Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP. DBA THE MOONLIGHT

CAFE

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04–944. Argued January 11, 2006—Decided February 22, 2006

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for “an em-

ployer . . . to discriminate against any [employee] with respect to . . .

sex,” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1), and defines “employer” as “a person

. . . who has fifteen or more employees,” §2000e(b). The Act’s jurisdic-

tional provision empowers federal courts to adjudicate civil actions

“brought under” Title VII. §2000e–5(f)(3). Title VII actions also fit

within the Judicial Code’s grant of subject-matter jurisdiction to fed-

eral courts over actions “arising under” federal law. 28 U. S. C.

§1331. At the time Title VII was enacted, §1331 contained a $10,000

amount-in-controversy threshold, which left Title VII claims below

that amount uncovered. Section 2000e–5(f)(3) assured that the

amount-in-controversy limitation would not impede a Title VII com-

plainant’s access to a federal forum. Since 1980, when Congress

amended §1331 to eliminate the amount-in-controversy threshold,

§2000e–5(f)(3) has served simply to underscore Congress’ intention to

provide a federal forum for Title VII claims. Because Congress has

also authorized federal courts to exercise “supplemental” jurisdiction

over state-law claims linked to a federal claim, 28 U. S. C. §1367, Ti-

tle VII plaintiffs may pursue complete relief in federal court.

The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,

see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1), may be raised at any stage in the

litigation, even after trial and the entry of judgment, Rule 12(h)(3).

See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 455. By contrast, the objection

that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted,” Rule 12(b)(6), endures only up to, not beyond, trial on the

merits, Rule 12(h)(2).

Petitioner Arbaugh sued her former employer, respondent Y&H

2 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.

Syllabus

Corporation, in Federal District Court, charging sexual harassment

in violation of Title VII and asserting related state-law claims. The

case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for Arbaugh. After

the court entered judgment on that verdict, Y&H moved to dismiss

the entire action for want of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, as-

serting, for the first time, that it had fewer than 15 employees on its

payroll and therefore was not amenable to suit under Title VII. Al-

though recognizing the unfairness and waste of judicial resources

that granting the motion would entail, the District Court, citing Fed-

eral Rule 12(h)(3), considered itself obliged to do so because it be-

lieved the 15-or-more-employees requirement to be jurisdictional. It

therefore vacated its prior judgment and dismissed Arbaugh’s Title

VII claim with prejudice and her state-law claims without prejudice.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed based on its precedent holding that unless

the employee-numerosity requirement is met, federal-court subject-

matter jurisdiction does not exist.

Held: Title VII’s numerical threshold does not circumscribe federal-

court subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, the employee-numerosity

requirement relates to the substantive adequacy of Arbaugh’s Title

VII claim, and therefore could not be raised defensively late in the

lawsuit, i.e., after Y&H had failed to assert the objection prior to the

close of trial on the merits. The basic statutory grants of federal-

court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U. S. C. §1331,

which provides for “[f]ederal-question” jurisdiction, and §1332, which

provides for “[d]iversity of citizenship” jurisdiction. A plaintiff prop-

erly invokes §1331 jurisdiction when she pleads a colorable claim

“arising under” the Federal Constitution or laws. See Bell v. Hood,

327 U. S. 678, 681–685. She invokes §1332 jurisdiction when she pre-

sents a claim between parties of diverse citizenship that exceeds the

required jurisdictional amount, currently $75,000. See §1332(a). Ar-

baugh invoked federal-question jurisdiction under §1331, but her

case “aris[es]” under a federal law, Title VII, that specifies, as a pre-

requisite to its application, the existence of a particular fact, i.e., 15

or more employees. The Court resolves the question whether that

fact is “jurisdictional” or relates to the “merits” of a Title VII claim

mindful of the consequences of typing the 15-employee threshold a

determinant of subject-matter jurisdiction, rather than an element of

Arbaugh’s claim for relief. First, “subject-matter jurisdiction, be-

cause it involves the court’s power to hear a case, can never be for-

feited or waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625, 630. More-

over, courts, including this Court, have an independent obligation to

determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the ab-

sence of a challenge from any party. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil

Co., 526 U. S. 574, 583. Nothing in Title VII’s text indicates that

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Syllabus

Congress intended courts, on their own motion, to assure that the

employee-numerosity requirement is met. Second, in some instances,

if subject-matter jurisdiction turns on contested facts, the trial judge

may be authorized to review the evidence and resolve the dispute on

her own. If satisfaction of an essential element of a claim is at issue,

however, the jury is the proper trier of contested facts. Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133, 150–151. Third,

when a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdic-

tion, the complaint must be dismissed in its entirety. Thus, the trial

court below dismissed, along with the Title VII claim, pendent state-

law claims fully tried by a jury and determined on the merits. In

contrast, when a court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a federal claim, the court generally retains discretion to exercise sup-

plemental jurisdiction, pursuant to §1367, over pendent state-law

claims.

