in

structions, stating only that the arguments not discussed

in the order were “without merit.” Id., at 826. Petitioner

was then resentenced, and we granted certiorari, 554 U. S.

___ (2008), to resolve conflicts among the Courts of Ap

peals concerning the meaning of a RICO enterprise.

II

A

RICO makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or

associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities

of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct

or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such

enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering

activity or collection of unlawful debt.” 18 U. S. C.

§1962(c) (emphasis added).

The statute does not specifically define the outer

boundaries of the “enterprise” concept but states that the

term “includes any individual, partnership, corporation,

association, or other legal entity, and any union or group

of individuals associated in fact although not a legal en

tity.” §1961(4).2 This enumeration of included enterprises

——————

2 This provision does not purport to set out an exhaustive definition of

the term “enterprise.” Compare §§1961(1)–(2) (defining what the terms

“racketeering activity” and “State” mean) with §§1961(3)–(4) (defining

what the terms “person” and “enterprise” include). Accordingly, this

provision does not foreclose the possibility that the term might include,

in addition to the specifically enumerated entities, others that fall

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 5

Opinion of the Court

is obviously broad, encompassing “any . . . group of indi

viduals associated in fact.” Ibid. (emphasis added). The

term “any” ensures that the definition has a wide reach,

see, e.g., Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U. S. ___,

___ (2008) (slip op., at 4–5), and the very concept of an

association in fact is expansive. In addition, the RICO

statute provides that its terms are to be “liberally con

strued to effectuate its remedial purposes.” §904(a), 84

Stat. 947, note following 18 U. S. C. §1961; see also, e.g.,

National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510

U. S. 249, 257 (1994) (“RICO broadly defines ‘enterprise’ ”);

Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 497 (1985)

(“RICO is to be read broadly”); Russello v. United States,

464 U. S. 16, 21 (1983) (noting “the pattern of the RICO

statute in utilizing terms and concepts of breadth”).

In light of these statutory features, we explained in

Turkette that “an enterprise includes any union or group

of individuals associated in fact” and that RICO reaches “a

group of persons associated together for a common pur

pose of engaging in a course of conduct.” 452 U. S., at 580,

583. Such an enterprise, we said, “is proved by evidence of

an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evi

dence that the various associates function as a continuing

unit.” Id., at 583.

Notwithstanding these precedents, the dissent asserts

that the definition of a RICO enterprise is limited to

“business-like entities.” See post, at 1–5 (opinion of

STEVENS, J.). We see no basis to impose such an extratex

tual requirement.3

——————

within the ordinary meaning of the term “enterprise.” See H. J. Inc. v.

Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 238 (1989) (explaining

that the term “pattern” also retains its ordinary meaning notwithstand

ing the statutory definition in §1961(5)).

3 The dissent claims that the “business-like” limitation “is confirmed

by the text of §1962(c) and our decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507

U. S. 170 (1993).” Post, at 3. Section 1962(c), however, states only that

6 BOYLE v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

B

As noted, the specific question on which we granted

certiorari is whether an association-in-fact enterprise

must have “an ascertainable structure beyond that inher

ent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it

engages.” Pet. for Cert. i. We will break this question into

three parts. First, must an association-in-fact enterprise

have a “structure”? Second, must the structure be “ascer

tainable”? Third, must the “structure” go “beyond that

inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity” in which

its members engage?

“Structure.” We agree with petitioner that an associa

tion-in-fact enterprise must have a structure. In the sense

relevant here, the term “structure” means “[t]he way in

which parts are arranged or put together to form a whole”

and “[t]he interrelation or arrangement of parts in a com

plex entity.” American Heritage Dictionary 1718 (4th ed.

2000); see also Random House Dictionary of the English

Language 1410 (1967) (defining structure to mean, among

other things, “the pattern of relationships, as of status or

friendship, existing among the members of a group or

society”).

From the terms of RICO, it is apparent that an associa

tion-in-fact enterprise must have at least three structural

features: a purpose, relationships among those associated

with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit

——————

one may not “conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the

conduct of [an] enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering

activity.” Whatever business-like characteristics the dissent has in

mind, we do not see them in §1962(c). Furthermore, Reves v. Ernst &

Young, 507 U. S. 170 (1993), is inapposite because that case turned on

our interpretation of the participation requirement of §1962, not the

definition of “enterprise.” See id., at 184–185. In any case, it would be

an interpretive stretch to deduce from the requirement that an enter

prise must be “directed” to impose the much broader, amorphous

requirement that it be “business-like.”

