Opinion

Jillian L. Brown v. The School Board of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, Kristen Nichols, Cynthia Badger, Susan Stuart Davis-Foxworth, Tierra Lanier, D. Jean Jones, D. Timothy Billups, Crystal Satchell, and Sharon I. Byrdsong

Court
District Court, E.D. Virginia
Filed
Sep 23, 2026
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Norfolk Division

JILLIAN L. BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-cv-563

THE SCHOOL BOARD OF THE CITY

OF NORFOLK, VIRGINIA,

KRISTEN NICHOLS,

CYNTHIA BADGER,

SUSAN STUART DAVIS-FOXWORTH,

TIERRA LANIER,

D. JEAN JONES,

D. TIMOTHY BILLUPS,

CRYSTAL SATCHELL,

and

SHARON I. BYRDSONG,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6). ECF Nos. 29, 30 (“Mot. Dismiss,” “Def.’s

Mem.”). On November 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint pro se. ECF No.

28 (“Am. Compl.”). On December 8, 2025, Defendants filed both their Motion to Dismiss and

Memorandum in Support. ECF Nos. 29, 30. On January 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 32

(“Resp. Opp.”). On January 8, 2028, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Memorandum

in Opposition and a Memorandum in Support, due to untimeliness. ECF Nos. 33, 34.

On January 12, 2026, Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of their Motion

to Dismiss. ECF No. 35 (“Def.’s Reply”). On January 22, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Strike. ECF No. 36. On January 27, 2026, Defendants filed

a Reply Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Strike. ECF No. 37. On that same date,

Defendants filed a Request for Oral Argument. ECF No. 38. Plaintiff then filed a Combined

Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Request for Oral Argument and their Motion to Strike.

ECF No. 39.' The Court has considered the parties’ memoranda, and this matter is now ripe for

judicial determination. Upon review, the Court finds that a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss is

not necessary. See Va. Local Civ. R. 7(J). For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss is GRANTED.

I, FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 8, 2025, Jillian L. Brown (“Plaintiff”) filed a Second Amended Complaint

alleging (1) race-based hostile work environment and harassment; (2) race-based discrimination;

(3) retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (4) retaliation in violation

of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (5)

retaliation in violation of the First Amendment; and (6) retaliation in violation of the Civil Rights

Act of 1871 (under two theories). Am. Compl. {J 146-181. Stated in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, the following alleged facts are drawn from the Second Amended Complaint and

attachments thereto.

Given her pro se status, the Court will grant Plaintiff deference and accept her Memorandum in

Opposition, though it was untimely by one week.

Plaintiff, a Black female, was employed as a special education teacher by the School Board

of the city of Norfolk (Norfolk School Board). Am. Compl. § 16. Defendants are the Norfolk

School Board, Norfolk Public Schools (“NPS”), Principal Dr. Kristen Nichols, teachers Cynthia

Badger, Susan Stuart David-Foxworth, and Tierra Lanier, Executive Director Dr. D. Jean Jones,

Chief Human Resources Officer D. Timothy Billups, Human Resources Generalist Crystal

Satchell, and Superintendent Dr. Sharon I. Byrdsong (“Defendants”). /d. J] 3-12. Plaintiff alleges

that she suffered adverse employment action due to unlawful discrimination, and that she was

treated differently than similarly situated employees who were not in her protected class. /d. { 40.

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. See generally Mot. Dismiss;

Def.’s Mem.

In 2021, Plaintiff was hired as a special education teacher at Crossroads School for 2021-

2022 school year. Jd. | 16. In September 2021, a white fifth-grade teacher, Rebecca Logsdon,

knowingly made false claims to other teachers that Plaintiff failed to provide services to one of

Mrs. Logsdon’s students. Jd. §27. The next month, another white fifth-grade teacher, Cynthia

Badger, began falsely claiming that Plaintiff was not providing mandated services to a student and

otherwise failed manage Ms. Badgers students. Jd. 427. However, Ms. Badger knew these

statements were false and that Plaintiff had no responsibility for Ms. Badger’s students. /a@ { 28.