While Congress could make the employee-numerosity requirement

“jurisdictional” if it so chose, neither §1331 nor Title VII’s jurisdic-

tional provision, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(f)(3), specifies any threshold

ingredient akin to 28 U. S. C. §1332’s monetary floor. Instead, the

15-employee threshold appears in a separate provision that “does not

speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of

the district courts.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385,

394. Given the unfairness and waste of judicial resources entailed in

tying the employee-numerosity requirement to subject-matter juris-

diction, the sounder course is to refrain from constricting §1331 or

§2000e–5(f)(3), and to leave the ball in Congress’ court. If the Legis-

lature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope

shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly in-

structed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. But when

Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdic-

tional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in

character. Applying that readily administrable bright line here

yields the holding that Title VII’s 15-employee threshold is an ele-

ment of a plaintiff’s claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue. Pp. 8–

15.

380 F. 3d 219, reversed and remanded.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other

Members joined, except ALITO, J., who took no part in the consideration

or decision of the case.

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 04–944

_________________

JENIFER ARBAUGH, PETITIONER v. Y & H COR-

PORATION, DBA THE MOONLIGHT CAFE

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[February 22, 2006]

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the distinction between two some-

times confused or conflated concepts: federal-court “sub-

ject-matter” jurisdiction over a controversy; and the essen-

tial ingredients of a federal claim for relief. Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful “for an

employer . . . to discriminate,” inter alia, on the basis of

sex. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). The Act’s jurisdictional

provision empowers federal courts to adjudicate civil

actions “brought under” Title VII. §2000e–5(f)(3). Cover-

ing a broader field, the Judicial Code gives federal courts

subject-matter jurisdiction over all civil actions “arising

under” the laws of the United States. 28 U. S. C. §1331.

Title VII actions fit that description. In a provision defin-

ing 13 terms used in Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §2000e, Con-

gress limited the definition of “employer” to include only

those having “fifteen or more employees,” §2000e(b). The

question here presented is whether the numerical qualifi-

cation contained in Title VII’s definition of “employer”

affects federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction or, in-

stead, delineates a substantive ingredient of a Title VII

2 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.

Opinion of the Court

claim for relief.

The question arises in this context. Jenifer Arbaugh,

plaintiff below, petitioner here, brought a Title VII action

in federal court against her former employer, defendant-

respondent Y&H Corporation (hereinafter Y&H), charging

sexual harassment. The case was tried to a jury, which

returned a verdict for Arbaugh in the total amount of

$40,000. Two weeks after the trial court entered judgment

on the jury verdict, Y&H moved to dismiss the entire

action for want of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. For

the first time in the litigation, Y&H asserted that it had

fewer than 15 employees on its payroll and therefore was

not amenable to suit under Title VII.

Although recognizing that it was “unfair and a waste of

judicial resources” to grant the motion to dismiss, App. to

Pet. for Cert. 47, the trial court considered itself obliged to

do so because it believed that the 15-or-more-employees

requirement was jurisdictional. We reject that categoriza-

tion and hold that the numerical threshold does not cir-

cumscribe federal-court subject-matter jurisdiction. In-

stead, the employee-numerosity requirement relates to the

substantive adequacy of Arbaugh’s Title VII claim, and

therefore could not be raised defensively late in the law-

suit, i.e., after Y&H had failed to assert the objection prior

to the close of trial on the merits.

I

We set out below statutory provisions and rules that

bear on this case. Title VII makes it “an unlawful em-

ployment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to

hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-

criminate against any individual with respect to his com-

pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or

national origin.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). To spare very

small businesses from Title VII liability, Congress pro-

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Opinion of the Court

vided that:

“[t]he term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an

industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more

employees for each working day in each of twenty or

more calendar weeks in the current or preceding cal-

endar year, and any agent of such a person . . . .”

