Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

REGINALD LAMAR BROWN,

Petitioner,

v. Case No.: 3:23-cv-1093-MMH-PDB

3:18-cr-89-MMH-LLL

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

ORDER

Petitioner Reginald Lamar Brown moves to vacate his convictions and

sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Civ. Doc. 1).1 A jury found Reginald Brown

and Katrina Brown guilty of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud,

aiding and abetting mail fraud, aiding and abetting wire fraud, aiding and

abetting money laundering, and other crimes. (Crim. Docs. 280 and 281).

Reginald Brown raises sixteen grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel

and one ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The United

1 “Civ. Doc #” refers to a docket entry in the § 2255 case, No. 3:23-cv-1093-

MMH-PDB. “Crim. Doc. #” refers to a docket entry in the criminal case, No. 3:18-cr-

89-MMH-LLL. For all pleadings and documents filed in each case, the Court cites to

the document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing

System.

States responded in opposition (Civ. Doc. 9), and Reginald Brown replied.

(Civ. Doc. 10). Thus, the case is ripe for a decision.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section

2255 Proceedings2, the Court has considered the need for an evidentiary

hearing and determines that a hearing is unnecessary to resolve the Motion.

No evidentiary hearing is required because Reginald Brown’s allegations are

affirmatively contradicted by the record or, even if the facts he alleges are true,

he still would not be entitled to relief. Rosin v. United States, 786 F.3d 873,

877 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Patel v. United States, 252 F. App’x 970, 975

(11th Cir. 2007).3

I. Motion to Supplement and for Leave to Amend

Two years after the parties completed briefing, Reginald Brown filed a

motion titled “Motion to Supplement Pending § 2255 Motion with Newly

Discovered Brady Evidence and Request for Evidentiary Hearing.” (Civ. Doc.

2 Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings expressly requires

the Court to review the record, including any transcripts and submitted materials, to

determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted before resolving a § 2255

motion.

3 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent, but

they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a particular

point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022); see

generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

19). The United States opposed the motion (Civ. Doc. 20), and Reginald Brown

replied. (Civ. Doc. 21).

In the motion, Reginald Brown moves to supplement the record with a

letter that he allegedly recently discovered. (Civ. Doc. 19 at 1–3). On June 12,

2015, Jane G. Bouda, a contract compliance manager, sent the letter to

BizCapital. (Civ. Doc. 19-1 at 3). In Ground Seven and Ground Seventeen,

Reginald Brown asserts that trial counsel deficiently performed at trial by not

cross-examining Bouda with the letter. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 17, 37). Because the

letter is relevant to Ground Seven and Ground Seventeen, Brown’s motion

(Civ. Doc. 19) to supplement the record is due to be GRANTED. Rule 7(a),

Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. The Court will direct the Clerk to

docket the letter (Civ. Doc. 19-1 at 3) as a supplement to Reginald Brown’s

§ 2255 motion.

In the motion, Reginald Brown also moves for leave to supplement his §

2255 motion with new grounds. (Civ. Doc. 19 at 3–9). For the first time, he

asserts (1) that the prosecutor violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),

by failing to disclose the June 12, 2015 letter, (2) that the prosecutor failed to

prove that the City of Jacksonville was a victim under the Mandatory Victims

Restitution Act, (3) that trial counsel deficiently performed by not introducing

the June 12, 2015 letter into evidence to challenge the prosecutor’s restitution

calculation, (4) that the prosecutor failed to prove actual loss under the MVRA,

and (5) that the prosecutor violated his federal right to due process by

calculating restitution with false evidence. (Civ. Doc. 19 at 3–13).

“After the time to file an amendment as a matter of course expires,

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 allows a plaintiff to amend his complaint

only with the opposing party’s written consent or leave of court.” Wade v.

Daniels, 36 F.4th 1318, 1328 (11th Cir. 2022). See Rule 12, Rules Governing

Section 2255 Proceedings. “Leave to amend should be freely given, but a

district court can deny leave to amend [ ] when amendment would be futile.”

Wade, 36 F.4th at 1328. And leave to amend is futile if the pleading “as

amended is still subject to dismissal.” Wade, 36 F.4th at 1328 (quoting Hall v.

United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004)).

A one-year statute of limitations applies to a § 2255 motion.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The limitation period starts to run “the date on which the

judgment of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Here, the United

States Supreme Court denied Reginald Brown’s petition for a writ of certiorari

on October 3, 2022. (Crim. Doc. 554). The limitation period started the next

day, October 4, 2022, and expired a year later, October 4, 2023. Clay v. United

States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003). Reginald Brown filed his § 2255 motion on

September 27, 2023. (Doc. 1 at 12). Washington v. United States, 243 F.3d

1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). Unless the new grounds in the motion to

supplement relate back to the timely filed grounds in the § 2255 motion, the

new grounds are time-barred. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 650 (2005).

Notably, an amended motion does not relate back to a timely motion when the

amended motion “asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ

in both time and type from those the original pleading set forth.” Mayle, 545

U.S. at 650. However, if the amended motion and the timely motion state

“claims that are tied to a common core of operative facts, relation back will be

in order.” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 664.

In the motion to supplement, Reginald Brown asserts (1) that the

prosecutor violated Brady by failing to disclose the June 12, 2015 letter, (2)

that the prosecutor failed to prove that the City of Jacksonville was a victim

under the MVRA, (3) that trial counsel deficiently performed by not

introducing the June 12, 2015 letter into evidence to challenge the calculation

of restitution, (4) that the prosecutor failed to prove actual loss under the

MVRA, and (5) that the prosecutor violated his federal right to due process by

calculating restitution with false evidence. (Civ. Doc. 19 at 3–13). In the timely

filed § 2255 motion Reginald Brown asserted that trial counsel deficiently

performed by not challenging the calculation of the amount of loss (Doc. 1 at

13, 17, 37), and the calculation of forfeiture (Doc. 1 at 15), but the calculation

of the amount of loss and forfeiture is different than the calculation of

restitution and actual loss under the MVRA. Also, even though Reginald

Brown asserted in the timely § 2255 motion that trial counsel deficiently

performed by not cross-examining Bouda with the June 12, 2015 letter,

a Brady claim based on the prosecutor’s failure to disclose the letter before trial

is not based on the same operative facts as a Strickland claim based on

counsel’s conduct during trial. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 662 (“If claims asserted after

the one-year period could be revived simply because they relate to the same

trial, conviction, or sentence as a timely filed claim, AEDPA’s limitation period

would have slim significance.”). Because the new grounds in the motion to

supplement do not relate back to the grounds in the timely § 2255 motion, the

new grounds are untimely.

Under § 2255(f)(4), the limitation starts “the date on which the facts

supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through

the exercise of due diligence.” At the sentencing hearing for both Reginald

Brown and Katrina Brown, Katrina Brown introduced the June 12, 2015 letter

into evidence. (Crim. Docs. 442-22 and 492 at 4, 138). Because Reginald Brown

could have discovered the June 12, 2015 letter with reasonable diligence at the

sentencing hearing, the letter is not “newly discovered,” and § 2255(f)(4) does

not apply. Trucchio v. United States, 553 F. App’x 862, 863 (11th Cir. 2014)

(“[T]he ‘due diligence’ element of § 2255(f)(4) requires neither the ‘maximum

feasible diligence’ nor the undertaking of repeated exercises in futility, but it

does require that a prisoner make ‘reasonable efforts’ in discovering the factual

predicate of his claim.” (citation omitted)).

Even if the new grounds are timely, the new grounds are without merit.

On the third day of trial and outside the presence of the jury, Katrina Brown

advised the trial judge that the prosecutor had failed to disclose the June 12,

2015 letter. (Crim. Doc. 335 at 21–24). And at the sentencing hearing, Katrina

Brown introduced the letter into evidence. (Crim. Docs. 442-22 and 492 at 138).

Even if the prosecutor failed to disclose the June 12, 2015 letter before trial,

Reginald Brown learned about the suppression of the letter during trial and

could have raised a Brady claim on direct appeal. Likewise, Reginald Brown

could have argued on direct appeal that the prosecutor failed to prove that the

City of Jacksonville was a victim and failed to prove actual loss under the

MVRA, and that the prosecutor violated his federal right to due process by

calculating restitution with false evidence. Consequently, these trial error

claims are procedurally defaulted. McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190,

1196 (11th Cir. 2011); Cani v. United States, 331 F.3d 1210, 1213–14 (11th Cir.

2003).

Also, the new claims identified in the motion to supplement are based on

either trial counsel’s failure to challenge the calculation of restitution or the

prosecutor’s failure to prove restitution with competent evidence. (Civ. Doc. 19

at 3–13). Indeed, Reginald Brown contends that the Brady violation in part

deprived him an opportunity to challenge restitution. (Civ. Doc. 19 at 5). But a

defendant cannot assert a claim that challenges restitution in a § 2255 motion

because § 2255 authorizes relief only for a defendant who is in custody and

claims a right to release. Mamone v. United States, 559 F.3d 1209, 1211 (11th

Cir. 2009) (“Despite the presence of claims challenging his custody and

requesting release from custody, the restitution claim did not seek release from

custody and was rightly denied by the district court.”). This bar on a restitution

claim in a § 2255 motion extends to a claim of deficient performance for a

failure to challenge restitution. Blaik v. United States, 161 F.3d 1341, 1343

(11th Cir. 1998). Consequently, the new claims in the motion to amend are

untimely, procedurally barred, and without merit. Because an amendment to

the § 2255 motion with the new claims is futile, Reginald Brown’s motion

(Civ. Doc. 19) to amend is due to be DENIED. Hall, 367 F.3d at 1262–63.

