United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 06–562. Argued April 23, 2007—Decided June 11, 2007

Sections 107(a) and 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Re

sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 allow private parties

to recover expenses associated with cleaning up contaminated sites.

Section 107(a) defines four categories of potentially responsible par

ties (PRPs) and makes them liable for, among other things, “(A) all

costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States

Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the

national contingency plan” and “(B) any other necessary costs of re

sponse incurred by any other person consistent with [such] plan,”

§§107(a)(4)(A)–(B). Originally, some courts interpreted §107(a)(4)(B)

as providing a cause of action for a private party to recover voluntar

ily incurred response costs and to seek contribution after having been

sued. However, after the enactment of §113(f), which authorizes one

PRP to sue another for contribution, many courts held it to be the ex

clusive remedy for PRPs. In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Ser

vices, Inc., 543 U. S. 157, 161, this Court held that a private party

could seek contribution under §113(f) only after being sued under

§106 or §107(a).

After respondent Atlantic Research cleaned up a Government site

it leased and contaminated while doing Government work, it sued the

Government to recover some of its costs under, as relevant here,

§107(a). The District Court dismissed the case, but the Eighth Cir

cuit reversed, holding that §113(f) does not provide the exclusive

remedy for recovering cleanup costs and that §107(a)(4)(B) provided a

cause of action to any person other than those permitted to sue under

§107(a)(4)(A).

Held: Because §107(a)(4)(B)’s plain terms allow a PRP to recover costs

from other PRPs, the statute provides Atlantic Research with a cause

of action. Pp. 4–11.

2 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.

Syllabus

(a) Applying the maxim that statutes must “be read as a whole,”

King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221, subparagraph (B)’s

language can be understood only with reference to subparagraph (A).

The provisions are adjacent and have similar structures, and the text

denotes a relationship between them. Subparagraph (B)’s phrase

“other necessary costs” refers to and differentiates the relevant costs

from those listed in subparagraph (A). Thus, it is natural to read the

phrase “any other person” by referring to the immediately preceding

subparagraph (A). Accepting the Government’s interpretation—that

“any other person” refers only to a person not identified as a PRP in

§§107(a)(1)–(4)—would destroy the symmetry of subparagraphs (A)

and (B) and render subparagraph (B) internally confusing. Moreover,

because the statute defines PRPs so broadly as to sweep in virtually

all persons likely to incur cleanup costs, accepting that interpretation

would reduce the number of potential plaintiffs to almost zero, ren

dering subparagraph (B) a dead letter. Pp. 4–7.

(b) Contrary to the Government’s argument, this interpretation

will not create friction between §107(a) and §113(f). Their two clearly

distinct remedies complement each other: §113(f)(1) authorizes a con

tribution action to PRPs with common liability stemming from an ac

tion instituted under §106 or §107(a), while §107(a) permits cost re

covery (as distinct from contribution) by a private party that has

itself incurred cleanup costs. Thus, at least in the case of reim

bursement, a PRP cannot choose §107(a)’s longer statute of limita

tions for recovery actions over §113(f)’s shorter one for contribution

claims. Similarly, a PRP could not avoid §113(f)’s equitable distribu

tion of reimbursement costs among PRPs by instead choosing to im

pose joint and several liability under §107(a). That choice of reme

dies simply does not exist, and in any event, a defendant PRP in a

§107(a) suit could blunt any such distribution by filing a §113(f) coun

terclaim. Finally, permitting PRPs to seek recovery under §107(a)

will not eviscerate §113(f)(2), which prohibits §113(f) contribution

claims against “[a] person who has resolved its liability to the United

States or a State in an administrative or judicially approved settle

ment . . . .” Although that settlement bar does not by its terms pro

tect against §107(a) cost-recovery liability, a district court applying

traditional equity rules would undoubtedly consider any prior settle

ment in the liability calculus; the settlement bar continues to provide

significant protection from contribution suits by PRPs that have in

equitably reimbursed costs incurred by another party; and settlement

carries the inherent benefit of finally resolving liability as to the

United States or a State. Pp. 7–11.

459 F. 3d 827, affirmed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 06–562

_________________

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. ATLANTIC

RESEARCH CORPORATION

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[June 11, 2007]

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Two provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980

(CERCLA)—§§107(a) and 113(f)—allow private parties to

recover expenses associated with cleaning up contami

nated sites. 42 U. S. C. §§9607(a), 9613(f). In this case,

we must decide a question left open in Cooper Industries,

Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U. S. 157, 161 (2004):

whether §107(a) provides so-called potentially responsible

parties (PRPs), 42 U. S. C. §§9607(a)(1)–(4), with a cause

of action to recover costs from other PRPs. We hold that it

does.

