Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT CO. v. MENDEL

SOHN

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 06–1221. Argued December 3, 2007—Decided February 26, 2008

In respondent Mendelsohn’s age discrimination case, petitioner Sprint

moved in limine to exclude the testimony of former employees alleg

ing discrimination by supervisors who had no role in the employment

decision Mendelsohn challenged, on the ground that such evidence

was irrelevant to the case’s central issue, see Fed. Rules Evid. 401,

402, and unduly prejudicial, see Rule 403. Granting the motion, the

District Court excluded evidence of discrimination against those not

“similarly situated” to Mendelsohn. The Tenth Circuit treated that

order as applying a per se rule that evidence from employees of other

supervisors is irrelevant in age discrimination cases, concluded that

the District Court abused its discretion by relying on the Circuit’s

Aramburu case, determined that the evidence was relevant and not

unduly prejudicial, and remanded for a new trial.

Held: The Tenth Circuit erred in concluding that the District Court

applied a per se rule and thus improperly engaged in its own analysis

of the relevant factors under Rules 401 and 403, rather than remand

ing the case for the District Court to clarify its ruling. Pp. 4–9.

(a) In deference to a district court’s familiarity with a case’s details

and its greater experience in evidentiary matters, courts of appeals

uphold Rule 403 rulings unless the district court has abused its dis

cretion. Here, the Tenth Circuit did not accord due deference to the

District Court. The District Court’s two-sentence discussion of the

evidence neither cited nor gave any other indication that the decision

relied on Aramburu or suggested that the court applied a per se rule

of inadmissibility. Neither party’s submissions to the District Court

suggested that Aramburu was controlling. That court’s use of the

same “similarly situated” phrase that Aramburu used cannot be pre

2 SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT CO. v. MENDELSOHN

Syllabus

sumed to indicate adoption of Aramburu’s analysis, for the District

Court was addressing a very different kind of evidence here. And the

nature of Sprint’s argument was not that the particular evidence was

never admissible, but only that such evidence lacked sufficient proba

tive value in this case to be relevant or outweigh prejudice and delay.

Pp. 4–7.

(b) Because of the Tenth Circuit’s error, it went on to assess the

relevance of the evidence itself and conduct its own balancing of pro

bative value and potential prejudicial effect when it should have al

lowed the District Court to make these determinations in the first in

stance, explicitly and on the record. Pp. 7–8.

466 F. 3d 1223, vacated and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 06–1221

_________________

SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT COMPANY,

PETITIONER v. ELLEN MENDELSOHN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

[February 26, 2008]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this age discrimination case, the District Court ex

cluded testimony by nonparties alleging discrimination at

the hands of supervisors of the defendant company who

played no role in the adverse employment decision chal

lenged by the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals, having

concluded that the District Court improperly applied a per

se rule excluding the evidence, engaged in its own analysis

of the relevant factors under Federal Rules of Evidence

401 and 403, and remanded with instructions to admit the

challenged testimony. We granted certiorari on the ques

tion whether the Federal Rules of Evidence required

admission of the testimony. We conclude that such evi

dence is neither per se admissible nor per se inadmissible.

Because it is not entirely clear whether the District Court

applied a per se rule, we vacate the judgment of the Court

of Appeals and remand for the District Court to conduct

the relevant inquiry under the appropriate standard.

I

Respondent Ellen Mendelsohn was employed in the

Business Development Strategy Group of petitioner

2 SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT CO. v. MENDELSOHN

Opinion of the Court

Sprint/United Management Company (Sprint) from 1989

until 2002, when Sprint terminated her as a part of an

ongoing company-wide reduction in force. She sued Sprint

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

(ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §621 et seq.,

alleging disparate treatment based on her age.