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 7

Opinion of the Court

these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose. As we

succinctly put it in Turkette, an association-in-fact enter

prise is “a group of persons associated together for a com

mon purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.” 452

U. S., at 583.

That an “enterprise” must have a purpose is apparent

from meaning of the term in ordinary usage, i.e., a “ven

ture,” “undertaking,” or “project.” Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary 757 (1976). The concept of “asso

ciat[ion]” requires both interpersonal relationships and a

common interest. See id., at 132 (defining “association” as

“an organization of persons having a common interest”);

Black’s Law Dictionary 156 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (defining

“association” as a “collection of persons who have joined

together for a certain object”). Section 1962(c) reinforces

this conclusion and also shows that an “enterprise” must

have some longevity, since the offense proscribed by that

provision demands proof that the enterprise had “affairs”

of sufficient duration to permit an associate to “partici

pate” in those affairs through “a pattern of racketeering

activity.”

Although an association-in-fact enterprise must have

these structural features, it does not follow that a district

court must use the term “structure” in its jury instruc

tions. A trial judge has considerable discretion in choosing

the language of an instruction so long as the substance of

the relevant point is adequately expressed.

“Ascertainable.” Whenever a jury is told that it must

find the existence of an element beyond a reasonable

doubt, that element must be “ascertainable” or else the

jury could not find that it was proved. Therefore, telling

the members of the jury that they had to ascertain the

existence of an “ascertainable structure” would have been

redundant and potentially misleading.

“Beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering

activity.” This phrase may be interpreted in least two

8 BOYLE v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

different ways, and its correctness depends on the particu

lar sense in which the phrase is used. If the phrase is

interpreted to mean that the existence of an enterprise is

a separate element that must be proved, it is of course

correct. As we explained in Turkette, the existence of an

enterprise is an element distinct from the pattern of rack

eteering activity and “proof of one does not necessarily

establish the other.”4 452 U. S., at 583.

On the other hand, if the phrase is used to mean that

the existence of an enterprise may never be inferred from

the evidence showing that persons associated with the

enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, it

is incorrect. We recognized in Turkette that the evidence

used to prove the pattern of racketeering activity and the

evidence establishing an enterprise “may in particular

cases coalesce.” Ibid.

C

The crux of petitioner’s argument is that a RICO enter

prise must have structural features in addition to those

that we think can be fairly inferred from the language of

the statute. Although petitioner concedes that an associa

tion-in-fact enterprise may be an “ ‘informal’ ” group and

that “not ‘much’ ” structure is needed, Reply Brief for

Petitioner 24, he contends that such an enterprise must

have at least some additional structural attributes, such

as a structural “hierarchy,” “role differentiation,” a

“unique modus operandi,” a “chain of command,” “profes

sionalism and sophistication of organization,” “diversity

——————

4 It is easy to envision situations in which proof that individuals en

gaged in a pattern of racketeering activity would not establish the

existence of an enterprise. For example, suppose that several individu

als, independently and without coordination, engaged in a pattern of

crimes listed as RICO predicates—for example, bribery or extortion.

Proof of these patterns would not be enough to show that the individu

als were members of an enterprise.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 9

Opinion of the Court

and complexity of crimes,” “membership dues, rules and

regulations,” “uncharged or additional crimes aside from

predicate acts,” an “internal discipline mechanism,” “regu

lar meetings regarding enterprise affairs,” an “enterprise

‘name,’ ” and “induction or initiation ceremonies and ritu

als.” Id., at 31–35; see also Brief for Petitioner 26–28, 33;

Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 8, 17.

We see no basis in the language of RICO for the struc

tural requirements that petitioner asks us to recognize.

As we said in Turkette, an association-in-fact enterprise is

simply a continuing unit that functions with a common

purpose. Such a group need not have a hierarchical struc

ture or a “chain of command”; decisions may be made on

an ad hoc basis and by any number of methods—by major

ity vote, consensus, a show of strength, etc. Members of

the group need not have fixed roles; different members

may perform different roles at different times. The group

need not have a name, regular meetings, dues, established

rules and regulations, disciplinary procedures, or induc

tion or initiation ceremonies. While the group must func

tion as a continuing unit and remain in existence long

enough to pursue a course of conduct, nothing in RICO

exempts an enterprise whose associates engage in spurts

of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence. Nor is the

statute limited to groups whose crimes are sophisticated,

diverse, complex, or unique; for example, a group that does

nothing but engage in extortion through old-fashioned,

unsophisticated, and brutal means may fall squarely

within the statute’s reach.

