Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 YOANDRY R.Z.,1 No. 1:26-cv-05624-KES-EGC (HC)

A-Number: 201-496-851,

12 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner, TO GRANT MOTION TO DISMISS, DENY

13 WITHOUT PREJUDICE PETITION FOR

v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND DENY

14 MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

WARDEN, CALIFORNIA CITY

15 DETENTION FACILITY, (Docs. 1, 2)

16 Respondents. [14-DAY DEADLINE]

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18 I. INTRODUCTION

19 Petitioner Yoandry R.Z. is an immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for

20 writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). He challenges his continued detention by

21 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) without an individualized bond hearing and

22 seeks immediate release or, alternatively, a bond hearing before an immigration judge. (Docs. 1,

23 2). Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 8). For the reasons set forth below, the

24 undersigned recommends that the petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, that

25 the motion for immediate release (Doc. 2) be DENIED, and that the motion to dismiss (Doc. 8) be

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1 As recommended by the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of

the United States, the Court omits Petitioner’s full name, using only their first name and last initial, to protect sensitive

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personal information. See Memorandum re: Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security and Immigration Opinions,

Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United States (May 1, 2018),

28 https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf.

1 GRANTED.

2 II. BACKGROUND

3 A. Petitioner’s Immigration and Criminal History

4 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cuba. (Doc. 8-1 at 1–2). On December 18, 2018, he

5 requested asylum at the Paso Del Norte Port of Entry in El Paso, Texas. (Id. at 3). He was processed

6 on a Form I-860 with a credible fear referral, and was paroled into the United States from the Otero

7 County Processing Center. (Id. at 2-3). On January 10, 2019, USCIS found his fear credible and

8 referred the case to the Executive Office for Immigration Review. (Id. at 3).

9 On October 4, 2019, Petitioner was ordered removed in absentia. (Id.). A motion to reopen

10 was granted on November 15, 2023, and those removal proceedings were terminated without

11 prejudice the same day. (Id.).

12 On June 14, 2021, Petitioner filed a Form I-485 seeking adjustment of status under section

13 1 of the Cuban Adjustment Act. (Doc. 1 at 9). USCIS denied the application on April 30, 2024,

14 as abandoned, based on his failure to respond to a Request for Evidence. (Id. at 9-10).

15 On April 15, 2026, ICE arrested Petitioner upon his release from the Travis County

16 Correctional Complex. (Doc. 8-1 at 2). That same day, DHS served him with a Notice to Appear

17 charging removability under Immigration and Nationality Act section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C.

18 § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). (Doc. 8-2). The Notice to Appear set an initial hearing for April 29, 2026,

19 at the immigration court in Pearsall, Texas. (Id. at 1). Petitioner has been detained at the California

20 City Immigration Processing Center presumably since the ICE arrest, and Respondents represent

21 that removal proceedings remain pending (Doc. 8 at 1 n.1).

22 Exhibit 3 to Respondents’ motion is a multi-source criminal history record. (Doc. 8-3). As

23 relevant here, it reflects a February 2022 arrest by the Temple Police Department for credit or debit

24 card abuse, Tex. Penal Code § 32.31, resulting in an August 16, 2023 conviction, with two years’

25 confinement suspended and five years’ probation. (Id. at 8-9). It further reflects a December 2023

26 deferred adjudication for violation of motor fuel tax requirements, with five years’ probation and a

27 $3,000 fine (id. at 12); and an April 13, 2026 arrest by the Austin Police Department for possession

28 of a controlled substance, which remains pending (id. at 14). Petitioner was released on bond on

1 the pending charge on April 14, 2026, and was taken into ICE custody the following day. (Doc. 8-

2 1 at 3).