§2000e(b).1

This employee-numerosity requirement2 appears in a

section headed “Definitions,” §2000e, which also prescribes

the meaning, for Title VII purposes, of 12 other terms used

in the Act.3

Congress has broadly authorized the federal courts to

exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States.” 28 U. S. C. §1331. Title VII surely is a

“la[w] of the United States.” Ibid. In 1964, however,

when Title VII was enacted, §1331’s umbrella provision for

federal-question jurisdiction contained an amount-in-

controversy limitation: Claims could not be brought under

§1331 unless the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000.

See §1331(a) (1964 ed.). Title VII, framed in that light,

assured that the amount-in-controversy limitation would

not impede an employment-discrimination complainant’s

——————

1 The same provision further states that the term “employer” does not

include the United States, corporations wholly owned by the United

States, Indian Tribes, certain departments and agencies of the District

of Columbia, or tax-exempt “bona fide private membership club[s]”

(other than labor organizations). §2000e(b).

2 Congress originally prescribed a 25-or-more-employee threshold,

Civil Rights Act of 1964, §701, 78 Stat. 253, but lowered the minimum

number of employees to 15 in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act

of 1972, §2, 86 Stat. 103.

3 The other terms defined in §2000e are: “person,” “employment

agency,” “labor organization,” “employee,” “commerce,” “industry

affecting commerce,” “State,” “religion,” “because of sex,” “complaining

party,” “demonstrates,” and “respondent.”

4 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.

Opinion of the Court

access to a federal forum. The Act thus contains its own

jurisdiction-conferring provision, which reads:

“Each United States district court and each United

States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the

United States shall have jurisdiction of actions

brought under this subchapter.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e–

5(f)(3).4

Congress amended 28 U. S. C. §1331 in 1980 to eliminate

the amount-in-controversy threshold. See Federal Ques-

tion Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, §2, 94 Stat.

2369. Since that time, Title VII’s own jurisdictional provi-

sion, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(f)(3), has served simply to

underscore Congress’ intention to provide a federal forum

for the adjudication of Title VII claims. See Brief for

United States as Amicus Curiae 13; Tr. of Oral Arg. 4.

We note, too, that, under 28 U. S. C. §1367, federal

courts may exercise “supplemental” jurisdiction over state-

law claims linked to a claim based on federal law.5 Plain-

tiffs suing under Title VII may avail themselves of the

opportunity §1367 provides to pursue complete relief in a

federal-court lawsuit. Arbaugh did so in the instant case

by adding to her federal complaint pendent claims arising

under state law that would not independently qualify for

——————

4 Title VII contains a separate jurisdictional provision, 42 U. S. C.

§2000e–6(b), authorizing suits by the Government to enjoin “pattern or

practice” discrimination.

5 Section 1367(a) states: “Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)

or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil

action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district

courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that

are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction

that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of

the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall

include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional

parties.”

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

Opinion of the Court

federal-court adjudication.

The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1), may be

raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any

stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of

judgment. Rule 12(h)(3) instructs: “Whenever it appears

by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court

lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall

dismiss the action.” See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443,

455 (2004). By contrast, the objection that a complaint

“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,”

Rule 12(b)(6), may not be asserted post trial. Under Rule

12(h)(2), that objection endures up to, but not beyond, trial

on the merits: “A defense of failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted . . . may be made in any plead-

ing . . . or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at

the trial on the merits.” Cf. Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 459.

II

From May 2000 through February 2001, Jenifer Ar-

baugh worked as a bartender and waitress at the

Moonlight Cafe, a New Orleans restaurant owned and

operated by Y&H. Arbaugh alleged that Yalcin Hatipoglu,

one of the company’s owners, sexually harassed her and

precipitated her constructive discharge.6 In November

2001, Arbaugh filed suit against Y&H in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Her

complaint asserted claims under Title VII and Louisiana

law. App. to Pet. for Cert. 1–2.

Arbaugh’s pleadings alleged that her federal claim

“ar[o]se under Title VII” and that the Federal District

——————

6 See Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U. S. 129, 147 (2004)

(constructive discharge compensable under Title VII includes an em-

ployee’s departure due to sexual harassment that renders “working

conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt com-

pelled to resign”).