II. Background

A federal grand jury returned a thirty-eight-count Indictment

(Crim. Doc. 1) against Reginald Brown and Katrina Brown. The grand jury

charged (1) conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud against both Reginald

Brown and Katrina Brown (Count One), (2) twenty-six counts of aiding and

abetting mail and wire fraud against both Reginald Brown and Katrina Brown

(Count Two to Count Twenty-Seven), (3) six counts of aiding and abetting

money laundering against both Reginald Brown and Katrina Brown (Count

Twenty-Eight to County Thirty-Three), (4) two counts of attempted bank fraud

only against Katrina Brown (Count Thirty-Four and Count Thirty-Five), (5)

two counts of making a false statement to a federally insured institution only

against Katrina Brown (Count Thirty-Six and Count Thirty-Seven), and (6)

one count of failing to file a tax return only against Reginald Brown. (Count

Thirty-Eight) (Crim. Doc. 1 at 1–58).

The evidence at trial4 proved that Katrina Brown’s parents owned a

company called KJB Specialties, which managed a barbecue restaurant in

Jacksonville, Florida. (Crim. Doc. 334 at 42). KJB Specialties obtained a loan

and a grant from the City of Jacksonville to start a new business producing

and selling barbecue sauce. (Crim. Doc. 334 at 42–44). Katrina Brown and her

mother formed a company called Basic Products to manage the production of

the barbecue sauce and another company called Cowealth to manage a

warehouse for the production of the sauce. (Crim. Docs. 276-13 at 7–10 and 334

at 42, 72–74). Katrina Brown and her mother opened a bank account for Basic

Products. (Crim. Docs. 276-13 and 339 at 191–92).

An ordinance from the City of Jacksonville authorized a $380,000.00 loan

for the barbecue sauce business, and a $260,000.00 grant. (Crim. Docs. 276-1,

334 at 50, and 339 at 203). Reginald Brown, a city councilman, voted on the

ordinance that authorized both the loan and the grant. (Crim. Docs. 276-1 and

334 at 51). KJB Specialties assigned the City’s loan to Basic Products and

4 At trial, Katrina Brown represented herself. (Crim. Doc. 334 at 6).

Cowealth (Crim. Docs. 276-8 at 49–58 and 334 at 55–56, 64–65), and both Basic

Products and Cowealth obtained a Small Business Administration loan from

BizCapital in the amount of $2,650,000.00 to cover the remaining costs of

starting the business. (Crim. Docs. 276-3, 276-4, 276-5, 334 at 43–44, 52–53,

57, 186–87, and 339 at 24, 27, 205). The agreement for the City’s loan required

Basic Products and Cowealth to use the funds from the City’s loan for the

purchase and improvement of the land where the warehouse was located.

(Crim. Docs. 276-8 at 12–13 and 339 at 220–21). The agreement for the City’s

grant required Basic Products and Cowealth to first use funds from the SBA

loan for other expenses before using funds from the grant. (Crim. Docs. 276-8

at 11, 334 at 64–65, 115–16, and 339 at 224–25). The Small Business

Administration guaranteed seventy-five percent of the SBA loan. (Crim. Docs.

276-2 at 1 and 334 at 43, 155).

To obtain funds from the SBA loan, BizCapital required Basic Products

and Cowealth to submit a draw request with an invoice from a vendor. (Crim.

Docs. 276-2 at 5, 334 at 43–44, 46–47, and 339 at 25). After approving a draw

request, an employee at BizCapital sent a check to the vendor to pay the

invoice. (Crim. Docs. 334 at 44 and 339 at 25). Also, BizCapital allowed Basic

Products and Cowealth to request reimbursement for the payment of an

invoice. (Crim. Doc. 334 at 103–04). Katrina Brown submitted to BizCapital

draw requests for fraudulent invoices. (Crim. Doc. 334 at 47).

For example, in October of 2013, Katrina Brown submitted a draw

request for an invoice from VC Gantt, LLC, for office furniture. (Crim. Docs.

276-24 at 1, 10–11 and 334 at 95–99). But VC Gantt did not sell Basic Products

or Cowealth office furniture. (Crim. Doc. 335 at 59–62). Nevertheless,

BizCapital sent VC Gantt a check for $6,083.00 for the fraudulent invoice, and

the owner of VC Gantt deposited the check, withdrew the funds, provided

Katrina Brown $5,583.00, and kept $500.00 for himself. (Crim. Docs. 276-24 at

10, 276-25, 334 at 98–100, 335 at 64–68, and 339 at 36–37, 41–42). In

December of 2013, Katrina Brown submitted a draw request for

reimbursement of another invoice from VC Gantt for more office furniture.

(Crim. Docs. 276-27 at 35–36, 334 at 100, 108, and 339 at 45–47). Again, VC

Gantt did not sell Basic Products or Cowealth any furniture, yet the owner of

VC Gantt cashed a check from Katrina Brown for furniture and gave the funds

to Katrina Brown. (Crim. Docs. 276-31, 334 at 98–99, 100, and 335 at 69–71).

The owner of VC Gantt denied preparing the invoices but testified that he and

Katrina Brown discussed creating invoices for furniture already used at the

warehouse. (Crim. Doc. 335 at 61–64).

In December of 2013, Katrina Brown also submitted a draw request for

three invoices from Tommie Hogan for work as a contractor. (Crim. Docs.

276-26 at 1, 19–24, 334 at 104, and 339 at 45). The invoices charged three

months of work at a rate of $500.00 a week, and Katrina Brown attached three

checks from an account belonging to Basic Products issued to Hogan for the

work. (Crim. Docs. 276-26 at 19–24, 334 at 104–08, and 339 at 46–47). Hogan

denied either working for Basic Products or creating the invoices and testified

that Katrina Brown asked him to cash the checks and that she kept $5,000.00

and gave him $1,000.00. (Crim. Docs. 335 at 110–18).

Katrina Brown also submitted draw requests for fraudulent invoices

from A Plus Training Consultants and RB Packaging. Katrina Brown and

Reginald Brown formed these two companies, and Reginald Brown opened a

bank account for each company designating himself as the only person

authorized to access the accounts. (Crim. Docs. 276-9, 276-10, 276-11, 276-12,

and 334 at 42, 66–72). Between December of 2013, and December of 2014,

Katrina Brown submitted ten draw requests for a total payment of $251,918.44

for fraudulent invoices from A Plus Training and two draw requests for a total

payment of $12,500.00 for fraudulent invoices from RB Packaging. (Crim.

Docs. 276-19, 276-159, 334 at 47, 78–79, 100–03, 109–11, and 339 at 57–71).

For example, Katrina Brown submitted an invoice from RB Packaging for the

design of a label for the barbecue sauce; but another company designed the

label. (Crim. Docs. 276-33 at 1, 12–14, 334 at 110–11, and 335 at 141–46).

Katrina Brown also submitted an invoice from RB Packaging for custom

corrugated boxes. (Crim. Docs. 276-60 at 3–4 and 336 at 38–39). The

description of the boxes and other items in the invoice submitted by Katrina

Brown was almost identical to the description of boxes and other items in an

invoice from another business for an earlier purchase of custom corrugated

boxes. (Crim. Doc. 336 at 40). A sales representative for the other business

testified that he had never heard of RB Packaging as a competitor in the

custom corrugated box industry. (Crim. Doc. 336 at 39).

Katrina Brown submitted another invoice from RB Packaging for

cooking equipment; however, RB Packaging’s bank account did not reflect any

purchase of cooking equipment. (Crim. Docs. 276-64 at 7–16 and 335 at

158–64). And again, the description of the cooking equipment in the invoice

submitted by Katrina Brown was almost identical to a description of

equipment in estimates that Katrina Brown obtained from other businesses.

(Crim. Doc. 335 at 158–64, 174–77). Notably, law enforcement searched the

warehouse and found no cooking equipment that matched the equipment

identified in the invoice. (Crim. Docs. 334 at 47–48 and 335 at 285–89).

Also, Katrina Brown submitted an invoice from A Plus Training for

employee orientation and onboarding and for the development of plans for

obtaining FDA and other food permits. (Crim. Docs. 276-26 at 1, 14 and 334 at

101). Statements from the bank account belonging to A Plus Training did not

reveal any expenditures related to these services. (Crim. Docs. 334 at 103 and

336 at 65–66). And a state agency inspector who assisted Katrina Brown in

applying for food permits denied ever working with either A Plus Training or

Reginald Brown. (Crim. Doc. 335 at 180–84).

