Cuellar v. United States

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06–1456. Argued February 25, 2008—Decided June 2, 2008

Arrested after a search of the car he was driving through Texas toward

Mexico revealed nearly $81,000 bundled in plastic bags and covered

with animal hair in a secret compartment under the rear floorboard,

petitioner was charged with, and convicted of, attempting to trans-

port “funds from a place in the United States to . . . a place outside

the United States . . . knowing that the . . . funds . . . represent the

proceeds of . . . unlawful activity and . . . that such transportation . . .

is designed . . . to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the

source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of ” the money,

in violation of the federal money laundering statute, 18 U. S. C.

§1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Affirming, the Fifth Circuit rejected as inconsistent

with the statutory text petitioner’s argument that the Government

must prove that he attempted to create the appearance of legitimate

wealth, but held that his extensive efforts to prevent the funds’ detec-

tion during transportation showed that he sought to conceal or dis-

guise their nature, location, source, ownership, or control.

Held: Although §1956(a)(2)(B)(i) does not require proof that the defen-

dant attempted to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, neither

can it be satisfied solely by evidence that the funds were concealed

during transport. The statutory text makes clear that a conviction

requires proof that the transportation’s purpose—not merely its ef-

fect—was to conceal or disguise one of the listed attributes: the funds’

nature, location, source, ownership, or control. Pp. 5–17.

(a) The statute contains no “appearance of legitimate wealth” re-

quirement. Although petitioner is correct that taking steps to make

funds appear legitimate is the common meaning of “money launder-

ing,” this Court must be guided by a statute’s words, not by its title’s

common meaning, to the extent they are inconsistent, see Pennsyl-

2 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

vania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 212. Here, Con-

gress used broad language that captures more than classic money

laundering: In addition to concealing or disguising the nature or

source of illegal funds, Congress also sought to reach transportation

designed to conceal or disguise the funds’ location, ownership, or con-

trol. Nor does the Court find persuasive petitioner’s attempt to in-

fuse a money-laundering requirement into the listed attributes. Only

the attribute “nature” is coextensive with the funds’ illegitimate

character, but that does not mean that Congress intended nature to

swallow the other attributes. The Court is likewise skeptical of peti-

tioner’s argument that violating the statute’s elements would neces-

sarily have the effect of making the funds appear more legitimate

than they did before. It is not necessarily true that concealing or dis-

guising any one of the listed attributes may have the effect of making

the funds appear more legitimate by impeding law enforcement’s

ability to identify illegitimate funds. Finally, the Court disagrees

with petitioner’s argument that §1956(a)(2) must be aimed at some-

thing other than merely secretive transportation of illicit funds be-

cause that conduct is already punished by the bulk cash smuggling

statute, 31 U. S. C. §5332. Even if §1956(a)(2)(B)(i) has no “appear-

ance of legitimate wealth” requirement, the two statutes nonetheless

target distinct conduct, in that §5332(a)(1) encompasses, inter alios, a

defendant who, “with the intent to evade a currency reporting re-

quirement . . . , knowingly conceals more than $10,000 . . . and trans-

ports [it] from . . . the United States to a place outside” the country.

Pp. 6–9.

(b) The evidence that petitioner concealed the money during trans-

portation is not sufficient to sustain his conviction. In determining

whether he knew that “such transportation,” §1956(a)(2)(B)(i), was

designed to conceal or disguise the specified attributes of the illegally

obtained funds, the critical transportation was not the transportation

of the funds within this country on the way to the border, but trans-

portation “from a place in the United States to . . . a place outside the

United States,” ibid.—here, from this country to Mexico. Therefore,

what the Government had to prove was that petitioner knew that

taking the funds to Mexico was “designed,” at least in part, to conceal

or disguise their “nature,” “location,” “source,” “ownership,” or “con-

trol.” The Court agrees with petitioner that merely hiding funds dur-

ing transportation is not sufficient to violate the statute, even if sub-

stantial efforts have been expended to conceal the money. This

conclusion turns on §1956(a)(2)(B)(i)’s text, particularly the term “de-

sign,” which the dictionaries show means purpose or plan; i.e., the

transportation’s intended aim. Congress wrote “knowing that such

transportation is designed . . . to conceal or disguise” a listed attrib-

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

Syllabus

ute, and when an act is “designed to” do something, the most natural

reading is that it has that something as its purpose. Because the

Fifth Circuit used “design” to refer not to the transportation’s pur-

pose but to the manner in which it was carried out, its use of the

term in this context was consistent with the alternate meaning of

“design” as structure or arrangement. It is implausible, however,

that Congress intended this meaning. If it had, it could have ex-

pressed its intention simply by writing “knowing that such transpor-

tation conceals or disguises,” rather than the more complex formula-

tion “knowing that such transportation . . . is designed . . . to conceal

or disguise.” §1956(a)(2)(B)(i). It seems far more likely that Con-

gress intended courts to apply the familiar criminal law concepts of

purpose and intent than to focus exclusively on how a defendant

“structured” the transportation. In addition, the structural meaning

of “design” is both overinclusive and underinclusive: It would capture

individuals who structured transportation in a secretive way but

lacked any criminal intent (such as a person who hid illicit funds en

route to turn them over to law enforcement); yet it would exclude in-

dividuals who fully intended to move the funds in order to impede de-

tection by law enforcement but failed to hide them during transport.