3 B. This Action

4 Petitioner filed the instant petition and an accompanying motion for immediate release on

5 July 20, 2026. (Docs. 1, 2). On July 22, 2026, the undersigned ordered Respondents to show cause

6 why the petition should not be granted, directed Respondents to address how the issues presented

7 differ from those resolved in the Court’s prior orders, and permitted Petitioner to file a traverse

8 within seven days of the response. (Doc. 5). On August 10, 2026, Respondents filed a motion to

9 dismiss. (Doc. 8). No traverse has been filed.

10 III. DISCUSSION

11 A. Jurisdiction

12 A district court may entertain a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in

13 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

14 “[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to

15 immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits of [a] removal order.” Lopez-

16 Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court has confirmed that

17 federal courts have jurisdiction to review a constitutional challenge to a noncitizen’s detention. See

18 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). Petitioner is detained at the California City Detention

19 Facility in California City, California, within this judicial district, and he challenges the

20 constitutionality of his detention. Jurisdiction is therefore proper.

21 B. Petitioner Is Subject to Mandatory Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(a)

22 Respondents first contend that Petitioner, having been paroled rather than admitted, remains

23 an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) and is therefore subject to mandatory

24 detention under section 1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. 8 at 1-2). They acknowledge Rodriguez Vazquez v.

25 Bostock, No. 25-6842, 2026 WL 2196424 (9th Cir. July 30, 2026), but seek to distinguish it on the

26 ground that Petitioner was processed under section 1225(b)(1), paroled, and subsequently

27 redetained. (Id. at 1).

28 That distinction does not hold on this record. Rodriguez Vazquez forecloses the proposition

1 that a noncitizen arrested in the interior long after entry is detained under section 1225(b)(2) rather

2 than section 1226. Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, No. 25-6842, 2026 WL 2196424, at *3 (9th Cir.

3 July 30, 2026). Respondents’ attempted distinction turns on Petitioner’s status as an “arriving

4 alien,” but Respondents’ own evidence is inconsistent on that point: the Form I-213 describes

5 Petitioner as “an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled or who arrived

6 in the United States at a time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General” (Doc. 8-1

7 at 2), which describes the population addressed in Rodriguez Vazquez. Respondent’s contention

8 that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under section 1225(b)(2) should be rejected.

9 Respondents alternatively invoke section 1226(c)(1)(A), which mandates detention of a

10 noncitizen who “is inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section

11 1182(a)(2).” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) states “…any alien convicted of, or who admits having

12 committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of” a crime

13 involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”) is inadmissible. “While there is no federal statutory definition

14 of a CIMT, we have defined it as involving ‘either fraud or base, vile, and depraved conduct that

15 shocks the public conscience.’” Ortiz v. Garland, 25 F.4th 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation

16 omitted).

17 Respondents contend that Petitioner’s 2023 conviction under Tex. Penal Code § 32.31 is a

18 CIMT within section 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). (Doc. 8 at 2). While the record is unclear as to which

19 subsection of section 32.31 Petitioner was convicted, as Respondents pointed out, each subsection

20 of section 32.31 involves some form of fraud or dishonesty. Further, the Ninth Circuit has held

21 credit card fraud to be a CIMT. See Balogun v. Gonzales, 126 F. App’x 874 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding

22 that conviction of credit card fraud was a crime of moral turpitude). Accordingly, Petitioner is

23 subject to mandatory detention under section 1226(c)(1)(A) and is therefore ineligible for a bond

24 redetermination before an immigration judge.

25 C. Petitioner’s As-applied Due Process Claim Fails at This Stage

26 Petitioner claims that his continued detention without an individualized hearing at which

27 the Government bears the burden by clear and convincing evidence violates the Fifth Amendment.

28 (Doc. 1 at 2).

1 The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that no person shall be “deprived of

2 life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” “It is well established that the Fifth

3 Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law” in removal proceedings, Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.