On October 17, 2024, an employee from BizCapital sent an employee at

the City of Jacksonville all the invoices that Katrina Brown had submitted,

including the fraudulent invoices, and documents showing all the

disbursements from the SBA loan. (Crim. Doc. 339 at 102–05, 226–27). After

receiving the records, the City of Jacksonville wired $210,549.99 from the

grant to an account belonging to Cowealth. (Crim. Docs. 335 at 268 and 339 at

105–06, 230–32). Then, on December 18, 2014, after funds from the City of

Jacksonville had been deposited into the account belonging to Cowealth,

Katrina Brown submitted another fraudulent invoice from RB Packaging for

$63,216.35 for kitchen equipment, and BizCapital paid the invoice. (Crim.

Docs. 276-42 at 1–5, 335 at 220–21, 269, and 339 at 106–08).

BizCapital mailed the checks to pay the invoices from A Plus Training to

an address where Reginald Brown’s mother lived and the checks to pay for the

invoices from RB Packaging to the address where Reginald Brown lived. (Crim.

Docs. 276-46 and 334 at 110, 113, 116–18). After depositing the checks,

Reginald Brown either withdrew the money as cash or transferred the money

to Basic Products by writing a check. (Crim. Docs. 334 at 79–81, 83–85 and 335

at 230–33, 235–37, 239–51, 252–73, 281). Also, Reginald Brown used some of

the money for purchases at retail stores, restaurants, hotels, and a movie

theater. (Crim. Docs. 335 at 251 and 336 at 65, 86–87).5 After the account

belonging to Basic Products received the money, Katrina Brown withdrew

some money as cash and used other money for purchases at retail stores and

restaurants and to pay rent for a condominium. (Crim. Doc. 336 at 101–04).

Statements for accounts belonging to A Plus Training and RB Packaging did

not reveal payments for ordinary business expenses, like office space or payroll,

or other expenses to vendors for services, items, and equipment. (Crim. Doc.

336 at 65–66, 87–89).

Reginald Brown failed to disclose that he earned any income from RB

Packaging or Basic Products on a public disclosure form required for a city

official and failed to file a tax return in 2014. (Crim. Docs. 276-108, 276-111,

and 340 at 40–54). In January of 2015, Katrina Brown submitted to BizCapital

a draw request for $64,071.20 for more cooking equipment, and BizCapital

denied the request. (Crim. Docs. 276-44 and 335 at 224–27). That same month,

Basic Products defaulted on the SBA loan. (Crim. Docs. 276-43, 334 at 160–61,

and 335 at 223–24). With taxpayer money, the Small Business Administration

paid BizCapital a guarantee on the defaulted loan. (Crim. Docs. 276-47 and

334 at 195–96). In October of 2015, Katrina Brown submitted to BizCapital a

5 Reginald Brown legitimately used some money from the RB Packaging

account for expenses related to the promotion of the barbecue sauce at several

festivals. (Crim. Docs. 276-150, 334 at 152–54, 336 at 85–86, 159–62, and 340 at

101–08).

fraudulent tax return for Basic Products. (Crim. Docs. 276-117, 276-118,

276-119, and 340 at 59–64). In November of 2015, and November of 2016,

Katrina Brown applied for two more loans from a different lender and

submitted fraudulent bank statements with her applications, and the lender

denied the applications. (Crim. Docs. 335 at 289–91, 336 at 172–83, 192–97,

204–10, 216–19, 228–37, and 340 at 18–29, 34–39).

At trial, Reginald Brown did not present a case in chief. (Crim. Doc. 337

at 139–40, 149). But Katrina Brown did. During Katrina Brown’s case in chief,

an economic development officer with the City of Jacksonville testified that he

helped Katrina Brown obtain the loan and the grant from the City and

introduced Katrina Brown to BizCapital. (Crim. Doc. 340 at 137–38, 142). He

explained that the City offered the loan and the grant to encourage

redevelopment in the northwest area of Jacksonville. (Crim. Doc. 340 at

138–39). The economic development officer presented the project for the

barbecue sauce business to the City’s economic board, several committees, and

the City council. (Crim. Doc. 340 at 146–47). Fourteen out of the seventeen

members of the City council voted in favor of the ordinance authorizing the

loan and the grant. (Crim. Doc. 340 at 147–48). Before presenting the project

to the City, Katrina Brown’s father made a fifty-gallon batch of sauce and

offered samples to the economic development officer for tasting. (Crim. Doc.

340 at 148). The economic development officer helped Katrina Brown’s father

and mother pitch the barbecue sauce to the Winn Dixie grocery chain. (Crim.

Doc. 340 at 151–52). He testified that about seventy percent of the projects

funded by the City’s economic board failed and that, even though the barbecue

sauce business failed, Katrina Brown and her parents genuinely tried to

launch the business. (Crim. Doc. 340 at 150, 152).

Another economic development officer for the City of Jacksonville

testified that, in 2015, when Cowealth and Basic Products failed to create

fifty-six new jobs, the City asked both companies to return $210,000.00 from

the grant provided by the City. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 32). He testified that Katrina

Brown asked to renegotiate the terms of the contract. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 32).

Before renegotiating the terms, the City of Jacksonville asked Katrina Brown

for audited financial statements for both companies. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 33). He

testified that Katrina Brown instead provided tax returns for the companies,

(Crim. Doc. 337 at 33), and that the City of Jacksonville later amended the

guidelines that required an audited financial statement because an audit was

costly, (Crim. Doc. 337 at 34).

Katrina Brown’s father testified that he made barbecue sauce at the

warehouse managed by Cowealth and that at the warehouse he received the

delivery of equipment to produce the sauce. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 88). When

making the sauce, he prepared all the ingredients, and about four or five other

persons helped mix the ingredients. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 90–91, 93). Katrina

Brown gave him cash to purchase the ingredients, and with money in an

account that belonged to KJB Specialties he paid the persons who helped mix

the ingredients. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 91–94). He purchased ingredients and made

the sauce only when a store like Winn Dixie or Sam’s Club requested the sauce.

(Crim. Doc. 337 at 111–12). But still, he lost money selling the sauce to a store

because shipping and marketing were expensive. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 115–16).

He purchased a five-hundred-gallon kettle for making large quantities of sauce

but never used the kettle because an electrician was unable to install the

machine. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 117). For the barbecue sauce business, he used

money from his personal checking account to pay the City of Jacksonville,

BizCapital, a restaurant supplier, utility and insurance companies, and a tax

agency. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 98–103, 105, 110–11). Also, he paid cash to five or

six bands that performed at a barbecue sauce festival and supplied ribs and

chicken wings for the festival. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 104–05). The warehouse

appeared empty during inspections because he planned to use sections of the

warehouse for a bakery, for producing other brands of sauce, and for

barbecuing and packaging ribs and pulled pork. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 121–22).

A manager who worked for a parent company of Winn Dixie testified that

he worked with Katrina Brown to sell the barbecue sauce at the grocery store.

(Crim. Doc. 340 at 163–65). Winn Dixie sold the barbecue sauce in over a

hundred stores; however, Winn Dixie stopped selling the barbecue sauce

because the barbecue sauce business stopped supplying any new product.

(Crim. Doc. 340 at 169–71, 173). Also, Winn Dixie partnered with the barbecue

sauce business at two or three local events for marketing. (Crim. Doc. 340 at

167–68).

A graphics designer testified that Katrina Brown hired him to design a

label for the barbecue sauce bottle. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 24). The designer created

all the messaging on the label, and Katrina Brown wrote a description of the

company for the label. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 26). He sent a design of a label to a

printing company after Katrina Brown approved the design. (Crim. Doc. 337

at 25). The designer did not know whether RB Packaging printed the labels for

the bottles. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 28).

The jury found Reginald Brown guilty on all Counts except Count

Thirteen, a count for aiding and abetting mail fraud. (Crim. Doc. 281). The

Court sentenced Reginald Brown to imprisonment for eighteen months on

Count One to Count Twelve, and Count Fourteen to Count Thirty-Three, and

twelve months on Count Thirty-Eight, all to run concurrently, followed by

concurrent terms of supervised release of three years on Count One to Count

Twelve, and Count Fourteen to Count Thirty-Three, and one year on Count

Thirty-Eight. (Crim. Doc. 98).

Reginald Brown appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, raising the following

arguments:

Reginald Brown challenges two of the district court’s

procedural actions at trial and two of its determinations related

to his sentencing. With respect to Brown’s procedural

challenges, he argues that the district court erred in (1) denying

his motions to sever his trial from his co-defendant, Katrina

Brown, and (2) denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal.

Reginald Brown also argues that, at sentencing, the district

court erred in (1) applying the sophisticated means

enhancement and (2) denying his request for the minor role

reduction.

United States v. Brown, No. 20-14254, 2021 WL 5407455, at *1 (11th Cir. Nov.

19, 2021). The court of appeals rejected these arguments, affirming Reginald

Brown’s convictions and sentences. Id. Reginald Brown then petitioned the

United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court

denied certiorari review on October 3, 2022. (Crim. Doc. 554). Reginald Brown

timely filed his § 2255 motion on September 27, 2023. (Civ. Doc. 1).

III. Governing Law

Under Title 28, United States Code, § 2255, a person in federal custody

may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Section 2255 permits

collateral relief on four grounds: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction

to impose the sentence; (3) the imposed sentence exceeded the maximum

authorized by law; or (4) the imposed sentence is otherwise subject to collateral

attack. 28 U.S.C § 2255(a). Only jurisdictional claims, constitutional claims,

and claims of error that are so fundamentally defective as to cause a complete

miscarriage of justice will warrant relief through collateral attack. United

States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184–86 (1979); Spencer v. United States, 773

F.3d 1132, 1138 (11th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“[A] district court lacks the

authority to review the alleged error unless the claimed error constitute[s] a

fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of

justice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court recognizes

that a petitioner’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel,

in violation of the Sixth Amendment, is properly brought in a collateral

proceeding under § 2255. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003).

