The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 JOSEPH MOORE, Case No.: 3:25-cv-2980-AJB-JAC
CDCR #BD8941,
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ORDER DISMISSING SECOND
Plaintiff,
13 AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
vs. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
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PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
JEFF MACOMBER, CDCR, DR. SATO,
15 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b)
Defendants.
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19 I. INTRODUCTION
20 Plaintiff Joseph Moore (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights
21 action. On February 4, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma
22 pauperis (“IFP”), dismissed the original complaint without prejudice, and denied her1
23 motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). (See Doc. No. 6.) The Court also
24 granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. (Id.)
25 On February 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and
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1 As noted in previous orders, because Plaintiff identifies as a transgender woman, the Court refers to
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1 another TRO motion. (See Doc. Nos. 7; 8.) On March 26, 2026, the Court dismissed the
2 FAC for failure to state a claim, denied the TRO motion, but granted Plaintiff leave to file
3 a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (Doc. No. 9.) Plaintiff filed the SAC on April 10,
4 2026. In the SAC, Plaintiff again raises claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act
5 and the Rehabilitation Act, as well as an Eighth Amendment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
6 § 1983. (Doc. No. 10.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses the SAC for
7 failure to state a claim.
8 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)
9 A. Legal Standard
10 As with her previous pleadings, because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding IFP on a
11 civil rights complaint against government defendants, the Court must screen the SAC and
12 is required to sua sponte dismiss the case at any time it concludes the action is frivolous or
13 malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
14 from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A; Byrd
15 v. Phoenix Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 641–42 (9th Cir. 2018). “The standard for
16 determining whether Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
17 under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
18 standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.
19 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a
20 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
21 (internal quotation marks omitted). While detailed factual allegations are not required,
22 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
23 statements, do not suffice” to state a claim. Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or
24 “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this
25 plausibility standard. Id.
26 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations
27 In the SAC, Plaintiff states she is a transgender inmate, diagnosed with gender
28 dysphoria, confined at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”). (Doc. No. 10 at 3.)
1 Plaintiff alleges she was denied “reasonable accommodation” for her gender dysphoria
2 disability by the California Department of Corrections (“CDCR”); Macomber, the
3 Secretary of the CDCR; and Dr. Sato, a psychologist at RJD. (Id. at 3, 7.) Specifically,
4 Plaintiff states the CDCR failed to properly consider her disability when classifying her for
5 a double cell. (Id. at 3, 4.) She states that because she is transgender, she is vulnerable to
6 harassment and assault. (Id.) Plaintiff further states she was the victim of an assault in 2018.
7 (Id. at 3.)
8 As with Plaintiff’s previous pleadings, while Plaintiff states she was improperly
9 classified for “double cell” housing, she does not allege she has been assigned a cellmate.
10 (See id. at 3–7.) Plaintiff has, however, been “threatened with disciplinary actions for
11 failure to accept housing assignments.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff states that the failure to classify
12 her for a single cell causes her “severe psychological harm and emotional distress.” (Id.
13 at 5.) And while other inmates with mental health diagnoses have been classified for single
14 cells, the “classification committee never once discussed [her] gender dysphoria medical
15 needs” when classifying Plaintiff for a double cell. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges the classification
16 committee failed to properly conduct an “individualized assessment” when making their
17 decision. (Id. at 6.) As a result, she was classified for a double cell in September of 2025,
18 November of 2025, and January 7, 2026. (Id.)
19 Plaintiff also states that Macomber and Dr. Sato knew of her gender dysphoria and
20 requests for a single cell but failed to make an accommodation for her disability, despite
21 knowing the “emotional distress and psychological harm [a] double-celling housing
22 assignment cause[s] her.” (Id. at 8.)
23 C. Discussion
24 Plaintiff names three defendants in the SAC: the CDCR itself, Macomber (Secretary
25 of the CDCR), and Dr. Sato. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff alleges the CDCR violated her rights
26 under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”).
27 (Id. at 3–6.) She also alleges Macomber and Sato violated her Eighth Amendment right to
28 be free from cruel and unusual punishment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 7–8.)
1 Plaintiff seeks money damages and an injunction requiring the CDCR to provide her with
2 single-cell housing. (Id. at 10.)
3 1. ADA and RA Claims
4 Plaintiff alleges the CDCR violated her rights under the ADA and the RA. (Id. at 3–
5 5.) As discussed in this Court’s previous orders, to state a claim under Title II of the ADA,
6 a plaintiff must allege: “(1) [s]he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) [s]he was
7 either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services,
8 programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3)
9 such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of [her] disability.”
