Bryant

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Regina Bryant, Case No. 1:25-cv-166-PAB

Plaintiff,

-vs- JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER

Douglas A. Collins, Secretary MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

of the U.S. Department of ORDER

Veterans Affairs,

Defendant.

Currently pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant

Douglas A. Collins, Secretary of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (“Defendant”),

filed January 16, 2026 (“the Motion”). (Doc. No. 29.) On March 6, 2026, Plaintiff Regina Bryant

(“Plaintiff” or “Bryant”) filed a Brief in Opposition to the Motion (the “Opposition”). (Doc. No.

34.) On March 19, 2026, Defendant filed a Reply Brief in support of the Motion (the “Reply”).

(Doc. No. 35.)

For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.

I. Background

Bryant was employed as a Medical Supply Technician at the VA Medical Center in

Cleveland, Ohio for at least eleven years.1 (Doc. No. 15-1, PageID#s 192-93.) Karen Kendrick is

the Chief of the Sterile Processing Service and Bryant’s immediate supervisor. (Dep. of Regina

Bryant (Doc. No. 29-4) (hereinafter “Bryant Dep.”), pg. 92.) In November 2022, Bryant was

1 The parties appear to dispute if Plaintiff has worked for Defendant for 11, 12, or 13 years. (Doc. No. 29-1, PageID#

857; Doc No. 34, PageID# 1023, 1039.) Regardless, Plaintiff had worked for Defendant for well over a year when she

filed the Complaint. See 5 U.S.C. § 6381 (defining an employee under Title II of the FMLA as one who “has completed

at least twelve months of service”).

diagnosed with uterine cancer. (Doc. No. 15, PageID# 162.) However, Bryant never shared her

diagnosis with her supervisor. (Bryant Dep., pg. 117.) Her doctor scheduled her to have surgery on

December 28, 2022. (Doc. No. 15, PageID# 163.) On November 23, 2022, Bryant originally

requested 300 hours of Advanced Annual Leave to cover her absence between December 27, 2022

and February 16, 2023. (Bryant Dep., PageID# 918). Bryant also checked the box to indicate she

was invoking her entitlement to Family Medical Leave. (Id.) Bryant had previously been approved

for intermittent FMLA leave for other medical conditions but not for cancer or the related surgery.

(Id., pgs. 9-10.)

Two weeks later, on December 12, 2022, Bryant submitted a fax to the VA’s Human

Resources Department (“HR”) that was a revised “Request for Leave or Approved Absence”

requesting 240 hours of Advanced Sick Leave between December 28, 2022 and February 27, 2023,

and Leave Without Pay. (Id., PageID# 922.) On the revised form, Bryant did not invoke leave under

FMLA. (Id.) Bryant also requested eight hours of Sick Leave through the electronic time and

attendance system, to cover her scheduled shifts on December 27-28, 2022. (Doc. No. 15-1,

PageID# 193.) Bryant had 4.30 hours of accrued Sick Leave at the time of her request. (Id.)

Kendrick approved her Sick Leave request the same day. (Id.)

On December 15, 2022, an HR Specialist emailed Kendrick an “Advanced Leave Memo,”

which confirmed that Bryant requested 240 hours of Advanced Sick Leave and 96 hours of Leave

Without Pay. (Id., PageID#s 193-94.) The memo documented that Bryant had exhausted her current

leave balance. (Id., PageID # 194.) On December 21, 2022, Teresa Holder, the Office Timekeeper,

checked the “Not Recommended” box on Kendrick’s behalf even though the “Approved” box was

highlighted. (Id.) On December 21, 2022, an HR Specialist emailed Bryant indicating that her leave

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had been approved. (Id.) Hours later, the same HR Specialist sent a follow-up email stating that

“[t]he previous approval…was sent in error” and attached a copy of the leave memo with the box

for “[D]enied” highlighted. (Id.) As mandated by VA Policy, the senior executive for SPS,

Associate Director of Patient Care Services Garett E. Scheier, not Kendrick or Holder, was the final

decision maker on whether Ms. Bryant’s request for advance leave was approved. (Bryant Dep.,

PageID# 936.)

