The opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-2860
KYLE BEATTY,
Appellant
v.
CLINTON GARDNER; CALVIN IRVIN
_____________________________
On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, M.D. Pa.
Judge Keli M. Neary, No. 4:23-cv-00364
Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
Argued: June 24, 2026; Filed: Sept. 16, 2026
_____________________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. After arresting a suspect, officers
may search his person for weapons or evidence without a war-
rant or any further justification. But they may go only so far.
To search his home, car, or cellphone, they ordinarily need to
get a warrant backed by probable cause.
Today, we recognize another such limit on searches inci-
dent to arrest: strip searches. Outside of jails or prisons, offic-
ers need a search warrant (or exigent circumstances) supported
by probable cause to believe that a strip search will reveal
weapons, contraband, or evidence under the arrestee’s clothes.
Thus, the officers here violated the Fourth Amendment by
strip-searching an arrestee without a warrant or exigent cir-
cumstances. But because that limit was not clearly established
at the time, qualified immunity shields them from liability. So
we will affirm the District Court’s summary judgment for the
officers.
I. POLICE SEARCH BEATTY THREE TIMES
One afternoon, police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin
Irvin were patrolling an area of Williamsport, Pennsylvania,
known for drug trafficking. They noticed Kyle Beatty and his
girlfriend in a car, followed them to a gas station, and waited
for them to head into the store. Gardner then approached the
car. He smelled marijuana through an open window and spotted
a burnt marijuana joint in the ashtray as well as marijuana
flakes on the floor. So he headed toward the store to investigate.
Beatty was first searched inside the store. As Gardner ap-
proached him, Beatty put his hands up and asked if the officer
wanted to search him. Gardner obliged and patted down his
waistband, pockets, legs, ankles, and groin but found nothing.
Beatty was searched a second time outside. After exiting
the store together, Beatty and Gardner went back to the car.
Gardner warned the couple that unless its owner, Beatty’s girl-
friend, consented to a car search, the officers would have it
towed and apply for a search warrant. Though she consented at
first, she started disobeying an officer’s commands. Beatty
then told his girlfriend to revoke her consent to search and the
officers handcuffed him, turning him face-down onto the hood
of the car. Irvin searched Beatty’s waist, pockets, groin, and
ankles and removed his wallet, but found no contraband. After
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this search, the officers put him in the back of their squad car
and waited for a tow truck.
While waiting for the tow, the officers tried to get Beatty to
identify himself. Gardner threatened that, until Beatty gave his
full name, he would be arraigned as John Doe and could sit in jail.
They could “play that game.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. 28, Exh. A.2 at 04:49.
Beatty was searched a third time after the officers drove
him down to the police station. The officers brought him there
solely to strip-search him, but they found nothing.
Beatty then filed this federal civil-rights lawsuit against
both officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He challenged the initial
stop, arrest, and all three searches as unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment and retaliatory under the First Amend-
ment. He also brought state-law claims for assault, battery,
false arrest, and false imprisonment.
The District Court granted the officers summary judgment
on all federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law ones. It found the stop, arrest,
and first two searches reasonable and the strip search shielded
by qualified immunity. It likewise found the First Amendment
retaliation claim barred by qualified immunity. We review de
novo. Tundo v. County of Passaic, 923 F.3d 283, 286–87 (3d
Cir. 2019).
II. THE STOP AND FIRST TWO SEARCHES
WERE REASONABLE
The Fourth Amendment bars unreasonable searches. Its
touchstone is reasonableness. United States v. Knights, 534
U.S. 112, 118 (2001). To discern reasonableness, courts have
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developed rules that weigh the intrusion on a person’s privacy
against the government’s legitimate interest in a search. Id. at
118–19. As a rule of thumb, the Supreme Court has held,
searches must first be authorized by search warrants. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). But not always.