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a § 2255 petitioner must

demonstrate both: (1) that his counsel’s conduct amounted to constitutionally

deficient performance, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced

his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Martin v.

United States, 949 F.3d 662, 667 (11th Cir. 2020). In determining whether the

petitioner has satisfied the first requirement, that counsel performed

deficiently, the Court adheres to the standard of reasonably effective

assistance. Weeks v. Jones, 26 F.3d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). The petitioner must show, given all the

circumstances, that counsel’s performance fell outside the “wide range of

professionally competent assistance.” Scott v. United States, 890 F.3d 1239,

1258 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other

words, “[t]he standard for effective assistance of counsel is reasonableness, not

perfection.” Brewster v. Hetzel, 913 F.3d 1042, 1056 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To satisfy the second requirement, that counsel’s

deficient performance prejudiced the defense, the petitioner must show a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. Martin, 949 F.3d at 667 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky,

559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010)). In determining whether a petitioner has met the two

prongs of deficient performance and prejudice, the Court considers the totality

of the evidence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. But because both prongs are

necessary, “there is no reason for a court . . . to approach the inquiry in the

same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant

makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697.

A § 2255 movant “bears the burden to prove the claims in his § 2255

motion.” Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2015); see also

Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 2017). Moreover,

a § 2255 movant is not entitled to a hearing, much less relief, “when his claims

are merely conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics or contentions that

in the face of the record are wholly incredible.” Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d

1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

IV. Discussion

Brown asserts sixteen grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel

and one ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Civ. Doc. 1

at 5–37).

A. Ground One

As Ground One, Reginald Brown argues that trial counsel deficiently

performed by not timely filing motions. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 4). He contends that trial

counsel failed to object to the admission of bank records and other evidence.

(Civ. Doc. 1 at 4). He says that, at a September 6, 2019, hearing, Katrina Brown

objected to the admission of bank records and other evidence and that trial

counsel failed to adopt Katrina Brown’s objections. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 4). He further

contends that trial counsel deficiently performed by introducing into evidence

documents that were not relevant to the charges in the Indictment. (Civ. Doc.

1 at 4).

Before trial, Katrina Brown moved to exclude summary charts related to

deposits, checks, transactions, deliveries of checks, and draw requests.

(Crim. Doc. 201 at 1). At the September 6, 2019, hearing, the prosecutor

advised that he intended to introduce into evidence the bank and business

records on which the summary charts were based and to present testimony by

witnesses to authenticate the records. (Crim. Doc. 312 at 5–8, 16–17). For that

reason, the Court denied Katrina Brown’s motion to exclude the summary

charts without prejudice to Katrina Brown’s renewal of the objection at trial if

the prosecutor failed to lay an adequate predicate for the admission of the

summary charts. (Crim. Doc. 312 at 18–20). At trial, the Court admitted into

evidence thirty-six summary charts6 because an adequate predicate supported

their admission. (Crim. Docs. 334 at 117, 335 at 282, 336 at 51, 53, 58–59,

63–64, 67, 71–80, 83–84, 89–92, 99–100, 104–07, and 340 at 52–53, 68, 71–72).

Consequently, because trial counsel would not have obtained any relief by

adopting Katrina Brown’s motion to exclude, Reginald Brown fails to

demonstrate prejudice under Strickland. Brewster, 913 F.3d at 1056 (“Defense

counsel, of course, need not make meritless motions or lodge futile objections.”).

Also, at the September 6, 2019, hearing, after the Court ruled on Katrina

Brown’s pro se motion, trial counsel further objected to the admission of the

summary charts. (Crim. Doc. 312 at 20–26). Notably, trial counsel argued that

the summaries mischaracterized the evidence and were misleading, confusing,

and cumulative to other evidence. (Crim. Doc. 312 at 21–26). Additionally, trial

counsel renewed the objections during trial. (Crim. Docs. 336 at 57–59, 67,

70–77, 89–90). Because the record demonstrates that trial counsel did object,

the claim is meritless.

6 (Crim. Docs. 276-46, 276-54, 276-55, 276-113, 276-127, 276-129, 276-141, 276-

142, 276-143, 276-144, 276-145, 276-146, 276-147, 276-148, 276-149, 276-150, 276-

151, 276-152, 276-153, 276-154, 276-155, 276-156, 276-157, 276-158, and 276-159).

Lastly, Reginald Brown fails to identify any other bank record or

document that trial counsel should have moved to exclude and fails to identify

a legal ground that supported a motion to exclude. Likewise, Reginald Brown

fails to identify any document introduced into evidence by trial counsel that

lacked relevance. “[T]he Section 2255 Rules mandate ‘fact pleading’ as opposed

to ‘notice pleading,’ as authorized under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).”

Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 810 (11th Cir. 2011). Because the allegations

supporting these additional claims fail to meet this “heightened pleading

requirement,” the additional claims are facially deficient. Borden, 646 F.3d at

810 (citing McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994)). Consequently, the

claims in Ground One are due to be DENIED.

B. Ground Two

As Ground Two, Reginald Brown asserts that trial counsel deficiently

performed during opening statements by using terms such as “shell

companies,” “tearful confessions,” and “false invoices.” (Civ. Doc. 1 at 5). He

also argues that trial counsel deficiently performed by admitting that Katrina

Brown submitted false invoices to vendors and saying that Reginald Brown

should have “been more suspicious.” (Civ. Doc. 1 at 5). According to Reginald

Brown, trial counsel conceded his guilt without his permission. (Civ. Doc. 1

at 5).

During opening statements, trial counsel told the jury that “[v]irtually

all the evidence [ ] in this case will concern whether Katrina Brown

fraudulently induced the lender, BizCapital, to disburse funds from a loan

agreement her family’s business made with the bank, [and] whether those false

representations that she made were material to the bank’s decision to issue

the check for the money.” (Crim. Doc. 286 at 25). Trial counsel asserted that

the evidence would not prove that Reginald Brown committed any crime

charged in the Indictment. (Crim. Doc. 286 at 25–26). Trial counsel maintained

that Reginald Brown relied on Katina Brown’s knowledge of business

development when assisting her with the new barbecue sauce business. (Crim.

Doc. 286 at 28–30). And he argued that, at Katrina Brown’s direction, Reginald

Brown opened a bank account for the new business, inspected shelves at stores

where the barbecue sauce was sold, and promoted the barbecue sauce by

organizing and planning a barbecue festival. (Crim. Doc. 286 at 30–32).

According to trial counsel, Reginald Brown started to ask Katrina Brown

questions in late 2016 and early 2017, only after learning about the criminal

investigation. (Crim. Doc. 286 at 33).

Trial counsel asserted that the evidence would demonstrate that

Reginald Brown did not know that Katrina Brown submitted false invoices and

that Katrina Brown exploited Reginald Brown by having him form the new

companies:

[Trial counsel:] The evidence will be, ladies and

gentlemen, that if the money

pipeline from the loan starts to dry

up for Katrina Brown in the fall of

2013, Katrina Brown, without

Mr. Brown’s knowledge or consent,

resorts to other tactics to keep it

flowing.

And those tactics, it appears,

consisted of using Mr. Brown to set

up two companies, A Plus Training

and RB Packaging, to be used as

[ ] a conduit, a shell company, a

holding company—however you like

to characterize it—to transfer what

she apparently truly believes was

her money, the proceeds of this loan,

to her Basic Products account.

The evidence will be, ladies and

gentlemen, that Reginald Brown

was not the first or only person

Ms. Brown may have used to obtain

disbursements from the bank

under—from the lender under false

pretenses.

(Crim. Doc. 286 at 34).

Trial counsel further maintained that after learning about the criminal

investigation, Reginald Brown confronted Katrina Brown and that Katrina

Brown admitted to preparing the false invoices:

[Trial counsel:] It is after he learns that he might be

implicated in this allegation that he

confronts Ms. Brown directly about

those allegations.

It is at this meeting he asked her, he

tells: “The FBI is investigating me.

What’s going on?”

It’s at this meeting Katrina Brown

admits tearfully that she did it. She

prepared the false invoices. She

e-mailed the lender. She oftentimes

picked up the deliveries from his

home. Reginald Brown had no

knowledge of the—that she

submitted false invoices to the

lender.

(Crim. Doc. 286 at 37–38).

Trial counsel asserted that the evidence would demonstrate that Reginald

Brown did not knowingly and willfully commit the crimes charged in the

Indictment and asked the jury to find Reginald Brown not guilty. (Crim. Doc.

286 at 39–40).

The transcript refutes Reginald Brown’s contention that trial counsel

conceded his guilt. Trial counsel instead argued that the evidence would

demonstrate that Reginald Brown was not guilty. In doing so, trial counsel

used terms like “shell companies” and “false invoices” to shift blame away from

Reginald Brown and onto Katrina Brown. Moreover, Reginald Brown knew

that trial counsel intended to blame Katrina Brown at trial because before

trial, trial counsel moved for a severance to pursue this strategy. (Crim. Docs.