On December 22, 2022, Bryant submitted a second revised “Request for Leave or Approved

Absence,” requesting 328 hours of Leave Without Pay. (Doc. No. 15-1, PageID# 194.) On

December 26, 2022, Holder notified the HR Specialist that Kendrick was recommending the request

be denied because “[t]he service does not feel [Bryant] prudently uses her leave and also staffing is

also [a] reason for disapproval.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues that because of this denial, she was forced to

re-schedule her surgery for a later date, which exacerbated her anxiety and Post Traumatic Stress

Disorder. (Doc. No. 34, PageID# 1023.)

Bryant rescheduled her surgical procedure for July 14, 2023. (Id., PageID# 195.) On May

26, 2023, Bryant submitted to HR “updated ‘FMLA paperwork’” which included medical

documentation from her treating physician verifying her diagnosis and course of treatment and a

request for eight weeks of FMLA leave. (Id.) On May 30, 2023, she contacted HR to clarify that

she was requesting six weeks of FMLA leave rather than eight. (Id.) On June 13, 2023, the HR

Specialist sent Kendrick an “Advanced Leave Memo,” informing her that Bryant had requested 120

hours of Annual and Sick Leave “to cover absences due to a surgical procedure scheduled on July

14, 2023.” (Id.) In the memo, HR Specialist noted that Bryant had 26 hours of available Annual

Leave and 16.30 hours of accrued Sick Leave. (Id.)

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On June 15, 2023, Kendrick emailed Bryant requesting “documentation from [her] physician

on the surgical procedure and time that [she] will be out.” (Bryant Dep., PageID# 931.) Shortly

thereafter, Kendrick emailed the HR Specialist requesting “supporting documents on the time that

[Bryant] will be out due to the surgical procedure” and noting that she “cannot approve the Advanced

Leave until [she] ha[s] specifics of the time [Bryant] will be out.’” (Doc. No. 15-1, PageID# 195.)

The next day, Bryant responded to Kendrick that she had already submitted verifying documentation

to HR, including “the dates that [Bryant’s] physician requested for [her] to be off.” (Bryant Dep.,

PageID# 933.) Kendrick replied that HR could not share Bryant’s FMLA paperwork with her so

she needed to provide the requested information so that she could plan for staffing needs. (Id.,

PageID# 934.) VA Policy authorizes supervisors to request additional information in support of sick

leave requests in excess of three workdays. (Id., PageID# 937.)

Kendrick recommended denying the request for Advanced Leave because Bryant “continues

to use up her time and FMLA time for the last 3 years” making it “difficult for [Bryant] to make up

the advanced leave.” (Doc. No. 15-1, PageID# 196.) Kendrick also noted that “[t]he tour of duty is

down staff members and providing the advanced leave would impede operations for the shift.” (Id.)

On June 26, 2023, HR informed Bryant that Kendrick recommended that her request for advanced

leave be denied. (Id.) However, on July 7, 2023, HR issued Bryant a FMLA approval letter, stating

that she had been approved for leave from July 14, 2023 to August 28, 2023. (Id.) On July 10, 2023,

Bryant submitted her request for FMLA leave through the electronic time and attendance system.

(Doc. No. 15-1, PageID# 196.)

On July 12, 2023, Kendrick emailed Bryant that Kendrick still needed paperwork from

Bryant’s physician stating she “will be out due to a surgical procedure and a proposed return date.”

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(Id.) Bryant told Kendrick that HR had emailed Kendrick the FMLA approval letter, including

Bryant’s leave dates. (Bryant Dep., PageID# 933.) Kendrick replied that she just returned from

vacation and was catching up on emails. (Doc. No. 15-1, PageID# 196.) The same day, Kendrick

confirmed that she had received the email from HR and approved Bryant’s time off (leave without

pay) in the electronic system. (Id.)

On July 26, 2023, Bryant initiated the EEO process by contacting an EEO counselor. (Id.,

PageID# 192.) She alleged that management subjected her to a hostile work environment due to

physical disability and retaliated against her for prior EEO activity “[when], in June and July 2023,

management requested verifying medical documentation in support of [her] requests for advance

leave and subsequently denied [her] leave requests.” (Id.) On August 18, 2023, Bryant filed a formal

EEO complaint, alleging that management also discriminated against her by denying her requests

for Advanced Leave in December 2022. (Id., PageID# 190.) The VA Office of Resolution

Management, Diversity, and Inclusion (“ORM”) dismissed Bryant’s December 2022 and June 2023

leave denials due to “untimely EEO Counselor contact.” (Id.)