There are exceptions for warrantless searches throughout
the criminal process. When he first encounters a suspect, an
officer who has reasonable suspicion may frisk the suspect’s
outer clothes for weapons to protect his own safety. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1968). After a lawful arrest, an officer
may search the arrestee’s person for weapons and evidence.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969). Upon
booking an arrestee at a police station, an officer may search
his person to inventory and safeguard his possessions before
jailing him. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643–47 (1983).
And at the end of the process, guards may strip-search inmates
before putting them into the general population of a jail or
prison. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318,
328 (2012). Plus, at any time during the process, valid consent
makes a warrantless search reasonable. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). The same is true of
exigent circumstances. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452,
460 (2011).
The first warrantless search, the pat-down inside the store,
was reasonable. Beatty consented to the pat-down, so it was
reasonable for Gardner to perform one. And Gardner was enti-
tled to stop Beatty in the first place because he had reasonable
suspicion. Indeed, Gardner had not only reasonable suspicion,
but probable cause to suspect Beatty of a crime: The officer
had smelled and seen traces of marijuana in the car, and
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possessing even a small amount of that drug is a state-law
crime. 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(31); United States v. Ra-
mos, 443 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2006) (recognizing that the
smell of marijuana alone can show probable cause).
The second warrantless search, on the hood of Beatty’s car,
was reasonable as a search incident to arrest. Both parties agree
that Beatty was under arrest. And the arrest itself was lawful:
As discussed, the officers had probable cause to believe that he
possessed marijuana.
III. STRIP SEARCHES EXCEED THE SCOPE OF
SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST
The difficulty lies with the third search. True, Beatty was
still under arrest. Even so, we hold that the search-incident-to-
arrest doctrine does not authorize strip searches; they go too
far. Because the officers had neither a warrant nor exigent cir-
cumstances to justify strip-searching Beatty, that search was
unreasonable.
The search-incident-to-arrest doctrine is a rule, not a case-
specific balancing test. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 235 (1973). After a lawful arrest, officers may automati-
cally search an arrestee’s person. No warrant, or even particu-
larized suspicion, is needed. Such a search is per se reasonable
because arrests are highly charged: Officers need to quickly
separate an arrestee from (1) weapons that he might pull out or
(2) evidence that he might destroy. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–
63. This rule has categorical exceptions for certain privacy
interests that categorically outweigh the government’s inter-
ests in conducting a search. Thus, certain searches categori-
cally fall outside the doctrine. See, e.g., id. (ruling out a home
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search incident to arrest); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343
(2009) (same for a car); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386
(2014) (same for cellphone data).
Riley illustrates how to gauge the limits on searches inci-
dent to arrest. There, officers searched two arrestees’ cell-
phones without warrants. The Supreme Court held that the
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not license warrantless
searches of cellphone data. 573 U.S. at 386. It reasoned that
neither of Chimel’s justifications ordinarily applies to cell-
phones. First, cellphones rarely enable escape or endanger
officer safety. Data are not weapons. Id. at 387. In the rare case
when the failure to search a cellphone could endanger an officer,
courts should instead rely on the case-specific exigent-circum-
stances exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 388.
Second, there is rarely a serious need to prevent destruc-
tion of evidence: Once arrested, arrestees usually cannot delete
data, and police can prevent destruction by turning phones off
or putting them into Faraday bags. Id. at 388–91. Riley also
noted that destruction of cellphone evidence is uncommon. Id.
at 389. And when officers do have an immediate need to pre-
vent that destruction, they may rely on the exigent circum-
stances to justify a warrantless search. Id. at 391.
Those governmental interests, Riley explained, pale in com-
parison to users’ interests in keeping their cellphone data pri-
vate. Id. at 393–98. Cellphones contain and reach enormous
amounts of personal data, much of it intimate. Id. Because of
“all they contain and all they may reveal,” the Court held that
the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not cover cellphone
data. Id. at 403. Though officers may seize a cellphone incident
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to arrest, to search its data they must “get a warrant” backed by
probable cause. Id.