59 at 5 and 224 at 4–5). Because Reginald Brown fails to demonstrate that no

reasonable counsel would have pursued this strategy at trial, his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim is meritless. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d

1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[B]ecause counsel’s conduct is presumed

reasonable, for a petitioner to show that the conduct was unreasonable, a

petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have taken the

action that his counsel did take.”). Consequently, the claim in Ground Two is

due to be DENIED.

C. Ground Three

As Ground Three, Reginald Brown asserts that trial counsel deficiently

performed by failing to reasonably investigate exculpatory evidence and by

failing to cross-examine Valentino Rovere, a witness who testified at trial. (Civ.

Doc. 1 at 7). Reginald Brown fails to identify any specific exculpatory evidence

that trial counsel failed to investigate, fails to explain what trial counsel would

have discovered if he had investigated, and fails to identify any questions that

trial counsel should have asked Rovere. At trial, Rovere testified on behalf of

Katrina Brown, and both the prosecutor and trial counsel cross-examined

Rovere. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 60–72, 78–83). Because the allegations supporting

this claim fail to meet the heightened pleading standards for a

§ 2255 motion and because the record demonstrates that trial counsel did

cross-examine Rovere, the claim is meritless. Borden, 646 F.3d at 810. Perkins

v. United States, 73 F.4th 866, 880 (11th Cir. 2023) (“‘Speculation is

insufficient to carry the burden of a habeas corpus petitioner as to what

evidence could have been revealed by further investigation.’”) (quoting

Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1060 (11th Cir. 2002)). Consequently, the

claim in Ground Three is due to be DENIED.

D. Ground Four

As Ground Four, Reginald Brown asserts that trial counsel deficiently

performed by not objecting to the admission of bank statements for accounts

belonging to Cowealth and Basic Products. (Doc. 1 at 8). He contends that the

Indictment alleged that the crimes occurred between 2012 and 2015, and

argues that the bank statements contained transactions that occurred “outside

of the indictment period.” Id.

Almost all the conduct alleged in the Indictment occurred between 2012

and 2015. (Crim. Doc. 1 at 11–12, 40, 48–49, 55, 57). However, the Indictment

further alleged that, between October 2015, and November 8, 2016, Katrina

Brown attempted to commit bank fraud and that on November 8, 2016, Katrina

Brown made a false statement to a federally insured institution. (Crim. Doc. 1

at 50–57). Indeed, the Indictment specifically alleged that Katrina Brown

“obtained altered Wells Fargo bank statements for Basic Products for the

months of July, August, and September 2016,” and that “actual Wells Fargo

bank statements for KJB Specialties for the months of March, April, and May

2016, were used as a template to create the false and fraudulent Basic Products

bank statements for July, August, and September 2016.” (Crim. Doc. 1 at 53).

Consequently, the record refutes Reginald Brown’s contention that the

Indictment alleged that the crimes occurred only between 2012 and 2015.

Also, the prosecutor introduced into evidence bank statements for three

accounts that belonged to Cowealth. (Crim. Doc. 276-18). Notably, the bank

statements for one account were for transactions that occurred from February

28, 2012, until January 31, 2016. (Crim. Doc. 276-18 at 5–72). The January

2016, bank statement for that account contained no transactions. (Crim. Doc.

276-18 at 72). The bank statements for the second account were for

transactions that occurred from November 22, 2011, until January 31, 2016.

(Crim. Doc. 276-18 at 76–126). Similarly, the November 20117, December 2011,

and January 2016, bank statements contained no transactions. (Crim. Doc.

276-18 at 76, 77, 126). The bank statement for the third account was for

transactions that occurred between December 9, 2014, and December 31, 2014.

(Crim. Doc. 276-91). Because Brown fails to demonstrate a reasonable

probability that the outcome at trial would have changed if trial counsel had

objected to the admission of the November 2011, December 2011, and January

2016, bank statements that contained no transactions, his claim based on those

bank statements is meritless. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

7 The November 2011, statement reflects only a deposit of $2,609,612.20 for

the SBA loan. (Crim. Docs. 276-7 and 276-18 at 76).

Likewise, the prosecutor introduced into evidence bank statements for

two accounts that belonged to Basic Products. The bank statements for the first

account were for transactions that occurred between November 1, 2013, and

December 31, 2014. (Crim. Doc. 276-25 at 6–15, 276-31 at 13–21, 276-72 at

11–15, 276-73 at 12–14, 276-74 at 7–9, 276-75 at 8–11, 276-76 at 8–14, 276-82

at 12–16, 276-85 at 5–9, 276-86 at 3–8, 276-87 at 3–7, 276-88 at 4–8, 276-89 at

3–6, 276-96 at 3–6). And Wells Fargo bank statements for the second account

were for transactions that occurred between July 12, 2016, and October 7,

2016. (Crim. Doc. 276-106). Because the 2016 Wells Fargo bank statements

were relevant to the crimes charged against Katrina Brown for attempted bank

fraud and making a false statement to a federally insured institution, an

objection to the admission of those bank statements would not have succeeded.

Consequently, trial counsel did not deficiently perform. Brewster, 913 F.3d at

1056. The claim in Ground Four is due to be DENIED.

E. Ground Five

As to Ground Five, Reginald Brown asserts that trial counsel deficiently

performed at sentencing by not presenting testimony of an expert addressing

the amount of loss. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 13). He further asserts that trial counsel

conceded that the amount of loss started at $265,000.00, and failed to ask

Timothy Myers, an accountant retained by trial counsel, to evaluate an

estimate of expenses calculated by Agent Castiglia and to calculate an amount

of loss. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 13).

In the presentence investigation report, the probation officer attributed

an amount of loss of $422,686.68 to Reginald Brown. (Crim. Doc. 419 at 18).

In a sentencing memorandum, trial counsel adopted an objection in Katrina

Brown’s sentencing memorandum to the amount of loss. (Crim. Doc. 400 at 1).

In her sentencing memorandum, Katrina Brown referred to a memorandum

jointly filed by both Defendants that “address[ed] virtually all of the financial

issues [and] disputes.” (Crim. Doc. 399 at 2). In the joint memorandum,

Reginald Brown and Katrina Brown argued that the Small Business

Administration, BizCapital, and the City of Jacksonville suffered no loss.

(Crim. Doc. 355 at 2–28). Also, at sentencing, Josh Shilts, a certified public

accountant, testified on behalf of both Reginald Brown and Katrina Brown.

(Crim. Doc. 492 at 76). Shilts reviewed relevant documents in the case, created

schedules based on his review of those documents, and explained the

schedules. (Crim. Doc. 492 at 76–133). At sentencing, trial counsel relied on

the testimony by Shilts, the exhibits introduced into evidence by Katrina

Brown’s counsel, and the jointly filed memorandum to object to the amount of

loss. (Crim. Doc. 492 at 8, 14–15, 142).8 Because the record demonstrates that

trial counsel did object to the amount of loss, did present testimony and other

evidence at sentencing to support the objection, and did not concede that the

amount of loss started at $265,000.00, Reginald Brown’s claim is meritless.

Reginald Brown further asserts that trial counsel deficiently performed

by not asking the expert to evaluate an estimate of expenses by Agent

Castiglia. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 13). He contends that the agent estimated the amount

of money that he spent for promotional events for the sauce and the amount of

money that he should have received for his work for the business. (Civ. Doc. 1

at 13). Brown fails to submit an affidavit or report by the expert and instead

speculates that testimony by the expert would have exculpated him. Perkins,

73 F.4th at 880. Despite this, at sentencing, the Court rejected the Defendants’

argument that legitimate business expenses offset the amount of loss.

(Crim. Doc. 493 at 45–46). See U.S.S.G. §2B1.1, application note (3)(D)(i) (“Loss

shall be reduced by the following: The money returned, and the fair market

value of the property returned and the services rendered, by the defendant or

other persons acting jointly with the defendant, to the victim before the offense

was detected.”). Consequently, Reginald Brown fails to demonstrate a

8 Also, trial counsel successfully objected to combining the amount of loss for

the fraud convictions with the amount of loss for the conviction for failing to file a tax

return. (Crim. Docs. 419 at 16 and 492 at 201).

reasonable probability that the outcome at sentencing would have changed if

trial counsel had presented additional testimony by an expert. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694. As such, the claim in Ground Five is due to be DENIED.

F. Grounds Six and Sixteen

As Ground Six, Reginald Brown asserts that trial counsel deficiently

performed by not preserving for appellate review an objection to the calculation

of forfeiture. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 15). And as Ground Sixteen, he asserts that

appellate counsel deficiently performed by not arguing on appeal that the

calculation of forfeiture was erroneous. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 35). Because a claim

based on the calculation of forfeiture is not cognizable in a § 2255 motion, the

claims are meritless. Saldana v. United States, 273 F. App’x 842, 844 (11th Cir.

2008). United States v. Harris, 546 F. App’x 898, 901 (11th Cir. 2013)

(“28 U.S.C. § 2255 does not offer relief from the non-custodial features of a

criminal sentence.”). The claims in Grounds Six and Sixteen are due to be

DENIED.

