Opinion

State v. Germany

  • 246 Ga. 455
  • 271 S.E.2d 851
  • 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1158
Court
Supreme Court of Georgia
Filed
Oct 1, 1980
Status
Published
Author
Jordan
On the bench
Jordan
Cited by
88 cases
Authority
More cited than 99.1%

interpreting Code Ann. § 27-1404 which provides that “[A]t any time before judgment is pronounced, the prisoner may withdraw the plea of‘guilty’...” (Emphasis supplied.

How later courts described this case

  • interpreting Code Ann. § 27-1404 which provides that “[A]t any time before judgment is pronounced, the prisoner may withdraw the plea of‘guilty’...” (Emphasis supplied.
  • later codified in Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.10, which provides that if the trial court intends to reject the plea agreement, the court shall, on the record, inform the defendant personally that (1) the trial court is not bound by any plea agreement; (2) the court intends to reject the agreement; (3) the case may be disposed of less favorably to the defendant than contemplated by the agreement; and (4) the defendant may then withdraw the guilty plea as a matter of right; if the plea is not then withdrawn, sentence may be pronounced
  • trial court is not required to accept a plea agreement between the state and the defendant
  • “[a] plea should never be received unless freely and voluntarily made”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Brooks v. State, 177 Ga. App. 12 (1985)

    The trial court having accepted the joint recommendation of the district attorney and defense counsel, and defendant having been sentenced accordingly, State v. Germany, 246 Ga. 455, 456 (1), supra, is inapplicable to the case sub judice.
    Court of Appeals of GeorgiaOct 30, 1985Read it

The opinion

Jordan, Presiding Justice.

This Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ decision in the case of

Germany v. State,

154 Ga. App. 579 ( 269 SE2d 75 ) (1980).

1. The Court of Appeals, citing

Williams v. State,

148 Ga. App. 521 ( 251 SE2d 601 ) (1978), reaffirmed its prior holding that a defendant has an absolute statutory right, under Code Ann. § 27-1404, to withdraw a guilty plea prior to

entry

of the defendant’s sentencing judgment. We reverse this holding.

Code Ann. § 27-1404 provides that “[A]t any time before judgment is

pronounced,

the prisoner may withdraw the plea of ‘guilty’ . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)

Black’s Law Dictionary 4th Ed., p. 1380, states that “to pronounce” means “to declare aloud and in a formal manner. In this sense, a court is said to ‘pronounce’ judgment or a sentence.” Accord:

Griffin v. State,

12 Ga. App. 615, 619 ( 77 SE 1080 ) (1913). Code Ann. § 102-102 (1) provides that, in construing a statute, “The ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art, or words connected with a particular trade. . .”

Accordingly, we hold that the term, “pronounced,” as employed by the Legislature in Code Ann. § 27-1404, means “orally announced” and that, therefore, a defendant does not have an absolute statutory right, under said Code Section, to withdraw a guilty plea, after the trial court’s oral announcement of the same. Accord, Federal Rules of

*456

Criminal Procedure, Rule 32(d), 18 USCA. All cases such as

Wright v. State,

75 Ga. App. 764 (2) ( 44 SE2d 569 ) (1947);

Ballard v. State,

131 Ga. App. 847, 848 (3) ( 207 SE2d 246 ) (1974); and

Williams v. State,

148 Ga. App. 521 ( 251 SE2d 601 ) (1978) and others contrary to what is held herein are expressly overruled.

Argued September 9, 1980

Decided October 1, 1980.

William F. Lee, Jr., District Attorney, Michael G. Kam, Assistant District Attorney,

for appellant.

Frank M. Samford, III,

for appellee.

We also hold, however, that at the time a plea is offered, the trial court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of any plea agreement which has been reached by the state and the defendant. Furthér, if the trial court intends to reject said plea agreement, the trial court shall, on the record, inform the defendant personally that (1) the trial court is not bound by any plea agreement, (2) the trial court intends to reject the plea agreement presently before it, (3) the disposition of the present case may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement, and (4) that the defendant may then withdraw his or her guilty plea as a matter of right. Accord: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e), 18 USCA; ABA Standards* Pleas of Guilty, § 4.1 (1974). If the plea is not then withdrawn, sentence may be pronounced and the plea cannot thereafter be withdrawn except upon the sound legal discretion of the court. The holdings within this division are prospective only.

2. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea because “under the totality of the circumstances under which the defendant’s plea was received, . . . the State failed to carry its burden of showing that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered ...”

Having reviewed the record, we affirm.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.