The VA’s Office of Employment Discrimination Complaint Adjudication held that Kendrick

denied Bryant’s Advanced Leave requests “due to [Bryant’s] documented leave patterns, as opposed

to her membership in a protected class” and ultimately found that Kendrick’s 2022 and 2023 denials

were based on “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason[s].” (Id., PageID# 204.)

Bryant claims that Kendrick harassed her by assigning Dionna Arthur, a fellow Sterile

Processing Technician, to work the same shift as her. (Doc. No. 15-1, PageID# 196; Bryant Dep.,

pgs. 148-49.) Plaintiff accuses Arthur of bullying and threatening her. (Id.) Bryant testified that

(1) she and Arthur do not speak to one another and did not speak to one another as early as January

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2023; (2) Arthur has never physically assaulted her; and (3) Arthur has never said anything

derogatory or verbally abusive to her. (Id.)

II. Procedural History

Bryant filed her Complaint in this Court on January 30, 2025. (Doc. No. 1.) On May 28,

2025, Bryant filed her Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 15.) Therein, she asserts ten (10) claims:

(1) “Intentional Infliction of Emotional distress”; (2) “Emotional Anguish”; (3) “Mental distress”;

(4) “Discrimination Based on Disability”; (5) “Harassment/Hostile work environment”; (6)

Retaliation for prior EEO activity;” (7) “Negligent Emotional distress”; (8) “FMLA Interference

with right to take Leave”; (9) “Willful Violation under the family and medical leave act”; and (10)

“Family medical leave Discrimination.” (Id. at PageID# 157.) Bryant attached thereto a

“Transmittal of Final Agency Decision” from the “Department of Veterans Affairs Office of

Employment Discrimination Complaint Adjudication.” (Doc. No. 15-1 at PageID# 188.)

On June 10, 2025, Defendant filed an Answer and its Partial Motion to Dismiss, seeking to

dismiss Bryant’s claims for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) and Negligent

Infliction of Emotional Distress (“NIED”) for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies.2 (Doc.

Nos. 18, 19.) On October 7, 2025, this Court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order, granting

Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss, and dismissing Plaintiff’s IIED and NIED claims. (Doc. No.

25.)

On January 16, 2026, Defendant filed the Motion. (Doc. No. 29.) On February 4, 2026,

Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Motion, but Defendant moved to strike the filing on February 12,

2 Because “emotional anguish” and “mental distress” are not private causes of action, this Court grants summary

judgment in favor of Defendant as to these claims to the extent that they were not already disposed of in this Court’s

previous Memorandum Opinion and Order.

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2026, arguing that the opposition exceeded the page limitation in violation of Rule 7.1 of the Local

Civil Rules of the Northern District of Ohio and relied on non-existent case law. (Doc. Nos. 30, 31.)

On February 24, 2026, Plaintiff sought to withdraw the opposition and filed a Motion for Leave to

Exceed Page Limitations, and the next day, the Court granted her requests, permitting her to

withdraw her opposition and file an amended opposition not exceeding thirty pages in length. (Doc.

Nos. 32, 33); Non-Doc Order dated Feb. 25, 2026. On March 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed the Opposition

to which Defendant replied on March 19, 2026. (Doc. Nos. 34, 35.) Thus, the Motion is ripe for

this Court’s review.

III. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A

dispute is ‘genuine’ only if based on evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict

in favor of the non-moving party.” Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Sch., 469 F.3d 479, 487 (6th

Cir. 2006). “Thus, ‘the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position

will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the

plaintiff.’” Cox v. Ky. Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). A fact is “material” only “if its resolution might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law.” Henderson, 469 F.3d at 487.

At the summary judgment stage, “[a] court should view the facts and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Pittman v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 901 F.3d

619, 628 (6th Cir. 2018). In addition, “the moving party bears the initial burden of showing that

there is no genuine dispute of material fact.” Ask Chems., LP v. Comput. Packages, Inc., 593 F.

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App’x 506, 508 (6th Cir. 2014). The moving party may satisfy this initial burden by “identifying

those parts of the record which demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.”