G. Ground Seven

As Ground Seven, Reginald Brown again asserts that trial counsel

deficiently performed during sentencing by failing to object to the amount of

loss, by agreeing that the amount of loss was at least $265,000.00, and by

failing to consult with the accountant. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 17). He further asserts

that trial counsel deficiently performed by failing to object to the prosecutor’s

Exhibit 1A to Exhibit 1I, by failing to cross-examine a witness about the June

12, 2015 letter and by failing to object to the amount of loss incurred by the

City of Jacksonville and BizCapital. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 17).

As previously noted, the record refutes the contention that trial counsel

failed to either object to the amount of loss or agreed that the amount of loss

was at least $265,000.00. Also, although Brown speculates that he suffered

prejudice from trial counsel’s alleged failure to consult with the accountant, he

fails to present any supporting evidence. Moreover, the documents in the

prosecutor’s Exhibit 1A to Exhibit 1I demonstrate that in 2011, Cowealth and

Basic Products signed the SBA loan agreement, and the City of Jacksonville

passed the ordinance for the second loan and the grant. (Crim. Docs. 276-1,

276-2, 276-3, 276-4, 276-5, 276-6, 276-7, 276-8). While the criminal conduct

alleged in the Indictment occurred between 2012 and 2016 (Crim. Doc. 1 at

11–57), the Indictment also alleged that in 2011, Cowealth and Basic Products

obtained the SBA loan from BizCapital, and the City of Jacksonville passed

the ordinance. (Crim. Doc. 1 at 3–4). The Indictment further alleged that

Reginald Brown and Katrina Brown fraudulently obtained money from the

SBA loan and the City’s grant by submitting false invoices. (Crim. Doc. 1 at

12–39). Because Exhibit 1A to Exhibit 1I demonstrated the source of the money

fraudulently obtained by the Defendants, the exhibits were relevant to the

crimes charged in the Indictment. United States v. Duff, 707 F.2d 1315, 1318

(11th Cir. 1983) (“‘Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401). An objection to the exhibits would not

have succeeded, thus trial counsel did not deficiently perform. Brewster, 913

F.3d at 1056.

In the June 12, 2015 letter, Jane Bouda, a contract compliance manager

at the City of Jacksonville, advised BizCapital as follows:

The City of Jacksonville gave Cowealth [and] Basic

Products a grant in the amount of $210,549.99, in

December of 2014. These funds were reimbursement

for eligible project costs associated with the renovation

of the facility located at 5638 Commonwealth Avenue,

Jacksonville, Florida. These monies can be disbursed

to Cowealth [and] Basic Products.

(Civ. Doc. 19-1 at 3).

The facility referenced in the letter is the warehouse where the barbecue sauce

was produced. (Crim. Docs. 276-8 at 6 and 339 at 207–08). Certainly, the letter

did not authorize the use of the money from the City’s grant without any

restriction. Notably, the redevelopment agreement between the City of

Jacksonville and KJB Specialties authorized Cowealth and Basic Products to

use the money from the City’s grant only for improvements described in

Exhibit B attached to the agreement. (Crim. Doc. 276-8 at 11). Exhibit B

contained a chart with a list of expenses for building the barbecue sauce

facility. (Crim. Doc. 276-8 at 43). Specifically, the chart prohibited the use of

the City’s loan and grant for “working capital and inventory.” (Crim. Doc.

276-8 at 43). Consequently, Reginald Brown cannot demonstrate prejudice

from trial counsel’s failure to cross-examine Bouda with the letter. White v.

Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1223 (11th Cir. 1992).

Reginald Brown asserts that trial counsel deficiently performed by not

objecting to the addition of $210,549.99 from the City of Jacksonville to the

amount of loss, by failing to cross-examine an employee from BizCapital about

additional funding of $129,991.46 received on August 25, 2015, and by not

objecting to evidence related to Draw Requests 79, 80, 81, and 82. (Civ. Doc. 1

at 17). As previously noted, trial counsel did object to the amount of loss

incurred by the City of Jacksonville. Also, Reginald Brown does not identify

the source of the additional funding. Likewise, Reginald Brown fails to identify

any evidence admitted at trial related to Draw Requests 79, 80, 81, and 82.

(Crim. Doc. 276 at 4–7, 10–16, 31–32). Consequently, the record refutes the

claims. The claims in Ground Seven are due to be DENIED.

H. Grounds Eight and Eleven

As Grounds Eight and Eleven, Reginald Brown asserts that trial counsel

deficiently performed by failing to object to evidence that contained “false

numbers” presented by the prosecutor and to evidence concerning a loss

incurred by the SBA. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 19, 25). He contends that the SBA was not

a victim because the SBA initially paid money to BizCapital and BizCapital

used that money to fund a bridge loan. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 19). He also contends

that payments for the twelve invoices charged as fraud in the Indictment

derived from the bridge loan funded by BizCapital. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 19).

According to Reginald Brown, any funding by the SBA occurred outside the

scope of the charges in the Indictment. (Crim. Doc. 1 at 19).

Reginald Brown does not identify any “false numbers” presented by the

prosecutor. Notably, in the joint loss memorandum, Reginald Brown and

Katrina Brown argued that because the Small Business Administration “did

not provide any of the funds disbursed by BizCapital, there [was] no loss as to

the [Small Business Administration], as confirmed by the [presentence

investigation report], which does not list [the Small Business Administration]

as a ‘victim’ in the ‘Victim Impact’ portion of the [report].” (Crim. Doc. 355 at

2). Indeed, in the “Victim Impact” section of the presentence investigation

report, the probation officer did not identify the Small Business

Administration as a victim. (Crim. Doc. 419 at 16–17). At sentencing, the Court

calculated an amount of loss attributable to Reginald Brown of $422,686.66,

which comprised of $201,202.69 as a loss for BizCapital and $210,549.99 as a

loss for the City of Jacksonville. (Crim. Doc. 493 at 22, 58–59, 61). Moreover,

the Court refused to assess the full amount of the SBA loan when calculating

the amount of loss:

[Court:] In paragraph 49, the Defendants

object to the request by BizCapital

for the full amount of the loan

proceeds, and BizCapital has

submitted a request for restitution,

claiming to have a total loss of 1.89

— $1,189,320.91, which it explains

is the amount lost on the loan.

And if this had been a fraudulent

loan from the start, then perhaps

that would have been the amount

that would have been appropriately

calculated as the loss and awarded,

at least as a starting point, of

restitution to BizCapital, although

it would have been reduced by the

sale of the building. But that’s not

what the charged conduct was and

that restitution request by

BizCapital is not supported by the

evidence.

The full amount of the default on the

loan was not caused by the fraud.

And restitution is not intended to be

a windfall for the victim. BizCapital

made what turns out to have been a

bad loan, and the consequence of

that will not be visited on Mr. Brown

and Ms. Brown entirely. Instead,

they are responsible for their

conduct that resulted in wrongful

distributions, but not for the failed

loan.

(Crim. Doc. 493 at 59–60).

Because the Court did not treat the Small Business Administration as a victim

and did not add to the amount of loss the money that the Small Business

Administration paid for the guarantee, Reginald Brown cannot demonstrate

prejudice under Strickland. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Importantly, while the Court did not find the Small Business

Administration to be a victim, evidence of the SBA loan was still relevant at

trial. In fact, the SBA loan agreement required Basic Products and Cowealth

to submit a draw request to use money from the SBA loan because of

restrictions on the use of the money. (Crim. Doc. 276-2 at 4). In an SBA

settlement sheet signed by Katrina Brown and her mother, Basic Products and

Cowealth agreed to comply with the restrictions on the use of the money.

(Crim. Doc. 276-6). Consequently, Katrina Brown committed fraud when she

submitted draw requests with fabricated invoices and used money from the

SBA loan for unauthorized purposes, including personal expenses. Because an

objection to evidence related to the SBA loan would not have succeeded, trial

counsel did not deficiently perform.9 Brewster, 913 F.3d at 1056; Duff, 707 F.2d

at 1318. The claims in Grounds Eight and Eleven are due to be DENIED.

9 Also, at trial, trial counsel attempted to ask an SBA employee and a

BizCapital employee questions about an administrative proceeding in which the

Small Business Administration demanded from BizCapital $782,000.00 for the

guarantee. (Crim. Doc. 339 at 8–12, 91–94). For tax purposes, BizCapital initially

funded the SBA loan with a bridge loan and intended to substitute the bridge loan

with the SBA loan. (Crim. Doc. 339 at 6). The SBA accused BizCapital of

mismanagement of the SBA loan by failing to close the bridge loan. (Crim. Doc. 339

at 6–7). The Court refused to permit trial counsel to cross-examine the witnesses

about the administrative proceeding because BizCapital’s negligence or disregard of

its own policies did not excuse the charged fraudulent conduct. (Crim. Doc. 339 at

94–100). Consequently, trial counsel did not deficiently perform.

I. Ground Nine

As Ground Nine, Reginald Brown asserts that trial counsel deficiently

performed by failing to investigate and present exculpatory evidence at

sentencing. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 21). He asserts that before sentencing, Katrina

Brown’s counsel gave trial counsel exculpatory evidence, and trial counsel

refused to investigate the exculpatory evidence. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 21). Because

Reginald Brown fails to identify any exculpatory evidence that trial counsel

failed to investigate, the allegations supporting this claim fail to meet the

heightened pleading standards for a § 2255 motion. Borden, 646 F.3d at 810.