6 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.

Opinion of the Court

Court had jurisdiction over this claim under §1331 plus

supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims under

§1367. Record in No. 01–3376 (ED La.), Doc. 3, p. 1

(Amended Complaint). Y&H’s responsive pleadings ad-

mitted Arbaugh’s “jurisdictional” allegations but denied

her contentions on the merits. Id., Doc. 4, p. 1 (Answer to

Complaint). The pretrial order submitted and signed by

the parties, and later subscribed by the presiding judge,

reiterated that the court was “vested with jurisdiction over

[Arbaugh’s Title VII claim] pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1331,”

and “ha[d] supplemental jurisdiction over [her] state law

claims pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1367.” Id., Doc. 19, p. 2.

The order listed “Uncontested Material Facts,” including:

“Plaintiff was employed as a waitress/bartender at the

Moonlight for Defendants from May, 2000 through Febru-

ary 10, 2001 when she terminated her employment with

the company.” Id., p. 3. It did not list among “Contested

Issues of Fact” or “Contested Legal Issues” the question

whether Y&H had the requisite number of employees

under 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b). Record, Doc. 19, pp. 4–5. Nor

was the issue raised at any other point pretrial or at trial.

The parties consented to trial before a Magistrate

Judge. See 28 U. S. C. §636(c). After a two-day trial, the

jury found that Arbaugh had been sexually harassed and

constructively discharged in violation of Title VII and

Louisiana antidiscrimination law. The verdict awarded

Arbaugh $5,000 in backpay, $5,000 in compensatory dam-

ages, and $30,000 in punitive damages. The trial court

entered judgment for Arbaugh on November 5, 2002.

Two weeks later, Y&H filed a motion under Federal

Rule 12(h)(3) to dismiss Arbaugh’s complaint for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. Record, Doc. 44. As sole

ground for the motion, Y&H alleged, for the first time in

the proceedings, that it “did not employ fifteen or more

employees [during the relevant period] and thus is not an

employer for Title VII purposes.” Id., p. 2 (Memorandum

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

Opinion of the Court

in Support of Rule 12(h)(3) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Subject Matter Jurisdiction). The trial court commented

that “[i]t is unfair and a waste of judicial resources to

permit [Y&H] to admit Arbaugh’s allegations of jurisdic-

tion, try the case for two days and then assert a lack of

subject matter jurisdiction in response to an adverse jury

verdict.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 47. Nevertheless, reciting

the text of Rule 12(h)(3), see supra, at 5, the trial court

allowed Y&H to plead that it did not qualify as an “em-

ployer” under Title VII’s definition of that term. App. to

Pet. for Cert. 47–48; see supra, at 3.

Discovery ensued. The dispute over the employee count

turned on the employment status of Y&H’s eight drivers,

engaged to make deliveries for the restaurant, and the

company’s four owners (the Moonlight Cafe’s two manag-

ers and their shareholder spouses). As the trial court

noted, “[i]f either the delivery drivers or the four owners

are counted with the persons shown on the payroll jour-

nals, then Y&H employed fifteen or more persons for the

requisite time.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 27. After reviewing

the parties’ submissions, however, the trial court con-

cluded that neither the delivery drivers nor the owner-

managers nor their shareholder spouses qualified as “em-

ployees” for Title VII purposes. Id., at 32–43. Based on

that determination, the trial court vacated its prior judg-

ment in favor of Arbaugh, dismissed her Title VII claim

with prejudice, and her state-law claims without preju-

dice. Id., at 23.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 380

F. 3d 219 (2004). Bound by its prior decisions, the Court

of Appeals held that a defendant’s “failure to qualify as an

‘employer’ under Title VII deprives a district court of

subject matter jurisdiction.” Id., at 224 (citing, e.g., Du-

mas v. Mt. Vernon, 612 F. 2d 974, 980 (1980)). Dismissal

for want of subject-matter jurisdiction was proper, the

Court of Appeals ruled, for the record warranted the con-

8 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.

Opinion of the Court

clusion that Y&H’s delivery drivers, its owner-managers,

and their shareholder wives were not “employees” for Title

VII purposes, 380 F. 3d, at 225–230, and it was undis-

puted that Y&H “did not employ the requisite 15 employ-

ees without the inclusion of” those persons, id., at 231.

