“[W]e have jurisdiction over law-based denials of qualified immunity, but do not have jurisdiction over a genuine-issue-of- fact-based denial of qualified immunity”
How later courts described this case
- “[W]e have jurisdiction over law-based denials of qualified immunity, but do not have jurisdiction over a genuine-issue-of- fact-based denial of qualified immunity”
- "to the extent that a district court order denying qualified immunity determines an issue of law, such an order is ap-pealable in spite of the existence .of genuine issues of material fact”
- court of appeals has “jurisdiction over law-based denials of qualified immunity, but [does] not have jurisdiction over a genuine-issue-of-fact-based denial”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
REVISED
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 96-31067
Summary Calendar.
Michael Allen NAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
STATE OF LOUISIANA, Dept. of Corrections, et al., Defendants,
Kirt Guerin, Sgt., Defendant-Appellant.
Robert Latroy White, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Hunt Correctional Center, et al., Defendants,
Unknown Guerrin, Di, Defendant-Appellant.
Oct. 3, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Louisiana.
Before WISDOM, KING and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kirt Guerin, a drill instructor at Elayn Hunt Correctional
Center, appeals from the magistrate judge's denial of his motions
for summary judgment, in which he asserted his right to qualified
immunity. We dismiss Guerin's appeal for want of jurisdiction.
I.
Plaintiffs/appellees, Michael Naylor and Robert L. White,
inmates at Elayn Hunt Correctional Center, each sued
defendant/appellant drill instructor Kirt Guerin under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging cruel and unusual punishment and deliberate
1
indifference to their serious medical needs. According to the
plaintiffs' respective complaints, on April 10, 1994, Guerin locked
both of them in a supply closet along with 18 other inmates for a
period of up to three hours. Guerin allegedly placed a towel
beneath the door to cut off ventilation, and Naylor and White began
to feel dizzy and nauseated. Their requests for emergency sick
call were denied. Naylor also stated that Guerin denied his
request to use the bathroom, causing him to defecate on himself.
After answering the complaints, Guerin filed motions for
summary judgment against Naylor and White. He argued that he was
entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiffs' Eighth
Amendment claims.1 The magistrate judge denied both motions, and
this interlocutory appeal followed.
II.
This Court has jurisdiction over appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts.2 The denial of summary judgment
generally is not an appealable order.3 According to the collateral
order doctrine, however, district court orders denying summary
1
Both the district and appellate courts perform a two-step
analysis in evaluating a movant's assertion of qualified immunity.
First, the court determines whether the plaintiff has alleged the
violation of a clearly established constitutional right. If he or
she has, the court then decides whether the defendant's conduct was
objectively reasonable. Rankin v. Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103, 105
(5th Cir.1993). Because we hold that appellate jurisdiction is not
vested in this Court, we do not reach the substance of Guerin's
claim that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
2
Cantu v. Rocha, 77 F.3d 795, 802 (5th Cir.1996); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
3
Aldy v. Valmet Paper Mach., 74 F.3d 72, 75 (5th Cir.1996).
2
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity are immediately
appealable when based on a conclusion of law.4 Nevertheless, such
orders are not immediately appealable if they are based on
sufficiency of the evidence.5 Thus, orders denying qualified
immunity are immediately appealable only if they are predicated on
conclusions of law, and not if a genuine issue of material fact
precludes summary judgment on the question of qualified immunity.
Stated another way, we have jurisdiction over law-based denials of
qualified immunity, but do not have jurisdiction over a
genuine-issue-of-fact-based denial of qualified immunity.6
In Johnson v. Jones,7 the Supreme Court held that a defendant
who is entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense may not
bring an interlocutory appeal of a district court's summary
judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the
pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial.8
Thus, a district court's order, entered in a qualified immunity
case, is not appealable if it simply determines a question of
evidence sufficiency.9
4
Coleman v. Houston Independent School District, 113 F.3d 528,
531 (5th Cir.1997).
5
Id.
6
John Doe v. Hillsboro Independent School District, 81 F.3d
1395, 1401 (5th Cir.1996).
7
515 U.S. 304, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995).
8
Id. at 319-20, 115 S.Ct. at 2159-50.
9
Nerren v. Livingston Police Department, 86 F.3d 469 (5th
Cir.1996).
3
In Behrens v. Pelletier,10 a case decided shortly after
Johnson, the Supreme Court clarified its earlier ruling, explaining
that the existence of a genuine issue of material fact does not
necessarily preclude immediate appeal of an order denying qualified
immunity.11 Thus, to the extent that a district court order denying
qualified immunity determines an issue of law, such an order is
appealable in spite of the existence of genuine issues of material
fact.12
With this precedential backdrop in mind, we turn to the case
at bar. As a threshold matter, we note that the magistrate judge
did not base her denial of Guerin's motion for summary judgment on
any conclusion of law. Rather, she reached her decision solely on
the basis that genuine issues of material fact rendered summary
judgment inappropriate. Moreover, she was unable to assess
Guerin's assertion of qualified immunity because the record before
her was not sufficiently developed for her to do so. She could not
determine whether Guerin's conduct was objectively reasonable in
light of clearly established law.13 This Court has held that
"orders are based on an issue of law when they concern only
10
--- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996).
11
Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 842.
12
Id.; Coleman v. Houston Independent School District, 113
F.3d at 531.
13
In Behrens, the Court noted that the district court's denial
of the petitioner's summary judgment motion necessarily determined
that certain disputed conduct attributed to petitioner constituted
a violation of clearly established law. --- U.S. at ----, 116
S.Ct. at 842. As we have shown, the same cannot be said of the
magistrate judge's ruling in the case at bar.
4
application of established legal principles, such as whether an
official's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly
established law, to a given set of facts."14
Accordingly, this case fits squarely within that class of
unappealable, fact-based qualified immunity orders contemplated by
Johnson. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a qualified
immunity order less suited for immediate interlocutory appeal.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, Guerin's appeal is DISMISSED, and
the case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
14
Cantu v. Rocha, 77 F.3d at 802.
5