John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

No. 06–1164. Argued November 6, 2007—Decided January 8, 2008

In a Court of Federal Claims action, petitioner argued that various fed

eral activities on land for which it held a mining lease amounted to

an unconstitutional taking of its leasehold rights. The Government

initially asserted that the claims were untimely under the court of

claims statute of limitations, but later effectively conceded that issue

and won on the merits. Although the Government did not raise time

liness on appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue sua sponte,

finding the action untimely.

Held: The court of claims statute of limitations requires sua sponte con

sideration of a lawsuit’s timeliness, despite the Government’s waiver

of the issue. Pp. 2–9.

(a) This Court has long interpreted the statute as setting out a

more absolute, “jurisdictional” limitations period. For example, in

1883, the Court concluded with regard to the current statute’s prede

cessor that “it [was] the duty of the court to raise the [timeliness]

question whether it [was] done by plea or not.” Kendall v. United

States, 107 U. S. 123, 125–126. See also Finn v. United States, 123

U. S. 227, and Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270. That the

statute’s language has changed slightly since 1883 makes no differ

ence here, for there has been no expression of congressional intent to

change the underlying substantive law. Pp. 2–6.

(b) Thus, petitioner can succeed only by convincing the Court that

it has overturned, or should overturn, its earlier precedent. Pp. 6–9.

(1) The Court did not do so in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Af

fairs, 498 U. S. 89, where it applied equitable tolling to a limitations

statute governing employment discrimination claims against the

Government. While the Irwin Court noted the similarity of that

statute to the court of claims statute, the civil rights statute is unlike

2 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

the present statute in the key respect that the Court had not previ

ously provided a definitive interpretation. Moreover, the Irwin Court

mentioned Soriano, which reflects the particular interpretive history

of the court of claims statute, but said nothing about overturning it or

any other case in that line. Finally, just as an equitable tolling pre

sumption could be rebutted by statutory language demonstrating

Congress’ contrary intent, it should be rebutted by a definitive earlier

interpretation finding a similar congressional intent. Language in

Franconia Associates v. United States, 536 U. S. 129, 145, describing

the court of claims statute as “unexceptional” and citing Irwin for the

proposition “that limitations principles should generally apply to the

Government in the same way that they apply to private parties” re

fers only to the statute’s claims-accrual rule and adds little or noth

ing to petitioner’s contention that Irwin overruled earlier cases.

Pp. 6–7.

(2) Stare decisis principles require rejection of petitioner’s argu

ment that the Court should overturn Kendall, Finn, Soriano, and re

lated cases. Any anomaly such old cases and Irwin together create is

not critical, but simply reflects a different judicial assumption about

the comparative weight Congress would likely have attached to com

peting national interests. Moreover, the earlier cases do not produce

“unworkable” law, see, e.g., United States v. International Business

Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 856. Stare decisis in respect to statu

tory interpretation also has “special force.” Congress, which “remains

free to alter what [the Court has] done,” Patterson v. McLean Credit

Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172–173, has long acquiesced in the interpreta

tion given here. Finally, even if the Government cannot show detri

mental reliance on the earlier cases, reexamination of well-settled

precedent could nevertheless prove harmful. Overturning a decision

on the belief that it is no longer “right” would inevitably reflect a will

ingness to reconsider others, and such willingness could itself

threaten to substitute disruption, confusion, and uncertainty for nec

essary legal stability. Pp. 8–9.

457 F. 3d 1345, affirmed.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined.

STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.

GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 06–1164

_________________

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[January 8, 2008]

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether a court must raise on

its own the timeliness of a lawsuit filed in the Court of

Federal Claims, despite the Government’s waiver of the

issue. We hold that the special statute of limitations

governing the Court of Federal Claims requires that

sua sponte consideration.

I

Petitioner John R. Sand & Gravel Company filed an

action in the Court of Federal Claims in May 2002. The

complaint explained that petitioner held a 50-year mining

lease on certain land. And it asserted that various Envi

ronmental Protection Agency activities on that land (in

volving, e.g., the building and moving of various fences)

amounted to an unconstitutional taking of its leasehold

rights.

The Government initially asserted that petitioner’s

several claims were all untimely in light of the statute

providing that “[e]very claim of which the United States

Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred

unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after

2 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

such claim first accrues.” 28 U. S. C. §2501. Later, how

ever, the Government effectively conceded that certain

claims were timely. See App. 37a–39a (Government’s

pretrial brief). The Government subsequently won on the

merits. See 62 Fed. Cl. 556, 589 (2004).