In this case, evidence that petitioner transported the cash bundled

in plastic bags and hidden in a secret compartment covered with

animal hair was plainly probative of an underlying goal to prevent

the funds’ detection during the drive into Mexico. However, even

with the abundant evidence that petitioner had concealed the money

in order to transport it, the Government’s own expert testified that

the transportation’s purpose was to compensate the Mexican leaders

of the operation. Thus, the evidence suggested that the transporta-

tion’s secretive aspects were employed to facilitate it, but not neces-

sarily that secrecy was its purpose. Because petitioner’s extensive ef-

forts to conceal the funds en route to Mexico was the only evidence

the Government introduced to prove that the transportation was “de-

signed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the [funds’] nature,

. . . location, . . . source, . . . ownership, or . . . control,” petitioner’s

conviction cannot stand. Pp. 10–17.

478 F. 3d 282, reversed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. ALITO, J.,

filed a concurring opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, J.,

joined.

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 06–1456

_________________

HUMBERTO FIDEL REGALADO CUELLAR,

PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 2, 2008]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves the provision of the federal money

laundering statute that prohibits international transpor­

tation of the proceeds of unlawful activity. Petitioner

argues that his conviction cannot stand because, while the

evidence demonstrates that he took steps to hide illicit

funds en route to Mexico, it does not show that the cross-

border transport of those funds was designed to create the

appearance of legitimate wealth. Although we agree with

the Government that the statute does not require proof

that the defendant attempted to “legitimize” tainted

funds, we agree with petitioner that the Government must

demonstrate that the defendant did more than merely

hide the money during its transport. We therefore reverse

the judgment of the Fifth Circuit.

I

On July 14, 2004, petitioner Humberto Fidel Regalado

Cuellar was stopped in southern Texas for driving errati­

cally. Driving south toward the Mexican border, about

114 miles away, petitioner had just passed the town of

Eldorado. In response to the officer’s questions, petitioner,

2 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

who spoke no English, handed the officer a stack of pa­

pers. Included were bus tickets showing travel from a

Texas border town to San Antonio on July 13 and, in the

other direction, from San Antonio to Big Spring, Texas, on

July 14. A Spanish-speaking officer, Trooper Danny Nu­

ñez, was called to the scene and began questioning peti­

tioner. Trooper Nuñez soon became suspicious because

petitioner was avoiding eye contact and seemed very

nervous. Petitioner claimed to be on a 3-day business trip,

but he had no luggage or extra clothing with him, and he

gave conflicting accounts of his itinerary. When Trooper

Nuñez asked petitioner about a bulge in his shirt pocket,

petitioner produced a wad of cash that smelled of

marijuana.

Petitioner consented to a search of the Volkswagen

Beetle that he was driving. While the officers were

searching the vehicle, Trooper Nuñez observed petitioner

standing on the side of the road making the sign of the

cross, which he interpreted to mean that petitioner knew

he was in trouble. A drug detection dog alerted on the

cash from petitioner’s shirt pocket and on the rear area of

the car. Further scrutiny uncovered a secret compartment

under the rear floorboard, and inside the compartment the

officers found approximately $81,000 in cash. The money

was bundled in plastic bags and duct tape, and animal

hair was spread in the rear of the vehicle. Petitioner

claimed that he had previously transported goats in the

vehicle, but Trooper Nuñez doubted that goats could fit in

such a small space and suspected that the hair had been

spread in an attempt to mask the smell of marijuana.

There were signs that the compartment had been re­

cently created and that someone had attempted to cover

up the bodywork: The Beetle’s carpeting appeared newer

than the rest of the interior, and the exterior of the vehicle

appeared to have been purposely splashed with mud to

cover up toolmarks, fresh paint, or other work. In the

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

Opinion of the Court

backseat, officers found a fast-food restaurant receipt

dated the same day from a city farther north than peti­

tioner claimed to have traveled. After a check of peti­

tioner’s last border crossing also proved inconsistent with

his story, petitioner was arrested and interrogated. He

continued to tell conflicting stories about his travels. At

one point, before he knew that the officers had found the

cash, he remarked to Trooper Nuñez that he had to have

the car in Mexico by midnight or else his family would be

“floating down the river.” App. 50.