Ms. Badger later falsely told two fifth grade teachers that Plaintiff cursed at a student. Jd. 7 30.

Plaintiff reported the incident to a superior. Jd. 31. The principal, Dr. Nichols, ignored Ms.

Badger’s pattern of disseminating false statements about Plaintiff's performance. Jd. { 32.

Plaintiff also notified administrators that (1) two fifth-grade teachers refused to provide

Individualized Education Program (IEP) accommodations to their students; and (2) teachers

allowed students to look at test answers and then change their answers. /d. J] 33-34. Thereafter,

the two teachers limited Plaintiff's access to her student caseload.” Jd. 935. After Plaintiff

complained to administration, the teachers removed any non-IEP student from Plaintiff's small-

group instruction. Jd. 436. Still, Plaintiff passed her performance evaluations and received a

retention bonus from the Virginia Department of Education. /d. 937. She also received a contract

renewal for the 2022-2023 school year.? /d. 38.

Throughout the 2021-2022 school year, Ms. Badger publicly accused Plaintiff of failing to

address students’ behavior, despite them not being assigned to Plaintiff. Jd. 41. Plaintiff reported

this to Dr. Nichols, who took no corrective action. /d. In contrast, a white special-education teacher

in Ms. Badger’s classroom was not required to address behavioral issues or criticized for failing

to do so. Id. 142. Ms. Badger knowingly made more false statements about Plaintiff's job

performance from October 2021 through the end of the 2021-2022 school year. Jd. 43.

Plaintiff alleges that in the 2022-2023 school year, Ms. Badger’s conduct escalated. Id.

q 44. Dr. Nichols began requiring Plaintiff to keep a separate tally sheet for each of her students’

IEP goals, which Plaintiff believes is retaliatory. Jd. (47. A non-Black special education chair,

Sarah Gurel, did not perform the same tracking requirements. /d. {{] 45, 48-49.

In 2022, Plaintiff notified NPS and the Norfolk School Board that she was subject to

unlawful discrimination.* Jd. 953. Neither NPS, the Norfolk School Board, nor Dr. Nichols

investigated this conduct. Jd, □ 53, 55. Instead, NPS and the Norfolk School Board ignored

Plaintiff's complaints and labeled them as “building level concerns.” /d. [§ 53, 66.

2 Plaintiff does not clarify what “limiting access to her caseload” means. The Court determines, based on

the rest of the Second Amended Complaint, that Plaintiff means the teachers did not let her interact with

her assigned students. See, e.g., Am. Compl. { 60 (stating that “Ms. Badger lacked authority to restrict

Plaintiff's access to her assigned students”).

3 Plaintiff's contract was renewed and she received a retention bonus after the alleged complaints to

administration.

‘In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does not specify on what basis she told NPS she was

discriminated against. See Am. Compl. 53.

Ms. Badger spread false accusations about Plaintiff's performance to Mrs. Davis-

Foxworth, whose daughter was on Plaintiff's caseload. /d, 58. The statements were circulated by

staff members, including Tierra Lanier. Jd. Ms. Badger also falsely told students that Plaintiff made

negative comments about them. /d. § 62.

Plaintiff also believes she faced retaliation for attempting to protect educational rights of

the learning-disabled students. /d 768. Plaintiff reported that her students with learning

disabilities were denied a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE)° and faced “improper

conduct” from Ms. Badger. /d. | 69. Dr. Nichols had assigned Plaintiff to work with Ms. Badger,

who had full classroom authority and restricted Plaintiff's caseload access. Jd. 471. In addition to

denying Plaintiff access to her caseload, Plaintiff alleges NPS and the Norfolk School board denied

students a FAPE by failing to provide students “resources, accommodations, and support necessary

for students with learning disabilities.” /d. 72. Additionally, Ms. Badger failed to comply with

students’ IEPs. Id. J 74.

Ms. Badger limited students’ interaction with Plaintiff to a few minutes, relocated classes

without notifying Plaintiff of the new location, and penalized students for interacting with Plaintiff.