Petitioner appealed the adverse judgment to the Court

of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See 457 F. 3d 1345,

1346 (2006). The Government’s brief said nothing about

the statute of limitations, but an amicus brief called the

issue to the court’s attention. See id., at 1352. The court

considered itself obliged to address the limitations issue,

and it held that the action was untimely. Id., at 1353–

1360. We subsequently agreed to consider whether the

Court of Appeals was right to ignore the Government’s

waiver and to decide the timeliness question. 550 U. S.

___ (2007).

II

Most statutes of limitations seek primarily to protect

defendants against stale or unduly delayed claims. See,

e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 117 (1979).

Thus, the law typically treats a limitations defense as an

affirmative defense that the defendant must raise at the

pleadings stage and that is subject to rules of forfeiture

and waiver. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8(c)(1), 12(b), 15(a);

Day v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 198, 202 (2006); Zipes v.

Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 393 (1982).

Such statutes also typically permit courts to toll the limi

tations period in light of special equitable considerations.

See, e.g., Rotella v. Wood, 528 U. S. 549, 560–561 (2000);

Zipes, supra, at 393; see also Cada v. Baxter Healthcare

Corp., 920 F. 2d 446, 450–453 (CA7 1990).

Some statutes of limitations, however, seek not so much

to protect a defendant's case-specific interest in timeliness

as to achieve a broader system-related goal, such as facili

tating the administration of claims, see, e.g., United States

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

Opinion of the Court

v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 352–353 (1997), limiting the

scope of a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity,

see, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596, 609–610

(1990), or promoting judicial efficiency, see, e.g., Bowles v.

Russell, 551 U. S. ___ , ___–___ (2007) (slip op., at 7–8).

The Court has often read the time limits of these statutes

as more absolute, say as requiring a court to decide a

timeliness question despite a waiver, or as forbidding a

court to consider whether certain equitable considerations

warrant extending a limitations period. See, e.g., ibid.; see

also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006).

As convenient shorthand, the Court has sometimes re

ferred to the time limits in such statutes as “jurisdic

tional.” See, e.g., Bowles, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 5).

This Court has long interpreted the court of claims

limitations statute as setting forth this second, more

absolute, kind of limitations period.

A

In Kendall v. United States, 107 U. S. 123 (1883), the

Court applied a predecessor of the current 6-year bar to a

claim that had first accrued in 1865 but that the plaintiff

did not bring until 1872. Id., at 124; see also Act of Mar.

3, 1863, §10, 12 Stat. 767 (Rev. Stat. §1069). The plaintiff,

a former Confederate States employee, had asked for

equitable tolling on the ground that he had not been able

to bring the suit until Congress, in 1868, lifted a previ

ously imposed legal disability. See 107 U. S., at 124–125.

But the Court denied the request. Id., at 125–126. It did

so not because it thought the equities ran against the

plaintiff, but because the statute (with certain listed ex

ceptions) did not permit tolling. Justice Harlan, writing

for the Court, said the statute was “jurisdiction[al],” that

it was not susceptible to judicial “engraft[ing]” of unlisted

disabilities such as “sickness, surprise, or inevitable acci

dent,” and that “it [was] the duty of the court to raise the

4 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

[timeliness] question whether it [was] done by plea or not.”

Ibid. (emphasis added).

Four years later, in Finn v. United States, 123 U. S. 227

(1887), the Court found untimely a claim that had origi

nally been filed with a Government agency, but which that

agency had then voluntarily referred by statute to the

Court of Claims. Id., at 229–230 (citing Act of June 25,

1868, §7, 15 Stat. 76–77); see also Rev. Stat. §§1063–1065.

That Government reference, it might have been argued,

amounted to a waiver by the Government of any limita

tions-based defense. Cf. United States v. Lippitt, 100 U. S.

663, 669 (1880) (reserving the question of the time bar’s

application in such circumstances). The Court nonethe

less held that the long (over 10-year) delay between the

time the claim accrued and the plaintiff’s filing of the

claim before the agency made the suit untimely. Finn, 123

U. S., at 232. And as to any argument of Government

waiver or abandonment of the time-bar defense, Justice

Harlan, again writing for the Court, said that the ordinary

legal principle that “limitation . . . is a defence [that a

defendant] must plead . . . has no application to suits in

the Court of Claims against the United States.” Id. at 232–

233 (emphasis added).