In support of her claim, Mendelsohn sought to introduce

testimony by five other former Sprint employees who

claimed that their supervisors had discriminated against

them because of age. Three of the witnesses alleged that

they heard one or more Sprint supervisors or managers

make remarks denigrating older workers. One claimed

that Sprint’s intern program was a mechanism for age

discrimination and that she had seen a spreadsheet sug

gesting that a supervisor considered age in making layoff

decisions. Another witness was to testify that he had been

given an unwarranted negative evaluation and “banned”

from working at Sprint because of his age, and that he had

witnessed another employee being harassed because of her

age. App. 17a. The final witness alleged that Sprint had

required him to get permission before hiring anyone over

age 40, that after his termination he had been replaced by

a younger employee, and that Sprint had rejected his

subsequent employment applications.

None of the five witnesses worked in the Business De

velopment Strategy Group with Mendelsohn, nor had any

of them worked under the supervisors in her chain of

command, which included James Fee, Mendelsohn’s direct

supervisor; Paul Reddick, Fee’s direct manager and the

decisionmaker in Mendelsohn’s termination; and Bill

Blessing, Reddick’s supervisor and head of the Business

Development Strategy Group. Neither did any of the

proffered witnesses report hearing discriminatory remarks

by Fee, Reddick, or Blessing.

Sprint moved in limine to exclude the testimony, argu

ing that it was irrelevant to the central issue in the case:

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

Opinion of the Court

whether Reddick terminated Mendelsohn because of her

age. See Fed. Rules Evid. 401, 402. Sprint claimed that

the testimony would be relevant only if it came from em

ployees who were “similarly situated” to Mendelsohn in

that they had the same supervisors. App. 156a. Sprint

also argued that, under Rule 403, the probative value of

the evidence would be substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, mis

leading of the jury, and undue delay.

In a minute order, the District Court granted the mo

tion, excluding, in relevant part, evidence of “discrimina

tion against employees not similarly situated to plaintiff.”

App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a. In clarifying that Mendelsohn

could only “offer evidence of discrimination against Sprint

employees who are similarly situated to her,” the court

defined “ ‘ [s]imilarly situated employees,’ for the purpose

of this ruling, [as] requir[ing] proof that (1) Paul Ruddick

[sic] was the decision-maker in any adverse employment

action; and (2) temporal proximity.” Ibid. Beyond that,

the District Court provided no explanation of the basis for

its ruling. As the trial proceeded, the judge orally clarified

that the minute order was meant to exclude only testi

mony “that Sprint treated other people unfairly on the

basis of age,” and would not bar testimony going to the

“totally different” question “whether the [reduction in

force], which is [Sprint’s] stated nondiscriminatory reason,

is a pretext for age discrimination.” App. 295a–296a.

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit treated the

minute order as the application of a per se rule that evi

dence from employees with other supervisors is irrelevant

to proving discrimination in an ADEA case. Specifically, it

concluded that the District Court abused its discretion by

relying on Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F. 3d 1398 (CA10

1997). 466 F. 3d 1223, 1227–1228 (CA10 2006). Aram

buru held that “[s]imilarly situated employees,” for the

purpose of showing disparate treatment in employee

4 SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT CO. v. MENDELSOHN

Opinion of the Court

discipline, “are those who deal with the same supervisor

and are subject to the same standards governing perform

ance evaluation and discipline.” 112 F. 3d, at 1404 (inter

nal quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals

viewed that case as inapposite because it addressed dis

criminatory discipline, not a company-wide policy of dis

crimination. The Court of Appeals then determined that

the evidence was relevant and not unduly prejudicial, and

reversed and remanded for a new trial. We granted cer

tiorari, 551 U. S. ___ (2007), to determine whether, in an

employment discrimination action, the Federal Rules of

Evidence require admission of testimony by nonparties

alleging discrimination at the hands of persons who

played no role in the adverse employment decision chal

lenged by the plaintiff.