Id. $92. On September 29, Plaintiff complained to Assistant Principal, Ms. Morris, that Ms.

Badger treated Black and white students differently. /d. | 102.

To address these claims, Ms. Morris scheduled a meeting, which included Dr. Nichols, Ms.

Ryan, and Mrs. Gurel. Jd. 4103. After the meeting, Mrs. Gurel required Plaintiff to supervise

recess and transition periods. Jd. 7104. Plaintiff alleges that this task conflicted with the

5 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Jd. 4 104.° Plaintiff believes this new

requirement was a form of punishment for raising her concerns at the meeting. /d. Ms. Gurel

further assigned Plaintiff the responsibility of arranging coverage for Ms. Badger and Ms. Jones

to attend IEP meetings. /d. { 105. Plaintiff complained to the Human Resources Generalist about

the new requirement. /d. J 106.

Ms. Badger told students that Dr. Nichols intended to fire Plaintiff. Jd. ¢ 107. On October

24, Plaintiff requested a transfer via email. /d. | 108. Dr. Nichols responded by scheduling Plaintiff

for a formal observation set for October 31. Jd. § 109. Dr. Nichols attended Plaintiff's student’s

IEP meeting, at which Ms. Badger said Plaintiff was not permitted to work with any of her students

without permission. Jd. J 112. None of the present administrators corrected the statement. Jd. Dr.

Nichols placed Plaintiff on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”), citing the meeting as a

catalyst. Jd. 4] 114, 126. Prior to the meeting, Plaintiff had not received a warning. Jd. 126.

Dr. Nichols required Plaintiff to submit lesson plans on Thursday, while other teachers

were allowed to submit their lesson plans by Sunday night. /d 9119. These lesson plans were

intended to modify Ms. Jones and Ms. Badger’s plans, making them practically impossible to

complete on Thursdays. /d. Plaintiff was reprimanded and threatened with termination because of

consequentially inaccurate lesson plans. Jd. { 120. Dr. Nichols emailed Plaintiff a Letter of

Concern on December 5, that was backdated to November 9. This letter was a necessary step

according to a Memorandum of Understanding for progressive discipline steps. Jd. ¥ 115.

On December 9, Ms. Badger allegedly sent students to the Main Office to make false

reports about Plaintiff. Jd § 128. Plaintiff subsequently requested an investigation, which was

6 Section 300.117 of the IDEA regulations states that “each public agency must ensure that each child with

a disability participates with nondisabled children in the extracurricular services and activities to the

maximum extent appropriate to the needs of that child. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.117; 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(a}(5)(A).

assigned to Dr. Nichols. /d. ff 130-131. On January 22, Plaintiff reported concerns regarding Ms.

Badger inflating assessment scores, to which the Norfolk School Board took no corrective action.

Id. 134-135. On February 10, Plaintiff received a formal Plan of Action, which is the final step

before termination. Jd. § 140. Meanwhile, Ms. Badger continued to prevent students from

participating in Plaintiff's small group. /d@ § 142. Plaintiff was eventually terminated and her

contract was not renewed for the 2023-2024 school year. Id. 56.

Plaintiff asserts the following against Defendant:

1. Race-Based Hostile Work Environment and Harassment in Violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, Public Law 88-352, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000(e) et seg. (id. J 146);

2. Race-Based Discrimination in Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended, Public Law 88-352, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seg. Ud. 4 151);

3. Retaliation in Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

Public Law 88-352, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seg. Ud. 158);

4. Retaliation in Violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

Public Law 117-286, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seg. and Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), as amended, Public Law 101-336, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 ef

seq. (ld. J 163);

5. Retaliation in Violation of the First Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. I. (/d. J 171);

6. Retaliation in Violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, as amended, Public Law

96-170, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Uid.);

7. Retaliation in Violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, as amended, Public Law

96-170, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Ud. 7 181).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of actions that fail to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts may

only rely upon the complaint’s allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or

incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cnty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th

Cir. 1985). Courts will favorably construe the allegations of the complainant and assume that the

facts alleged in the complaint are true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However,

a court “need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts,” nor “accept as true

unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc., v.

