Opinion

Sandy Mush Properties, Inc. v. Rutherford County Ex Rel. Rutherford County Board of Commissioners

  • 187 N.C. App. 809
  • 654 S.E.2d 253
  • 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 2515
Court
Court of Appeals of North Carolina
Filed
Dec 18, 2007
Status
Published
Author
McGEE
On the bench
McGee, Bryant, Elmore
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.7%

The opinion

McGEE, Judge.

In

Sandy Mush Props., Inc. v. Rutherford Cty.,

181 N.C. App. 224 , 638 S.E.2d 557 (2007), our Court held,

inter alia,

that pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-344(b) (2003), Plaintiffs did not obtain a statutory vested right to use the subject property as a quarry by virtue of the issuance of a building permit for an office building.

Sandy Mush,

181 N.C. App. at 232-36 , 638 S.E.2d at 562-64 . Our Supreme Court allowed Plaintiffs’ petition for discretionary review “for the limited purpose of remanding this case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of its decision in light of

Robins v. Town of Hillsborough,

361 N.C. 193 , 639 S.E.2d 421 (2007).”

Sandy Mush Props., Inc. v. Rutherford Cty.,

361 N.C. 569 , 651 S.E.2d 566 (2007). Upon remand, our Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs and the matter is now before our Court for reconsideration as ordered by our Supreme Court.

In

Robins ,

our Supreme Court held that “when the applicable rules and ordinances are not followed by a town board, the applicant is entitled to have his application reviewed under the ordinances and procedural rules in effect as of the time he filed his application.”

Robins,

361 N.C. at 199 , 639 S.E.2d at 425 .

In the present cáse, Plaintiffs argue that the rationale of

Robins

“supports a determination that Plaintiffs had a vested right to develop the property upon fulfilling all permitting requirements applicable under State law.” We disagree.

The Supreme Court specifically limited its holding in

Robins ,

as follows:

Although the parties have presented arguments as to whether [the] plaintiff may assert a vested right, either by operation of statute or common law principles, these arguments are inap-posite because our vested rights decisions have considered whether a plaintiff has a right to complete his project despite changes in the applicable zoning ordinances,

see, e.g., Finch v.

*811

City of Durham,

325 N.C. 352, 373 , 384 S.E.2d 8, 20 (1989), an issue distinct from the one before us today.

Robins,

361 N.C. at 197 , 639 S.E.2d at 423 . Because the Supreme Court in

Robins

determined that the issue of a statutory vested right was not an issue before the Court,

Robins

is thus not a statutory vested rights case, and we hold that the decision in

Robins

has no effect on the present case. Therefore, we affirm our prior decision in full.

Affirmed.

Judges BRYANT and ELMORE concur.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.