I

A

Courts have frequently grappled with whether and how

PRPs may recoup CERCLA-related costs from other PRPs.

The questions lie at the intersection of two statutory

provisions—CERCLA §§107(a) and 113(f). Section 107(a)

defines four categories of PRPs, 94 Stat. 2781, 42 U. S. C.

§§9607(a)(1)–(4), and makes them liable for, among other

things:

2 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.

Opinion of the Court

“(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred

by the United States Government or a State or an In

dian tribe not inconsistent with the national contin

gency plan; [and]

“(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred

by any other person consistent with the national con

tingency plan.” §9607(a)(4)(A)–(B).

Enacted as part of the Superfund Amendments and Reau

thorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 100 Stat. 1613, §113(f)

authorizes one PRP to sue another for contribution in

certain circumstances. 42 U. S. C. §9613(f).1

Prior to the advent of §113(f)’s express contribution

right, some courts held that §107(a)(4)(B) provided a cause

of action for a private party to recover voluntarily incurred

response costs and to seek contribution after having been

sued. See Cooper Industries, supra, at 161–162 (collecting

cases); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U. S. 809,

816, n. 7 (1994) same. After SARA’s enactment, however,

some Courts of Appeals believed it necessary to “direc[t]

traffic between” §107(a) and §113(f). 459 F. 3d 827, 832

(CA8 2006) (case below). As a result, many Courts of

Appeals held that §113(f) was the exclusive remedy for

PRPs. See Cooper Industries, supra, at 169 (collecting

cases). But as courts prevented PRPs from suing under

§107(a), they expanded §113(f) to allow PRPs to seek

“contribution” even in the absence of a suit under §106 or

§107(a). Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc., 312

F. 3d 677, 681 (CA5 2002) (en banc).

In Cooper Industries, we held that a private party could

seek contribution from other liable parties only after

having been sued under §106 or §107(a). 543 U. S., at 161.

——————

1 Section

113(f)(1) permits private parties to seek contribution during

or following a civil action under §106 or §107(a). 42 U. S. C. §9613(f)(1).

Section 113(f)(3)(B) permits private parties to seek contribution after

they have settled their liability with the Government. §9613(f)(3)(B).

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3

Opinion of the Court

This narrower interpretation of §113(f) caused several

Courts of Appeals to reconsider whether PRPs have rights

under §107(a)(4)(B), an issue we declined to address in

Cooper Industries. Id., at 168. After revisiting the issue,

some courts have permitted §107(a) actions by PRPs. See

Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423

F. 3d 90 (CA2 2005); Metropolitan Water Reclamation

Dist. of Greater Chicago v. North American Galvanizing &

Coatings, Inc., 473 F. 3d 824 (CA7 2007). However, at

least one court continues to hold that §113(f) provides the

exclusive cause of action available to PRPs. E. I. Dupont

de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F. 3d 515 (CA3

2006). Today, we resolve this issue.

B

In this case, respondent Atlantic Research leased prop

erty at the Shumaker Naval Ammunition Depot, a facility

operated by the Department of Defense. At the site, At

lantic Research retrofitted rocket motors for petitioner

United States. Using a high-pressure water spray, Atlan

tic Research removed pieces of propellant from the motors.

It then burned the propellant pieces. Some of the resul

tant wastewater and burned fuel contaminated soil and

groundwater at the site.

Atlantic Research cleaned the site at its own expense

and then sought to recover some of its costs by suing the

United States under both §107(a) and §113(f). After our

decision in Cooper Industries foreclosed relief under

§113(f), Atlantic Research amended its complaint to seek

relief under §107(a) and federal common law. The United

States moved to dismiss, arguing that §107(a) does not

allow PRPs (such as Atlantic Research) to recover costs.

The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, relying

on a case decided prior to our decision in Cooper Indus

tries, Dico, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 340 F. 3d 525 (CA8

2003).

4 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.

Opinion of the Court

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.

Recognizing that Cooper Industries undermined the rea

soning of its prior precedent, 459 F. 3d, at 830, n. 4, the

Court of Appeals joined the Second and Seventh Circuits

in holding that §113(f) does not provide “the exclusive

route by which [PRPs] may recover cleanup costs.” Id., at

834 (citing Consolidated Edison Co., supra). The court

reasoned that §107(a)(4)(B) authorized suit by any person

other than the persons permitted to sue under

§107(a)(4)(A). 459 F. 3d, at 835. Accordingly, it held that

§107(a)(4)(B) provides a cause of action to Atlantic Re

search. To prevent perceived conflict between

§107(a)(4)(B) and §113(f)(1), the Court of Appeals reasoned

that PRPs that “have been subject to §§106 or 107 en

forcement actions are still required to use §113, thereby

ensuring its continued vitality.” Id., at 836–837. We

granted certiorari, 549 U. S. ___ (2007), and now affirm.