The breadth of the “enterprise” concept in RICO is

highlighted by comparing the statute with other federal

statutes that target organized criminal groups. For exam

ple, 18 U. S. C. §1955(b), which was enacted together with

RICO as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,

84 Stat. 922, defines an “illegal gambling business” as one

that “involves five or more persons who conduct, finance,

10 BOYLE v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such busi

ness.” A “continuing criminal enterprise,” as defined in 21

U. S. C. §848(c), must involve more than five persons who

act in concert and must have an “organizer,” supervisor, or

other manager. Congress included no such requirements

in RICO.

III

A

Contrary to petitioner’s claims, rejection of his argu

ment regarding these structural characteristics does not

lead to a merger of the crime proscribed by 18 U. S. C.

§1962(c) (participating in the affairs of an enterprise

through a pattern of racketeering activity) and any of the

following offenses: operating a gambling business, §1955;

conspiring to commit one or more crimes that are listed as

RICO predicate offenses, §371; or conspiring to violate the

RICO statute, §1962(d).

Proof that a defendant violated §1955 does not necessar

ily establish that the defendant conspired to participate in

the affairs of a gambling enterprise through a pattern of

racketeering activity. In order to prove the latter offense,

the prosecution must prove either that the defendant

committed a pattern of §1955 violations or a pattern of

state-law gambling crimes. See §1961(1). No such proof is

needed to establish a simple violation of §1955.

Likewise, proof that a defendant conspired to commit a

RICO predicate offense—for example, arson—does not

necessarily establish that the defendant participated in

the affairs of an arson enterprise through a pattern of

arson crimes. Under §371, a conspiracy is an inchoate

crime that may be completed in the brief period needed for

the formation of the agreement and the commission of a

single overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See

United States v. Feola, 420 U. S. 671, 694 (1975). Section

1962(c) demands much more: the creation of an “enter

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 11

Opinion of the Court

prise”—a group with a common purpose and course of

conduct—and the actual commission of a pattern of predi

cate offenses.5

Finally, while in practice the elements of a violation of

§§1962(c) and (d) are similar, this overlap would persist

even if petitioner’s conception of an association-in-fact

enterprise were accepted.

B

Because the statutory language is clear, there is no need

to reach petitioner’s remaining arguments based on statu

tory purpose, legislative history, or the rule of lenity. In

prior cases, we have rejected similar arguments in favor of

the clear but expansive text of the statute. See National

Organization for Women, 510 U. S., at 262 (“The fact that

RICO has been applied in situations not expressly antici

pated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It

demonstrates breadth” (quoting Sedima, 473 U. S., at 499,

brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also

Turkette, 452 U. S., at 589–591. “We have repeatedly

refused to adopt narrowing constructions of RICO in order

to make it conform to a preconceived notion of what Con

gress intended to proscribe.” Bridge v. Phoenix Bond &

Indemnity Co., 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 20);

see also, e.g., National Organization for Women, supra, at

252 (rejecting the argument that “RICO requires proof

that either the racketeering enterprise or the predicate

acts of racketeering were motivated by an economic pur

pose”); H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492

U. S. 229, 244 (1989) (declining to read “an organized

——————

5 The dissent states that “[o]nly if proof of the enterprise ele

ment . . . requires evidence of activity or organization beyond that

inherent in the pattern of predicate acts will RICO offenses retain an

identity distinct from §371 offenses.” Post, at 7 (opinion of STEVENS, J.).

This is incorrect: Even if the same evidence may prove two separate

elements, this does not mean that the two elements collapse into one.

12 BOYLE v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

crime limitation into RICO’s pattern concept”); Sedima,

supra, at 481 (rejecting the view that RICO provides a

private right of action “only against defendants who had

been convicted on criminal charges, and only where there

had occurred a ‘racketeering injury’ ”).

IV

The instructions the District Court judge gave to the

jury in this case were correct and adequate. These in

structions explicitly told the jurors that they could not

convict on the RICO charges unless they found that the

Government had proved the existence of an enterprise.

See App. 111. The instructions made clear that this was a

separate element from the pattern of racketeering activity.

Ibid.