We granted certiorari, 544 U. S. 1031 (2005), to resolve

conflicting opinions in Courts of Appeals on the question

whether Title VII’s employee-numerosity requirement, 42

U. S. C. §2000e(b), is jurisdictional or simply an element of

a plaintiff’s claim for relief. Compare, e.g., 380 F. 3d, at

223–225 (Title VII’s employee-numerosity requirement is

jurisdictional), and Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F. 2d 1332,

1335 (CA6 1983) (same), with, e.g., Da Silva v. Kinsho

International Corp., 229 F. 3d 358, 361–366 (CA2 2000)

(Title VII’s employee-numerosity requirement is not juris-

dictional); Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F. 3d 72,

76–83 (CA3 2003) (same); EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier

Parochial School, 117 F. 3d 621, 623–624 (CADC 1997)

(Americans with Disabilities Act’s employee-numerosity

requirement, 42 U. S. C. §12111(5)(A), resembling Title

VII’s requirement, is not jurisdictional).

III

“Jurisdiction,” this Court has observed, “is a word of

many, too many, meanings.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better

Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 90 (1998) (internal quotation

marks omitted). This Court, no less than other courts, has

sometimes been profligate in its use of the term. For

example, this Court and others have occasionally de-

scribed a nonextendable time limit as “mandatory and

jurisdictional.” See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 361

U. S. 220, 229 (1960). But in recent decisions, we have

clarified that time prescriptions, however emphatic, “are

not properly typed ‘jurisdictional.’ ” Scarborough v. Prin-

cipi, 541 U. S. 401, 414 (2004); accord Eberhart v. United

States, 546 U. S. ___, ___ (2005) (per curiam) (slip op., at 4–

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 9

Opinion of the Court

7); Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 454–455. See also Carlisle v.

United States, 517 U. S. 416, 434–435 (1996) (GINSBURG, J.,

concurring).

The dispute now before us concerns the proper classifi-

cation of Title VII’s statutory limitation of covered em-

ployers to those with 15 or more employees. If the limita-

tion conditions subject-matter jurisdiction, as the lower

courts held it did, then a conclusion that Y&H had fewer

than 15 employees would require erasure of the judgment

for Arbaugh entered on the jury verdict. But if the lower

courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction characterization is

incorrect, and the issue, instead, concerns the merits of

Arbaugh’s case, then Y&H raised the employee-

numerosity requirement too late. Its pretrial stipulations,

see supra, at 6, and its failure to speak to the issue prior

to the conclusion of the trial on the merits, see Fed. Rule

Civ. Proc. 12(h)(2), supra, at 5, would preclude vacation of

the $40,000 judgment in Arbaugh’s favor.

On the subject-matter jurisdiction/ingredient-of-claim-

for-relief dichotomy, this Court and others have been less

than meticulous. “Subject matter jurisdiction in federal-

question cases is sometimes erroneously conflated with a

plaintiff’s need and ability to prove the defendant bound

by the federal law asserted as the predicate for relief—a

merits-related determination.” 2 J. Moore et al., Moore’s

Federal Practice §12.30[1], p. 12–36.1 (3d ed. 2005) (here-

inafter Moore). Judicial opinions, the Second Circuit

incisively observed, “often obscure the issue by stating

that the court is dismissing ‘for lack of jurisdiction’ when

some threshold fact has not been established, without

explicitly considering whether the dismissal should be for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to state a

claim.” Da Silva, 229 F. 3d, at 361. We have described

such unrefined dispositions as “drive-by jurisdictional

rulings” that should be accorded “no precedential effect”

on the question whether the federal court had authority to

10 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.

Opinion of the Court

adjudicate the claim in suit. Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 91.

Cases of this genre include Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U. S. 69 (1984), and EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,