Over the years, the Court has reiterated in various

contexts this or similar views about the more absolute

nature of the court of claims limitations statute. See

Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270, 273–274 (1957);

United States v. Greathouse, 166 U. S. 601, 602 (1897);

United States v. New York, 160 U. S. 598, 616–619 (1896);

De Arnaud v. United States, 151 U. S. 483, 495–496

(1894).

B

The statute’s language has changed slightly since Kend

all was decided in 1883, but we do not see how any

changes in language make a difference here. The only

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 5

Opinion of the Court

arguably pertinent linguistic change took place during the

1948 recodification of Title 28. See §2501, 62 Stat. 976.

Prior to 1948, the statute said that “[e]very claim . . .

cognizable by the Court of Claims, shall be forever barred”

unless filed within six years of the time it first accrues.

Rev. Stat. §1069 (emphasis added); see also Act of Mar. 3,

1911, §156, 36 Stat. 1139 (reenacting the statute without

any significant changes). Now, it says that “[e]very claim

of which” the Court of Federal Claims “has jurisdiction

shall be barred” unless filed within six years of the time it

first accrues. 28 U. S. C. §2501 (emphasis added).

This Court does not “presume” that the 1948 revision

“worked a change in the underlying substantive law

‘unless an intent to make such a change is clearly ex

pressed.’ ” Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U. S. 200, 209

(1993) (quoting Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products

Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 227 (1957) (alterations omitted)); see

also No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1–8 (1947) (herein

after Rep. No. 308) (revision sought to codify, not substan

tively modify, existing law); Barron, The Judicial Code:

1948 Revision, 8 F. R. D. 439 (1948) (same). We can find

no such expression of intent here. The two linguistic

forms (“cognizable by”; “has jurisdiction”) mean about the

same thing. See Black’s Law Dictionary 991 (4th ed. 1951)

(defining “jurisdiction” as “the authority by which courts

and judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases”

(emphasis added)); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1038

(3d ed. 1933) (similarly using the term “cognizance” to

define “jurisdiction”). Nor have we found any suggestion

in the Reviser’s Notes or anywhere else that Congress

intended to change the prior meaning. See Rep. No. 308,

at A192 (Reviser’s Note); Barron, supra, at 446 (Reviser’s

Notes specify where change was intended). Thus, it is not

surprising that nearly a decade after the revision, the

Court, citing Kendall, again repeated that the statute’s

limitations period was “jurisdiction[al]” and not suscepti

6 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

ble to equitable tolling. See Soriano, supra, at 273–274,

277.

III

In consequence, petitioner can succeed only by convinc

ing us that this Court has overturned, or that it should

now overturn, its earlier precedent.

A

We cannot agree with petitioner that the Court already

has overturned the earlier precedent. It is true, as peti

tioner points out, that in Irwin v. Department of Veterans

Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 (1990), we adopted “a more general

rule” to replace our prior ad hoc approach for determining

whether a Government-related statute of limitations is

subject to equitable tolling—namely, “that the same rebut

table presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits

against private defendants should also apply to suits

against the United States.” Id., at 95–96. It is also true

that Irwin, using that presumption, found equitable toll

ing applicable to a statute of limitations governing em

ployment discrimination claims against the Government.

See id., at 96; see also 42 U. S. C. §2000e–16(c) (1988 ed.).

And the Court noted that this civil rights statute was

linguistically similar to the court of claims statute at issue

here. See Irwin, supra, at 94–95.

But these few swallows cannot make petitioner’s sum

mer. That is because Irwin dealt with a different limita

tions statute. That statute, while similar to the present

statute in language, is unlike the present statute in the

key respect that the Court had not previously provided a

definitive interpretation. Moreover, the Court, while

mentioning a case that reflects the particular interpretive

history of the court of claims statute, namely Soriano, 352

U. S. 270, says nothing at all about overturning that or

any other case in that line. See 498 U. S., at 94–95.

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 7

Opinion of the Court

Courts do not normally overturn a long line of earlier

cases without mentioning the matter. Indeed, Irwin

recognized that it was announcing a general prospective

rule, see id., at 95, which does not imply revisiting past

precedents.