The instructions also adequately told the jury that the

enterprise needed to have the structural attributes that

may be inferred from the statutory language. As noted,

the trial judge told the jury that the Government was

required to prove that there was “an ongoing organization

with some sort of framework, formal or informal, for carry

ing out its objectives” and that “the various members and

associates of the association function[ed] as a continuing

unit to achieve a common purpose.” Id., at 112.

Finally, the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury

that “the existence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes

more readily proven by what it does, rather than by ab

stract analysis of its structure.” Id., at 111–112. This

instruction properly conveyed the point we made in

Turkette that proof of a pattern of racketeering activity

may be sufficient in a particular case to permit a jury to

infer the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise.

We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of

Appeals.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

STEVENS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 07–1309

_________________

EDMUND BOYLE, PETITIONER v. UNITED

STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 8, 2009]

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins,

dissenting.

In my view, Congress intended the term “enterprise” as

it is used in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or

ganizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §1961 et seq., to refer

only to business-like entities that have an existence apart

from the predicate acts committed by their employees or

associates. The trial judge in this case committed two

significant errors relating to the meaning of that term.

First, he instructed the jury that “an association of indi

viduals, without structural hierarchy, form[ed] solely for

the purpose of carrying out a pattern of racketeering acts”

can constitute an enterprise. App. 112. And he allowed

the jury to find that element satisfied by evidence showing

a group of criminals with no existence beyond its intermit

tent commission of racketeering acts and related offenses.

Because the Court’s decision affirming petitioner’s convic

tion is inconsistent with the statutory meaning of the term

enterprise and serves to expand RICO liability far beyond

the bounds Congress intended, I respectfully dissent.

I

RICO makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or

associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities

of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct

2 BOYLE v. UNITED STATES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such

enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering

activity.” §1962(c). The statute defines “enterprise” to

include “any individual, partnership, corporation, associa

tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of indi

viduals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”

§1961(4).

It is clear from the statute and our earlier decisions

construing the term that Congress used “enterprise” in

these provisions in the sense of “a business organization,”

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 757 (1976),

rather than “a ‘venture,’ ‘undertaking,’ or ‘project,’ ” ante,

at 6 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Diction

ary, at 757). First, the terms “individual, partnership,

corporation, association, or other legal entity” describe

entities with formal legal structures most commonly es

tablished for business purposes. §1961(4). In context, the

subsequent reference to any “union or group of individuals

associated in fact although not a legal entity” reflects an

intended commonality between the legal and nonlegal

entities included in the provision. Ibid. (emphasis added).

“The juxtaposition of the two phrases suggests that ‘asso

ciated in fact’ just means structured without the aid of

legally defined structural forms such as the business

corporation.” Limestone Development Corp. v. Lemont, 520

F. 3d 797, 804–805 (CA7 2008).1

——————

1 To

be sure, we have read RICO’s enterprise term broadly to include

entities with exclusively noneconomic motives or wholly unlawful

purposes. See National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510

U. S. 249, 252 (1994) (NOW); United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576,

580–581 (1981). But those holdings are consistent with the conclusion

that an enterprise is a business-like entity. Indeed, the examples of

qualifying associations cited in Turkette—including loan-sharking,

property-fencing, drug-trafficking, and counterfeiting operations—

satisfy that criterion, as each describes an organization with continuing

operations directed toward providing goods or services to its customers.

See id., at 589–590 (citing 84 Stat. 923; 116 Cong. Rec. 592 (1970)).

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

STEVENS, J., dissenting

That an enterprise must have business-like characteris

tics is confirmed by the text of §1962(c) and our decision in

Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170 (1993). Section

1962(c) creates liability for “conduct[ing] or participat[ing]

. . . in the conduct of [an] enterprise’s affairs through a

pattern of racketeering activity.” In Reves, we examined

that provision’s meaning and held that, “[i]n order to

‘participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such

enterprise’s affairs,’ one must have some part in directing

those affairs.” Id., at 179 (quoting §1962(c)). It is not

enough for a defendant to “carry on” or “participate in” an

enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering

activity; instead, evidence that he operated, managed, or

directed those affairs is required. See id., at 177–179.

This requirement confirms that the enterprise element

demands evidence of a certain quantum of business-like

organization—i.e., a system of processes, dealings, or other

affairs that can be “directed.”

Our cases also make clear that an enterprise “is an

entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in

which it engages.” United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S.