Petitioner was charged with attempting to transport the

proceeds of unlawful activity across the border, knowing

that the transportation was designed “to conceal or dis­

guise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership,

or the control” of the money. 18 U. S. C. §1956(a)(2)(B)(i).

After a 2-day trial, the jury found petitioner guilty. The

District Court denied petitioner’s motion for judgment of

acquittal based on insufficient evidence and sentenced

petitioner to 78 months in prison, followed by three years

of supervised release.

On appeal, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed

and rendered a judgment of acquittal. 441 F. 3d 329

(2006). Judge Smith’s majority opinion held that, al­

though the evidence showed that petitioner concealed the

money for the purpose of transporting it, the statute re­

quires that the purpose of the transportation itself must

be to conceal or disguise the unlawful proceeds. Id., at

333–334. Analogizing from cases interpreting another

provision of the money laundering statute, the court held

that the transportation must be undertaken in an attempt

to create the appearance of legitimate wealth.1 See id., at

——————

1 Several Courts of Appeals have considered this requirement as

relevant, or even necessary, in the context of 18 U. S. C.

§1956(a)(1)(B)(i), which prohibits, inter alia, engaging in financial

transactions “involv[ing] the proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . .

knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part . . . to

4 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

334. Although the evidence showed intent to avoid detec­

tion while driving the funds to Mexico, it did not show that

petitioner intended to create the appearance of legitimate

wealth, and accordingly no rational trier of fact could have

found petitioner guilty. Ibid. Judge Davis dissented,

arguing that concealment during transportation is suffi­

cient to violate §1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Id., at 334–336.

The Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and af­

firmed petitioner’s conviction. 478 F. 3d 282 (2007). The

court rejected as inconsistent with the statutory text

petitioner’s argument that the Government must prove

that he attempted to create the appearance of legitimate

wealth. Id., at 290. But it held that petitioner’s extensive

efforts to prevent detection of the funds during transporta­

tion showed that petitioner sought to conceal or disguise

the nature, location, and source, ownership, or control of

the funds. Id., at 289–290. Judge Smith dissented for

largely the same reasons set forth in his opinion for the

original panel majority. He emphasized the distinction

——————

conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership,

or the control of the proceeds of some specified unlawful activity.” See

United States v. Morales-Rodriguez, 467 F. 3d 1, 13 (CA1 2006); United

States v. Esterman, 324 F. 3d 565, 572–573 (CA7 2003); United States

v. Abbell, 271 F. 3d 1286, 1298 (CA11 2001); United States v. McGahee,

257 F. 3d 520, 527–528 (CA6 2001); United States v. Dobbs, 63 F. 3d

391, 397 (CA5 1995); United States v. Dimeck, 24 F. 3d 1239, 1247

(CA10 1994).

In construing the provision under which petitioner was convicted,

four Courts of Appeals, including the Fifth Circuit, have implicitly or

explicitly rejected the requirement. See United States v. Garcia-

Jaimes, 484 F. 3d 1311, 1322 (CA11 2007) (upholding convictions for

conspiracy to commit transportation money laundering without ad­

dressing the requirement); United States v. Ness, 466 F. 3d 79, 81–82

(CA2 2006) (rejecting the requirement and upholding a conviction for

conspiracy to violate the transportation provision where defendant’s

conduct was elaborate and highly secretive); United States v. Carr, 25

F. 3d 1194, 1206–1207 (CA3 1994) (upholding a conviction under the

transportation provision without discussing the requirement).

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 5

Opinion of the Court

between “concealing something to transport it, and trans­

porting something to conceal it,” and explained that

whether petitioner was doing the latter depended on

whether his ultimate plan upon reaching his destination

was to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or

control of the money. Id., at 296–297.

We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. ___ (2007).

II

The federal money laundering statute, 18 U. S. C.

§1956, prohibits specified transfers of money derived from

unlawful activities. Subsection (a)(1) makes it unlawful to

engage in certain financial transactions, while subsection

(a)(2) criminalizes certain kinds of transportation. Peti­

tioner was charged under the transportation provision:

The indictment alleged that he attempted to transport

illicit proceeds across the Mexican border “knowing that

such transportation was designed in whole or in part to

conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, owner­

ship, and control” of the funds.2 App. 10–11 (citing

——————

2 Subsection (a)(2) reads, in its entirety:

“Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport,

transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in

the United States to or through a place outside the United States or to

a place in the United States from or through a place outside the United

States—

“(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful

activity; or

“(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the

transportation, transmission, or transfer represent the proceeds of

some form of unlawful activity and knowing that such transportation,

transmission, or transfer is designed in whole or in part—

“(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the

ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity;

or

“(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or

Federal law,

“shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the

value of the monetary instrument or funds involved in the transporta­

6 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

§1956(a)(2)(B)(i)).