Finally, Irwin adopted a “rebuttable presumption” of

equitable tolling. Ibid. (emphasis added). That presump

tion seeks to produce a set of statutory interpretations

that will more accurately reflect Congress’ likely meaning

in the mine run of instances where it enacted a Govern

ment-related statute of limitations. But the word “rebut

table” means that the presumption is not conclusive.

Specific statutory language, for example, could rebut the

presumption by demonstrating Congress’ intent to the

contrary. And if so, a definitive earlier interpretation of

the statute, finding a similar congressional intent, should

offer a similarly sufficient rebuttal.

Petitioner adds that in Franconia Associates v. United

States, 536 U. S. 129 (2002), we explicitly considered the

court of claims limitations statute, we described the stat

ute as “unexceptional,” and we cited Irwin for the proposi

tion “that limitations principles should generally apply to

the Government in the same way that they apply to pri

vate parties.” 536 U. S., at 145 (internal quotation marks

omitted). But we did all of this in the context of rejecting

an argument by the Government that the court of claims

statute embodies a special, earlier-than-normal, rule as to

when a claim first accrues. Id., at 144–145. The quoted

language thus refers only to the statute’s claims-accrual

rule and adds little or nothing to petitioner’s contention

that Irwin overruled our earlier cases—a contention that

we have just rejected.

B

Petitioner’s argument must therefore come down to an

invitation now to reject or to overturn Kendall, Finn,

8 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Soriano, and related cases. In support, petitioner can

claim that Irwin and Franconia represent a turn in the

course of the law and can argue essentially as follows:

The law now requires courts, when they interpret statutes

setting forth limitations periods in respect to actions

against the Government, to place greater weight upon the

equitable importance of treating the Government like

other litigants and less weight upon the special govern

mental interest in protecting public funds. Cf. Irwin,

supra, at 95–96. The older interpretations treated these

interests differently. Those older cases have consequently

become anomalous. The Government is unlikely to have

relied significantly upon those earlier cases. Hence the

Court should now overrule them.

Basic principles of stare decisis, however, require us to

reject this argument. Any anomaly the old cases and

Irwin together create is not critical; at most, it reflects a

different judicial assumption about the comparative

weight Congress would likely have attached to competing

legitimate interests. Moreover, the earlier cases lead, at

worst, to different interpretations of different, but simi

larly worded, statutes; they do not produce “unworkable”

law. See United States v. International Business Machines

Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 856 (1996) (internal quotation marks

omitted); California v. FERC, 495 U. S. 490, 499 (1990).

Further, stare decisis in respect to statutory interpretation

has “special force,” for “Congress remains free to alter

what we have done.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,

491 U. S. 164, 172–173 (1989); see also Watson v. United

States, ante, at 8. Additionally, Congress has long acqui

esced in the interpretation we have given. See ibid.;

Shepard v. United States, 544 U. S. 13, 23 (2005).

Finally, even if the Government cannot show detrimen

tal reliance on our earlier cases, our reexamination of

well-settled precedent could nevertheless prove harmful.

Justice Brandeis once observed that “in most matters it is

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 9

Opinion of the Court

more important that the applicable rule of law be settled

than that it be settled right.” Burnet v. Coronado Oil &

Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (dissenting opinion). To

overturn a decision settling one such matter simply be

cause we might believe that decision is no longer “right”

would inevitably reflect a willingness to reconsider others.

And that willingness could itself threaten to substitute

disruption, confusion, and uncertainty for necessary legal

stability. We have not found here any factors that might

overcome these considerations.

IV

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

STEVENS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 06–1164

_________________

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[January 8, 2008]

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins,

dissenting.

Statutes of limitations generally fall into two broad

categories: affirmative defenses that can be waived and so-

called “jurisdictional” statutes that are not subject to

waiver or equitable tolling. For much of our history, stat

utes of limitations in suits against the Government were

customarily placed in the latter category on the theory

that conditions attached to a waiver of sovereign immu

nity “must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are

not to be implied.” Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S.

270, 276 (1957); see also Finn v. United States, 123 U. S.

227, 232–233 (1887); Kendall v. United States, 107 U. S.