576, 583 (1981). As with the requirement that an enter

prise have business-like characteristics, that an enterprise

must have a separate existence is confirmed by §1962(c)

and Reves. If an entity’s existence consisted solely of its

members’ performance of a pattern of racketeering acts,

the “enterprise’s affairs” would be synonymous with the

“pattern of racketeering activity.” Section 1962(c) would

then prohibit an individual from conducting or participat

ing in “the conduct of [a pattern of racketeering activity]

through a pattern of racketeering activity”—a reading

——————

Similarly, the enterprise at issue in NOW was a nationwide network of

antiabortion groups that had a leadership counsel and regular confer

ences and whose members undertook an extensive pattern of extortion,

arson, and other racketeering activity for the purpose of “shut[ting]

down abortion clinics.” 510 U. S., at 253.

4 BOYLE v. UNITED STATES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

that is unbearably redundant, particularly in a case like

this one in which a single pattern of activity is alleged.

The only way to avoid that result is to require that an

“enterprise’s affairs” be something other than the pattern

of racketeering activity undertaken by its members.2

Recognizing an enterprise’s business-like nature and its

distinctness from the pattern of predicate acts, however,

does not answer the question of what proof each element

requires. In cases involving a legal entity, the matter of

proving the enterprise element is straightforward, as the

entity’s legal existence will always be something apart

from the pattern of activity performed by the defendant or

his associates. Cf. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v.

King, 533 U. S. 158, 163 (2001). But in the case of an

association-in-fact enterprise, the Government must ad

duce other evidence of the entity’s “separate” existence

and “ongoing organization.” Turkette, 452 U. S., at 583.

There may be cases in which a jury can infer that exis

tence and continuity from the evidence used to establish

the pattern of racketeering activity. Ibid. But that will be

——————

2 The

other subsections of 18 U. S. C. §1962 further demonstrate the

business-like nature of the enterprise element and its necessary dis

tinctness from the pattern of racketeering activity. Subsection (a)

prohibits anyone who receives income derived from a pattern of racket

eering activity from “us[ing] or invest[ing], directly or indirectly, any

part of such income . . . in acquisition of any interest in, or the estab

lishment or operation of, any enterprise.” And subsection (b) prohibits

anyone from “acquir[ing] or maintain[ing]” any interest in or control of

an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. We noted in

NOW that the term enterprise “plays a different role in the structure”

of those subsections than it does in subsection (c) because the enter

prise in those subsections is the victim. 510 U. S., at 258–259. We did

not, however, suggest that the term has a substantially different

meaning in each subsection. To the contrary, our observation that the

enterprise in subsection (c) is “the vehicle through which the unlawful

pattern of racketeering activity is committed,” id., at 259, indicates

that, as in subsections (a) and (b), the enterprise must have an exis

tence apart from the pattern of racketeering activity.

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 5

STEVENS, J., dissenting

true only when the pattern of activity is so complex that it

could not be performed in the absence of structures or

processes for planning or concealing the illegal conduct

beyond those inherent in performing the predicate acts.

More often, proof of an enterprise’s separate existence will

require different evidence from that used to establish the

pattern of predicate acts.

Precisely what proof is required in each case is a more

difficult question, largely due to the abundant variety of

RICO predicates and enterprises. Because covered enter

prises are necessarily business-like in nature, however,

proof of an association-in-fact enterprise’s separate exis

tence will generally require evidence of rules, routines, or

processes through which the entity maintains its continu

ing operations and seeks to conceal its illegal acts. As

petitioner suggests, this requirement will usually be satis

fied by evidence that the association has an “ascertainable

structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeer

ing activity in which it engages.” Pet. for Cert. i. Exam

ples of such structure include an organizational hierarchy,

a “framework for making decisions,” an “internal disci

pline mechanism,” “regular meetings,” or a practice of

“reinvest[ing] proceeds to promote and expand the enter

prise.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 31–34. In other cases,

the enterprise’s existence might be established through

evidence that it provides goods or services to third parties,

as such an undertaking will require organizational ele

ments more comprehensive than those necessary to per

form a pattern of predicate acts. Thus, the evidence

needed to establish an enterprise will vary from case to

case, but in every case the Government must carry its

burden of proving that an alleged enterprise has an exis

tence separate from the pattern of racketeering activity

undertaken by its constituents.