II

A

The parties’ dispute centers on what “other person[s]”

may sue under §107(a)(4)(B). The Government argues

that “any other person” refers to any person not identified

as a PRP in §§107(a)(1)–(4).2 In other words, subpara

——————

2 CERCLA §107(a) lists four broad categories of persons as PRPs, by

definition liable to other persons for various costs:

“(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,

“(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub

stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub

stances were disposed of,

“(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged

for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport

for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed

by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incinera

tion vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing

such hazardous substances, and

“(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances

for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5

Opinion of the Court

graph (B) permits suit only by non-PRPs and thus bars

Atlantic Research’s claim. Atlantic Research counters

that subparagraph (B) takes its cue from subparagraph

(A), not the earlier paragraph (1)–(4). In accord with the

Court of Appeals, Atlantic Research believes that sub

paragraph (B) provides a cause of action to anyone except

the United States, a State, or an Indian tribe—the persons

listed in subparagraph (A). We agree with Atlantic

Research.

Statutes must “be read as a whole.” King v. St. Vin

cent’s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221 (1991). Applying that

maxim, the language of suparagraph (B) can be under

stood only with reference to subparagraph (A). The provi

sions are adjacent and have remarkably similar struc

tures. Each concerns certain costs that have been

incurred by certain entities and that bear a specified

relationship to the national contingency plan.3 Bolstering

the structural link, the text also denotes a relationship

between the two provisions. By using the phrase “other

necessary costs,” subparagraph (B) refers to and differen

tiates the relevant costs from those listed in subparagraph

(A).

In light of the relationship between the subparagraph, it

is natural to read the phrase “any other person” by refer

ring to the immediately preceding subparagraph (A),

which permits suit only by the United States, a State, or

an Indian tribe. The phrase “any other person” therefore

——————

sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threat

ened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazard

ous substance, shall be liable for [various costs].” 42 U. S. C.

§§9607(a)(1)–(4).

3 “The national contingency plan specifies procedures for preparing

and responding to contaminations and was promulgated by the Envi

ronmental Protection Agency . . . .” Cooper Industries Inc. v. Aviall

Services, Inc., 543 U. S. 157, 161, n. 2 (2004) (citing 40 CFR pt. 300

(2004)).

6 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.

Opinion of the Court

means any person other than those three. See 42 U. S. C.

§9601(21) (defining “person” to include the United States

and the various States). Consequently, the plain language

of subparagraph (B) authorizes cost-recovery actions by

any private party, including PRPs. See Key Tronic, 511

U. S., at 818 (stating in dictum that §107 “impliedly au

thorizes private parties to recover cleanup costs from other

PRP[s]” (emphasis added)).

The Government’s interpretation makes little textual

sense. In subparagraph (B), the phrase “any other neces

sary costs” and the phrase “any other person” both refer to

antecedents—“costs” and “person[s]”—located in some

previous statutory provision. Although “any other neces

sary costs” clearly references the costs in subparagraph

(A), the Government would inexplicably interpret “any

other person” to refer not to the persons listed in subpara

graph (A) but to the persons listed as PRPs in paragraphs

(1)–(4). Nothing in the text of §107(a)(4)(B) suggests an

intent to refer to antecedents located in two different

statutory provisions. Reading the statute in the manner

suggested by the Government would destroy the symmetry

of §§107(a)(4)(A) and (B) and render subparagraph (B)

internally confusing.

Moreover, the statute defines PRPs so broadly as to

sweep in virtually all persons likely to incur cleanup costs.

Hence, if PRPs do not qualify as “any other person” for

purposes of §107(a)(4)(B), it is unclear what private party

would. The Government posits that §107(a)(4)(B) author

izes relief for “innocent” private parties—for instance, a

landowner whose land has been contaminated by another.

But even parties not responsible for contamination may

fall within the broad definitions of PRPs in §§107(a)(1)–

(4). See 42 U. S. C. §9607(a)(1) (listing “the owner and

operator of a . . . facility” as a PRP); see also United States

v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F. 3d 179, 184 (CA2 2003)

(“CERCLA §9607 is a strict liability statute”). The Gov

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 7

Opinion of the Court

ernment’s reading of the text logically precludes all PRPs,

innocent or not, from recovering cleanup costs. Accord

ingly, accepting the Government’s interpretation would

reduce the number of potential plaintiffs to almost zero,

rendering §107(a)(4)(B) a dead letter.4 See Louisville &

Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 475 (1911) (“We

must have regard to all the words used by Congress, and

as far as possible give effect to them”).