123, 125–126 (1883). But that rule was ignored—and thus

presumably abandoned—in Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484

(1967),1 and Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467

(1986).2

——————

1 In Honda, we concluded, as to petitioners’ attempts to recover assets

that had been seized upon the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, that it

was “consistent with the overall congressional purpose to apply a

traditional equitable tolling principle, aptly suited to the particular

facts of this case and nowhere eschewed by Congress.” 386 U. S., at

501.

2 In Bowen, we permitted equitable tolling of the 60-day requirement

for challenging the denial of disability benefits under the Social Secu

2 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89,

95–96 (1990), we followed the lead of Bowen (and, by

extension, Honda), and explicitly replaced the Soriano

rule with a rebuttable presumption that equitable tolling

rules “applicable to suits against private defendants

should also apply to suits against the United States.”3 We

acknowledged that “our previous cases dealing with the

effect of time limits in suits against the Government [had]

not been entirely consistent,” 498 U. S., at 94, and we

determined that “a continuing effort on our part to decide

each case on an ad hoc basis . . . would have the disadvan

tage of continuing unpredictability without the corre

sponding advantage of greater fidelity to the intent of

Congress,” id., at 95. We therefore crafted a background

rule that reflected “a realistic assessment of legislative

intent,” and also provided “a practically useful principle of

interpretation.” Ibid.

Our decision in Irwin did more than merely “mentio[n]”

Soriano, ante, at 7; rather, we expressly declined to follow

that case. We noted that the limitations language at issue

in Irwin closely resembled the text we had confronted in

Soriano; although we conceded that “[a]n argument [could]

undoubtedly be made” that the statutes were distinguish

——————

rity Act. We cautioned that “we must be careful not to assume the

authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended, or construe the

waiver unduly restrictively.” 476 U. S., at 479 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

3 During the Irwin oral arguments, several Members of the Court

remarked on the need to choose between the Soriano line of cases and

the approach taken in cases like Bowen. See Tr. of Oral Arg., O. T.

1990, No. 89–5867, pp. 25–26 (“Question: ‘[W]hat do you make of our

cases which seem to go really in different directions. The Bowen case,

which was unanimous and contains language in it that says statutory

time limits are traditionally subject to equitable tolling, and other cases

like maybe Soriano . . . which point in the other direction[?]’ ”); see also

id., at 8 (“Question: ‘. . . I think we sort of have to choose between

Soriano and Bowen, don’t you think?’ ”).

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

STEVENS, J., dissenting

able, we were “not persuaded that the difference between

them [was] enough to manifest a different congressional

intent with respect to the availability of equitable tolling,”

498 U. S., at 95. Having found the two statutes function

ally indistinguishable, we nevertheless declined the Gov

ernment’s invitation to follow Soriano, and we did not so

much as cite Kendall or Finn. Instead, we adopted “a

more general rule to govern the applicability of equitable

tolling in suits against the Government,” 498 U. S., at 95,

and we applied the new presumption in favor of equitable

tolling to the case before us.4 Nothing in the framing of

our decision to adopt a “general rule” to govern the avail

ability of equitable tolling in suits against the Govern

ment, ibid., suggested a carve-out for statutes we had

already held ineligible for equitable tolling, pursuant to

the approach that we had previously abandoned in Honda

and Bowen, and definitively rejected in Irwin.

Indeed, in his separate opinion in Irwin, Justice White

noted that that the decision was not only inconsistent with

our prior cases but also that it “directly overrule[d]” Sori

ano. 498 U. S., at 98 (opinion concurring in part and

concurring in judgment). Neither the Court’s opinion nor

my separate opinion disagreed with that characterization

——————

4 In the years since we decided Irwin, we have applied its rule in a

number of statutory contexts. See, e.g., Scarborough v. Principi, 541

U. S. 401, 420–423 (2004) (applying the rule of Irwin and finding that

an application for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28

U. S. C. §2412(d)(1)(A), should be permitted to be amended out of time).

Most significantly, in Franconia Associates v. United States, 536 U. S.

129, 145 (2002), we affirmed, in the context of 28 U. S. C. §2501, the

rule that “limitations principles should generally apply to the Govern

ment ‘in the same way that’ they apply to private parties” (citing Irwin,

498 U. S., at 95). Although the Government is correct that the question

presented by Franconia was when a claim accrued under §2501, our

reliance on Irwin undermines the majority’s suggestion that Irwin has

no bearing on statutes that have previously been the subject of judicial

construction.