J.D. Assocs. Lid. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000).

A complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss,

but the complaint must incorporate “enough facts to state a belief that is plausible on its face.” See

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302

(4th Cir. 2008). This plausibility standard does not equate to a probability requirement, but it

entails more than a mere possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009). Accordingly, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate

facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it

plausible he is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677, and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). To achieve factual plausibility, plaintiffs

must allege more than “naked assertions . . . without some further factual enhancement.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 557. Otherwise, the complaint will “stop[ ] short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of entitlement to relief.” /d.

Note that courts liberally construe complaints filed pro se. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007). ““‘[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jd. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429

US. 97, 106).

III. DISCUSSION

Under Rule 12(b)(6), Defendants the School Board of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, Kristen

Nichols, Cynthia Badger, Susan Stuart Davis-Foxworth, D. Jean Jones, and Sharon I. Byrdsong’

move to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. ECF Nos. 29-30.

A. Counts 1, 2 and 3—Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Plaintiff did not attach an EEOC complaint to her Second Amended Complaint, nor

mention one in the body of the Complaint. See generally Am. Compl. Plaintiff's Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss states that “Plaintiff timely filed her complaint with

the EEOC and subsequently filed suit in federal court.” ECF No. 32 at 29. However, Plaintiff again

did not offer proof of such complaint.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. “An individual alleging discrimination in violation

of Title VII must first file an administrative charge with the EEOC within a certain time of the

alleged unlawful act.” Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 508 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000(e)-5(e)(1)). “A charge is acceptable only if it is ‘sufficiently precise to identify the parties,

and to describe generally the action or practices complained of.’” Jd (citing 29 C.F.R.

7 Timothy Billups and Crystal Satchell were not NPS employees at the time of attempted service, and they

were not personally served. ECF No. 9 at 3. The summons for Tierra Lanier was unexecuted as she was no

longer employed with NPS and had moved to New Jersey. ECF No. 3.

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§ 1601.12(b)). Next, the EEOC investigates and notifies the employer of the alleged unlawful

discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e}-5(b). “If the [EEOC] determines after such investigation that

there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the [EEOC] shall endeavor to eliminate

any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation,

and persuasion.” Jd. However, if the EEOC determines not to file a civil action, then the individual

may file a civil action against their employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f)(1).

The First, Second, and Third Causes of Action allege that Defendants violated Title VII.

Am. Compl. ff 146-162. Plaintiff has not provided evidence that she has exhausted administrative

remedies with the EEOC. Though she states in a memorandum that she filed a complaint with the

agency, the Court finds this evidence insufficient. In the absence of any evidence that Plaintiff

exhausted administrative remedies, the Court must dismiss Counts 1, 2, and 3 without prejudice.

B. Count 4—Statute of Limitations

The Fourth Cause of Action in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint includes ADA and

Rehabilitation Act Claims. Am. Compl. 163. Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated these

statutes by retaliating against her for engaging in protected activity—namely, opposing unlawful

- discrimination under both Acts. Id. § 164. Defendants have raised the statute of limitations bar in

their Motion to Dismiss. Def.’s Mem. at 18-19.

“Because Title II of the ADA does not contain a statute of limitations, courts must either

apply the deferral four-year catch-all limitations period or the state statute of limitations for the

most analogous state-law claim.” Latson v. Clarke, 346 F. Supp. 3d 831, 857 (W.D. Va. 2018)

(citing A Soc'y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2011)). However, “[tJhe

four-year catch-all period applies only to claims arising under statutes enacted after December 1,

1990.” Id. The Supreme Court reiterated this rule in 2004. “[A] cause of action ‘aris[es] under an

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Act of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990—and therefore is governed by § 1658's 4-year

statute of limitations—if the plaintiff's claim against the defendant was made possible by a post-

1990 enactment.” Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004).