499 U. S. 244 (1991). Hishon involved a Title VII claim

brought by a lawyer denied partnership in a law firm. The

District Court ruled that Title VII did not apply to the

selection of partners and dismissed the case for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed

that judgment. We noted that the District Court’s reason-

ing “ma[de] clear that it dismissed petitioner’s complaint

on the ground that her allegations did not state a claim

cognizable under Title VII.” 467 U. S., at 73, n. 2. Dis-

agreeing with the lower courts, we held that Title VII

applies to partnership decisions. Id., at 73–78. That

holding, we said, “ma[de] it unnecessary to consider the

wisdom of the District Court’s invocation of Rule 12(b)(1),

as opposed to Rule 12(b)(6).” Id., at 73, n. 2. The former

Rule concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, the latter,

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

See supra, at 5. Our opinion in Hishon thus raised, but

did not decide, the question whether subject-matter juris-

diction was the proper rubric for the District Court’s deci-

sions.7

In Arabian American Oil Co., we affirmed the judgment

of the courts below that Title VII, as then composed, did

not apply to a suit by a United States employee working

——————

7 Y&H features Walters v. Metropolitan Ed. Enterprises, Inc., 519 U. S.

202 (1997), as supportive of the jurisdictional character of the employee-

numerosity requirement. Brief for Respondent 8–10. Y&H urges that

the Court must have considered the requirement jurisdictional, for

Walters held definitively that, under the correct legal standard, the

defendant had more than 15 employees. If the requirement had been

seen as a merits issue, Y&H contends, the Court would have remanded

the employee count for determination by the trier of fact. But the

parties in Walters apparently stipulated to all relevant facts, leaving

nothing for a fact trier to resolve on remand. Cf. 519 U. S., at 211–212.

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 11

Opinion of the Court

abroad for a United States employer.8 That judgment had

been placed under a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

label. We agreed with the lower courts’ view of the limited

geographical reach of the statute. 499 U. S., at 246–247.

En passant, we copied the petitioners’ characterizations of

terms included in Title VII’s “Definitions” section, 42

U. S. C. §2000e, as “jurisdictional.” See 499 U. S., at 249,

251, 253. But our decision did not turn on that characteri-

zation, and the parties did not cross swords over it. See

Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 91 (declining to follow a decision

treating an issue as jurisdictional because nothing “turned

upon whether [the issue] was technically jurisdictional” in

that case). In short, we were not prompted in Arabian

American Oil Co. to home in on whether the dismissal had

been properly based on the absence of subject-matter

jurisdiction rather than on the plaintiff’s failure to state a

claim. 499 U. S., at 247.9

The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-

matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U. S. C. §§1331 and

1332. Section 1331 provides for “[f]ederal-question” juris-

diction, §1332 for “[d]iversity of citizenship” jurisdiction.

A plaintiff properly invokes §1331 jurisdiction when she

pleads a colorable claim “arising under” the Constitution

——————

8 Congress subsequently amended Title VII to extend protection to

United States citizens working overseas. See Civil Rights Act of 1991,

§109(a), 105 Stat. 1077, codified at 42 U. S. C. §2000e(f) (“With respect

to employment in a foreign country,” the term “employee” “includes an

individual who is a citizen of the United States.”).

9 In EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U. S. 107 (1988), also

featured by Y&H, see Brief for Respondent 12, a plurality of this Court

noted that “[r]eactivation of state proceedings after the conclusion of

federal proceedings serves [a] useful function,” in part because “Title

VII does not give the EEOC jurisdiction to enforce the Act against

employers of fewer than 15 employees.” 486 U. S., at 119, n. 5. That

fleeting footnote addressed the relative administrative provinces of the

EEOC and state agencies. It did not speak of federal-court subject-

matter jurisdiction, which was not at issue in the case.

12 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.

Opinion of the Court

or laws of the United States. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S.

678, 681–685 (1946).10 She invokes §1332 jurisdiction

when she presents a claim between parties of diverse

citizenship that exceeds the required jurisdictional

amount, currently $75,000. See §1332(a).

Arbaugh invoked federal-question jurisdiction under

§1331, but her case “aris[es]” under a federal law, Title

VII, that specifies, as a prerequisite to its application, the

existence of a particular fact, i.e., 15 or more employees.

We resolve the question whether that fact is “jurisdic-

tional” or relates to the “merits” of a Title VII claim mind-

ful of the consequences of typing the 15-employee thresh-

old a determinant of subject-matter jurisdiction, rather

than an element of Arbaugh’s claim for relief.

First, “subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves

the court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or

waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625, 630

(2002). Moreover, courts, including this Court, have an

independent obligation to determine whether subject-

matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a chal-

lenge from any party. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,

526 U. S. 574, 583 (1999). Nothing in the text of Title VII

indicates that Congress intended courts, on their own

motion, to assure that the employee-numerosity require-

ment is met.

