Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 DEREK HOWARD BURR, Case No.: 1:26-cv-04163-EGC

12 Petitioner, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED

13 v.

14 RIDGECREST MUNICIPAL COURT, Deadline: Respond Within 30 Days

15 Respondent.

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17 Petitioner Derek Howard Burr is a state pretrial detainee proceeding pro se with a petition

18 for writ of habeas corpus.

19 I. BACKGROUND

20 Petitioner is currently confined at the Kern County Lerdo Pretrial Facility. (Doc. 1 at 2.)

21 The petition states he is “awaiting trial.” (Id.) In the instant federal habeas petition, Petitioner

22 contends he has “been ‘charged’ with enhancements not ‘charges,’” is being held without bail, his

23 attorney “was not present for any of [his] court appearances” between January 23 and April 23,

24 2026, and his “due process rights have been violated (no time waivers). (Id. at 3.) Petitioner also

25 alleges “[arrest] dates, filing dates, [arraignment] dates, no [warrants],” and that the prosecutor

26 was his “private family lawyer paid by [his] Great Uncle David Taylor [and] Aunt Mary Taylor

27 [who] mishandled-misappropriated their estate.” (Id.)

1 II. DISCUSSION

2 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases1 requires preliminary review of a

3 habeas petition and allows a district court to dismiss a petition before the respondent is ordered to

4 file a response, if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner

5 is not entitled to relief in the district court.”

6 A. Younger Abstention

7 In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that when there is a

8 pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state

9 prosecution. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41; Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013);

10 see also Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 133 (2004) (“The doctrine of Younger v. Harris . . .

11 reinforces our federal scheme by preventing a state criminal defendant from asserting ancillary

12 challenges to ongoing state criminal procedures in federal court”). “Younger abstention is a

13 jurisprudential doctrine rooted in overlapping principles of equity, comity, and federalism.” San

14 Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d

15 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit has held that the “logical implication” of Younger

16 “is that abstention principles likewise prohibit a federal court from considering a pre-conviction

17 habeas petition that seeks preemptively to litigate an affirmative constitutional defense unless the

18 petitioner can demonstrate that ‘extraordinary circumstances’ warrant federal intervention.”

19 Brown v. Ahern, 676 F.3d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83

20 (9th Cir. 1980)). Extraordinary circumstances include “cases of proven harassment or

21 prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid

22 conviction,” or situations “where irreparable injury can be shown.” Brown, 676 F.3d at 903

23 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Carden, 626 F.2d at 84).

24 “[T]he rule of this circuit is that abstention principles generally require a federal district

25 court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a habeas petition in which the petitioner raises a

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27 1 The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases also apply to § 2241 habeas petitions. See Rule 1(b) of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases (“The district court may apply any or all of these rules to a habeas corpus petition not

1 claim under the Speedy Trial Clause as an affirmative defense to state prosecution.” Brown, 676

2 F.3d at 903 (emphasis added). However, a petitioner seeking “only to demand enforcement of the

3 [State]’s affirmative constitutional obligation to bring him promptly to trial,” and having

4 exhausted all available state remedies toward that end, may go forward with a federal habeas

5 petition. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1973). See

6 Coleman v. Ahlin, 542 F. App’x 549, 551 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that Braden “[p]lac[ed] great

7 weight on the fact that ‘petitioner made no effort to abort a state proceeding or to disrupt the

8 orderly functioning of state judicial processes,’ and that he came ‘to federal court, not in an effort

9 to forestall a state prosecution, but to enforce the Commonwealth’s obligation to provide him

10 with a state court forum.’” (quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at 491)).

11 Here, it is unclear following review of the petition what remedy Petitioner seeks, but the

12 Court presumes Petitioner seeks a release from custody. Although unclear, it appears that

13 Petitioner raises a speedy trial claim as an affirmative defense to state prosecution, which would

14 require the Court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. However, it is possible that Petitioner

15 seeks only to demand enforcement of the State’s obligation to bring him promptly to trial.

16 Therefore, Petitioner must inform the Court whether he raises a speedy trial claim as an

17 affirmative defense to state prosecution or whether he seeks only to demand enforcement of the

18 State’s obligation to bring him promptly to trial.

19 B. Exhaustion

20 Further, it appears that Petitioner may have failed to exhaust the claims that raises in the

21 instant petition. “As a prudential matter, courts require that habeas petitioners exhaust all

22 available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Ward v.

23 Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047

24 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30

25 (2006)). “The rule of exhaustion in federal habeas corpus actions is rooted in considerations of

26 federal-state comity.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973). The “comity

27 considerations are not limited to challenges to the validity of state court convictions,” but also

1 | speedy trial.” Jd. (citing Braden, 410 U.S. 484). A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion

2 || requirement by providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider each

3 | claim before presenting it to the federal court. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999);

4 | Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). If

5 | Petitioner has not sought relief in the California Supreme Court, the Court will not proceed to the

6 | merits of his claims as a prudential matter. The petition lacks any indication that Petitioner sought

7 || review in the California Supreme Court. Thus, Petitioner must inform the Court whether each of

8 | his claims has been presented to the California Supreme Court, and if possible, provide the Court

9 | with a copy of the petition filed in the California Supreme Court that includes the claims now

10 | presented and a file stamp showing that the petition was indeed filed in the California Supreme

11 | Court.

12 Il. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

13 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS Petitioner to show cause within thirty (30)

14 | days from the date of service of this order why the petition should not be dismissed on Younger

15 | grounds and for a failure to exhaust state judicial remedies.

16 A failure to respond to this Order to Show Cause (OSC) will result in a

17 | recommendation for dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of

18 | Civil Procedure for a failure to comply with orders and failure to prosecute.

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20 IT IS SO ORDERED. .

21 | Dated: _ August 26, 2026 C “iy de | Gsllo

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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