The ADA was enacted months before this cutoff, on July 26, 1990. See Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327. Therefore, the Court must apply the

state statute of limitations for the most analogous state law claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988; 4 Soc’y

Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d at 347. The Commonwealth of Virginia has a one-year

statute of limitations period for claims under the Virginia Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act.

Va. CODE ANN. § 51.5-40 et seg. Courts have found the Virginia Rights of Persons with

Disabilities Act to be the most analogous to both the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973. See, e.g., Eastman v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 732 F. Supp. 665, 666 (W.D.

Va. 1990) (stating, “[t]he most analogous state statute to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is Va.

Code §§ 51.540 et seg. (1988 Repl. Vol.)”); A Soc 'y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d at 347-

348 (stating that “the Virginia Disabilities Act provides the limitations period for claims brought

under the Federal Rehabilitation Act in Virginia” and that “the one-year limitations period in the

Virginia Disabilities Act applies to ADA claims brought in Virginia”).

The Court finds that because the alleged retaliatory adverse employment action—contract

nonrenewal—occurred in June 2023, and the complaint was filed in September 2024, the Fourth

Cause of Action is time-barred. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count 4 is granted.

C. Count 5—First Amendment Retaliation

Plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action is retaliation in violation of the First Amendment under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Am. Compl. J 171. Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to plead this Count

because she did not speak as a private citizen on a matter of public concern. Def.’s Mem. at 28.

12

The Civil Rights Act was incorporated into the United States Code as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 governs civil actions for deprivation of rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute

states that:

Every person who . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to

the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress ....”

Id.

“First Amendment retaliation is actionable because ‘retaliatory actions may tend to chill

individuals’ exercise of constitutional rights.” Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason

Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting ACLU of Md., Inc. v. Wicomico County, Mad.,

999 F.2d 780, 785 (4th Cir. 1993)). However, “not all retaliatory conduct tends to chill First

Amendment activity... Jd. (citing DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 806 (4th Cir. 1995)).

Therefore, a cause of action for First Amendment retaliation must allege conduct that chills First

Amendment activity. See id. Moreover, a plaintiff must allege a causal connection between her

First Amendment activity and the alleged adverse action. /d. at 501.

To state a First Amendment claim for retaliatory discharge, Plaintiff must allege (1) she

spoke as a citizen upon a matter of public concern rather than as an employee about a matter of

personal interest; (2) her interest in speaking upon the matter of public concern outweighed the

Government’s interest in providing effective and efficient services to the public; and (3) her speech

was a substantial factor in the employer’s termination decision. See McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271,

277-78 (4th Cir. 1998). Ultimately, “a teacher’s exercise of [her] right to speak on issues of public

importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.” Pickering v. Bd.

of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Illinois, 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).

13

First, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff spoke as a citizen on a matter of public

concern. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). “If the answer is no, the employee has

no First Amendment cause of action based on the employer’s reaction to the speech.” Jd. This

inquiry controls the Court’s determination because an employer must have a “significant degree

of control over its employees’ words and actions” to “provide services efficiently.” Jd.

The issue is whether Plaintiff spoke as a citizen, rather than as an employee. Defendants

argue that Plaintiff's complaints were made in her role as a special education teacher rather than a

private citizen, and thus the First Amendment retaliation claim must fail. Def.’s Mem. at 27-28.

“The First Amendment does not protect speech made pursuant to a government employee’s official

duties, even when that speech is upon a matter of public concern.” Crouse v. Town of Moncks

Corner, 848 F.3d 576, 584 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410, 421 (2006)).

“Determining whether speech was made in the course of an employee’s job requires courts ‘to

engage in a practical inquiry into the employee’s daily professional activities.’” Jd. (citing Hunter

v. Town of Mocksville, 789 F.3d 389, 397 (4th Cir. 2015)).

There are few cases in which courts use a detailed inquiry to determine whether a plaintiff's

speech was within the scope of their employment duties. /d. However, Plaintiff plainly states that

she acted within her “duties as a special education teacher” by making her complaints. Am. Compl.