A

We first consider the “designed . . . to conceal” element.

Petitioner argues that to satisfy this element, the Gov­

ernment must prove that the defendant attempted to

create the appearance of legitimate wealth. Petitioner

would replace “designed . . . to conceal or disguise the

nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the

control of the proceeds” with “designed to create the ap­

pearance of legitimate wealth.” §1956(a)(2)(B)(i). This is

consistent with the plain meaning of “money laundering,”

petitioner argues, because that term is commonly under­

stood to mean disguising illegally obtained money in order

to make it appear legitimate. In petitioner’s view, this

common understanding of “money laundering” is implicit

in both the transaction and transportation provisions of

the statute because concealing or disguising any of the

listed attributes would necessarily have the effect of mak­

ing the funds appear legitimate, and, conversely, revealing

any such attribute would necessarily reveal the funds as

illicit. The Government disagrees, contending that mak­

ing funds appear legitimate is merely one way to accom­

plish money laundering, and that revealing a listed at­

tribute would not necessarily reveal the funds’ illicit

nature. In any event, the Government argues, the statute

should not be cabined to target only classic money laun­

dering because Congress intended to reach any conduct

that impairs the ability of law enforcement to find and

——————

tion, transmission, or transfer whichever is greater, or imprisonment

for not more than twenty years, or both. For the purpose of the offense

described in subparagraph (B), the defendant’s knowledge may be

established by proof that a law enforcement officer represented the

matter specified in subparagraph (B) as true, and the defendant’s

subsequent statements or actions indicate that the defendant believed

such representations to be true.”

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 7

Opinion of the Court

recover the unlawful proceeds.

We agree with petitioner that taking steps to make

funds appear legitimate is the common meaning of the

term “money laundering.” See American Heritage Dic­

tionary 992 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter Am. Hert.) (defin­

ing “launder” as “[t]o disguise the source or nature of

(illegal funds, for example) by channeling through an

intermediate agent”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1027 (8th ed.

2004) (hereinafter Black’s) (defining “money-laundering”

to mean “[t]he act of transferring illegally obtained money

through legitimate people or accounts so that its original

source cannot be traced”). But to the extent they are

inconsistent, we must be guided by the words of the opera­

tive statutory provision, and not by the common meaning

of the statute’s title. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Correc-

tions v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 212 (1998) (declining to use

a statute’s title to limit the meaning of the text). Here,

Congress used broad language that captures more than

classic money laundering: In addition to concealing or

disguising the nature or source of illegal funds, Congress

also sought to reach transportation designed to conceal or

disguise the location, ownership, or control of the funds.

For example, a defendant who smuggles cash into Mexico

with the intent of hiding it from authorities by burying it

in the desert may have engaged in transportation de­

signed to conceal the location of those funds, but his con­

duct would not necessarily have the effect of making the

funds appear legitimate.

Nor do we find persuasive petitioner’s attempt to infuse

a “classic money laundering” requirement into the listed

attributes. Contrary to petitioner’s argument, revealing

those attributes—nature, location, source, ownership, or

control—would not necessarily expose the illegitimacy of

the funds. Digging up the cash buried in the Mexican

desert, for example, would not necessarily reveal that it

was derived from unlawful activity. Indeed, of all the

8 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

listed attributes, only “nature” is coextensive with the

funds’ illegitimate character: Exposing the nature of illicit

funds would, by definition, reveal them as unlawful pro­

ceeds. But nature is only one attribute in the statute; that

it may be coextensive with the creation of the appearance

of legitimate wealth does not mean that Congress

intended that requirement to swallow the other listed

attributes.

We likewise are skeptical of petitioner’s argument that

violating the elements of the statute would necessarily

have the effect of making the funds appear more legiti­

mate than they did before. It is true that concealing or

disguising any one of the listed attributes may have the

effect of making the funds appear more legitimate—

largely because concealing or disguising those attributes

might impede law enforcement’s ability to identify ille­

gitimate funds—but we are not convinced that this is

necessarily so. It might be possible for a defendant to

conceal or disguise a listed attribute without also creating

the appearance of legitimate wealth. Cf. United States v.

Abbell, 271 F. 3d 1286, 1298 (CA11 2001) (noting that the

transaction provision, although designed to punish those

who “attemp[t] to legitimize their proceeds,” may be satis­

fied without proof that a particular defendant did so).

Petitioner’s “appearance of legitimate wealth” requirement

simply has no basis in the operative provision’s text.