Lindsey v. Whirlpool Corp., 295 F. App’x 758, 764 (6th Cir. 2008). “[I]f the moving party seeks

summary judgment on an issue for which it does not bear the burden of proof at trial,” the moving

party may also “meet its initial burden by showing that ‘there is an absence of evidence to support

the nonmoving party’s case.’” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).

Once the moving party satisfies its burden, “the burden shifts to the non-moving party who

must then point to evidence that demonstrates that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for

trial.” Ask Chems., 593 F. App’x at 508–09. “[T]he nonmoving party may not simply rely on its

pleading, but must ‘produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be solved by a

jury.’” MISC Berhad v. Advanced Polymer Coatings, Inc., 101 F.Supp.3d 731, 736 (N.D. Ohio 2015)

(quoting Cox, 53 F.3d at 150).

IV. Analysis

A. Plaintiff cannot rely on Defendant’s December 2022 denial of her request for FMLA

leave because Plaintiff she failed to administratively exhaust this claim.

In the Motion, Defendant argues that some of Bryant’s claims, specifically those based on

Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for leave in December 2022, are subject to dismissal for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies because Plaintiff did not initiate the EEO process until

July 26, 2023. (Doc. No. 29-1, PageID# 869.) In the Opposition, Plaintiff argues that she did satisfy

the administrative exhaustion requirement and contacted her EEO counselor within 45 days. (Doc.

No. 34, PageID#s 1024, 1041.) In the Reply, Defendant reiterates that it is entitled to summary

judgment on the unexhausted claims, pointing out that Bryant “has not come forth with any evidence

that she contacted EEO within forty-five (45) days of the denial of the leave requests submitted in

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December 2022” and “does not dispute the date she first contacted EEO, July 26, 2023.” (Doc. No.

35, PageID# 1051.) This Court finds that Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s request for leave in

December 2022 is not actionable because Plaintiff failed to administratively exhaust her remedies.

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is “the exclusive remedy for a federal employee alleging

disability-based discrimination.” Jones v. Potter, 488 F.3d 397, 403 (6th Cir. 2007); 29 U.S.C. §

791 et seq; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.103(a). Federal employees must pursue all available

administrative remedies before resorting to the courts for Rehabilitation Act claims. Steiner v.

Henderson, 354 F.3d 432, 434-35 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Congress conditioned the government’s waiver

of sovereign immunity upon a plaintiff’s satisfaction of rigorous administrative exhaustion

requirements and time limitations.”); see also Bryant v. Wilkie, 834 Fed. Appx. 170, 173 (6th Cir.

2020), (citing Smith v. U.S. Postal Serv., 742 F.2d 257, 262 (6th Cir. 1984)) (clarifying that the

exhaustion requirement of Title VII also applies to Rehabilitation Act claims). Exhaustion of

administrative remedies is a condition precedent to suing in federal court and is “like a statute of

limitations.” Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 819-820 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Zipes v. Trans

World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982); Truitt v. Cnty. of Wayne, 148 F.3d 644, 646 (6th Cir.

1998)).

The first administrative step federal employees must take is to contact an EEO counselor

within 45 days of the date the discrimination occurred. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). The employee

then can accept alternative dispute resolution or file a formal complaint within 15 days of receiving

notice of her right to do so. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(d); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(b). After the complaint

is filed, the agency has 180 days to complete its investigation and cannot extend this without the

employee’s express written consent. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(a), (e). While the investigation is

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ongoing, the employee may amend her complaint “to include issues or claims like or related to those

raised in the complaint.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(d). Any amendments, if they are new charges, are

treated the same as the original charges under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1) and must be filed within

45 days of the occurrence of the underlying events. If those new charges are not filed within that

45-days’ time, the employee is permanently foreclosed from meeting the statutory prerequisites and

cannot exhaust her administrative remedies to meet the condition precedent to pursuing recourse in

federal court. Mitchell, 343 F.3d at 820.