Applying Riley’s categorical approach, we hold that the
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not include strip
searches either. To start, Chimel’s twin rationales are not impli-
cated. As for destruction of evidence, the officers give us little
reason to believe that destruction of evidence concealed on an
arrestee’s body pending a search warrant is a widespread prob-
lem. Gardner did testify that “in [his] experience, [with] both
traffickers and users, one of the most common places that they
conceal narcotics is in their groin area.” JA 278. But Riley dis-
missed “only a couple of anecdotal examples” as not enough
to justify evidence preservation across the board. 573 U.S. at
389. Particular crimes, such as smuggling drugs by airplane
passengers, may often involve concealing drugs on the body.
Even so, we see no solid evidence to justify strip searching all
drug users and traffickers as a matter of course. And there are
ways short of strip searches to keep suspects from disposing of
secreted evidence on or in their persons. Id.
As for Chimel’s officer-safety rationale, police are free to
pat arrestees down for weapons. If a frisk turns up a potentially
dangerous bulge, that may amount to exigent circumstances
justifying a further search for weapons. The same is true if
police have some other particularized reason to believe that
this arrestee is concealing a dangerous weapon. But no such
danger was present here: The officers had already searched
Beatty twice, finding nothing dangerous. No one had told them
that he was concealing a gun or knife in his crotch. And they
admit they were searching him solely for evidence, not weap-
ons. Given the various alternative sources of authority that
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officers could rely on to justify a further search, there is little
need to authorize strip searches automatically upon arrest.
On the other side of the balance, the privacy interests are
weighty. Strip searches expose to strangers the most intimate
parts of the body, which are kept covered for modesty and
called “private parts.” These searches are an “extreme intrusion
on privacy.” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 327 (3d Cir.
2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). They are “embar-
rassing” and “humiliating,” sometimes even “frightening.”
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374–
75 (2009). That humiliation is a necessary evil to keep weap-
ons, drugs, other contraband, and lice out of the general popu-
lation of jails and prisons. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558
(1979); Florence, 566 U.S. at 330–33 (majority), 340–41
(Alito, J., concurring). But because Beatty was not going to be
jailed or imprisoned, the institutional-search exception does
not apply here.
Given the balance of competing interests, we hold that the
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not extend to strip
searches. Sometimes, an arrestee may consent to a strip search.
Or exigent circumstances may justify it: For instance, an officer
might detect a weapon during a pat-down or know that this
arrestee conceals weapons in his crotch. Otherwise, an officer
must first get a search warrant based on particularized facts
showing probable cause to search underneath the arrestee’s
clothing. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
The officers here had no warrant, exigent circumstances, or
consent. They had already searched Beatty twice, once inside
the store and again on the hood of the car, without finding
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weapons or contraband. They had no particularized reason to
believe that a warrantless third search was needed to preserve
evidence. Their generalized speculation about drug users and
traffickers is not specific enough to show that Beatty might
have concealed evidence, let alone that he might destroy it
immediately.
True, other circuits have let officers strip-search arrestees
based only on reasonable suspicion. United States v. Perez, 977
F.3d 163, 169–70 (1st Cir. 2020); Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d
711, 717 (7th Cir. 2007); Richmond v. City of Brooklyn Ctr.,
490 F.3d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir. 2007); Justice v. Peachtree City,
961 F.2d 188, 193 (11th Cir. 1992). But we are unpersuaded.
This approach rests on older cases that predate the Supreme
Court’s reweighing of the privacy interests in Safford and Flor-
ence, not to mention Riley. And these cases failed to explain
why they adopted a standard below the ordinary requirement
of probable cause. Instead, we join the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits in requiring a warrant supported by probable cause.
Williams v. Kaufman Cnty., 352 F.3d 994, 1005 (5th Cir.
