Opinion

Perez

Court: District Court, E.D. California
Filed: Aug 26, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases

The opinion

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9 CLAYBORN WASHINGTON, No. 1:25-cv-0684-JLT-EPG

10 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,

RECOMMENDATING THIS ACTION BE

11 v. DISMISSED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE

12 PEREZ, et al. TO PROSECUTE, AND FAILURE TO

COMPLY WITH A COURT ORDER

Defendants.

(ECF No. 9)

15 I. INTRODUCTION

16 Plaintiff Clayborn Washington is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil

17 rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the complaint commencing this

18 action on June 5, 2025. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff appears to assert a myriad of claims including

conspiracy, cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, emotional

abuse and mental anguish, excessive confinement, negligence, gross corruption, and violation of

the equal protection clause related to criminal proceedings against him.

The Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint on July 10, 2026, finding that his complaint

failed to state any cognizable claims. (ECF No. 9 at 1). Specifically, the Court stated Plaintiff’s

complaint failed to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, asserted claims against

prosecutor defendants, and some of his claims were barred under Heck v. Humphrey. (Id. at 4-6).

The Court gave Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint or notify the Court that he

wanted to stand on his complaint. (Id. at 2). Additionally, the Court warned Plaintiff that, if he

chose to stand on his complaint, the Court would issue findings and recommendations to the

1 district judge assigned to the case recommending that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for the

2 reasons set forth in this order. The Court also warned Plaintiff that if he failed to file anything, the

3 Court would recommend that the case be dismissed. (Id. at 2).

4 The thirty-day deadline has passed, and Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or

otherwise responded to the Court’s order. Accordingly, for the reasons below, the Court will

recommend that Plaintiff’s case be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim,

failure to prosecute, and failure to comply with a court order.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court screens the complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

III. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff filed his complaint on June 5, 2025 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s complaint lists

numerous causes of action, including violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for equal protection, the

Eighth Amendment, conspiracy, state law claims, and mental anguish and emotional distress.

Plaintiff’s complaint asserts these claims against Doctor Perez and the District Attorney, along

with an unknown number of defendants.

Plaintiff’s complaint begins as follows:

19 The elements necessary for this action are as follows: 1. A conspiracy by the Defendant

Individuals to corrupt and sully the constitution of the United States. 2. With the purpose

of depriving a class of citizens equal protection of the law. 3. With a purposeful intent to

21 discriminate, i.e. there is a class based invidiously discriminatory animus behind the

conspirator's actions, causing 4. Emotional injury to the Plaintiff and a deprivation of his

22 rights and privileges as a citizen of the United States resulting from ongoing and

continuous "EVIL" actions by the Defendant Individuals in the Defendant Individuals for

23 erroneously enacting and upholding a law that infringes on the Civil and Constitutional.

Rights of the Plaintiff as well as violates his 4th, 5th and 14th Amendments. The

Defendant Individuals who caused Plaintiff to be unconstitutionally committed are not

25 entitled to absolute or qualified immunity from liability for damages and tlie Defendant

Individuals are not shielded from damages liability on grounds that enacting and

26 upholding an unconstitutional law is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render

the Defendant Individuals belief in their act unreasonable and causing them to lose the

27 shield of immunity making them liable for damages.

1 (ECF No. 1 at 1-2). Plaintiff’s complaint then alleges “Defendant Individuals entered into a

2 criminal conspiracy in order, under color of Federal and State law, to commit a broad base of

3 intellectual and ethical crimes, including, but not limited to, a conspiracy to create a civil rights

4 violation of the constitution.” (Id. at 2). Plaintiff appears to allege this conspiracy was enacted to

5 civilly commit him as a sexually violent predator, which Plaintiff further argues was excess. (Id.

6 at 3).

7 For damages, Plaintiff seeks “retroactive damages of $1,500.00 a day from each

8 Defendant Individual for emotional abuse, mental anguish, gross negligence and cruel and

9 unusual punishment, retroactive punitive damages of $50,000.00 a year, retroactive damages of

10 $1,000,000.00 a year for suffering with depression retroactive damages of $1,000,000.00 a year

11 for negligent actions by Defendant Individuals. (ECF No. 1 at 9).