Second, in some instances, if subject-matter jurisdiction

turns on contested facts, the trial judge may be authorized

to review the evidence and resolve the dispute on her own.

See 5B C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Proce-

——————

10 A claim invoking federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C.

§1331, Bell held, may be dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdic-

tion if it is not colorable, i.e., if it is “immaterial and made solely for the

purpose of obtaining jurisdiction” or is “wholly insubstantial and

frivolous.” 327 U. S., at 682–683; see Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better

Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 89 (1998). Arbaugh’s case surely does not

belong in that category.

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 13

Opinion of the Court

dure §1350, pp. 243–249 (3d ed. 2004); 2 Moore §12.30[3],

pp. 12–37 to 12–38. If satisfaction of an essential element

of a claim for relief is at issue, however, the jury is the

proper trier of contested facts. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumb-

ing Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133, 150–151 (2000).

Third, when a federal court concludes that it lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the

complaint in its entirety. See 16 Moore §106.66[1], pp.

106–88 to 106–89. Thus in the instant case, the trial court

dismissed, along with the Title VII claim, pendent state-

law claims, see supra, at 4, fully tried by a jury and de-

termined on the merits, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 23, 47.

In contrast, when a court grants a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a federal claim, the court generally retains

discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant

to 28 U. S. C. §1367, over pendent state-law claims. See

16 Moore §106.66[1], pp. 106–86 to 106–89.

Of course, Congress could make the employee-

numerosity requirement “jurisdictional,” just as it has

made an amount-in-controversy threshold an ingredient of

subject-matter jurisdiction in delineating diversity-of-

citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1332. But

neither §1331, nor Title VII’s jurisdictional provision, 42

U. S. C. §2000e–5(f)(3) (authorizing jurisdiction over ac-

tions “brought under” Title VII), specifies any threshold

ingredient akin to 28 U. S. C. §1332’s monetary floor.

Instead, the 15-employee threshold appears in a separate

provision that “does not speak in jurisdictional terms or

refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.”

Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 394

(1982). Given the “unfair[ness]” and “waste of judicial

resources,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 47, entailed in tying the

employee-numerosity requirement to subject-matter juris-

diction, we think it the sounder course to refrain from

constricting §1331 or Title VII’s jurisdictional provision,

42 U. S. C. §2000e–5(f)(3), and to leave the ball in Con-

14 ARBAUGH v. Y & H CORP.

Opinion of the Court

gress’ court. If the Legislature clearly states that a

threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as

jurisdictional,11 then courts and litigants will be duly

instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue.

See Da Silva, 229 F. 3d, at 361 (“Whether a disputed

matter concerns jurisdiction or the merits (or occasionally

both) is sometimes a close question.”). But when Congress

does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as juris-

dictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjuris-

dictional in character. Applying that readily adminis-

trable bright line to this case, we hold that the threshold

number of employees for application of Title VII is an

element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief, not a jurisdictional

issue.

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of

——————

11 Congress has exercised its prerogative to restrict the subject-matter

jurisdiction of federal district courts based on a wide variety of factors,

some of them also relevant to the merits of a case. Certain statutes

confer subject-matter jurisdiction only for actions brought by specific

plaintiffs, e.g., 28 U. S. C. §1345 (United States and its agencies and

officers), 49 U. S. C. §24301(l)(2) (Amtrak), or for claims against particular

defendants, e.g., 7 U. S. C. §2707(e)(3) (persons subject to orders of the

Egg Board); 28 U. S. C. §1348 (national banking associations), or for

actions in which the amount in controversy exceeds, e.g., 16 U. S. C.

§814, or falls below, e.g., 22 U. S. C. §6713(a)(1)(B), 28 U. S. C. §1346(a)(2),

a stated amount. Other jurisdiction-conferring provisions describe par-

ticular types of claims. See, e.g., §1339 (“any civil action arising under any

Act of Congress relating to the postal service”); §1347 (“any civil action

commenced by any tenant in common or joint tenant for the partition of

lands where the United States is one of the tenants in common or joint

tenants”). In a few instances, Congress has enacted a separate provision

that expressly restricts application of a jurisdiction-conferring statute.

See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 756–761 (1975) (42 U. S. C.

§405(h) bars §1331 jurisdiction over suits to recover Social Security

benefits).

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 15

Opinion of the Court

Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE ALITO took no part in the consideration or

decision of this case.