Dahlman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

EASTERN DIVISION

No. 4:25-CV-139-BO-KS

K.D., BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS, _ )

DANIEL DAHLMAN AND JULIANNE )

DAHLMAN, )

)

Plaintiff,

)

v. ) ORDER

)

WASHINGTON MONTESSORI PUBLIC )

CHARTER SCHOOL, )

)

Defendant. )

This cause comes before the Court on defendant’s motion for partial judgment on the

pleadings. Plaintiff has responded, defendant has replied, and in this posture the motion is ripe for

disposition. For the reasons that follow, defendant’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings

is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, proceeding by and through her parents, filed this action seeking relief from the

final decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in underlying proceedings pursuant to the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, ef seg. and

parallel state law. Plaintiff also seeks relief under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and for constitutional violations. Defendant now

seeks partial judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff’s claims for retaliation under Section 504 of

the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (Count IV), claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (Count V), and claims for violation of the North Carolina Constitution (Count VJ).

The Court summarizes the relevant facts below, but otherwise relies on the allegations in

the amended complaint. Defendant, WMPCS, is a public charter school in Beaufort County, North

Carolina. Plaintiff, K.D., was born in 2012 and is an IDEA-eligible student who lives in Beaufort

County with her parents. She has been diagnosed with, among other things, autism spectrum

disorder, attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder, anxiety, sensory processing disorder, and

pragmatic language impairments. K.D. is entitled to receive special education and related services

and attended WMPCS. The facts underlying plaintiff’s claims addressed herein occurred during

the 2023-2024 school year. During this school year, there were multiple individualized education

program (IEP) meetings held regarding K.D., and plaintiff alleges that WMPCS failed to create

appropriate IEP goals which would address K.D.’s needs and further failed to provide K.D. with

requisite services and supports. K.D.’s parents, Daniel and Julianne Dahlman, had earlier been

banned from WMPCS’s campus.

On March 29, 2024, K.D. was banned from WMPCS. The ban arose after K.D. had accused

a WMPCS staff member of touching her, causing K.D. harm. K.D.’s parents contacted law

enforcement once they learned of the touching and WMPCS sought to interview K.D. regarding

the incident. K.D.’s parents would not consent to K.D. being interviewed. WMPCS sought to

determine if K.D. had made a wrongful allegation against the staff member, which would constitute

intolerable behavior under the school’s policy. WMPCS scheduled a manifestation determination

review and disciplinary proceeding.

'Plaintiff’s amended complaint references Count V for both her § 1983 claims and her North

Carolina Constitution claims. For clarity, the Court refers to the North Carolina Constitution claims

as Count VI.

Plaintiff filed a due process petition on March 26, 2024. Despite plaintiff requesting a

continuance, WMPCS held the manifestation determination review (MDR) and disciplinary

hearing on March 27, 2024. The review team determined that K.D.’s conduct was not a

manifestation of her disability and on March 29, 2024, the WMPCS board of trustees determined

that K.D. had made a wrongful allegation against a staff member in violation of policy and

excluded K.D. from WMPCS, banning her from campus.

WMPCS did not provide any services to K.D. from March 29, 2024, to June 6, 2024.

Plaintiff’s parents repeatedly requested that WMPCS provide special education services to K.D.

during this time-frame, but it refused. A contested case hearing on plaintiff’s due process petition

was held over a period of fourteen non-consecutive days in September, October, and November

2024 and the ALJ issued a final decision on April 10, 2025. The ALJ determined, among other

things, that plaintiff had failed to prove that WMPCS had denied K.D. a free appropriate public

education (FAPE) from October 9, 2023, through March 9, 2024, and that she had failed to prove

any substantive harm for the denial of a FAPE from March 29, 2024, through the remainder of that

school year. See [DE 1-3]. Plaintiff sought relief from the ALJ’s decision by filing this action on

July 9, 2025.

DISCUSSION

A Rule 12(c) motion is considered under the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Alexander v. City of Greensboro, 801 F. Supp. 2d 429, 433 (M.D.N.C. 2011). Thus, “the court

should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). A

complaint must allege enough facts to state a claim for relief that is facially plausible. Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). However, this standard does not permit a plaintiff to

merely plead the elements of a cause of action alongside legal conclusions; the Court need not

accept those as true. Jd. at 555.

The primary distinction between Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) is that Rule 12(c) permits a court

to consider a defendant’s answer in addition to plaintiff’s complaint. However, a defendant may

not rely on allegations of fact as provided in the answer if they are contradictory to the facts

presented in the complaint. Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717, 724 (M.D.N.C.