10 Adom v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., — F.4th —, 2026 WL 2639549, at *5 (9th Cir.
11 Sept. 8, 2026) (quoting Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001)).
12 To state a claim under Section 504 of the RA, a plaintiff must allege she was: (1) an
13 individual with a disability; (2) otherwise qualified to receive the benefit; (3) denied the
14 benefits of the program solely by reason of her disability; and (4) the program receives
15 federal financial assistance. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002).
16 Because of the similarities between the laws and remedies available, a complaint that
17 properly states a claim under Title II of the ADA also states a claim under Section 504 of
18 the RA. Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.11 (9th Cir. 1999).
19 In screening Plaintiff’s previous complaints, the Court assumed gender dysmorphia
20 to be a qualifying disability.2 But the Court found Plaintiff failed to state a claim under the
21 ADA or RA because she failed to allege facts showing prison officials denied her a single
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2 As discussed in this Court’s previous screening orders, while this Court is unaware of any controlling
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law in the Ninth Circuit on whether gender dysmorphia is a qualifying disability under the ADA and RA,
25 it presumes so for the sake of this screening order. See, e.g., Williams v. Kincaid, 45 F.4th 759, 779–80
(4th Cir. 2022) (holding that the plaintiff “has plausibly alleged that gender dysphoria does not fall within
26 the ADA’s exclusion for ‘gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments’”), cert.
denied, 600 U.S. ––, 143 S. Ct. 2414 (2023); see also Doe v. Horne, No23-cv-00185-TUC-JGZ, 2024 WL
27 3091984, at *4 (D. Ariz. June 21, 2024) (finding a plaintiff with gender dysphoria sufficiently alleged a
qualifying disability under the ADA and RA).
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1 cell classification “by reason of [her]” gender dysmorphia. See Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1135.
2 The SAC suffers from the same deficiency. Plaintiff states that CDCR knew of her
3 “gender dysphoria disability but refused to accommodate” her by classifying her for a
4 single cell. (See Doc No. 10 at 3.) But she again fails to plausibly allege she has been denied
5 a single cell classification because of her disability.3 Instead, she alleges her gender
6 dysphoria requires that she receive a single cell classification, and that the failure to classify
7 her for a single cell is “exacerbating her gender dysphoria.” (Id.) Plaintiff again fails to
8 allege facts showing she was denied access to a program or service “by reason of” of her
9 gender dysphoria. See, e.g., Bird v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 2016 WL 7383307, *4
10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2016) (dismissing ADA claim because “[p]laintiff’s request for single
11 cell status does not appear to allege that he is denied access to a program or service” and
12 “[i]nstead, Plaintiff appears to allege that his medical condition is exacerbated by double
13 cell status”); see also Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010)
14 (stating “[t]he ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate
15 treatment for disability”). As with Plaintiff’s previous pleadings, it is not clear from the
16 allegations in the SAC whether Plaintiff has ever even had a cellmate during the relevant
17 period, despite her double-cell classification.
18 In sum, Plaintiff again offers only conclusory allegations, lacking in factual support,
19 and as such has again failed to state a claim under the ADA and RA. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
20 at 681 (stating “formulaic recitations” of elements of a cause of action are insufficient); see
21 also Turner v. Ralkey, No. 3:20-CV-5472-TL-DWC, 2022 WL 18460747, at *18 (W.D.
22 Wash. Apr. 26, 2022) (dismissing ADA and RA claims when transgender plaintiff failed
23 to meet her burden to establish defendants’ decisions regarding her housing were “by
24 reason of” her gender dysphoria); Ritter v. Hunt, No. 24-CV-087-H-DLC, 2025 WL
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3 While Plaintiff states she was designated for a double cell in September of 2025, November of 2025 and
27 January of 2026, it appears she “refused” to accept any assigned cellmate(s). (Doc. No 10 at 3.) She further
states she was “threatened” with disciplinary action for refusing the accept the cellmates, but she alleges
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1 1194016, at *2 (D. Mont. Apr. 24, 2025) (“[Plaintiff] does not allege any facts that, if true,
2 would establish that any defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his
3 disability.”); Olson v. Carter, No. 2:21-CV-00929-JAM-CKD-PS, 2021 WL 3115126, at
4 *7 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2021) (dismissing ADA and RA claims as conclusory where “ the
5 complaint does not contain any additional supporting facts” to show the plaintiff was
6 denied benefits “because of [their] disability”).