4 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

of our holding. The attempt of the Court today, therefore,

to cast petitioner’s argument as an entreaty to overrule

Soriano, as well as Kendall and Finn—and its response

that “[b]asic principles of stare decisis . . . require us to

reject this argument,” ante, at 8—has a hollow ring. If the

doctrine of stare decisis supplied a clear answer to the

question posed by this case—or if the Government could

plausibly argue that it had relied on Soriano after our

decision in Irwin—I would join the Court’s judgment,

despite its unwisdom.5 But I do not agree with the major

ity’s reading of our cases. It seems to me quite plain that

Soriano is no longer good law, and if there is in fact ambi

guity in our cases, it ought to be resolved in favor of clari

fying the law, rather than preserving an anachronism

whose doctrinal underpinnings were discarded years ago.6

——————

5 The majority points out quite rightly, ante, at 8, that the doctrine of

stare decisis has “ ‘special force’ ” in statutory cases. See Patterson v.

McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172–173 (1989). But the doctrine

should not prevent us from acknowledging when we have already

overruled a prior case, even if we failed to say so explicitly at the time.

In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U. S. 466 (2004), for example, we explained that

in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U. S. 484 (1973), we

had overruled so much of Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U. S. 188 (1948), as

found that the habeas petitioners’ presence within the territorial reach

of the district court was a jurisdictional prerequisite. Braden held,

contrary to Ahrens, that a prisoner’s presence within the district court’s

territorial reach was not an “inflexible jurisdictional rule,” 410 U. S., at

500. Braden nowhere stated that it was overruling Ahrens, although

Justice Rehnquist began his dissent by noting: “Today the Court

overrules Ahrens v. Clark.” 410 U. S., at 502. Thirty years later we

acknowledged in Rasul what was by then clear: Ahrens was no longer

good law. 542 U. S., at 478–479, and n. 9.

Moreover, the logic of the “special force” of stare decisis in the statu

tory context is that “Congress remains free to alter what we have done,”

Patterson, 491 U. S., at 172–173. But the amendment of an obscure

statutory provision is not a high priority for a busy Congress, and we

should remain mindful that enactment of legislation is by no means a

cost-free enterprise.

6 See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897)

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 5

STEVENS, J., dissenting

With respect to provisions as common as time limita

tions, Congress, in enacting statutes, and judges, in apply

ing them, ought to be able to rely upon a background rule

of considerable clarity. Irwin announced such a rule, and

I would apply that rule to the case before us.7 Because

today’s decision threatens to revive the confusion of our

pre-Irwin jurisprudence, I respectfully dissent.

——————

(“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it

was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the

grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the

rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past”).

7 The majority does gesture toward an application of Irwin, contend

ing that even if Irwin’s rule is apposite, the presumption of congres

sional intent to allow equitable tolling is rebutted by this Court’s

“definitive earlier interpretation” of §2501, ante, at 7. But the major

ity’s application of the Irwin rule is implausible, since Irwin itself

compared the language of §2501 with the limitations language of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and found that the comparison did

not reveal “a different congressional intent with respect to the availabil

ity of equitable tolling,” 498 U. S., at 95.

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 06–1164

_________________

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[January 8, 2008]

JUSTICE GINSBURG, dissenting.

I agree that adhering to Kendall, Finn, and Soriano is

irreconcilable with the reasoning and result in Irwin, and

therefore join JUSTICE STEVENS’ dissent. I write sepa

rately to explain why I would regard this case as an ap

propriate occasion to revisit those precedents even if we

had not already “directly overrule[d]” them. Cf. Irwin

v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 98

(1990) (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in

judgment).

Stare decisis is an important, but not an inflexible,

doctrine in our law. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas

Co., 285 U. S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

(“Stare decisis is not . . . a universal, inexorable com

mand.”). The policies underlying the doctrine—stability

and predictability—are at their strongest when the Court

is asked to change its mind, though nothing else of signifi

cance has changed. See Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial

Restraint, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 281, 286–287 (1990).

As to the matter before us, our perception of the office of a

time limit on suits against the Government has changed

significantly since the decisions relied upon by the Court.

We have recognized that “the same rebuttable presump

tion of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private

defendants should also apply to suits against the United

2 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

States,” Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95–96, and that “limitations

principles should generally apply to the Government in

the same way that they apply to private parties,” Franco

nia Associates v. United States, 536 U. S. 129, 145 (2002)

(internal quotation marks omitted). See also Scarborough

v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 420–422 (2004). It damages the

coherence of the law if we cling to outworn precedent at

odds with later, more enlightened decisions.