Petitioner argues that the money laundering transpor­

tation provision must be aimed at something other than

merely secretive transportation of illicit funds because

that conduct is already punished by the bulk cash smug­

gling statute, 31 U. S. C. §5332 (2000 ed., Supp. V). We

disagree. A comparison of the statutory language reveals

that, even if no “appearance of legitimate wealth” re­

quirement exists in 18 U. S. C. §1956(a)(2)(B)(i), the two

statutes nonetheless target distinct conduct. The bulk

cash smuggling provision encompasses, in relevant part, a

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 9

Opinion of the Court

defendant who,

“with the intent to evade a currency reporting re­

quirement under section 5316, knowingly conceals

more than $10,000 in currency or other monetary in­

struments . . . and transports or transfers or attempts

to transport or transfer such currency or monetary in­

struments from a place within the United States to a

place outside of the United States.” 31 U. S. C.

§5332(a)(1).

To be sure, certain conduct may fall within both statutes.

For example, both provisions may be violated by a defen­

dant who intends to evade a relevant reporting require­

ment. See §5332(a)(1) (transportation of funds “with the

intent to evade a currency reporting requirement”); 18

U. S. C. §1956(a)(2)(B)(ii) (transportation of funds know­

ing that it is designed “to avoid a transaction reporting

requirement”). But only the money laundering statute

may be violated in the absence of such intent. See

§1956(a)(2)(B)(i) (prohibiting transportation of illicit funds

knowing that the transportation is designed to conceal or

disguise a listed attribute). Similarly, although both

statutes encompass transportation of illicit funds, only the

bulk cash smuggling statute also punishes the mere

transportation of lawfully derived proceeds.3 Compare 31

U. S. C. §5332(a) (omitting any requirement that the funds

be unlawfully derived) with 18 U. S. C. §1956(a)(2)(B)

(requiring that the defendant “kno[w] that the monetary

instrument or funds involved in the transportation . . .

represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity”).

——————

3 Section 1956(a)(2)(A) also punishes the mere transportation of

lawfully derived proceeds, but it imposes the additional requirement,

not found in 31 U. S. C. §5332 (2000 ed., Supp. V), that the defendant

must have “inten[ded] to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful

activity.”

10 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

B

Having concluded that the statute contains no “appear­

ance of legitimate wealth” requirement, we next consider

whether the evidence that petitioner concealed the money

during transportation is sufficient to sustain his convic­

tion. As noted, petitioner was convicted under

§1956(a)(2)(B)(i), which, in relevant part, makes it a crime

to attempt to transport “funds from a place in the United

States to . . . a place outside the United States . . . know­

ing that the . . . funds involved in the transportation . . .

represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity

and knowing that such transportation . . . is designed in

whole or in part . . . to conceal or disguise the nature, the

location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the

proceeds of specified unlawful activity.” Accordingly, the

Government was required in this case to prove that peti­

tioner (1) attempted to transport funds from the United

States to Mexico, (2) knew that these funds “represent[ed]

the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,” e.g., drug

trafficking, and (3) knew that “such transportation” was

designed to “conceal or disguise the nature, the location,

the source, the ownership, or the control” of the funds.

It is the last of these that is at issue before us, viz.,

whether petitioner knew that “such transportation” was

designed to conceal or disguise the specified attributes of

the illegally obtained funds. In this connection, it is im­

portant to keep in mind that the critical transportation

was not the transportation of the funds within this coun­

try on the way to the border. Instead, the term “such

transportation” means transportation “from a place in the

United States to . . . a place outside the United States”—

here, from the United States to Mexico. Therefore, what

the Government had to prove was that petitioner knew

that taking the funds to Mexico was “designed,” at least in

part, to conceal or disguise their “nature,” “location,”

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 11

Opinion of the Court

“source,” “ownership,” or “control.”

Petitioner argues that the evidence is not sufficient to

sustain his conviction because concealing or disguising a

listed attribute of the funds during transportation cannot

satisfy the “designed . . . to conceal” element. Citing cases

that interpret the identical phrase in the transaction

provision to exclude “mere spending,”4 petitioner argues

that the transportation provision must exclude “mere

hiding.” Otherwise, petitioner contends, all cross-border

transport of illicit funds would fall under the statute

because people regularly make minimal efforts to conceal

money, such as placing it inside a wallet or other recepta­

cle, in order to secure it during travel. The Government

responds that concealment during transportation is suffi­

cient to satisfy this element because it is circumstantial

evidence that the ultimate purpose of the transportation—

i.e., its “design”—is to conceal or disguise a listed attribute

of the funds. This standard would not criminalize all

cross-border transport of illicit funds, the Government

argues, because, just as in the transaction cases,5 the

statute encompasses only substantial efforts at conceal­

——————

4 See, e.g., Esterman, 324 F. 3d, at 570–572; United States v. Cor-

chado-Peralta, 318 F. 3d 255, 259 (CA1 2003); McGahee, 257 F. 3d, at

527; United States v. Herron, 97 F. 3d 234, 237 (CA8 1996); United

States v. Majors, 196 F. 3d 1206, 1213 (CA11 1999); United States v.