Bryant claims that Defendant unlawfully discriminated against her when it denied her request

for advanced leave in December 2022, but Bryant failed to contact an EEO counselor regarding this

claim until July 26, 2023. (Doc. No. 15-1, PageID# 189.) As Defendant points out, Bryant “has not

come forth with any evidence that she contacted EEO within forty-five (45) days of the denial of the

leave requests submitted in December 2022” and “does not dispute the date she first contacted EEO,

July 26, 2023.” (Doc. No. 35, PageID# 1051.)3 Plaintiff’s failure to contact an EEO counselor

regarding Defendant’s denial of her request for advanced leave in December 2022 within forty-five

days of that denial is fatal to her claim. Thus, Plaintiff cannot rely on Defendant’s December 2022

denial of her request for annual leave to support any of her claims. Accordingly, this Court is left to

adjudicate Plaintiff’s claims premised upon (1) Kendrick’s emails to Bryant requesting that she

provide documentation as to the time she would be out for the surgery; (2) Kendrick’s June 15, 2023

recommendation that her request for leave be denied; and (3) Kendrick assigning Dionna Arthur to

3 Defendant correctly asserts that in a previous action, Bryant had attempted to amend her complaint to include

Defendant’s December 2022 denial of her request for annual leave, and in response to Defendant’s argument that she

failed to exhaust her remedies, Bryant admitted that she “completely forgot about the EEO process.” Bryant v.

McDonough, No. 1:24-CV-1135 (Doc. No. 35, PageID# 609) (N.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2023). This Court ultimately denied

her request to amend. Id. at (Doc. No. 37) (Mar. 10, 2023).

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work the same shift as Plaintiff.

B. Plaintiff cannot bring a private cause of action under the FMLA.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint includes claims for: “FMLA Interference with right to take

Leave” (Count 8); “Willful Violation under the family and medical leave act” (Count (9); and

“Family medical leave Discrimination (Count 10).” But according to Defendant, because Plaintiff

is a federal civil service employee governed by the provisions of Title II of the FMLA and Title II

does not expressly waive the government’s sovereign immunity, private suits to enforce its

provisions are barred. In other words, Plaintiff has no private cause of action under the FMLA.

(Doc. No. 29-1, PageID# 863.)

The Court agrees that as a federal employee for at least eleven years who was appointed

pursuant to Title 5 of the U.S. Code, Plaintiff is subject to the provisions of Title II of the FMLA. 5

U.S.C. § 6381 et seq.4 (Defendant’s Exhibit A – Jindra Decl. ¶ 2.) And although the Sixth Circuit

has not expressly ruled on the issue, this Court agrees with at least three circuit courts of appeals that

have held that “federal employees covered by Title II may not bring lawsuits based on FMLA

violations.” Doucette v. Johnson, 2017 WL 840406, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2017). See Russell

v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 191 F.3d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1999) (“While Title I and Title II employees

under the FMLA are afforded equivalent rights to leave time, Title I expressly provides a private

right of action to remedy employer action violating FMLA rights.”); Mann v. Haigh, 120 F.3d 34,

37 (4th Cir. 1997) (“No unequivocal waiver of immunity exists in Title II, and, consequently, the

omission of a provision in Title II similar to that in Title I creating a private right of action is treated

as an affirmative congressional decision that the employees covered by Title II of the FMLA should

4 Title I governs leave for private employees and federal employees not covered by Title II. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.

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not have a right to judicial review of their FMLA claims through the FMLA.”); Cavicchi v. Sec’y of

Treasury, 2004 WL 4917357 (11th Cir. Oct. 15, 2004) (same). Indeed, in the Opposition, Plaintiff

“acknowledges that as a Title II federal employee, she does not possess a standalone private right of

action under the FMLA,” and Defendant reaffirms this point in its Reply. (Doc. No. 34, PageID#

1024; Doc. NO. 35, PageID# 1053.) Thus, this Court grants summary judgment in favor of

Defendant and against Plaintiff on Counts 8, 9 and 10 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.

C. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.

Plaintiff’s Sixth Count in her Amended Complaint is for “[r]etaliation for prior EEO

activity.” (Doc. No. 15, PageID# 157.) “Retaliation claims by federal employees alleging disability-

based discrimination are governed by the Rehabilitation Act.” See Johnson v. DeJoy, 2024 WL

2874573, at *6 (6th Cir. June 7, 2024) (citing Bledsoe v. Tenn. Valley Auth. Bd. of Dirs., 42 F.4th

568, 578 (6th Cir. 2022)); see also Bryant v. McDonough, 2025 WL 2799412, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept.