12 IV. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

13 a. No Short and Plain Statement

14 Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 8 of the Federal Rule of Civil

15 Procedure because it does not contain a short and plain statement of any claim.

A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this

plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not

required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681

(9th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The complaint must also contain

“sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to

defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Moreover, Plaintiff

must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in deprivation of his

1 rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77.

2 Additionally, complaints that are needlessly long, highly repetitious, or conclusory violate

3 Rule 8 and may be dismissed. Gibson v. City of Portland, 165 F.4th 1265, 1289 (9th Cir. 2026)

4 (“district courts do not have to accept such shotgun pleadings. It is not the job of the district

5 courts to make sense of the pleading, to supply facts to support the claim, or to imagine the claims

6 that might fit the facts”); Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir.

7 2011) (citing McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding a Rule 8(a)

8 dismissal of a complaint that was “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely

9 irrelevant”); Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 415 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding a Rule 8(a)

10 dismissal of a complaint that “exceeded 70 pages in length, [and was] confusing and

11 conclusory”)).

12 Finally, a complaint should not be pled in a “shotgun” manner, which occurs when

[A] party indiscriminately incorporates assertions from one count to another, for example,

by incorporating all facts or defenses from all previous counts into each successive count

14 ... prevent[ing] the opposing party from reasonably being able to prepare a response or

simply mak[ing] the burden of doing so more difficult.

5A Wright & Miller's Federal Practice and Procedure § 1326 (4th ed. 2024). There are four main

types of shotgun pleadings:

17 (1) a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all

preceding counts, causing each successive count to be a combination of the entire

18 complaint;

(2) a complaint that is replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously

20 connected to any particular cause of action;

21 (3) a complaint that fails to separate into a different count each cause of action or claim

for relief; and

(4) a complaint that asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying

which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the

24 defendants the claim is brought against.

35A C.J.S. Fed. Civ. Proc. § 310 (2025); see also 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading § 159 (2025)

(discussing the “four rough types or categories of shotgun pleadings”). The Ninth Circuit has

recently explained that “district courts do not have to accept such shotgun pleadings. It is not the

job of the district courts to make sense of the pleading, to supply facts to support the claim, or to

1 imagine the claims that might fit the facts.” Gibson, 165 F.4th at 1289.

2 Plaintiff’s complaint is pled in a manner that is considered a “shotgun pleading,” which

3 fails to set forth a plain statement of his claims as required by Rule 8.

4 The complaint “asserts multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying

5 which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions.” Gibson, 165 F.4th at 1288.

6 Plaintiff lists numerous causes of action, but Plaintiff does not specify what each defendant did or

7 failed to do to violate his rights; rather, he relies on vague statements while naming only

8 “Defendant Individuals.”

9 Additionally, Plaintiff’s entire complaint is replete with conclusory statements and is

10 entirely argumentative in nature. Plaintiff alleges various immaterial facts that are not connected

11 with any causes of action. For example, Plaintiff claims “The Defendant Individuals have

12 breached their fiduciary duty in that, (they hold in trust the rights of the constitution for the

13 citizens of the United States), in a manner displaying oppression, fraud, and malice within their

14 individual meaning,” yet provides no basis for this claim or any explanation as to how the specific

15 actions of defendants support such claims.

16 In short, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to contain a short and plain statement of Plaintiff’s

17 claims. Plaintiff does not specifically describe what each defendant did or failed to do that

18 supports each of Plaintiff’s claims.

19 Plaintiff’s complaint is thus subject to dismissal for failing to comply with Rule 8’s

20 requirement of a short and plain statement of Plaintiff’s claims.

21 b. Prosecutor Defendants

22 Plaintiff’s complaint is also subject to dismissal to the extent it seeks to assert claims

23 against the prosecutor of a criminal case for damages based on the prosecutor’s role in court

24 proceedings.

25 As the Ninth Circuit has explained, judges and prosecutors are immune from civil claims

based on their participation in court proceedings:

Absolute immunity is generally accorded to judges and prosecutors functioning in

their official capacities. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55

28 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (holding that state circuit judge is immune from suit for all

1 actions within his jurisdiction); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31, 96

S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (holding that state prosecutor had absolute

immunity for initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecutions, including presentation

of case at trial). This immunity reflects the long-standing “general principle of the

highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in

4 exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own

convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.” Bradley

5 v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871).