Stephenson, 183 F. 3d 110, 120–121 (CA2 1999); Dobbs, 63 F. 3d, at

398; United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F. 3d 1469, 1474 (CA10

1994).

5 See, e.g., Ness, 466 F. 3d, at 81 (concluding that extensive attempts

at secrecy were sufficient to support a conviction under 18 U. S. C.

§1956(a)(1), but “express[ing] no view” as to whether transactions

involving “less elaborate stratagems or a lesser measure of secrecy”

would be sufficient); United States v. Johnson, 440 F. 3d 1286, 1291

(CA11 2006) (“Evidence of concealment must be substantial”); Dimeck,

24 F. 3d, at 1247 (“The transportation of the money from Detroit to

California in a box, suitcase, or other container does not convert the

mere transportation of money into money laundering”).

12 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

ment. As a result, the Government agrees with the Court

of Appeals that a violation of the transportation provision

cannot be established solely by evidence that the defen­

dant carried money in a wallet or concealed it in some

other conventional or incidental way. See 478 F. 3d, at

291 (characterizing the defendant’s transportation of

money in a box in United States v. Dimeck, 24 F. 3d 1239,

1246 (CA10 1994), as a “minimal attempt at concealment”

that is distinguishable from petitioner’s “effort to hide or

conceal” the funds).

We agree with petitioner that merely hiding funds

during transportation is not sufficient to violate the stat­

ute, even if substantial efforts have been expended to

conceal the money. Our conclusion turns on the text of

§1956(a)(2)(B)(i), and particularly on the term “design.” In

this context, “design” means purpose or plan; i.e., the

intended aim of the transportation. See Am. Hert. 491

(“To formulate a plan for; devise”; “[t]o create or contrive

for a particular purpose or effect”); Black’s 478 (“A plan or

scheme”; “[p]urpose or intention combined with a plan”);

see also Brief for United States 14 (“ ‘to conceive and plan

out in the mind’ ” (quoting Webster’s Third New Interna­

tional Dictionary 611 (1993)). Congress wrote “knowing

that such transportation is designed . . . to conceal or

disguise” a listed attribute of the funds, §1956(a)(2)(B)(i),

and when an act is “designed to” do something, the most

natural reading is that it has that something as its pur­

pose. The Fifth Circuit employed this meaning of design

when it referred to the “transportation design or plan to

get the funds out of this country.” See 478 F. 3d, at 289.

But the Fifth Circuit went on to discuss the “design” of

the transportation in a different sense. It described the

packaging of the money, its placement in the hidden com­

partment, and the use of animal hair to mask its scent as

“aspects of the transportation” that “were designed to

conceal or disguise” the nature and location of the cash.

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 13

Opinion of the Court

Ibid. (emphasis added). Because the Fifth Circuit used

“design” to refer not to the purpose of the transportation

but to the manner in which it was carried out, its use of

the term in this context was consistent with the alternate

meaning of “design” as structure or arrangement. See Am.

Hert. 491, 492 (“To plan out in systematic, usually graphic

form”; “[t]he purposeful or inventive arrangement of parts

or details”); Black’s 478 (“The pattern or configuration of

elements in something, such as a work of art”). The Gov­

ernment at times also appears to adopt this meaning of

“design.” See Brief for United States 21 (“Congress fo­

cused on how the transportation itself was ‘designed’ ”);

id., at 43 (arguing that petitioner’s design to move funds

without detection is proof of a design to conceal or disguise

the location and nature of the funds).6 If the statutory

term had this meaning, it would apply whenever a person

transported illicit funds in a secretive manner. Judge

Smith supplied an example of this construction: A petty

thief who hides money in his shoe and then walks across

the border to spend the money in local bars, see 478 F. 3d,

at 301 (dissenting opinion), has engaged in transportation

——————

6 This understanding of “design” is also implicit in some of the Gov­

ernment’s statements that secretive transportation is sufficient to

prove a violation of the statute. See Brief for United States 46 (arguing

that the statute covers any “surreptitiou[s]” movement of funds “to a

location where United States law enforcement authorities are impaired

from detecting and intercepting them,” apparently regardless of

whether such impairment was the purpose of the plan); id., at 11

(“When a defendant surreptitiously transports or attempts to transport

illegal proceeds across the border knowing of their illegal character,

money laundering is the appropriate charge”); id., at 13 (“The statute

explicitly covers, and was intended to cover, a wide range of conduct

that impairs the ability of law enforcement to find and recover the

proceeds of crime”); Tr. of Oral Arg. 46. Agent Richard Nuckles, Immi­

gration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), appears to have adopted this

standard at trial as well. See Tr. 196 (Oct. 12, 2004) (testifying that

attempting to move funds across the border without detection would be

illegal, apparently regardless of the reason for doing so).