I surely do not suggest that overruling is routinely in

order whenever a majority disagrees with a past decision,

and I acknowledge that “[c]onsiderations of stare decisis

have special force in the area of statutory interpretation,”

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172

(1989). But concerns we have previously found sufficiently

weighty to justify revisiting a statutory precedent counsel

strongly in favor of doing so here. First, overruling Kend

all v. United States, 107 U. S. 123 (1883), Finn v. United

States, 123 U. S. 227 (1887), and Soriano v. United States,

352 U. S. 270 (1957), would, as the Court concedes, see

ante, at 8, “achieve a uniform interpretation of similar

statutory language,” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-

son/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 484 (1989).

Second, we have recognized the propriety of revisiting a

decision when “intervening development of the law” has

“removed or weakened [its] conceptual underpinnings.”

Patterson, 491 U. S., at 173. Irwin and Franconia—not to

mention our recent efforts to apply the term “jurisdic

tional” with greater precision, see, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H

Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 515–516 (2006)—have left no tenable

basis for Kendall and its progeny.

Third, it is altogether appropriate to overrule a prece

dent that has become “a positive detriment to coherence

and consistency in the law.” Patterson, 491 U. S., at 173.

The inconsistency between the Kendall line and Irwin is a

source of both theoretical incoherence and practical confu

sion. For example, 28 U. S. C. §2401(a) contains a time

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

limit materially identical to the one in §2501. Courts of

Appeals have divided on the question whether §2401(a)’s

limit is “jurisdictional.” Compare Center for Biological

Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F. 3d 1331, 1334 (CA11 2006)

(per curiam), with Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Sha

lala, 125 F. 3d 765, 770 (CA9 1997). See also Harris v.

Federal Aviation Admin., 353 F. 3d 1006, 1013, n. 7

(CADC 2004) (recognizing that Irwin may have under

mined Circuit precedent holding that §2401(a) is “jurisdic

tional”). Today’s decision hardly assists lower courts

endeavoring to answer this question. While holding that

the language in §2501 is “jurisdictional,” the Court also

implies that Irwin governs the interpretation of all stat

utes we have not yet construed—including, presumably,

the identically worded §2401. See ante, at 7.

Moreover, as the Court implicitly concedes, see ante, at

8, the strongest reason to adhere to precedent provides no

support for the Kendall-Finn-Soriano line. “Stare decisis

has added force when the legislature, in the public sphere,

and citizens, in the private realm, have acted in reliance

on a previous decision, for in this instance overruling the

decision would dislodge settled rights and expectations or

require an extensive legislative response.” Hilton v. South

Carolina Public Railways Comm’n, 502 U. S. 197, 202

(1991). The Government, however, makes no claim that

either private citizens or Congress have relied upon the

“jurisdictional” status of §2501. There are thus strong

reasons to abandon—and notably slim reasons to adhere

to—the anachronistic interpretation of §2501 adopted in

Kendall.

Several times, in recent Terms, the Court has discarded

statutory decisions rendered infirm by what a majority

considered to be better informed opinion. See, e.g., Leegin

Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S.

___, ___ (2007) (slip op., at 28) (overruling Dr. Miles Medi

cal Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911));

4 JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. ___, ___ (2007) (slip op., at 9)

(overruling Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384 (1964) (per

curiam), and Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat

Packers, Inc., 371 U. S. 215 (1962) (per curiam)); Illinois

Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U. S. 28, 42–

43 (2006) (overruling, inter alia, Morton Salt Co. v. G. S.

Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488 (1942)); Hohn v. United States,

524 U. S. 236, 253 (1998) (overruling House v. Mayo, 324

U. S. 42 (1945) (per curiam)). In light of these overrulings,

the Court’s decision to adhere to Kendall, Finn, and Sori

ano—while offering nothing to justify their reasoning or

results—is, to say the least, perplexing. After today’s

decision, one will need a crystal ball to predict when this

Court will reject, and when it will cling to, its prior deci

sions interpreting legislative texts.

I would reverse the judgment rendered by the Federal

Circuit majority. In accord with dissenting Judge New

man, I would hold that the Court of Appeals had no war

rant to declare the petitioner’s action time barred.