Taylor

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JOHNNY TAYLOR, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 25-cv-08255

)

v. )

) Judge John Robert Blakey

RIXIE DAVIS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, [41]. For

the reasons explained below, the Court grants the motion in part.

I. Factual Background1

While on parole for another offense, Plaintiff Johnny Taylor was arrested on

July 10, 2023, for felony failure to register as a sex offender.2 [1] ¶¶ 7, 11. In fact,

the deadline for him to register had not yet passed; Taylor was (and at all times

relevant to this lawsuit, has been) in compliance with his reporting obligations. Id.

¶ 10. Because Taylor was on parole at the time of his arrest, Defendant James

Herbert, a parole supervisor, charged Taylor with a parole violation. Id. ¶ 12. Taylor

was originally set for release from his confinement for this parole violation charge on

1 The Court takes these facts from Plaintiff’s complaint, [1], and accepts them as true for purposes of

resolving the motion to dismiss. See Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir.

2007).

2 Though “parole” and “Mandatory Supervised Release” (MSR) may differ slightly in practice, [47] at

10 n.2, there is little risk of confusion between the terms here. Because Illinois no longer imposes

“parole” and instead imposes “MSR,” the Court uses the terms interchangeably throughout this order.

August 8, 2023. Id. ¶ 13. Despite this, he was charged, arrested, and further confined

after Defendant Michael Morris, another parole supervisor, charged him with a

second parole violation. Id. ¶¶ 13, 14. Although all charges were eventually

dismissed, Taylor remained in custody at the Stateville Northern Reception and

Classification Center (NRC) from July 12, 2023, to August 24, 2023. Id. ¶¶ 14, 15.

Before Taylor’s arrest, on June 27, 2023, Defendant Brooke Settle, then

Taylor’s parole officer, applied for Taylor’s early release from parole. Id. ¶ 17.

Herbert, Settle’s supervisor, reviewed and approved this application on July 1, 2023.

Id. ¶ 18. Similarly, Defendant Jason Garnett, the Chief of Parole, reviewed and

approved the application on July 3, 2023. Id. ¶ 19. The Prisoner Review Board (PRB)

granted the application, and Taylor’s early release from parole became effective on

July 20, 2023. Id. ¶ 20. This order was documented in Taylor’s Automated

Management System (AMS) file, which was accessible to all Illinois Department of

Corrections (IDOC) employees. Id. ¶ 21. On July 22, 2023, Defendant Rixie Davis,

another parole supervisor, was personally informed of the decision to grant Taylor an

early release from parole. Id. ¶ 25. Defendant Syntynese Gray, the Records

Department Supervisor at Stateville NRC, received the early release order but failed

to record and communicate it. Id. ¶ 31.

Despite the PRB’s order, none of the Defendants took action to inform Taylor

that he had been granted early termination; nor did they terminate his parole. Id.

¶¶ 22, 25, 26, 27, 28. Defendant Charles Truitt, the Warden at Stateville NRC, did

not release Taylor until roughly a month after the early discharge from parole was

granted. Id. ¶ 30. Following his release, Taylor asked Settle about the status of his

discharge petition; instead of informing him of its status, she told him that she could

not submit a new petition for another six months. Id. ¶ 36. After Taylor moved to a

new apartment on December 1, 2023, he was assigned a new parole agent, Defendant

Davina Serrano; when Taylor asked her about the application, she told him that a

new discharge petition was “sitting on her supervisor’s desk.” Id. ¶¶ 37, 39. Taylor

received the same answer about the status of his discharge petition for the next

twelve months. Id. ¶ 40. In total, Taylor was subject to parole restrictions for roughly

16 months after his discharge petition was granted. Id. ¶ 44.

On July 10, 2024, Taylor filed a different lawsuit in this Court, Taylor v.