2012). “A Rule 12(c) motion tests only the sufficiency of the complaint and does not resolve the

merits of the plaintiff’s claims or any disputes of fact.” Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470,

474 (4th Cir. 2014). Judgment on the pleadings should be granted therefore only “where the

moving party is clearly entitled to the judgment it seeks as a matter of law.” Med-Trans Corp. v.

Benton, 581 F. Supp. 2d 721, 728 (E.D.N.C. 2008).

The Court considers first plaintiff’s retaliation claims under Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act (Section 504) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Both claims

proceed under the same standard, see Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 468 (4th Cir. 1999),

and require a plaintiff to ultimately show that she engaged in protected conduct, that she suffered

an adverse action, and that a causal connection exists between the protected conduct and the

adverse action. Southard v. Wicomico Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 79 F. Supp. 3d 552, 559 (D. Md. 2015).

Plaintiff alleges that she engaged in protected activity by filing a due process petition on

March 26, 2024, and that she suffered adverse action when (1) she was excluded from school on

March 29, 2024, and (2) when WMPCS failed to provide her with any services from March 29 to

June 6, 2024. Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a causal connection between her due process

petition and the alleged adverse action. Taking plaintiff’s allegations as true, the disciplinary

process which led to her exclusion from school was underway before she filed her due process

petition. For example, plaintiff alleges that a MDR and disciplinary hearing had been scheduled

and that she requested a continuance of the proceeding, which was denied prior to its

commencement on March 27.* Indeed, plaintiff has alleged that WMPCS had plans to exclude

K.D. from school prior to the MDR and disciplinary proceeding. Accordingly, despite the brief

temporal proximity between the filing of the due process petition and K.D.’s exclusion, plaintiff's

inference of retaliation is not plausible in light of the proceedings which were already underway.

See Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 309 (4th Cir. 2006). The Court further

agrees with defendant’s argument that the failure to provide K.D. with educational services

following her exclusion from school was a consequence of the exclusion, and not a discrete,

separate adverse action. Plaintiff’s Section 504 and ADA retaliation claim is dismissed.

Plaintiff further alleges that WMPCS deprived her of the most basic education in violation

of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of l:fe, liberty, or property

without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “Due process contains both

substantive and procedural components. Procedural due process prevents mistaken or unjust

deprivation, while substantive due process prohibits certain actions regardless of procedural

fairness.” Snider Int'l Corp. v. Town of Forest Heights, 739 F.3d 140, 145 (4th Cir. 2014).

In opposition to the Rule 12(c) motion, plaintiff argues that she has plausibly alleged that

she had a property interest in being placed at WMPCS and that WMPCS improperly excluded K.D.

It is undisputed that North Carolina’s children have a property interest in accessing public

* The Court further agrees with WMPCS’s argument that plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to

include relevant dates, and that this itself would support dismissal. Nonetheless, plaintiffs

allegations support that the disciplinary process was underway before plaintiff filed her due

process petition.

education. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-1. But “[t]he property interest in education created by the

state is participation in the entire process.” Pegram v. Nelson, 469 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 (M.D.N.C.

1979). “In other words, with respect to public education, citizens possess a property interest not in

the particulars of the educational experience, but rather in participation in the educational process

as a whole.” O.V v. Durham Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:1\7CV691, 2018 WL 2725467, at *27

(M.D.N.C. June 6, 2018) (cleaned up, citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No.

1:17-CV-691, 2018 WL 3370644 (M.D.N.C. July 10, 2018). Plaintiff has cited no case which

would support the conclusion that she had a property interest, not in public education generally,

but in public education at WMPCS. Instead, plaintiff relies on her allegations that she was not

provided a FAPE and those relating to the setting or adequacy of the educational setting, claims

which fall exclusively under the IDEA and do not form the basis of a § 1983 due process claim.

See, e.g., SE v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:23-CV-00139-FDW-DCK, 2024 WL 1316229, at

*5 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2024).