7 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims for failure to
8 state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
9 2. Eighth Amendment Claim
10 As in her pervious complaints, Plaintiff also raises an Eighth Amendment claim
11 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Macomber and
12 Dr. Sato violated her Eighth Amendment rights by being “deliberately indifferent” to her
13 gender dysphoria in failing to recommend her for a single cell assignment. (Doc. No. 10
14 at 7–8.)
15 As discussed in the Court’s previous orders, “[f]or an inmate to bring a valid § 1983
16 claim against a prison official for a violation of the Eighth Amendment, he must [ ]
17 objectively show that he was deprived of something sufficiently serious” and “make a
18 subjective showing that the deprivation occurred with deliberate indifference to the
19 inmate’s health or safety.” Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074
20 (9th Cir. 2013). Put another way, a prisoner must plausibly allege the defendants acted with
21 subjective “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk to the inmate’s objectively serious
22 need for health or safety. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
23 Here, even assuming Plaintiff’s gender dysphoria constitutes an objectively serious
24 medical need, she has again failed to plausibly allege Macomber and Dr. Sato acted with
25 deliberate indifference. To show deliberate indifference a prisoner must plausibly allege
26 “the official kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the
27 official must [have been] both be aware of facts from which the inference could [have been]
28 drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and he must also [have] draw[n] the
1 inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). As in her previous pleadings,
2 while Plaintiff alleges Macomber and Dr. Sato knew of her gender dysphoria, she fails to
3 allege facts showing they were subjectively aware that a double cell classification
4 amounted to a substantial risk to her health or safety.4 See Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d
5 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating deliberate indifference requires a showing the
6 defendants chose a course of action (or inaction) “in conscious disregard of an excessive
7 risk to the plaintiff’s health”). In addition, the Court again notes that nowhere in the SAC—
8 nor in any of Plaintiff’s previous pleadings—does she allege she has been assigned a
9 cellmate. See Elias v. Griffin, No. 2:23-CV-02940-MWF-JC, 2024 WL 4406823, at *7
10 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2024) (finding transgender plaintiff who failed to allege she was ever
11 given a cellmate had not shown any defendant actually and proximately caused a
12 deprivation or injury and thus failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim). As such,
13 Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged Macomber or Dr. Sato acted with deliberate indifference.
14 The Court therefore DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against
15 Macomber and Dr. Sato for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),
16 1915A(b)(1); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
17 D. No Leave to Amend
18 In the Court’s most recent order dismissing the FAC, Plaintiff was granted a final
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4 Plaintiff frames her Eighth Amendment claim in the context of a medical need. However, to the extent
22 she also alleges the failure to classify her for a single cell amounted to a significant risk to her safety, the
Court finds she fails to state a claim for the same reasons discussed in the Court’s previous screening
23 orders. (See Doc. Nos. 6, 9.) Specifically, Plaintiff again fails to allege the possible future assignment of
an unspecified cellmate amounts to a threat to her safety. See Williams v. Wood, 223 Fed. App’x 670, 671
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(9th Cir. 2007) (“[S]peculative and generalized fears of harm at the hands of other prisoners do not rise to
25 a sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm.”); see also Eagle v. Wash. State Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:24-
CV-01388-JCC-BAT, 2025 WL 270555, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 21, 2025) (noting that while “transgender
26 inmates, face a general risk of sexual assault, to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must
do more than show that she faced a general risk of sexual assault: she must show that defendants were
27 aware of a specific threat to her”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (citing Bradley v.
Price, No. 20-CV-0048-JDP, 2021 WL 1895062, at *3 (W.D. Wis. May 11, 2021)).
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1 opportunity to amend. (See Doc. No. 9 at 11 (citing Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037,
2 || 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave
3 ||to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be
4 ||cured by amendment.”).) Now that Plaintiff has twice been informed of the pleading
5 || defects of her claims, and has twice failed to cure them, it is clear Plaintiff is unable to state
6 |}a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the SAC is dismissed without
7 further leave to amend. /d.; Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279
8 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing futility of amendment as a proper basis for
9 || dismissal without leave to amend).
10 || TT. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
11 Accordingly, the Court the Court DISMISSES all claims against all Defendants in
12 ||the Second Amended Complaint without prejudice and without further leave to amend
13 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). The Clerk of Court will issue a final
14 judgment accordingly and close the file.
15 IT IS SO ORDERED.
16 Dated: September 15, 2026 ©
7 Hon. Anthony J. attaglia
18 United States District Judge
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