Marchetti, Case No. 24-cv-8581. Id. ¶ 16; see Marchetti [1]. 3 In that case, Plaintiff

asserts various constitutional and state law claims arising out of his July 10, 2023

arrest and two subsequent parole violations; two of the defendants named in this suit,

Herbert and Morris, are also named in that first suit. See Marchetti [1] ¶ 1.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that, during discovery in Marchetti, he learned

that his application for early release from parole was granted on July 20, 2023. [1] ¶

41. Thereafter, he filed this lawsuit on July 18, 2025, [1]. Although he does not allege

specific claims against specific defendants, he ostensibly sues under § 1983, claiming

violations of his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. ¶ 1.

Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

3 Throughout the course of this order, “Marchetti [#]” will refer to the docket in Taylor v. Marchetti,

and “[#]” will refer to the docket in Taylor v. Davis.

12(b)(6), arguing that Taylor has not stated a claim for any constitutional violation.

See [41].

II. Applicable Legal Standards

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must provide

a “short and plain statement of the claim” showing that the pleader merits relief, Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), so the defendant has “fair notice” of the claim “and the grounds

upon which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A complaint must also contain “sufficient

factual matter” to state a facially plausible claim to relief—one that “allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference” that the defendant committed the alleged

misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570). This plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility” that a

defendant acted unlawfully. Id. In evaluating a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), this

Court accepts all well-pled allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in

the plaintiff's favor. Id. This Court does not, however, accept a complaint’s legal

conclusions as true. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must “allege that a

government official, acting under color of state law, deprived them of a right secured

by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.” Estate of Sims ex rel Sims v.

County of Bureau, 506 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 2007). To determine liability under

§ 1983, it is “necessary to isolate the precise constitutional violation” with which the

defendant is charged, and thus, the “first inquiry in any § 1983 suit . . . is whether

the plaintiff has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws.”

Welton v. Anderson, 770 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted).

III. Analysis

Defendants move to dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6) (or, in the alternative, based upon qualified immunity). The Court considers

the viability of each of Taylor’s claims, as well as the qualified immunity defense

below.

A. Fourth Amendment Claims

Taylor alleges that the defendants (lumped together) violated his Fourth

Amendment rights. Generally, the Fourth Amendment protects “against

unreasonable searches and seizures” and mandates that “no Warrants shall issue,

but upon probable cause.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Although Taylor’s allegations

remain unclear, he appears to assert two separate, but related, Fourth Amendment

claims. First, Taylor appears to allege that his Fourth Amendment rights were

violated because he was charged with and incarcerated for parole violations after he

was released from parole. Second, Taylor appears to allege that his Fourth

Amendment rights were violated because he was subject to parole restrictions even

after his release. The Court discusses each issue in turn.

1. Fourth Amendment False Arrest and Detention Claims

For the first issue, Defendants argue that any Fourth Amendment claims are

barred by the rule against claim splitting. “Claim splitting draws on and is a subset

of the doctrine of res judicata.” Cooper v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc.,

42 F.4th 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2022). Res judicata prohibits parties from raising claims

that have been, or could have been, litigated in a prior action resolved with a final

judgment on the merits. Barr v. Bd. of Trustees of W. Ill. Univ., 796 F.3d 837, 839

(7th Cir. 2015). In federal court “res judicata has three elements: (1) an identity of

parties; (2) a final judgment on the merits; and (3) an identity of the cause of action

(as determined by comparing the suit’s operative facts).” Palka v. City of Chicago,

662 F.3d 428, 437 (7th Cir. 2011). Claim splitting, while related, is less stringent in

its requirements. This is because “the bar against claim splitting can be applied

before either action reaches a final judgment on the merits.” Rexing Quality Eggs v.

Rembrandt Enters., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 3d 965, 971 (S.D. Ind. 2019), aff’d, 953 F.3d

998 (7th Cir. 2020). Thus, claims are precluded on claim splitting grounds when

“there is an identity of the parties and of the causes of action between the two

lawsuits.” Scholz v. United States, 18 F.4th 941, 952 (7th Cir. 2021).

Here, Taylor has sued Defendants Herbert and Morris in this suit and in the

prior suit, Taylor v. Marchetti. His arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, [47]

at 3, it makes no difference that he also named other defendants in both suits. See

Czarniecki v. City of Chicago, 633 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that existence

of other parties does not affect identity analysis for parties included in both).

An identity also exists as to the causes of actions in the two suits because “the

claims arise out of the same set of operative facts or the same transaction.” Scholz,

18 F.4th at 952 (cleaned up) (claim splitting applies when claims “are based on the

same, or nearly the same factual allegations,” even if the legal theories for the claims

differ). In particular, both complaints allege that: Herbert and Morris were employed

by the Illinois Department of Corrections as parole supervisors, Marchetti [71] ¶ 7;

[1] ¶ 6; Herbert falsely charged Taylor with a parole violation on July 11, 2023,

Marchetti [71] ¶ 36; [1] ¶ 12; Morris falsely charged Taylor with a parole violation on

August 8, 2023, Marchetti [71] ¶ 46; [1] ¶ 33; these parole violation charges caused

Taylor to be wrongfully confined for a crime that he did not commit, Marchetti [71]

¶¶ 85, 95; [1] ¶ 29; Herbert and Morris violated Taylor’s “Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment[]” rights, Marchetti [71] ¶ 1; [1] ¶ 1; and, perhaps most

critically, Taylor served 16 additional months of parole due at least in part to these

false charges, Marchetti [71] ¶ 58; [1] ¶ 43.

As it relates to Herbert and Morris, the only operative difference between the

two complaints’ factual allegations concerns Taylor’s early release from parole. In

Marchetti, Taylor alleged that Herbert’s and Morris’s actions “extinguished his

opportunity for an early release from parole,” Marchetti [71] ¶ 57, whereas here he

alleges that he received early release from parole but nonetheless remained

incarcerated for parole violations after receiving such early release, [1] ¶ 42. These

facts are sufficiently similar to trigger a dismissal on claim splitting grounds. See

Cooper, 42 F.4th at 697.

Claim splitting springs from the same principles as res judicata; both bar “not

only those issues that were actually decided in a prior lawsuit, but also all issues that

could have been raised in that action.” Rexing Quality Eggs, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 971.

Taylor alleges here that he did not learn of his early discharge until he received

documentation of it on May 27, 2025, and Herbert confirmed the early discharge in a

deposition on June 3, 2025. [1] ¶ 41. This means Taylor had the opportunity to

include these facts in his Amended Complaint in Marchetti, filed on July 29, 2025,

Marchetti [71]. Parties may amend in such a fashion when they learn new facts in

discovery, provided such amendment is timely and does not prejudice the defendant.

Cf. Feldman v. Am. Mem’l Life Ins., 196 F.3d 783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (instructing courts that leave to amend “shall be freely given when

justice so requires”). Because Taylor had the opportunity to amend his complaint to

assert these claims in Marchetti, res judicata principles instruct that his failure to do

so there bars him from asserting them here. The Court thus dismisses all Fourth

Amendment claims asserted by Taylor against Herbert and Morris in this case.

2. Fourth Amendment Parole Over-Detention Claim

Taylor next claims a violation of the Fourth Amendment based upon his having

“to serve out his remaining Mandatory Supervised Release sentence,” [47] at 11; the

claim runs against Seventh Circuit precedent requiring such claims to be evaluated

through an Eighth Amendment lens. See Sabo v. Erickson, 128 F.4th 836, 845–48

(7th Cir. 2025) (evaluating a parolee’s claim that he was unlawfully subject to parole

past his intended date of release under an Eighth Amendment framework); Hankins

v. Lowe, 786 F.3d 603, 605–06 (7th Cir. 2015) (same). For that reason, Taylor cannot

pursue any Fourth Amendment claims for his parole over-detention.

Further, as Defendants note, Taylor “does not appear to allege any other

Fourth Amendment claim committed by Davis, Garnett, Settle, Serrano, Truitt, or

Gray.” [41] at 12. He has not alleged that any member of this group of defendants

unreasonably searched or seized him; nor does he otherwise allege that conduct on

the part of any of these defendants violated a right covered by the Fourth

Amendment. Thus, to the extent Taylor seeks to assert any remaining claims under

the Fourth Amendment, such claims fail.

B. Fifth Amendment Claims

Taylor also alleges that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated by the

defendants. Because Taylor is suing state rather than federal officers, however, the

“Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is a misfit for a § 1983 action because it has

not been incorporated against the states.” Economan v. Luttrull, No. 24-3165, 2026

WL 82958, at *6 (7th Cir. Jan. 12, 2026). Thus, the Court dismisses any claims

asserted under the Fifth Amendment.

C. Eighth Amendment Claims

Next, Taylor alleges that because he was kept under parole restrictions past

the date that he was granted an early release from parole, his Eighth Amendment

rights were violated. The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual

punishments.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. “Incarceration beyond the date when a

person is entitled to be released violates the Eighth Amendment if it is the product of

deliberate indifference.” Figgs v. Dawson, 829 F.3d 895, 902 (7th Cir. 2016). This

includes instances where an individual is subject to parole restrictions past when

they are entitled to release from parole. See Sabo, 128 F.4th at 845–46; Hankins, 786

F.3d at 605. Thus, the central Eighth Amendment question is whether Taylor has

plausibly alleged that he was subject to parole restrictions after his release from

parole because the defendants were deliberately indifferent. An individual is

deliberately indifferent when they are “essentially criminally reckless, that is,

ignored a known risk.” Figgs, 829 F.3d at 903. A state official may be “deliberately

indifferent when he does nothing . . . or when he takes action that is so ineffectual

under the circumstances that deliberate indifference can be inferred.” Id. (internal

citations omitted).

Hankins is instructive here. In that case, the Seventh Circuit found that the

plaintiff, a woman on parole in Illinois for a crime committed in Arkansas, had stated

an Eighth Amendment claim against her parole officer when he subjected her to

parole restrictions after she had served the term of her parole. 786 F.3d at 605–06.

In particular, the officer would not tell the plaintiff when her term of supervised

release was scheduled to end and forbade her from asking the Arkansas authorities.

Id. at 604. The Seventh Circuit there noted that “Lowe must have realized that he

had to find out when his parolee’s parole would expire [and] . . . A phone call by him

to Arkansas would have answered that question.” Id. at 605–06. Because there was

“knowledge of a preventable risk coupled with refusal to do anything however trivial

(such as a phone call) to prevent it from materializing,” the court found that the officer

“was thus guilty of deliberate indifference or its equivalent, recklessness.” Id. at 606.

Given this precedent, Taylor has plausibly alleged an Eighth Amendment

claim against those who knew both that Taylor had an application for early release

from parole set for hearing and that he remained on parole afterwards.4 Based upon

the allegations, Herbert, Settle, and Serrano fall squarely within this camp. Like the

defendant in Hankins, these defendants would have known both that Taylor’s

application for an early release would have to get a decision (meaning his sentence of

supervised release may have expired), and that they could have easily verified

whether it had (here, by checking Taylor’s AMS file). Similarly, like the defendant

in Hankins, their failure to take these simple steps for verification resulted in parole

restrictions long after Taylor was meant to be released.

Defendants say “this is not Hankins. No defendant was subjectively aware that

Plaintiff remained on parole despite the early discharge yet failed to do anything

about it.” [50] at 5. But Hankins did not hinge upon the fact that the defendant had

notice that his parolee’s term of supervised release expired. Quite the opposite, the

court focused on the fact that the defendant knew Hankins’ parole may have already

expired, he could have easily verified if it had, and his decision not to do so resulted

in additional time that Hankins remained subject to parole. Hankins, 786 F.3d at

605–06. Because the defendant disregarded an obvious and known risk that Hankins

may have been subject to parole restrictions past the actual term of her parole, he

was thereby acting with deliberate indifference. Id. at 606. So too here. As alleged,

Herbert, Settle, and Serrano knew there was a prior petition for early termination,

4 Although Plaintiff did not allege specific facts in connection with specific claims, it appears he does

not assert these Eighth Amendment allegations in Marchetti, and any tension in the Court’s treatment

of Eighth Amendment claims in the two cases stems from the differences in the allegations. To the

extent the allegations against Herbert here are redundant to those in Marchetti, they would

appropriately be stricken. See Scholz, 18 F.4th at 952 (noting that trial courts may exercise their

discretion in dismissing claims on claim splitting grounds).

which they knew could have been approved. By failing to take the minimal step of

checking for the decision in the AMS file, they disregarded a known risk that Taylor

had been released but was still under parole restrictions.

Having said this, Taylor fails to plausibly allege deliberate indifference on the

part of any other defendants. He alleges no facts to suggest that Davis, Morris,

Garnett, Truitt, and Gray knew both about the pending application for early release

(and thus that Taylor may have been released from parole), and that Taylor was still

on parole despite the possibility that he might have been released. If a defendant

was unaware that Taylor was still on parole, then he/she could not have known that

there was a risk of parole over-detention (and thus a constitutional violation).

Similarly, if a defendant remained unaware of the application for early release, then

he/she would have no reason to believe that Taylor serving out the rest of his term of

parole presented a risk of a constitutional violation. Absent incriminating allegations

against these defendants, the complaint fails to plausibly allege that they “ignored a

known risk” as deliberate indifference requires. See Figgs, 829 F.3d at 903 (emphasis

added).

The lack of facts to demonstrate deliberate indifference by the above-named

group of defendants requires not only dismissal of the claims against them for their

personal conduct, but also any claims against them for supervisory liability. After

all, supervisory liability under § 1983 is not vicarious liability. See Doe v. Purdue

Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2019). Merely alleging that a defendant is “atop

an organizational food chain does not make a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s

unconstitutional conduct.” Bostic v. Murray, 160 F.4th 831, 841 (7th Cir. 2025).

Rather, the plaintiff must show: (1) that the supervisor was personally involved in

the constitutional violation; and (2) that the supervisor had the necessary state of

mind. Id. The relevant state of mind required for Eighth Amendment claims is

deliberate indifference. Palmer v. Marion Cnty., 327 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2003).

Therefore, because the facts alleged against these defendants do not rise to the level

of deliberate indifference, Taylor has not stated a claim against them directly or as

supervisors.

D. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Finally, Taylor alleges that Defendants denied him procedural due process, in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees

that states may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. To assess a procedural due process

claim, the Court follows “a two-step process,” determining first “if the plaintiff has

been deprived of a liberty or property interest,” and, second, “if the plaintiff was

provided constitutionally sufficient process.” Calderone v. City of Chicago, 979 F.3d

1156, 1165 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Knutson v. Vill. of Lakemoor, 932 F.3d 572, 576

(7th Cir. 2019)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Taylor has clearly pled that he

was deprived of a protected interest in liberty, as he was held in custody for an offense

he did not commit and subject to parole over-detention. Thus, the central question

for plausibility is whether the process to which he was subject was constitutionally

sufficient.

Key to this inquiry is that Taylor does not allege that the system of parole in

Illinois is itself unconstitutional, nor that his injury was due to the procedures by

which that system of parole is administered. Rather, the complaint describes a “series

of random and unauthorized departures from state law,” Vargas v. Cook Cnty.

Sheriff’s Merit Bd., 952 F.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 2020), stemming from Defendants’

failure to “communicate the orders of the Prisoner Review Board,” [47] at 14. When

a state actor deprives an individual of a constitutionally protected interest “through

a random, unauthorized act that departs from state law, the federal due-process

guarantee requires only that the state provide an adequate post[-]deprivation

remedy.” Vargas, 952 F.3d at 875 (emphasis added). Thus, Taylor “must avail

[himself] of post-deprivation remedies or demonstrate that the available remedies are

inadequate.” Cannici v. Vill. of Melrose Park, 885 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2018)

(cleaned up).

An inadequate remedy is one that is “meaningless or nonexistent.”

Michalowicz v. Vill. Of Bedford Park, 528 F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 2008). Here, Taylor

has not alleged that his post-deprivation remedy is inadequate, and for good reason;

he remains free to pursue a tort action with the Illinois Court of Claims for negligence

or false imprisonment. See 705 ILCS 505/8. Such claims are sufficient post-

deprivation remedies for procedural due process purposes. See Armato v. Grounds,

766 F.3d 713, 722 (7th Cir. 2014) (listing a suit for false imprisonment as one of

“numerous sufficient remedies”); Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir.

1993) (holding that a tort claim in the Illinois Court of Claims is an adequate post-

deprivation remedy). The Court thus dismisses any Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due process claim.

E. Qualified Immunity

In addition to seeking to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims based upon the sufficiency

of his allegations, Defendants also move to dismiss based upon qualified immunity.

Having determined above that Plaintiff may proceed only on his Eighth Amendment

claim, the Court considers Defendants’ qualified immunity defense only as to this

claim.

The defense of “qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To assess if qualified

immunity applies, “the courts employ a two-prong test: (1) whether the facts, viewed

in a light most favorable to the injured party, demonstrate that the conduct of the

officers violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly

established at the time the conduct occurred.” Jackson v. Anastasio, 150 F.4th 851,

856 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir.

2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts may “exercise their sound

discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis

should be addressed first.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.

Because Taylor has plausibly alleged that the conduct of Herbert, Settle, and

Serrano violated his Eighth Amendment rights, the only remaining question is

whether those rights were clearly established at the time the conduct occurred.

Rights are “clearly established when existing precedent ‘has placed the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.’” Howell v. Smith, 853 F.3d 892, 897 (7th Cir.

2017) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). This requires the

plaintiff to “show either a reasonably analogous case that has both articulated the

right at issue and applied it to a factual circumstance similar to the one at hand or

that the violation was so obvious that a reasonable person necessarily would have

recognized it as a violation of the law.” Chan v. Wodnicki, 123 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th

Cir. 1997). At a minimum, “there must be settled authority that would cause [the

defendant] to understand the illegality of the action.” Howell, 853 F.3d at 897.

Once again, Hankins remains instructive. Hankins involves analogous facts

and stands for the proposition that a parole officer who: (1) knows a parolee may have

been released from parole; (2) fails to take basic steps to verify if that is the case; and

therefore (3) causes that parolee to be subject to parole restrictions past the term of

her parole is “guilty of deliberate indifference” that violates the parolee’s Eighth

Amendment rights. See Hankins, 786 F.3d at 605–606. This is the case today as it

was in 2015, when Hankins was decided. Because the rights at issue here were

clearly established, the Court declines to dismiss based upon Defendants’ qualified

immunity defense.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, the Court grants in part and denies in part

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, [41]. Because Taylor has failed to plausibly allege

claims for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court

dismisses any and all claims brought under those amendments. The Court also

dismisses Taylor’s Eighth Amendment claims as to Defendants Davis, Morris,

Garnett, Truitt, and Gray. Taylor has, however, plausibly alleged that Herbert,

Settle, and Serrano violated his Eighth Amendment rights when their deliberate

indifference caused his parole over-detention, and his Eighth Amendment claims

against those defendants may proceed to this extent.

Dated: September 15, 2026 Entered:

John Robert Blakey

United States District Judge

17