Plaintiff’s argument that the IDEA’s stay-put provision conferred a property interest in her

continued enrollment at WMPCS also fails. “[T]he touchstone of the term ‘educational placement

{as used in the IDEA] is not the location to which the student is assigned but rather the environment

in which educational services are provided.” AW ex rel. Wilson v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 372 F.3d

674, 682 (4th Cir. 2004). And again, insofar as plaintiff relies on the IDEA and WMPCS’s alleged

failure to provide her with a FAPE, such allegations support claims under the IDEA, not the

Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiff also brings an equal protection claim in Count V, specifically a “class of one”

claim which requires her to allege ““that she has been intentionally treated differently from others

similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’” Willis v. Town

Of Marshall, N.C., 426 F.3d 251, 263 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “To state an equal

protection violation, plaintiff[] must plausibly allege facts sufficient to identify actual, similarly

situated students to [K.D.] who were treated differently.” Vlasaty v. Wake Cnty. Pub. Sch. Sys. Bd.

of Educ., No. 5:17-CV-578-D, 2018 WL 4515877, at *8 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2018). Plaintiff has

failed to identify actual, similarly situated students, and instead relies on generalized allegations

concerning other students with disabilities who were, for example, able to receive educational

services during the same period. This is insufficient, even at this early stage of the proceeding.

Finally, the Court considers plaintiff’s claims under the North Carolina Constitution. It is

well established that a plaintiff may not maintain a claim under the North Carolina Constitution

when adequate remedies at state law exist. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 781-82 (1992).

To plausibly allege a violation of North Carolina’s Constitution, the plaintiff must allege (1) the

violation of her constitutional rights by a state actor, (2) her claim must be colorable, and (3) she

must have no adequate remedy under state law. Deminski on behalf of C.E.D. v. State Bd. of Educ.,

377 N.C. 406, 413 (2021). “No adequate state remedy exists when ‘state law does not provide for

the type of remedy sought by the plaintiff.’” /d. (cleaned up, citation omitted). The “term

‘adequate’... is not used to mean ‘potentially successful.’” Craig ex rel. Craig v. New Hanover

Bd. of Educ., 185 N.C. App. 651, 656 (2007), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Craig ex rel. Craig

v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334 (2009). Rather, it means “available, existing,

applicable remedy.’” /d. (citation omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that WMPCS deprived her with the opportunity to receive a sound, basic

education in violation of Article I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2 of the North Carolina

Constitution when it did not provide plaintiff access to educational instruction between her

exclusion from WMPCS and June 6, 2024. Plaintiff alleges that the administrative process is both

inadequate and futile because plaintiff lacks an opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of

the education WMPCS was required to provide. In her opposition to the instant motion, plaintiff

frames her claim as a hostile educational environment claim, citing generally to her amended

complaint. Plaintiff argues that, while she could challenge the legitimacy of her exclusion, no state

court could redress K.D.’s unique injury of being the victim of a hostile educational environment

in which her educators plotted K.D.’s educational failure. K.D. further argues that she has

sufficiently alleged that WMPCS was deliberately indifferent to the hostile education environment.

In Deminski, North Carolina’s Supreme Court held that “the right to a sound basic

education rings hollow if the structural right exists but in a setting that is so intimidating and

threatening to students that they lack a meaningful opportunity to learn.” Deminski, 377 N.C. at

414. Courts had found plausible claims under the North Carolina Constitution where a student

alleges, for example, sexual harassment and the deprivation of the right to bodily integrity and a

school’s deliberate indifference to the same. See Doe 2 v. Nash Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 5:25-CV-

211-BO-KS, 2026 WL 313457, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2026).

Here, plaintiff does not allege harassment or deliberate indifference in the same vein as

those plaintiffs who have plausibly alleged claims under the North Carolina Constitution for a

hostile educational environment. See K.H. by & through Hartman v. Dixon, No. 290A24, 2026 WL

2357938, at *7 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (“local school authorities may not be deliberately indifferent

to extreme, in-school conduct that deprives a student of the opportunity to access a sound basic

education on equal terms.”). Rather, plaintiffhas alleged the neglect of her education by WMPCS’s

failure to provide her with the proper educational services and her ultimate exclusion from the

school. State law provided plaintiff with an opportunity to remedy these wrongs. See, e.g., N.C.

Gen. Stat. §§ 115C-109.6; 150B-43. Plaintiff’s North Carolina Constitution claim therefore fails.

CONCLUSION

In sum, having considered the pleadings and the arguments of the parties, the Court

determines that defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings in its favor on Counts IV, V, and

V (referred to herein as Count VI) of plaintiff's amended complaint. Defendant’s motion [DE 34]

is GRANTED and these counts are DISMISSED with prejudice.

_—

SO ORDERED, this /$ day of September 2026.

TERRENCE W. BOYLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE