Opinion

Gallimore v. Sink

  • 27 N.C. App. 65
  • 218 S.E.2d 181
  • 1975 N.C. App. LEXIS 1751
Court
Court of Appeals of North Carolina
Filed
Sep 17, 1975
Status
Published
Author
Hedrick
On the bench
Hedrick, Britt, Martin
Cited by
55 cases
Authority
More cited than 92.4%

due process satisfied where North Carolina tort law provides an adequate avenue for relief for state 23 prisoner

How later courts described this case

  • due process satisfied where North Carolina tort law provides an adequate avenue for relief for state 23 prisoner
  • due process satisfied where North Carolina tort law provides an adequate avenue for relief for state prisoner
  • “[P]laintiff has alleged ownership of the silver dollars and pistol. With respect to whether there was a wrongful conversion, plaintiff alleged that the Sheriff took possession of the property[.]”
  • plaintiff must demonstrate ownership of property and a wrongful conversion of that property by the defendant for conversion claim under North Carolina law

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

HEDRICK, Judge.

The one question for resolution on this appeal is whether the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

In North Carolina a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. A complaint may be dismissed on motion if clearly without any merit; and this want of merit may consist in an absence of law

*67

to support a claim, or in the disclosure of some fact which will necessarily defeat the claim. But a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim. Pleadings are to be liberally construed. Mere vagueness or lack of detail is not ground for a motion to dismiss, but should be attacked by a motion for a more definite statement.

Sutton v. Duke,

277 N.C. 94, 102-103 , 176 S.E. 2d 161, 166-67 (1970) ;

Caldwell v. Deese,

26 N.C. App. 435 , 216 S.E. 2d 452 (1975).

Conversion is defined as “an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of an owner’s rights.”

Wall v. Colvard, Inc.,

268 N.C. 48 , 149 S.E. 2d 559 (1966) ;

McNeill v. Minter,

12 N.C. App. 144 , 182 S.E. 2d 647 (1971).

Accord Peed v. Burleson’s, Inc.,

244 N.C. 437 , 94 S.E. 2d 351 (1956). “The essence of conversion is not the acquisition of property by the wrongdoer, but a wrongful deprivation of it to the owner . . . and in consequence it is of no importance what subsequent application was made of the converted property, or that defendant derived no benefit from the act.” 89 C.J.S., Trover and Conversion § 3, pp. 533-34. “[T]he general rule is that there is no conversion until some act is done which is a denial or violation of the plaintiff’s dominion over or rights in the property.” 18 Am. Jur. 2d, Conversion, § 1, p. 158. It is clear then that two essential elements are necessary in a complaint for conversion — there must be ownership in the plaintiff and a wrongful conversion by defendant.

Wall v. Colvard, Inc., supra; Vinson v. Knight,

137 N.C. 408 , 49 S.E. 891 (1905).

Assuming the truth of the allegations in his complaint, plaintiff has alleged ownership of the silver dollars and pistol. With respect to whether there was a wrongful conversion, plaintiff alleged that the Sheriff took possession of the property; that the Sheriff and defendant Varner transferred the silver dollars to the County General Fund; and that Sheriff Sink transferred the pistol to the SBI. He also alleged that the property was in no way connected with any crime and that he had demanded the return of his property which demands had been wrongfully refused.

Sheriffs in North Carolina can be held liable for conversion.

See Mica Industries, Inc. v. Penland,

249 N.C. 602 , 107

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S.E. 2d 120 (1959). Public officials enjoy no special immunity for unauthorized acts, or acts outside their official duty. Nelson

v. Comer,

21 N.C. App. 636 , 205 S.E. 2d 537 (1974) ;

Gurganious v. Simpson,

213 N.C. 613 , 197 S.E. 163 (1938) ;

Avery County v. Braswell,

215 N.C. 270 , 1 S.E. 2d 864 (1939). Whether the acts of the defendants in the case were consistent with their authority as defendants contend is an affirmative defense. The complaint does not disclose such an “ . . . unconditional affirmative .defense which [would defeat] the claim asserted or [plead] facts which deny the right to any relief on the alleged cláim. ...”

Sutton v. Duke, supra

at 102.

Therefore, construing the allegations of plaintiff's complaint in light of the foregoing principles of substance and procedure, we áre of the opinion that plaintiff’s complaint is sufficient to state a claim for damages for wrongful conversion of his silver dollars and the pistol.

Judgment appealed from is reversed.

Reversed.

Judges Britt and Martin concur.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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