According to the Government, our interpretation suffers

from the same infirmity because it causes the phrase “any

other person” to duplicate work done by other text. In the

Government’s view, the phrase “any other necessary costs”

“already precludes governmental entities from recovering

under” §107(a)(4)(B). Brief for United States 20. Even

assuming the Government is correct, it does not alter our

conclusion. The phrase “any other person” performs a

significant function simply by clarifying that subpara

graph (B) excludes the persons enumerated in subpara

graph (A). In any event, our hesitancy to construe stat

utes to render language superfluous does not require us to

avoid surplusage at all costs. It is appropriate to tolerate

a degree of surplusage rather than adopt a textually dubi

ous construction that threatens to render the entire provi

sion a nullity.

B

The Government also argues that our interpretation will

create friction between §107(a) and §113(f), the very harm

——————

4 Congress amended the statute in 2002 to exempt some bona fide

prospective purchasers (BFPPs) from liability under §107(a). See 42

U. S. C. §9607(r)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). The Government claims that

these persons are non-PRPs and therefore qualify as “any other person”

under its interpretation of §107(a)(4)(B). Prior to 2002, however, the

statute made this small set of persons liable as PRPs. Accordingly,

even if BFPPs now give some life to the Government’s interpretation of

§107(a)(4)(B), it would be implausible at best to conclude that

§107(a)(4)(B) lay dormant until the enactment of §107(r)(1) in 2002.

8 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.

Opinion of the Court

courts of appeals have previously tried to avoid. In par

ticular, the Government maintains that our interpreta

tion, by offering PRPs a choice between §107(a) and

§113(f), effectively allows PRPs to circumvent §113(f)’s

shorter statute of limitations. See 42 U. S. C.

§§9613(g)(2)–(3). Furthermore, the Government argues,

PRPs will eschew equitable apportionment under §113(f)

in favor of joint and several liability under §107(a). Fi

nally, the Government contends that our interpretation

eviscerates the settlement bar set forth in §113(f)(2).

We have previously recognized that §§107(a) and 113(f)

provide two “clearly distinct” remedies. Cooper Industries,

543 U. S., at 163, n. 3. “CERCLA provide[s] for a right to

cost recovery in certain circumstances, §107(a), and sepa

rate rights to contribution in other circumstances,

§§113(f)(1), 113(f)(3)(B).” Id., at 163 (emphases added).

The Government, however, uses the word “contribution” as

if it were synonymous with any apportionment of expenses

among PRPs. Brief for United States 33, n. 14 (“Contribu

tion is merely a form of cost recovery, not a wholly inde

pendent type of relief”); see also, e.g., Pinal Creek Group v.

Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F. 3d 1298, 1301 (CA9 1997)

(“Because all PRPs are liable under the statute, a claim by

one PRP against another PRP necessarily is for contribu

tion”). This imprecise usage confuses the complementary

yet distinct nature of the rights established in §§107(a)

and 113(f).

Section 113(f) explicitly grants PRPs a right to contribu

tion. Contribution is defined as the “tortfeasor’s right to

collect from others responsible for the same tort after the

tortfeasor has paid more than his or her proportionate

share, the shares being determined as a percentage of

fault.” Black’s Law Dictionary 353 (8th ed. 1999). Noth

ing in §113(f) suggests that Congress used the term “con

tribution” in anything other than this traditional sense.

The statute authorizes a PRP to seek contribution “during

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 9

Opinion of the Court

or following” a suit under §106 or §107(a). 42 U. S. C.

§9613(f)(1).5 Thus, §113(f)(1) permits suit before or after

the establishment of common liability. In either case, a

PRP’s right to contribution under §113(f)(1) is contingent

upon an inequitable distribution of common liability

among liable parties.

By contrast, §107(a) permits recovery of cleanup costs

but does not create a right to contribution. A private

party may recover under §107(a) without any establish

ment of liability to a third party. Moreover, §107(a) per

mits a PRP to recover only the costs it has “incurred” in

cleaning up a site. 42 U. S. C. §9607(a)(4)(B). When a

party pays to satisfy a settlement agreement or a court

judgment, it does not incur its own costs of response.

Rather, it reimburses other parties for costs that those

parties incurred.

Accordingly, the remedies available in §§107(a) and

113(f) complement each other by providing causes of ac

tion “to persons in different procedural circumstances.”