30, 2025) (applying the Rehabilitation Act to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim where Plaintiff had alleged

disability discrimination). Here, Plaintiff alleges disability discrimination and that Defendant

retaliated against her after she engaged in EEO proceedings related to the exercise of her rights under

the Rehabilitation Act. (Doc. No. 15, PageID# 157.) Thus, this Court will construe Plaintiff’s

retaliation claim as one brought under the Rehabilitation Act. See (id.)5 Assuming without deciding

that Plaintiff could bring a private cause of action against Defendant for retaliation under § 501 of

5 This Court declines to evaluate Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff cannot bring a private cause of action for retaliation

under § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Sixth Circuit has held that “§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not provide

a cause of action for retaliation.” Smith v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrs., 159 F.4th 1067, 1071 (6th Cir. 2025). Plaintiff brings

this cause of action under § 501 as opposed to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, but Defendant argues that the holding in

Smith should be applied to claims brought under § 501. (Doc. No. 34, PageID# 1026; Doc. No. 29-1, PageID# 865.)

This Court need not reach this argument because even if the law permits Plaintiff to bring a private cause of action under

§ 501, her claim would fail because she has not shown she was subjected to an adverse employment action.

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the Rehabilitation Act, such claim would fail because Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case

for retaliation.

For a plaintiff to have a valid retaliation claim under the Rehabilitation Act, she must show

that she “(1) engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant had knowledge of [her] protected

conduct; (3) the defendant took an adverse employment action toward [her]; and (4) there was a

causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Chan v. PNC

Bank, 2024 WL 1328610, at *6 (quoting Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 523 (6th

Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted)). Filing a discrimination claim with the EEOC is a protected

activity. Gribcheck v. Runyon, 245 F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2001). “Adverse employment action is

an action by the employer that constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring,

firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision

causing a significant change in benefits.” Regan v. Faurecia Auto. Seating, Inc., 679 F.3d 475, 479

(6th Cir. 2012).

To the extent that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is based on either (1) Kendrick’s emails to

Bryant requesting that she provide documentation as to the amount of time she would be out for the

surgery, (2) Kendrick’s June 15, 2023 recommendation that her request for leave be denied, or (3)

Kendrick assigning Dionna Arthur to the same shift as Plaintiff, the Court finds that none of these

actions rise to the level of an adverse employment action. First, as to Kendrick’s email to Plaintiff

requesting the dates she would be out for surgery, as Defendant points out, the VA’s policy

authorizes supervisors to request this information when a party applies for leave that is more than

three days long, and here, Kendrick noted that she needed the information to determine staffing.

This action of requesting the time Bryant would be out for the surgery does not result in a significant

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change in Bryant’s employment status.

Second, although Kendrick initially recommended that Bryant’s renewed request for leave

be denied in June 2023, Plaintiff’s request for advanced leave was approved, and as Defendant notes,

the senior executive for SPS, Garett E. Scheier, not Karen Kendrick, was the final decision maker

as to requests for advanced leave. Plaintiff cannot argue a condition of her employment was

materially changed when she ultimately received the unpaid leave that she requested.

Third, Kendrick’s assignment of Dionna Arthur to work the same shift as Bryant did not

cause a significant change in her employment status. See Bryant v. McDonough, 2025 WL 2799412,

at *4 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2025) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit in Bowman v. Shawnee State University, 220

F.3d 456, 462 (6th Cir. 2000) held that de minimis employment actions, such as short-term job

reassignments without the loss of income, do not as a matter of law ‘rise to the level of a materially

adverse employment decision.’”). Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of

Defendant and against Plaintiff on Bryant’s retaliation claim set forth in Count 6 of the Amended

Complaint.

D. Plaintiff was not subjected to conduct so severe or pervasive as to create a hostile

work environment.

In the Motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s hostile work environment cause of action set

forth in Count 5 of the Amended Complaint fails because Plaintiff has not established that her

supervisors or her co-worker, Dionna Arthur, engaged in conduct so extreme as to alter the terms

and conditions of her employment. (Doc. No. 29-1, PageID#s 875-76) (citation omitted). In the

Opposition, Plaintiff argues that she was forced to work on the same shift as a co-worker who

harassed and bullied her and that management was aware of this harassment. (Doc. No 34, PageID#

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1042.)6 In the Reply, Defendant repeats that its alleged acts were not so severe or pervasive

necessary as to create a hostile work environment. (Doc. No. 35, PageID# 1061.) This Court agrees

with Defendant that Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim fails as a matter of law.