4 292, 306 (1993), and “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious

5 constitutional problem,” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). At the same time,

6 “[d]etention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”

7 Demore, 538 U.S. at 531.

8 In Demore, the Supreme Court sustained such detention under section 1226(c) on the

9 understanding that it lasts only “for the brief period necessary for [the noncitizen’s] removal

10 proceedings,” relying on data reflecting detention averaging approximately a month and a half, and

11 approximately four months in the minority of cases involving an appeal to the Board of Immigration

12 Appeals. Demore, 538 U.S. at 513, 529-31. As discussed above, Demore does not, however,

13 foreclose a Due Process Clause challenge where detention extends well beyond the period the Court

14 contemplated. See id. at 532-33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (a detainee “could be entitled to an

15 individualized determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention

16 became unreasonable or unjustified”).

17 Under section 1226(c), there is no bright-line rule fixing the point at which detention

18 becomes unreasonable. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297-303 (2018); see also

19 Gonzalez v. Bonnar, No. 18-cv-05321-JSC, 2019 WL 330906, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2019).

20 Where a Due Process Clause challenge is presented, courts evaluate the claim under the balancing

21 framework of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), weighing the private interest at stake,

22 the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest, and the Government’s interest. See Rodriguez

23 Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2022); Diep v. Wofford, No. 1:24-cv-01238-

24 SKO, 2025 WL 604744 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2025). Applying that framework to immigration

25 detention, the Ninth Circuit has identified as relevant the duration of detention to date, the

26 anticipated duration of future detention, delays attributable to either party, and the likelihood that

27 the proceedings will result in a final removal order. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207-08.

28 Petitioner has been detained since April 15, 2026, approximately four months. That period

1 is approximately near the period Demore identified as the ordinary duration of detention during

2 removal proceedings, including those involving an administrative appeal. 538 U.S. at 529-31.

3 The posture of the proceedings likewise does not yet suggest indefinite detention. Neither

4 party has advised the Court of the current status of Petitioner’s removal proceedings or of any

5 scheduled hearing dates, and Respondents do not contend that proceedings are near conclusion. On

6 this record, the undersigned cannot find that Petitioner’s detention is likely to extend indefinitely,

7 nor that it is likely to end imminently.

8 Further, there is no indication that Petitioner has engaged in bad-faith delay, and a

9 noncitizen is not penalized for pursuing available relief. Neither is there any indication of dilatory

10 conduct by the government.

11 Weighing these considerations, the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention has not yet

12 become so prolonged as to require an individualized bond hearing as a matter of due process.

13 However, the undersigned’s recommendation of denial rests on duration, and duration changes.

14 Therefore, the undersigned recommends the petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED WITHOUT

15 PREJUDICE so that Petitioner may return to this Court if his detention continues to lengthen

16 without resolution of his removal proceedings.

17 D. Motion for Immediate Release

18 Petitioner separately moves for immediate release or, in the alternative, for a bond hearing.

19 (Doc. 2). The alternative request is coextensive with the relief sought in the petition and is

20 addressed above. As to immediate release, even a meritorious prolonged-detention claim would

21 warrant an individualized hearing rather than an order of release, leaving the custody determination

22 to the immigration judge in the first instance. The undersigned further notes that the petition’s

23 assertions that Petitioner “has no criminal history” and “no criminal record” (Doc. 1 at 2) are

24 inconsistent with the record. (Doc. 8-3). The motion should be denied.

25 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

26 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

27 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be DENIED WITHOUT

28 PREJUDICE;

] 2. The motion for immediate release (Doc. 2) be DENIED; and,

2 3. The motion to dismiss (Doc. 8) be GRANTED.

3 These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Court

4 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304

5 | of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California.

6 | Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, a

7 | party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Jd. The document

8 | should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation” and shall

9 | not exceed fifteen (15) pages, except by leave of court with good cause shown. The Court will not

10 | consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s),

11 || the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number,

12 || when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the

13 | fifteen (15) page limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings

14 | and Recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure

15 | to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson

16 | v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014). This recommendation is not an order that is

17 | immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to

18 | Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

19 | Court’s judgment.

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IT IS SO ORDERED. .

23 | Dated: _ August 26, 2026 Cn Un. de | Gxllo

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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