82. The Court finds that Plaintiff acted as an employee, rather than as a “citizen,” because (1) of

her concession in the Second Amended Complaint, and (2) because of case law that made similar

inquiries. In Pickering, for example, a teacher spoke to a local newspaper about school fund

allocation, which was a matter of public concern. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-572. In contrast,

Plaintiff in the instant case spoke internally about her student’s education, which she believes was

14

required as a special education teacher. Therefore, Plaintiff has not met the first prong of a First

Amendment retaliation claim. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 5 is granted.

D. Count 6—Retaliation in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff for her advocacy on behalf of

disabled students, therefore violating the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Am.

Compl. 7180. She also alleges a claim for violation of her constitutional rights. /d. { 188.

Defendants argue that these claims fail because Plaintiff has not (1) alleged she suffered an adverse

employment action; (2) alleged actions taken pursuant to an official custom or practice; or (3) been

deprived of a constitutional right. Def.’s Mem. at 25-26, 28.

1. Retaliation

Plaintiff states that the adverse employment action as a result of the advocacy was “loss of

access to her students,” “false performance reports,” and “other negative employment actions.” Jd.

176, 179. Defendants argue that these are not adverse employment actions. Def.’s Mem. at 28.

A cause of action for retaliation under the Act and § 1983 requires that (1) Plaintiff engaged

in protected activity; (2) the employer took adverse employment action against her; and (3) there

is a causal connection between the protected activity engaged in and the subsequent action. Hoyle

v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 337 (4th Cir. 2011). Numerous cases assert that placing an

employee on a PIP does not constitute an adverse employment action. For example, the court in

Pulley determined that “Neither [a] poor evaluation rating, nor [a] placement on a PIP constitute

adverse employment actions.” Pulley v. KPMG Consulting, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 388, 394 (D. Md.

2004). This is because “[a] performance review which has no effect on Plaintiff's compensation or

promotion cannot be considered an adverse employment action.” /d. Additionally, a PIP is

designed to help employees continue employment. Jd. Pulley was later affirmed by the Fourth

15

Circuit. See Pulley v. KPMG Consulting, Inc., 183 F. App’x 387 (4th Cir. 2006). Further, after

some of her complaints, Plaintiff's contract was renewed and she was granted a retention bonus.

Am. Compl. § 37.

Even if the Court reads Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint to state that the adverse

employment action was her eventual contract nonrenewal, there are not sufficient facts to create

an inference of retaliation regarding her advocacy for disabled students. The § 1983 Retaliation

claim is dismissed.

2. Deprivation of Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff states that “Defendants’ conduct violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights,

actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Am. Compl. { 188. She claims that Defendants deprived her

of a property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. /d. J 23. Defendants respond that Plaintiff

has not identified a constitutionally protected liberty or property right that was violated. Def.’s

Mem. at 2.

As stated above, § 1983 provides relief for deprivations under color of State law of rights,

privileges, and immunities and guaranteed by laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

Supreme Court has held that there is generally no constitutional requirement for a hearing before

terminating a nontenured state teacher’s contract absent a showing of a liberty or property interest

in continued employment. See The Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-

578 (1972) (explaining that (1) a nonrenewal based on serious allegations of dishonesty or

immorality may implicate a liberty interest; and (2) there is no property interest in a term teaching

contract without a “good cause” provision). Later cases take a firmer stance. “[A] teacher has no

personal right or property right under the United States Constitution to a limited, nontenured

coaching contract, where state law provides none. Burkey v. Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 513 F.

16

Supp. 1084, 1094-95 (N.D.W. Va. 1981); Sigmon v. Poe, 564 F.2d 1093, 1096 (4th Cir. 1977)

(stating that a teaching contract “does not establish a property interest under the Fourteenth

Amendment”); see also Chitwood v. Feaster, 468 F.2d 359, 360 (4th Cir. 1972) (asserting that

untenured teachers had no right to an administrative hearing for failure to renew their contracts).