Also, because Reginald Brown fails to identify any additional evidence that

trial counsel would have discovered if he investigated the exculpatory evidence,

his claim is based on speculation. Perkins, 73 F.4th at 880. Consequently, the

claim in Ground Nine is due to be DENIED.

J. Ground Ten

As Ground Ten, Reginald Brown asserts that trial counsel deficiently

performed at trial by failing to introduce into evidence receipts and contracts

to demonstrate that Reginald Brown legitimately spent money and worked

during the relevant period. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 23). He contends that the receipts

and contracts would have demonstrated that the invoices were not false. (Civ.

Doc. 1 at 23). He further contends that Katrina Brown’s counsel delivered the

receipts and contracts to the prosecutor and that the prosecutor failed to

present the receipts and contracts to the grand jury. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 23).

As an initial matter, because Reginald Brown does not identify any

receipt or contract that trial counsel failed to introduce into evidence, the

allegations supporting this claim fail to meet the heightened pleading

standards for a § 2255 motion and are also based on speculation. Borden, 646

F.3d at 810. Perkins, 73 F.4th at 880. Moreover, during trial, trial counsel

introduced into evidence photographs and a slideshow to demonstrate that

Reginald Brown organized and attended a festival. (Crim. Doc. 278-6). And on

cross-examination, trial counsel elicited testimony that showed that Reginald

Brown incurred legitimate expenses for several festivals. (Crim. Docs. 336 at

159–61 and 340 at 101–03). Additionally, during closing, trial counsel argued

that the evidence proved that Reginald Brown spent significant time

organizing the festivals and that a criminal conspiracy between Reginald

Brown and Katrina Brown did not exist. (Crim. Doc. 515 at 93–94, 97, 99). As

previously noted, at sentencing, the Court rejected the Defendants’ argument

that legitimate business expenses offset the amount of loss. (Crim. Doc. 493 at

45–46). Lastly, the jury’s guilty verdict at trial renders any error during the

grand jury proceedings harmless. United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317,

1333 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 67

(1986)). Consequently, trial counsel did not deficiently perform, and Reginald

Brown fails to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland. The claim in Ground

Ten is due to be DENIED.

K. Ground Twelve

As Ground Twelve, Reginald Brown asserts that trial counsel deficiently

performed by failing to call Katrina Brown as a witness at trial. (Civ. Doc. 1 at

27). Before trial, trial counsel filed a motion to sever Reginald Brown’s trial

from Katrina Brown’s trial because Katrina Brown intended to testify at his

trial. (Crim. Doc. 59). Reginald Brown supported the motion with an affidavit

from Katrina Brown stating that she intended to testify and exculpate

Reginald Brown at his trial. (Crim. Doc. 68). However, the Court denied the

motion because the affidavit contained only conclusory statements and did not

clearly demonstrate Reginald Brown’s need for Katrina Brown’s testimony.

(Crim. Doc. 114 at 11–13). Subsequently, Katrina Brown filed a pro se motion

to sever her trial from Reginald Brown’s trial because she intended to testify

at Reginald Brown’s trial. (Crim. Doc. 215). In doing so, Katrina Brown

supported her motion with a second affidavit that contained more detailed

statements about her proposed testimony. (Crim. Doc. 215 at 4–9). Also, trial

counsel filed a second motion to sever based on Katrina Brown’s intent to

testify and supported the second motion with Katrina Brown’s second affidavit.

(Crim. Doc. 224). Despite this, the Court denied both motions to sever because

the motions were untimely and because Katrina Brown’s proposed testimony

did not clearly exculpate Reginald Brown. (Crim. Doc. 237). Also, at the joint

trial, Katrina Brown declined to testify. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 139). Reginald

Brown speculates that Katrina Brown would have waived her Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination if trial counsel had subpoenaed

her to testify at trial. Because trial counsel attempted to secure Katrina

Brown’s testimony at a severed trial and because Reginald Brown fails to

demonstrate that Katrina Brown would have waived her privilege against self-

incrimination and testified at the joint trial, he fails to demonstrate prejudice

under Strickland. Ivory v. United States, 153 F.4th 1358, 1367 (11th Cir. 2025)

(holding that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel’s

failure to call a witness to testify was meritless because “there [was] little in

the record showing that [the witness] was willing to testify and waive his Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” (internal quotations

omitted)).

Also, Reginald Brown asserts that trial counsel deficiently performed by

not calling Ann Smiley to testify. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 27). Trial counsel listed Smiley

on a witness list (Crim. Doc. 247) and identified Smiley on an exhibit list as a

person who would authenticate the affidavit by Katrina Brown. (Crim. Doc.

268 at 2). When the Court advised that only some statements in the second

affidavit were admissible as statements against interest (Crim. Doc. 337 at

152–61), trial counsel responded that “[Reginald Brown’s] position [was] he

wants it all in, and absent that, he doesn’t want any of it in.” (Crim. Doc. 337

at 142–43). Therefore, trial counsel did not call Smiley to authenticate the

affidavit. Because Reginald Brown fails to demonstrate that no reasonable

attorney would have declined to call Smiley under these circumstances,

Reginald Brown’s claim is meritless. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315.

Consequently, the claim in Ground Twelve is due to be DENIED.

L. Ground Thirteen

As Ground Thirteen, Reginald Brown asserts that trial counsel

deficiently performed by not objecting to testimony by an IRS agent that

Reginald Brown failed to provide receipts and other documents substantiating

the expenses for the barbecue festival. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 29). At trial, on cross-

examination, the IRS agent testified that RB Packaging failed to produce

records related to the business:

[Trial counsel:] All right. And essentially, you know,

there may be some expenses related

to—entertainment expenses related

to the business, promotional type of

activities, that might be—if there

were kind of proper business

expenses circumstances, might be

expensed out of the income portion

of this.

[Agent:] Are we speaking hypothetically or

specifically about Mr. Brown?

[Trial counsel:] We’re speaking hypothetically.

[Agent:] Hypothetically, yes, a business

sometimes can do that.

[Trial counsel:] But that would require, I guess, a

basic understanding of what the

rules of reporting the income and

expensing business expenses would

be, correct?

[Agent:] Can you repeat that?

[Trial counsel:] I said that would require some basic

understanding of the business

income and business expensing

process in order to kind of properly

account for all this activity.

[Agent:] Or to hire someone who knew that.

[Trial counsel:] All right. All right. Let’s turn to, if

I could—Well, and I guess that

answers the question. In your

review of all the books, there was

really no indication that—that there

was any accounting or any kind of

professional services provided to do

the books in this case.

[Agent:] RB Packaging failed to produce any

records to us relating to the

business.

(Crim. Doc. 340 at 99–100).

However, during a break, trial counsel moved for a mistrial because of

the agent’s testimony:

[Trial counsel:] Judge, I have a preliminary matter

I’d like to—two, actually, I’d like to

address before we get to the

[judgment of acquittal]. Over the

lunch hour—actually at the

conclusion of Special Agent

Castiglia’s testimony, one of the last

answers he provided, in response to

a question about searching for funds

related to—identifying cash that

might have been spent on the

Memorial Day festival is—the

response that he appeared to have

made was that RB Packaging failed

to produce any records.

Now, I’ve got to be a hundred

percent honest with you. I’m not

sure I heard it at the time, but when

I sat down, Mr. Brown was quite

upset about it for really reasons

other than what I’m about to

address.

But having contemplated this over

lunch, and I checked with the court

reporter, and it appears to be

right—one of his very last answers.

It appears to be that’s what he said.

And my concern about it, of course,

is that it amounts to burden-

shifting, that the defendant has

some obligation to produce records

or to produce any evidence

whatsoever.

I don’t know the intent of the

answer. I was expecting a no, and

quite frankly, wasn’t sure at the

time that—in fact, Mr. Brown and

I had a bit of a dispute about

whether the remark was made at

all, but he certainly heard it, and it

appears to be supported by the

record.

So my concern in my motion is it’s

the burden—that the motion should

be—the answer should be at a

minimum stricken, and the jury

instructed to disregard it. I would

move for a mistrial because it has

essentially amounted to a burden-

shifting argument, and that is the—

that is my first motion.

(Crim. Doc. 340 at 121–22).

The Court denied the motion for a mistrial because the agent testified about

RB Packaging’s failure to produce records and did not testify that Reginald

Brown failed to produce records and because the comment was fleeting. (Crim.

Doc. 340 at 210, 215–17). Instead, the Court offered a curative instruction, and

trial counsel accepted the instruction. (Crim. Docs. 340 at 217 and 337 at 6).

The Court instructed the jury to disregard the testimony about RB Packaging’s

failure to produce any records:

[Court:] Before we begin with the evidence

this morning, I want to address one

thing with you. On Friday morning,

you heard Agent Castiglia testify

that RB Packaging did not produce

records relating to its business.

I want to remind you that the

defendant Reginald Brown has no

obligation to produce any evidence

in this case.

(Crim. Doc. 337 at 22).

Because trial counsel objected to the agent’s testimony and moved for a

mistrial and because a court presumes that the jury follows a curative

instruction, trial counsel did not deficiently perform, and Reginald Brown fails

to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland. United States v. Crespo, 178 F.4th

1250, 1269 (11th Cir. 2026).