As a preliminary matter, it is unclear whether Plaintiff is bringing a traditional hostile work

environment claim or a retaliatory hostile work environment claim. In the Opposition, Plaintiff

states that she is a member of protected class because she is a “Schedule A federal employee with

multiple disabilities, including Autism Spectrum Disorder, ADHD, Dyslexia, Dyscalculia,

Dysgraphia, sensory disorders, PTSD, depression, and anxiety” and that “[s]he is also in a protected

class by virtue of engaging in prior EEO activity, including filing formal complaints.” (Doc. No.

34, PageID# 1031.). Plaintiff appears to conflate the two causes of action. However, this distinction

does not affect this Court’s analysis because “the touchstone of any hostile work environment claim,

including a retaliatory hostile work environment claim, is whether ‘the workplace is permeated with

“discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”’” Khamati v.

Sec'y of the Dept. of the Treasury, 557 Fed. Appx. 434, 442 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Meritor Sav.

Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)). And here the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed

establish that Defendant subjected her to harassment so extreme so as to create a hostile work

environment.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory hostile work environment, a plaintiff must

demonstrate the following four elements: (1) the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity; (2) the

6 Plaintiff adds that “FMLA [l]eave [r]escission [w]as an [a]dverse [a]ction.” (Doc. No. 34, PageID# 1042.) This Court

has already explained that Defendant’s December 2022 denial of Plaintiff’s request for leave is not actionable due to

Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Thus, this Court need not address this argument.

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defendant knew this; (3) the defendant subjected the plaintiff to severe or pervasive retaliatory

harassment; and (4) the protected activity is causally connected to the harassment. Khamati, 557

Fed. Appx. at 442; see also Morris v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000);

Dean-Lis v. McHugh, 598 Fed. Appx. 412, 415 (6th Cir. 2015).

To establish a disability-based hostile-work-environment claim, “a plaintiff must show that

(1) [s]he is disabled; (2) [s]he ‘was subjected to harassment, either through words or actions, based

on’ h[er] disability; (3) the harassment ‘create[ed] an objectively intimidating, hostile, or offensive

work environment’ that ‘produce[d] “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of

employment”’; and (4) ‘there is some basis of liability on the part of the employer.’” Kellar v.

Yunion, Inc., 157 F.4th 855, 873 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting McNeal v. City of Blue Ash, 117 F.4th 887,

898, 904, 906 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 834-35 (6th

Cir. 1996) and Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024))).

Regardless of the test being applied, “the touchstone of any hostile work environment claim,

including a retaliatory hostile work environment claim, is whether ‘the workplace is permeated with

“discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”’” Khamati,

557 Fed. Appx. at 443 (quoting Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65). Courts consider “the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”

Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).

Plaintiff claims that Defendant subjected her to harassment when Plaintiff was assigned to

work the same shift as Dionna Arthur, whom she accused of bullying. Bryant testified that (1) she

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and Arthur do not speak to one another and did not speak to one another as early as January 2023;

(2) Arthur has never physically assaulted her; and (3) Arthur has never said anything derogatory or

verbally abusive to her. (Bryant Dep., pgs. 148-49). Being forced to work with someone whom

Bryant dislikes or who dislikes her is not conduct so extreme as to create a hostile work environment.

See Barnett v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 153 F.3d 338, 342-43 (6th Cir. 1998) (conflicts between

employees based upon personal issues do not equate to discriminatory animus). For these reasons,

Plaintiff’s claims for hostile work environment and retaliatory hostile work environment fail as a

matter of law because Plaintiff has not established that Defendant subjected her to harassment so

extreme so as to create a hostile work environment. Thus, this Court grants summary judgment in

favor of Defendant as to Plaintiff’s hostile work in environment claim.

E. Plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination fails as a matter of law.

In the Motion, Defendant argues that this Court should grant summary judgment in its favor

on Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim because (1) Plaintiff has not suffered an adverse

employment action; (2) Plaintiff has no evidence that nondisabled persons were treated more

favorably; and (3) Defendant had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for denying Bryant’s

request for advanced leave.7 (Doc. No. 29-1, PageID#s 871-73.) In the Opposition, Plaintiff argues

that Defendant discriminated against her when it denied her request for leave in December 20228

and that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably than her. (Doc. No. 34, PageID#s

1042, 1044.) In the Reply, Defendant points out that Plaintiff identifies no comparators to support

7 This Court declines to address Defendant’s argument that it had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for denying

Plaintiff’s request for leave because it finds Plaintiff’s claim fails for other reasons as set forth herein.