II

The parties focus their dispute on whether the Court of

Appeals correctly held that the evidence was relevant and

not unduly prejudicial under Rules 401 and 403. We

conclude, however, that the Court of Appeals should not

have engaged in that inquiry. Rather, as explained below,

we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that

the District Court applied a per se rule. Given the circum

stances of this case and the unclear basis of the District

Court’s decision, the Court of Appeals should have re

manded the case to the District Court for clarification.

A

In deference to a district court’s familiarity with the

details of the case and its greater experience in eviden

tiary matters, courts of appeals afford broad discretion to

a district court’s evidentiary rulings. This Court has

acknowledged:

“A district court is accorded a wide discretion in de

termining the admissibility of evidence under the Fed

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 5

Opinion of the Court

eral Rules. Assessing the probative value of [the prof

fered evidence], and weighing any factors counseling

against admissibility is a matter first for the district

court’s sound judgment under Rules 401 and 403 . . . .”

United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 54 (1984).

This is particularly true with respect to Rule 403 since it

requires an “on-the-spot balancing of probative value and

prejudice, potentially to exclude as unduly prejudicial

some evidence that already has been found to be factually

relevant.” 1 S. Childress & M. Davis, Federal Standards

of Review §4.02, p. 4–16 (3d ed. 1999). Under this defer

ential standard, courts of appeals uphold Rule 403 rulings

unless the district court has abused its discretion. See Old

Chief v. United States, 519 U. S. 172, 183, n. 7 (1997).

Here, however, the Court of Appeals did not accord the

District Court the deference we have described as the

“hallmark of abuse-of-discretion review.” General Elec.

Co. v. Joiner, 522 U. S. 136, 143 (1997). Instead, it rea

soned that the District Court had “erroneous[ly] con

clu[ded] that Aramburu controlled the fate of the evidence

in this case.” 466 F. 3d, at 1230, n. 4.

To be sure, Sprint in its motion in limine argued, with a

citation to Aramburu’s categorical bar, that “[e]mployees

may be similarly situated only if they had the same super

visor,” App. 163a, and the District Court’s minute order

mirrors that blanket language.

But the District Court’s discussion of the evidence nei

ther cited Aramburu nor gave any other indication that its

decision relied on that case. The minute order included

only two sentences discussing the admissibility of the

evidence:

“Plaintiff may offer evidence of discrimination against

Sprint employees who are similarly situated to her.

‘Similarly situated employees,’ for the purpose of this

ruling, requires proof that (1) Paul Ruddick [sic] was

6 SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT CO. v. MENDELSOHN

Opinion of the Court

the decision-maker in any adverse employment action;

and (2) temporal proximity.” App. to Pet. for Cert.

24a.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, these sen

tences include no analysis suggesting that the District

Court applied a per se rule excluding this type of evidence.

Mendelsohn argued on appeal1 that the District Court

must have viewed Aramburu as controlling because Sprint

cited the case in support of its in limine motion. But

neither party’s submissions to the District Court sug

gested that Aramburu was controlling. Sprint’s memo

randum in support of its motion mentioned the case only

in a string citation, and not for the proposition that only

“similarly situated” witnesses’ testimony would be admis

sible.2 App. 163a. Mendelsohn did not cite the case in her

memorandum in opposition, see id., at 208a, and Sprint

did not address it in its reply brief, see id., at 221a.

Mendelsohn further argued that the District Court’s use

of the phrase “similarly situated,” also used in Aramburu,

evidenced its reliance on that case. Although the District

Court used the same phrase, we decline to read the Dis

trict Court’s decision as relying on a case that was not

controlling. Aramburu defined the phrase “similarly

situated” in the entirely different context of a plaintiff’s

allegation that nonminority employees were treated more

——————

1 Although,

as noted above, the parties do not address in their filings

before this Court the grounds on which we base our decision, we shall

consider the relevant arguments they made before the Court of Ap

peals.

2 Even if Sprint had argued that Aramburu requires a per se rule

excluding such evidence, it would be inappropriate for the reviewing

court to assume, absent indication in the District Court’s opinion, that

the lower court adopted a party’s incorrect argument. Cf. Lawrence v.