14 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

designed to conceal the location of the money because he

has hidden it in an unlikely place.

We think it implausible, however, that Congress in­

tended this meaning of “design.” If it had, it could have

expressed its intention simply by writing “knowing that

such transportation conceals or disguises,” rather than the

more complex formulation “knowing that such transporta­

tion . . . is designed . . . to conceal or disguise.”

§1956(a)(2)(B)(i). It seems far more likely that Congress

intended courts to apply the familiar criminal law con­

cepts of purpose and intent than to focus exclusively on

how a defendant “structured” the transportation. In addi­

tion, the structural meaning of “design” is both overinclu­

sive and underinclusive: It would capture individuals who

structured transportation in a secretive way but lacked

any criminal intent (such as a person who hid illicit funds

en route to turn them over to law enforcement); yet it

would exclude individuals who fully intended to move the

funds in order to impede detection by law enforcement but

failed to hide them during the transportation.

To be sure, purpose and structure are often related.

One may employ structure to achieve a purpose: For ex­

ample, the petty thief may hide money in his shoe to

prevent it from being detected as he crosses the border

with the intent to hide the money in Mexico. See 478 F.

3d, at 301 (Smith, J., dissenting). Although transporting

money in a conventional manner may suggest no particu­

lar purpose other than simply to move it from one place to

another, secretively transporting it suggests, at least, that

the defendant did not want the money to be detected

during transport. In this case, evidence of the methods

petitioner used to transport the nearly $81,000 in cash—

bundled in plastic bags and hidden in a secret compart­

ment covered with animal hair—was plainly probative of

an underlying goal to prevent the funds from being de­

tected while he drove them from the United States to

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 15

Opinion of the Court

Mexico. The same secretive aspects of the transportation

also may be circumstantial evidence that the transporta­

tion itself was intended to avoid detection of the funds,

because, for example, they may suggest that the transpor­

tation is only one step in a larger plan to facilitate the

cross-border transport of the funds. Cf. id., at 289 (noting

that “concealment of the funds during the U. S. leg of the

trip [was] a vital part of the transportation design or plan

to get the funds out of this country”). But its probative

force, in that context, is weak. “There is a difference

between concealing something to transport it, and trans­

porting something to conceal it,” id., at 296–297 (Smith, J.,

dissenting); that is, how one moves the money is distinct

from why one moves the money. Evidence of the former,

standing alone, is not sufficient to prove the latter.

This case illustrates why: Even with abundant evidence

that petitioner had concealed the money in order to trans­

port it, the Government’s own expert witness—ICE Agent

Richard Nuckles—testified that the purpose of the trans­

portation was to compensate the leaders of the operation.7

Tr. 179 (Oct. 12, 2004), App. 64–65 (“[T]he bulk of [the

money] generally goes back to Mexico, because the smug­

gler is the one who originated this entire process. He’s

going to get a large cut of the profit, and that money has to

be moved back to him in Mexico”). The evidence suggested

that the secretive aspects of the transportation were em­

ployed to facilitate the transportation, see 478 F. 3d, at

289 (noting that “concealment of the funds during the

U. S. leg of the trip [was] a vital part of the transportation

design or plan”), but not necessarily that secrecy was the

purpose of the transportation. Agent Nuckles testified

——————

7 Concealing or disguising a listed attribute need be only one of the

purposes of the transportation. See §1956(a)(2)(B)(i) (providing that a

transportation plan need be designed “in whole or in part” to conceal or

disguise). But here, compensating the leaders of the operation was the

only purpose to which Agent Nuckles testified.

16 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

that the secretive manner of transportation was consistent

with drug smuggling, see Tr. 179–180, App. 65–66, but the

Government failed to introduce any evidence that the

reason drug smugglers move money to Mexico is to conceal

or disguise a listed attribute of the funds.

Agent Nuckles also testified that Acuna, the Mexican

border town to which petitioner was headed, has a cash

economy and that U. S. currency is widely accepted there.