Also, Reginald Brown asserts that trial counsel deficiently performed by

not objecting to evidence that demonstrated that Reginald Brown knew about

the SBA loan and the ordinance by the City of Jacksonville that funded both

the second loan and the grant. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 29). He argues that the prosecutor

unfairly inferred from this evidence that he knew that the City of Jacksonville

would provide the grant and the loan after Katrina Brown exhausted the funds

from the SBA loan. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 29). Yet, before trial, trial counsel moved to

exclude evidence that Reginald Brown voted in favor of the ordinance (Crim.

Doc. 123), and the Court granted the motion and prohibited the admission of

evidence of how Reginald Brown voted on the ordinance. (Crim. Doc. 151).

At trial, the prosecutor introduced into evidence a copy of the ordinance

and the minutes of the meeting when the city council approved the ordinance.

(Crim. Doc. 276-1). The minutes showed that Reginald Brown was a city

councilmember who voted on the ordinance. (Crim. Doc. 276-1 at 5–6).

However, the prosecutor redacted from the minutes how each councilperson

voted on the ordinance. (Crim. Doc. 276-1 at 6). During closing argument, the

prosecutor did not argue that the ordinance and the meeting minutes

demonstrated that Reginald Brown knew about the SBA loan. The prosecutor

drew the reasonable inference from the minutes that Reginald Brown knew

that some of the money fraudulently obtained from BizCapital derived from

the loan and the grant provided by the City of Jacksonville. (Crim. Doc. 515 at

18). Because an expanded objection to the ordinance, the meeting minutes, and

the prosecutor’s comment would not have succeeded, trial counsel did not

deficiently perform. Brewster, 913 F.3d at 1056; Duff, 707 F.2d at 1318. United

States v. Spila, 136 F.4th 1296, 1306 (11th Cir. 2025) (“So long as ‘the attorney

makes it clear that the conclusions he is urging are conclusions to be drawn

from the evidence,’ he may offer ‘inferences fairly suggested by the evidence or

by matters of common knowledge outside the evidence.’”) (citation omitted).

Consequently, the claim in Ground Thirteen is due to be DENIED.

M. Ground Fourteen

As Ground Fourteen, Reginald Brown asserts that trial counsel

deficiently performed by failing to assert several defenses at trial. (Civ. Doc. 1

at 31). He contends that he asked trial counsel to proceed with a defense of

“mistake of fact.” (Civ. Doc. 1 at 31). Also, he contends that trial counsel failed

to assert that he lacked any intent to commit the crimes. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 31).

He contends that exculpatory documents, including affidavits by Katrina

Brown, supported both defenses. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 31).

A mistake of fact is a defense to the formation of a contract in a civil

lawsuit based on state law. White v. Fort Myers Beach Fire Control Dist., 302

So. 3d 1064, 1073 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020) (“A cause of action for reformation ‘must

allege that, as a result of a mutual mistake or a unilateral mistake by one party

coupled with the inequitable conduct of the other party, the . . . contract fails

to express the agreement of the parties.’”) (citation omitted). Because a mistake

of fact is not a defense to a federal criminal charge for fraud or conspiracy to

commit fraud, trial counsel did not deficiently perform. Knowles v. Mirzayance,

556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (“[T]his Court has never required defense counsel to

pursue every claim or defense, regardless of its merit, viability, or realistic

chance for success.”); Pinkney v. Sec’y, Dep’t Corrs., 876 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th

Cir. 2017) (“[A]n attorney will not be held to have performed deficiently for

failing to perform a futile act, one that would not have gotten his client any

relief.”).

Moreover, Reginald Brown fails to identify any exculpatory documents

that supported a defense at trial, except for the affidavits by Katrina Brown.

(Civ. Doc. 1 at 31). As previously noted, trial counsel attempted to introduce

into evidence an affidavit by Katrina Brown, and the Court identified several

statements in the affidavit that were inadmissible. (Crim. Doc. 337 at 152–61).

Because Reginald Brown did not want the affidavit admitted into evidence

unless all the statements in the affidavit were admitted, trial counsel did not

attempt to seek any further relief. Consequently, to the extent that Reginald

Brown’s claim is based on the affidavits by Katrina Brown, trial counsel did

not deficiently perform. And to the extent that the claim is based on other

documents that Reginald Brown fails to identify, the allegations supporting

this claim fail to meet the heightened pleading standards for a § 2255 motion.

Borden, 646 F.3d at 810.

Lastly, during closing, trial counsel argued that the documents in the

case demonstrated that Katrina Brown used Reginald Brown’s name to create

false invoices from the companies to obtain funds from the loan. (Crim. Doc.

515 at 81–83, 90–91, 107–09). Additionally, he argued that the prosecutor did

not present any evidence that an unlawful agreement between Reginald Brown

and Katrina Brown existed, any evidence that connected Reginald Brown to an

invoice, any evidence that Reginald Brown deposited money drawn from the

loan, any evidence that Reginald Brown received a statement for a bank

account where money was deposited from the loan, any evidence that Reginald

Brown contacted any representative with BizCapital, or any evidence that he

used his position as a city councilman to contact any person about the loan.

(Crim. Doc. 515 at 84–88, 94–96, 102–07). Indeed, trial counsel argued that the

prosecutor failed to prove that Reginald Brown knew that the invoices were

fraudulent and argued that the legitimate expenses for the barbecue sauce

business proved that Reginald Brown reasonably believed that the barbecue

business was lawful and legitimate. (Crim. Doc. 515 at 88–93, 96–100). In

doing so, trial counsel told the jury that “the point is the intent” and argued

that the evidence demonstrated a “lack of intent” on the part of Reginald

Brown. (Crim. Doc. 515 at 97). Because the record refutes Reginald Brown’s

contention that trial counsel failed to argue that the prosecutor failed to prove

intent, the claim is meritless. Consequently, the claim in Ground Fourteen is

due to be DENIED.

N. Ground Fifteen

As Ground Fifteen, Reginald Brown asserts that trial counsel deficiently

performed by “opening the door” to the introduction of evidence about his

romantic relationship with Katrina Brown. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 33).10 At trial, trial

counsel did not introduce any evidence of the intimate relationship between

Reginald Brown and Katrina Brown. But during opening statements, trial

counsel described how Reginald Brown and Katrina Brown met and how their

10 Reginald Brown contends that a statement about the romantic relationship

appeared in an agent’s report and that the Court prohibited the prosecutor from

introducing evidence from the report. (Civ. Doc. 1 at 33). However, before trial,

Katrina Brown filed a motion to exclude any statement in the report. (Crim. Doc.

191). The prosecutor responded that he did not intend to introduce into evidence any

statement in the report. (Crim. Doc. 198 at 1–2). Therefore, the Court denied as moot

Katrina Brown’s request for an order prohibiting the prosecutor from introducing into

evidence any statement in the report. (Crim. Doc. 214 at 1–2).

relationship developed. (Crim. Doc. 286 at 27–29). Trial counsel stated that

Reginald Brown “[began] to see Katrina Brown [ ] more and more as 2013

unfold[ed],” and that “their relationship ultimately [became] intimate at

times.” (Crim. Doc. 286 at 29). Despite this, there was no other reference to the

intimate relationship during the seven-day trial. Notably, during the final

charge, the Court instructed the jury that “anything that the lawyers say [ ] is

not evidence and is not binding on you.” (Crim. Doc. 279 at 4). And a court

presumes that the jury followed the instruction. United States v. Lopez, 649

F.3d 1222, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2011). Regardless, an intimate relationship

between Reginald Brown and Katrina Brown supported the defense that

Katrina Brown took advantage of Reginald Brown to commit the crimes

charged in this case. Because the record refutes the contention that trial

counsel “opened the door” to the admission of the evidence of the intimate

relationship and because Reginald Brown fails to demonstrate prejudice under

Strickland, the claim is meritless. Consequently, the claim in Ground Fifteen

is due to be DENIED.

V. Certificate of Appealability

If Reginald Brown seeks issuance of a certificate of appealability, the

undersigned opines that a certificate of appealability is not warranted. This

Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if the petitioner makes “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, Reginald Brown “must

demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment

of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S.

274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that

“the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed

further,’” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v.

Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).

Where a district court has rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claims on

the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find

the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.

See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. However, when the district court has rejected a

claim on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show that “jurists of reason

would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial

of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. Upon

consideration of the record as a whole, this Court will deny a certificate of

appealability.

Therefore, it is now

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Reginald Brown’s Motion to Supplement (Civ. Doc. 19) is

GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to docket the letter (Civ. 19-1 at 3) attached

to the motion as a supplement to the Motion Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence.

2. Reginald Brown’s Motion to Amend (Civ. Doc. 19) is DENIED.

3. Reginald Brown’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set

Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ. Doc. 1) is DENIED.

4. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the United

States and against Reginald Brown, and close the file.

5. If Reginald Brown appeals the denial of the motion, the Court

denies a certificate of appealability. Because this Court has determined that a

certificate of appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the

pending motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may

be filed in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida this 15th day of

September, 2026. | | | | | |

MARCIA MORALES

Chief United States District Judge

Copies:

Reginald Brown Brown #70581-081

Counsel of record

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