6 BOYLE v. UNITED STATES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

II

In some respects, my reading of the statute is not very

different from that adopted by the Court. We agree that

“an association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three

structural features: a purpose, relationships among those

associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to

permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s pur

pose.” Ante, at 6. But the Court stops short of giving

content to that requirement. It states only that RICO

“demands proof that the enterprise had ‘affairs’ of suffi

cient duration to permit an associate to ‘participate’ in

those affairs through ‘a pattern of racketeering activity,’ ”

before concluding that “[a] trial judge has considerable

discretion in choosing the language of an instruction” and

need not use the term “structure.” Ante, at 7. While I

agree the word structure is not talismanic, I would hold

that the instructions must convey the requirement that

the alleged enterprise have an existence apart from the

alleged pattern of predicate acts. The Court’s decision, by

contrast, will allow juries to infer the existence of an

enterprise in every case involving a pattern of racketeer

ing activity undertaken by two or more associates.

By permitting the Government to prove both elements

with the same evidence, the Court renders the enterprise

requirement essentially meaningless in association-in-fact

cases. It also threatens to make that category of §1962(c)

offenses indistinguishable from conspiracies to commit

predicate acts, see §371, as the only remaining difference

is §1962(c)’s pattern requirement. The Court resists this

criticism, arguing that §1962(c) “demands much more”

than the inchoate offense defined in §371. Ante, at 10. It

states that the latter “may be completed in the brief period

needed for the formation of the agreement and the com

mission of a single overt act in furtherance of the conspir

acy,” whereas the former requires the creation of “a group

with a common purpose and course of conduct—and the

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 7

STEVENS, J., dissenting

actual commission of a pattern of predicate offenses.”

Ibid. Given that it is also unlawful to conspire to violate

§1962(c), see §1962(d), this comment provides no assur

ance that RICO and §371 offenses remain distinct. Only if

proof of the enterprise element—the “group with a com

mon purpose and course of conduct”—requires evidence of

activity or organization beyond that inherent in the pat

tern of predicate acts will RICO offenses retain an identity

distinct from §371 offenses.

This case illustrates these concerns. The trial judge

instructed the jury that an enterprise need have only the

degree of organization necessary “for carrying out its

objectives” and that it could “find an enterprise where an

association of individuals, without structural hierarchy,

forms solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattern of

racketeering acts.” App. 112.3 These instructions were

plainly deficient, as they did not require the Government

to prove that the alleged enterprise had an existence apart

from the pattern of predicate acts. Instead, they permit

ted the Government’s proof of the enterprise’s structure

and continuing nature—requirements on which all

agree—to consist only of evidence that petitioner and his

associates performed a pattern of racketeering activity.

Petitioner’s requested instruction would have required

the jury to find that the alleged enterprise “had an ongo

ing organization, a core membership that functioned as a

continuing unit, and an ascertainable structural hierarchy

distinct from the charged predicate acts.” Id., at 95. That

instruction does not precisely track my understanding of

the statute; although evidence of “structural hierarchy”

can evidence an enterprise, it is not necessary to establish

that element. Nevertheless, the proposed instruction

would have better directed the jury to consider whether

——————

3 For the full text of the relevant portion of the instructions, see ante,

at 3, n. 1.

8 BOYLE v. UNITED STATES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

the alleged enterprise possessed the separate existence

necessary to expose petitioner to liability under §1962(c),

and the trial judge should have considered an instruction

along those lines.

The trial judge also erred in finding the Government’s

evidence in this case sufficient to support petitioner’s

RICO convictions. Petitioner was alleged to have partici

pated and conspired to participate in the conduct of an

enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering

activity consisting of one act of bank robbery and three

acts of interstate transportation of stolen funds. Id., at

15–19. The “primary goals” of the alleged enterprise

“included generating money for its members and associ

ates through the commission of criminal activity, includ

ing bank robberies, bank burglaries and interstate trans

portation of stolen money.” Id., at 14. And its modus

operandi was to congregate periodically when an associate

had a lead on a night-deposit box that the group could

break into. Whoever among the associates was available

would bring screwdrivers, crowbars, and walkie-talkies to

the location. Some acted as lookouts, while others re

trieved the money. When the endeavor was successful, the

participants would split the proceeds. Thus, the group’s

purpose and activities, and petitioner’s participation

therein, were limited to sporadic acts of taking money

from bank deposit boxes. There is no evidence in RICO’s

text or history that Congress intended it to reach such

ad hoc associations of thieves.

III

Because the instructions and evidence in this case did

not satisfy the requirement that an alleged enterprise

have an existence separate and apart from the pattern of

activity in which it engages, I respectfully dissent.