Because Plaintiff has not (1) alleged that her contract nonrenewal was tethered to allegations that

implicate a liberty interest; or (2) demonstrated a property interest in her limited teaching contract,

the Court finds that she was not deprived of her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

3. Defamation Plus

Plaintiff also mentions a “defamation-plus” (also known as “stigma-plus”) claim under

§ 1983. Am. Compl. 951. Plaintiff states that Defendants deprived her of liberty and property

interests in her employment. Namely, she alleges that Ms. Badger undermined her professional

reputation by falsely stating that Plaintiff “refused to do her job.” Resp. Opp. at 36-37. Defendants

argue that Plaintiff has not alleged a reputational injury that was accompanied by a state action

that altered or extinguished her legal status. Def.’s Mem. at 2 n.2.

“[A] plaintiff bringing a ‘stigma-plus’ claim . . . must allege both a stigmatic statement and

a ‘state action that distinctly altered or extinguished’ [her] legal status.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703

F.3d 636, 654 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Shirvinski v. U.S. Coast Guard, 673 F.3d 308, 315 (4th Cir.

2012)). Because Plaintiff failed to state predicate § 1983 claims against the individual defendants,

this Court must hold that Plaintiff failed to state “defamation-plus” claims. See id.

Additionally, to establish a violation of one’s liberty interests, there must be open

disparagement, such as a “public disclosure” of the reasons for the discharge. Bishop v. Wood, 426

U.S. 341, 348 (1976). Plaintiff has not alleged any statements concerning her “professional

reputation” were made public, which is a requisite component of a “defamation-plus” claim. See

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Sciolino v. City of Newport News, Va., 480 F.3d 642, 646 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that to state

a liberty interest claim, a plaintiff must allege that the statements “(1) placed a stigma on [her]

reputation; (2) were made public by the employer; (3) were made in conjunction with [her]

termination or demotion; and (4) were false”) (citing Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855

F.2d 167, 172 n.5 (4th Cir. 1988)). Therefore, the “defamation-plus” component of Count 6 is

dismissed.

4. Monell Liability

The Court last considers Monell Liability. Local school boards in Virginia are treated as

municipalities for purposes of determining liability under Monell. Starbuck v. Williamsburg James

City Cnty. Sch. Bd., 28 F.4th 529, 532 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing Riddick v. Sch. Bd. of Portsmouth,

238 F.3d 518, 522 n.3 (4th Cir. 2000)). Aside from stating that Defendants did not violate

Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Defendants also contend that suits against a municipality for

federal constitutional deprivation are only permitted when the municipality undertook the

allegedly unconstitutional action pursuant to an “official policy” or “custom.” Def.’s Mem. at 25.

“Under Monell, a municipality can be held liable for constitutional violations ‘when

execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government

as an entity is responsible [for] under § 1983.’” O.W. v. Carr, 172 F.4th 337, 356 (4th Cir. 2026)

(citing Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, 897 F.3d 538, 554 (4th Cir. 2018)). However, in the absence

of a constitutional violation, a plaintiff's attempt to hold a school board liable under Monell is a

“nonstarter.” Jd. Because Plaintiff has failed to establish any constitutional violation, the Court

cannot hold the Norfolk School Board liable under Monell.

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For the individual defendants (rather than the Norfolk School Board), Defendants argue

that Plaintiff must demonstrate that they personally acted in the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights.

Def.’s Mem. at 26. However, the Court need not address these arguments, because Plaintiff was

not deprived of any constitutional right, whether Fourteenth Amendment or First Amendment-

related, as explained throughout Sections D of this opinion. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Count 6 is granted.

E. Count 7—Retaliation in Violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants took adverse actions against Plaintiff in retaliation for her

reporting IDEA and ADA violations to school administrators. Am. Compl. J 182-185. Defendants

argue that Plaintiff “fails to identify a specific constitutional right, other than a violation of her

general ‘constitutional rights’ that she claims was violated.” Def.’s Mem. at 30. The Court finds

that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendants violated her constitutional rights. As stated

in Section D(1) of this opinion, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged retaliation nor any cause of

action under § 1983. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 7 is granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to provide a copy of this Order to the parties.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Norfolk, Virginia

September 23 , 2026 Raymond A. iy

United States District Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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