Chater, 516 U. S. 163, 183 (1996) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (“[W]e should

not assume that a court of appeals has adopted a legal position only

because [a party] supported it”).

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 7

Opinion of the Court

favorably than minority employees. 112 F. 3d, at 1403–

1406. Absent reason to do so, we should not assume the

District Court adopted that “similarly situated” analysis

when it addressed a very different kind of evidence. An

appellate court should not presume that a district court

intended an incorrect legal result when the order is

equally susceptible of a correct reading, particularly when

the applicable standard of review is deferential.

Mendelsohn additionally argued that the District Court

must have meant to apply such a rule because that was

the nature of the argument in Sprint’s in limine motion.

But the in limine motion did not suggest that the evidence

is never admissible; it simply argued that such evidence

lacked sufficient probative value “in this case” to be rele

vant or outweigh prejudice and delay. App. 156a.

When a district court’s language is ambiguous, as it was

here, it is improper for the court of appeals to presume

that the lower court reached an incorrect legal conclusion.

A remand directing the district court to clarify its order is

generally permissible and would have been the better

approach in this case.

B

In the Court of Appeals’ view, the District Court ex

cluded the evidence as per se irrelevant, and so had no

occasion to reach the question whether such evidence, if

relevant, should be excluded under Rule 403. The Court of

Appeals, upon concluding that such evidence was not per

se irrelevant, decided that it was relevant in the circum

stances of this case and undertook its own balancing

under Rule 403. But questions of relevance and prejudice

are for the District Court to determine in the first in

stance. Abel, supra, at 54 (“Assessing the probative value

of [evidence], and weighing any factors counseling against

admissibility is a matter first for the district court’s sound

judgment under Rules 401 and 403 . . .”). Rather than

8 SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT CO. v. MENDELSOHN

Opinion of the Court

assess the relevance of the evidence itself and conduct its

own balancing of its probative value and potential prejudi

cial effect, the Court of Appeals should have allowed the

District Court to make these determinations in the first

instance, explicitly and on the record.3 See Pullman-

Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 291 (1982) (When a

district court “fail[s] to make a finding because of an erro

neous view of the law, the usual rule is that there should

be a remand for further proceedings to permit the trial

court to make the missing findings”). With respect to

evidentiary questions in general and Rule 403 in particu

lar, a district court virtually always is in the better posi

tion to assess the admissibility of the evidence in the

context of the particular case before it.

We note that, had the District Court applied a per se

rule excluding the evidence, the Court of Appeals would

have been correct to conclude that it had abused its discre

tion. Relevance and prejudice under Rules 401 and 403

are determined in the context of the facts and arguments

in a particular case, and thus are generally not amenable

to broad per se rules. See Advisory Committee’s Notes on

Fed. Rule Evid. 401, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 864 (“Relevancy is

not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but

exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a

matter properly provable in the case”). But, as we have

discussed, there is no basis in the record for concluding

that the District Court applied a blanket rule.

III

The question whether evidence of discrimination by

other supervisors is relevant in an individual ADEA case

is fact based and depends on many factors, including how

——————

3 The

only exception to this rule is when “the record permits only one

resolution of the factual issue.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S.

273, 292 (1982). The evidence here, however, is not of that dispositive

character.

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 9

Opinion of the Court

closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff’s circum

stances and theory of the case. Applying Rule 403 to

determine if evidence is prejudicial also requires a fact-

intensive, context-specific inquiry. Because Rules 401 and

403 do not make such evidence per se admissible or per se

inadmissible, and because the inquiry required by those

Rules is within the province of the District Court in the

first instance, we vacate the judgment of the Court of

Appeals and remand the case with instructions to have the

District Court clarify the basis for its evidentiary ruling

under the applicable Rules.

It is so ordered.