2003); Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1446–50 (9th
Cir. 1991); Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs,
962 F.3d 1204, 1239 (10th Cir. 2020).
IV. BUT THE OFFICERS HAVE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Though the strip search violated the Fourth Amendment,
that is not enough to make the officers liable. They raise the
defense of qualified immunity. To apply that defense, we first
define the right specifically, then ask if a reasonable officer
would have been on notice that his conduct would violate that
right. Otero v. Kane, 161 F.4th 189, 194 (3d Cir. 2025). The
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right must be clearly established by “Supreme Court precedent,
our own precedent, or a consensus of authority among the
courts of appeals plac[ing] that right beyond debate.” Id.
(cleaned up). When a challenged police action presents an unu-
sual, rarely discussed legal question, we have held that the action
violated the Constitution yet was shielded by qualified immun-
ity. Doe v. Groody, 361 F.3d 232, 243 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing
two cases that did so).
We start by defining the right carefully. An arrestee (who
is not being admitted to the general population of a jail or
prison) has a Fourth Amendment right to be free of a strip
search. That right can be overcome by consent to the search,
exigent circumstances, or a warrant backed by probable cause
to believe that searching under the clothing will uncover a
weapon, contraband, or evidence of a crime. The District Court
properly held that this right was not clearly established at the
time of the search. “[N]either the Supreme Court nor the Third
Circuit … ha[d] directly addressed—outside the institutional
setting—the constitutionality of strip searches incident to ar-
rest.” United States v. Parker, 458 F. Supp. 3d 260, 265 (M.D.
Pa. 2020), aff’d, 2023 WL 4117474 (3d Cir. June 22, 2023).
Thus, the officers enjoy qualified immunity from Beatty’s
Fourth Amendment strip-search claim.
Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim fails too. His
stop, arrest, and first two searches were lawful, supported by
probable cause. Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 404 (2019)
(holding that lack of probable cause is generally required to
make out a retaliatory-arrest claim). And even though there
was no probable cause to strip-search Beatty, any related retal-
iation claim based on the third search is shielded by qualified
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immunity. The right claimed here is the right to be free of a
search made in retaliation for refusing to cooperate with the
police during an investigative seizure. Beatty cites no cases in
which a plaintiff has made out a successful First Amendment
retaliation claim based on his unwillingness to cooperate with a
police search. Several of our sister circuits have previously
granted qualified immunity from similar claims, reasoning that
there is no clearly established “First Amendment right to re-
main silent when questioned by the police.” Moore v. Gar-
nand, 83 F.4th 743, 750 (9th Cir. 2023); accord Alexander v.
City of Round Rock, 854 F.3d 298, 308 (5th Cir. 2017); Koch
v. Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1244 (10th Cir. 2011). So a reason-
able officer would not have known that a search conducted in re-
sponse to Beatty’s unwillingness could be a basis for a First
Amendment claim.
*****
The officers began their encounter with Beatty lawfully.
They had probable cause to arrest him, and it was reasonable
to search him in the course of that arrest. But they went too far
by strip-searching him. We hold that the search-incident-to-
arrest doctrine does not license strip searches as a matter of
course. Unless the arrestee consents or there are exigent cir-
cumstances, police must first get a search warrant backed by
probable cause to believe that they will find weapons, contra-
band, or evidence under his clothes. Because the officers had
no such warrant or probable cause, they violated Beatty’s
Fourth Amendment right. But that right was not clearly estab-
lished, so qualified immunity shields the officers. The same is
true for his First Amendment retaliation claim. We will thus
AFFIRM the summary judgment for the officers.
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Counsel for Appellant
Joshua J. Cochran [Argued]
SCHEMERY ZICOLELLO
Counsel for Appellee Clinton Gardner
Shawna R. Laughlin [Argued]
WILLIAM J. FERREN & ASSOCIATES
Counsel for Appellee Calvin Irvin
Stephen Hartley
Austin White [Argued]
MCCORMICK LAW FIRM
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