8 This Court has already explained that Defendant’s December 2022 denial of Plaintiff’s request for leave is not

actionable due to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Thus, this Court need not address this argument.

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her assertion that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably or those who were

responsible for approving her leave request knew of her disability. (Doc. No. 35, PageID# 1055.)

When a plaintiff presents indirect evidence in support of a Rehabilitation Act claim, “the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework governs.” Bledsoe v. Tenn. Valley Auth. Bd. of

Directors, 42 F.4th 568, 578–79 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc., 988 F.3d 318,

328 (6th Cir. 2021). Under this framework, “the plaintiff faces the initial burden of presenting a

prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.” Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir.

2003). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must “show that 1) he is a

member of a protected class; 2) he was qualified for his job and performed it satisfactorily; 3) despite

his qualifications and performance, he suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) that he was

replaced by a person outside the protected class or was treated less favorably than a similarly situated

individual outside his protected class.” Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 572-73 (6th

Cir. 2000). “The establishment of a prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption of

discrimination and requires the defendant to ‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’

for taking the challenged action.” Kroger, 319 F.3d at 866 (quoting Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d

at 573). Finally, “[i]f the defendant is able to satisfy this burden, the plaintiff must then ‘prove that

the proffered reason was actually a pretext to hide unlawful discrimination.’” Id.

Plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff does

not identify a single similarly situated individual whom Defendant treated more favorably. In her

deposition, when Plaintiff was asked if she was aware of anyone in her role who was treated more

favorably than her, she said she did not know. (Bryant Dep., p. 71.) For this reason, Plaintiff’s

disability discrimination claim fails as matter of law.

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Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff had identified a comparator, none of Defendant’s

actions rise to the level of an adverse employment action. To plead an adverse employment action,

a plaintiff must show “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.”9

Ahmed v. Hamtramck Pub. Schs., 178 F.4th 975, 984 (6th Cir. 2026) (citing Muldrow, 601 U.S. at

354-55).

In Lee v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 636 F.3d 245, 248 (6th Cir. 2011), the city had a policy

requiring that “an employee who is returning to regular duty must under specified circumstances

provide a note from his or her attending physician to his or her immediate supervisor.” “The

physician’s note must state the nature of the illness and that the employee is capable of returning to

regular duty if the employee was off for more than three days of sick leave or was previously notified

by a commander to do so.” Id. The Sixth Circuit held that:

[T]he City’s Directive comports with the Rehabilitation Act and does not violate the

proscriptions pertaining to disability-related inquiries set forth in § 12112(d)(4)(A)

of the ADA, incorporated by reference into the Rehabilitation Act. Because the

City’s implementation of the Directive does not constitute an adverse employment

action, plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case of disability

discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. See Jones [v. Potter, 488 F.3d 397, 404

(6th Cir. 2007)].

Id. at 258–59 (6th Cir. 2011).

As in Lee, Kendrick’s request that Plaintiff send her the dates she would be out for her

surgery does not constitute an adverse employment action for disability discrimination under the

Rehabilitation Act. See id. The VA’s policy authorizes supervisors to request this information when

a party applies for leave that is more than three days long, and Kendrick explained she needed

information to determine staffing needs. Likewise, although Kendrick initially recommended that

9 The standard for an adverse action in a discrimination claim differs from that in a retaliation action. See Muldrow, 601

U.S. at 348.

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Bryant’s renewed request for leave be denied in June 2023, Plaintiff’s request for advanced leave

was ultimately granted, so it cannot be argued that Kendrick’s recommendation caused some harm

to a condition or term of Plaintiff’s employment. Nor can Plaintiff being assigned to the same shift

as Arthur, with whom she does not even speak, cause some harm to a term and condition of her

employment. Thus, for these reasons, this Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant as

to Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 29)

is GRANTED, and the action is DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Pamela A. Barker

PAMELA A. BARKER

Date: September 15, 2026 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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