Consolidated Edison, 423 F. 3d, at 99; see also E. I. Du

pont de Nemours, 460 F. 3d, at 548 (Sloviter, J., dissent

ing). Section 113(f)(1) authorizes a contribution action to

PRPs with common liability stemming from an action

instituted under §106 or §107(a). And §107(a) permits

cost recovery (as distinct from contribution) by a private

party that has itself incurred cleanup costs. Hence, a PRP

that pays money to satisfy a settlement agreement or a

court judgment may pursue §113(f) contribution. But by

reimbursing response costs paid by other parties, the PRP

has not incurred its own costs of response and therefore

cannot recover under §107(a). As a result, though eligible

——————

5 Similarly, §113(f)(3)(B) permits a PRP to seek contribution after it

“has resolved its liability to the United States or a State . . . in an

administrative or judicially approved settlement . . . .” 42 U. S. C.

§9613(f)(3)(B).

10 UNITED STATES v. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP.

Opinion of the Court

to seek contribution under §113(f)(1), the PRP cannot

simultaneously seek to recover the same expenses under

§107(a). Thus, at least in the case of reimbursement, the

PRP cannot choose the 6-year statute of limitations for

cost-recovery actions over the shorter limitations period

for §113(f) contribution claims.6

For similar reasons, a PRP could not avoid §113(f)’s

equitable distribution of reimbursement costs among

PRPs by instead choosing to impose joint and several

liability on another PRP in an action under §107(a).7 The

choice of remedies simply does not exist. In any event, a

defendant PRP in such a §107(a) suit could blunt any

inequitable distribution of costs by filing a §113(f) counter

claim. 459 F. 3d, at 835; see also Consolidated Edison,

supra, at 100, n. 9 (collecting cases). Resolution of a

§113(f) counter-claim would necessitate the equitable

apportionment of costs among the liable parties, including

the PRP that filed the §107(a) action. 42 U. S. C.

§9613(f)(a) (“In resolving contribution claims, the court

may allocate response costs among liable parties using

such equitable factors as the court determines are appro

——————

6 We do not suggest that §§107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f) have no overlap at

all. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U. S. 809, 816 (1994) (stat

ing the statutes provide “similar and somewhat overlapping

remed[ies]”). For instance, we recognize that a PRP may sustain

expenses pursuant to a consent decree following a suit under §106 or

§107(a). See, e.g., United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus

tries, Inc., 33 F. 3d 96, 97 (CA1 1994). In such a case, the PRP does not

incur costs voluntarily but does not reimburse the costs of another

party. We do not decide whether these compelled costs of response are

recoverable under §113(f), §107(a), or both. For our purposes, it suffices

to demonstrate that costs incurred voluntarily are recoverable only by

way of §107(a)(4)(B), and costs of reimbursement to another person

pursuant to a legal judgment or settlement are recoverable only under

§113(f). Thus, at a minimum, neither remedy swallows the other,

contrary to the Government’s argument.

7 We assume without deciding that §107(a) provides for joint and

several liability.

Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 11

Opinion of the Court

priate”).

Finally, permitting PRPs to seek recovery under §107(a)

will not eviscerate the settlement bar set forth in

§113(f)(2). That provision prohibits §113(f) contribution

claims against “[a] person who has resolved its liability to

the United States or a State in an administrative or judi

cially approved settlement . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §9613(f)(2).

The settlement bar does not by its terms protect against

cost-recovery liability under §107(a). For several reasons,

we doubt this supposed loophole would discourage settle

ment. First, as stated above, a defendant PRP may trig

ger equitable apportionment by filing a §113(f) counter

claim. A district court applying traditional rules of equity

would undoubtedly consider any prior settlement as part

of the liability calculus. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts

§886A(2), p. 337 (1977) (“No tortfeasor can be required to

make contribution beyond his own equitable share of the

liability”). Second, the settlement bar continues to provide

significant protection from contribution suits by PRPs that

have inequitably reimbursed the costs incurred by another

party. Third, settlement carries the inherent benefit of

finally resolving liability as to the United States or a

State.8

III

Because the plain terms of §107(a)(4)(B) allow a PRP to

recover costs from other PRPs, the statute provides Atlan

tic Research with a cause of action. We therefore affirm

the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.

——————

8 Because §107(a) expressly permits PRPs to seek cost recovery, we

need not address the alternative holding of the Court of Appeals that

§107(a) contains an additional implied right to contribution for PRPs

who are not eligible for relief under §113(f). Cf. Cooper Industries, 543

U. S., at 171 (citing Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,

451 U. S. 630 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451

U. S. 77 (1981)).