See Tr. 188–189, App. 69. The Fifth Circuit apparently

viewed this as evidence that petitioner transported the

money in order to conceal or disguise it: “[G]iven Mexico’s

largely cash economy, if [petitioner] had successfully

transported the funds to Mexico without detection, the

jury was entitled to find that the funds would have been

better concealed or concealable after the transportation

than before.” 478 F. 3d, at 292. The statutory text makes

clear, however, that a conviction under this provision

requires proof that the purpose—not merely effect—of the

transportation was to conceal or disguise a listed attrib­

ute. Although the evidence suggested that petitioner’s

transportation would have had the effect of concealing the

funds, the evidence did not demonstrate that such con­

cealment was the purpose of the transportation because,

for instance, there was no evidence that petitioner knew

about or intended the effect.8

——————

8 In many cases, a criminal defendant’s knowledge or purpose is not

established by direct evidence but instead is shown circumstantially

based on inferences drawn from evidence of effect. See, e.g., 1 W.

LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §5.2(a), p. 341 (2d ed. 2003).

Specifically, where the consequences of an action are commonly known,

a trier of fact will often infer that the person taking the action knew

what the consequences would be and acted with the purpose of bringing

them about. Although, as noted above, the Government introduced

some evidence regarding the effect of transporting illegally obtained

money to Mexico, the Government has not pointed to any evidence in

the record from which it could be inferred beyond a reasonable doubt

that petitioner knew that taking the funds to Mexico would have had

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 17

Opinion of the Court

In sum, we conclude that the evidence introduced by the

Government was not sufficient to permit a reasonable jury

to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner’s

transportation was “designed in whole or in part . . . to

conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source,

the ownership, or the control of the proceeds.”

§1956(a)(2)(B)(i).

III

The provision of the money laundering statute under

which petitioner was convicted requires proof that the

transportation was “designed in whole or in part to conceal

or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the owner­

ship, or the control” of the funds. §1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Al­

though this element does not require proof that the defen­

dant attempted to create the appearance of legitimate

wealth, neither can it be satisfied solely by evidence that a

defendant concealed the funds during their transport. In

this case, the only evidence introduced to prove this ele­

ment showed that petitioner engaged in extensive efforts

to conceal the funds en route to Mexico, and thus his con­

viction cannot stand. We reverse the judgment of the

Fifth Circuit.

It is so ordered.

——————

one of the relevant effects.

Cite as: 553 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

ALITO, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 06–1456

_________________

HUMBERTO FIDEL REGALADO CUELLAR,

PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[June 2, 2008]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and

JUSTICE KENNEDY join, concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court but write briefly to sum-

marize my understanding of the deficiency in the Govern-

ment’s proof.

As the Court notes, ante, at 10, the Government was

required in this case to prove that petitioner knew that

the plan to transport the funds across the Mexican border

was designed at least in part to “conceal or disguise the

nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the

control” of the funds. 18 U. S. C. §1956(a)(2)(B)(i).

Transporting the funds across the border would have

had the effect of achieving this objective if, once the funds

made it into Mexico, it would have been harder for law

enforcement authorities in this country (1) to ascertain

that the funds were drug proceeds (“nature”), (2) to find

the funds (“location”), (3) to determine where they came

from (“source”), (4) to ascertain who owned them (“owner-

ship”), or (5) to find out who controlled them (“control”).

But as the Court notes, ante, at 15, the prosecution had to

prove, not simply that the transportation of the funds

from the United States to Mexico would have had one of

these effects, ibid., but that petitioner knew that achieving

one of these effects was a design (i.e., purpose) of the

transportation.

2 REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., concurring

As the Court also notes, ante, at 16, n. 8, a criminal

defendant’s intent is often inferred. Here, proof of peti-

tioner’s knowledge and of the intent of the person or per-

sons who “designed” the transportation would have been

sufficient if the prosecution had introduced evidence show-

ing, not only that taking “dirty” money across the border

has one or more of the effects noted above, but that it is

commonly known in the relevant circles (that is, among

those who design and carry out “such transportation,”

§1956(a)(2)(B)) that taking “dirty” money to Mexico has

one of the effects noted above. Such evidence would per-

mit a trier of fact to infer (1) that the person or persons

who “designed” the plan to have the funds taken to Mexico

intended to achieve the effect in question and (2) that a

person like petitioner (that is, a person who is recruited to

transport the funds) knew that this was the design.

Of course, if the prosecution had introduced such evi-

dence, the defense could have countered with any avail-

able proof showing (1) that in fact the achievement of

these effects was not a design of the transportation or

(2) that petitioner in fact did not know that achieving one

of these effects was a purpose of the plan. It would have

then been up to the trier of fact to decide whether the

statutory elements had been adequately proven.

At petitioner’s trial, as the Court notes, ante, at 16, the

Government introduced some evidence regarding the

effect of transporting illegally obtained money to Mexico,

but the Government has not pointed to any evidence in the

record from which it could be inferred beyond a reasonable

doubt that a person like petitioner knew that taking the

funds to Mexico would have had one of the relevant ef-

fects. For this reason, I agree with the Court that peti-

tioner’s conviction cannot be sustained.