Recognizing these considerations, courts have extended the protections of absolute

7 immunity to qualifying state officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Miller v.

Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir.2003) (explaining that though § 1983 does

8 not include a defense of immunity, “the Supreme Court has recognized that when

Congress enacted § 1983, it was aware of a well-established and well-understood

9 common-law tradition that extended absolute immunity to individuals performing

functions necessary to the judicial process” (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.

219, 225–26 (1988) (superseded by statute))); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.

11 259, 268–69, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). Indeed, judicial immunity

from § 1983 suits is “viewed as necessary to protect the judicial process.” Burns v.

12 Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 485, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991). Likewise, the

protections of absolute immunity accorded prosecutors reflect the “‘concern that

13 harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor’s

energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his

decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his

15 public trust.’” Id. (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423, 96 S.Ct. 984).

Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 922-923 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Broam v.

Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A state prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity

from liability under § 1983 for violating a person’s federal constitutional rights when he or she

engages in activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff’s complaint asserts claims against defendant District Attorney based on the

District Attorney’s role as the prosecutor of Plaintiff’s criminal case. For example, Plaintiff

alleges that the District Attorney is liable for “upholding a criminally illegal law that violates the

rights of a class of citizens…” and that Defendant District Attorney excessively confined Plaintiff

in violation of his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 1 at 3-4).

However, Prosecutor Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity from such claims.

26 Stump, 435 U.S. at 364; Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Where a

27 prosecutor acts as an advocate in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the state’s case,

1 absolute immunity applies.”).

2 c. Heck v. Humphrey

3 Plaintiff’s complaint also appears to seek damages based on claims that would necessarily

4 invalidate his state criminal conviction.

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner cannot use §1983 to

seek damages attributable to his allegedly unconstitutional conviction. Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). The Supreme Court reasoned that such a suit in truth mounts a

“collateral attack” on the validity of the conviction and thus intrudes on the habeas statute’s

domain. Id. at 485. Hence the so-called Heck bar on “§1983 damages actions that necessarily re-

quire the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement.” Id. at 486.

“[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a §1983 suit,” the Court went on, “the district court

must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity

of his conviction or sentence.” Id. at 487.

Under the favorable termination rule, to recover damages in a § 1983 action for an alleged

constitutional violation that would necessarily imply that a criminal conviction or sentence is

invalid, a plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence was reversed, expunged, or

16 otherwise invalidated. If the criminal conviction or sentence has not been reversed, expunged, or

17 otherwise invalidated, claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of the criminal

18 conviction or sentence must be brought in a petition for writ of habeas corpus rather than through

19 a § 1983 case. See id; Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750-751 (2004).

20 Although it is not clear, Plaintiff’s complaint appears to bring claims based on his

21 previous criminal conviction or a related order of his civil commitment in a state criminal case.

22 However, Plaintiff’s claim(s) are subject to the Heck bar to the extent success on those claims

23 would necessarily imply that Plaintiff’s conviction was invalid. Plaintiff cannot challenge a state

conviction or civil commitment in this manner and must instead appeal any conviction and

resulting commitment through the direct appellate process.

Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to challenge his state criminal conviction

through this civil rights case, it is subject to dismissal based on the Heck doctrine.

1 V. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A COURT

2 ORDER

3 The Court will also recommend dismissal based on Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this

4 case and to comply with the Court’s screening order.

In determining whether to dismiss a[n] [action] for failure to prosecute or failure to

comply with a court order, the Court must weigh the following factors: (1) the public’s

6 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket;

(3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic

7 alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits.

8 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d

9 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992)).

10 “‘The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.’”

11 Id. (quoting Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, the

12 first factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

13 As to the Court’s need to manage its docket, “[t]he trial judge is in the best position to

14 determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes with docket management and the

15 public interest. . . . It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to

16 routine noncompliance of litigants. . . .” (Id.) (citations omitted). Plaintiff has failed to respond to

17 the Court’s screening order. The failure to respond delays the case and interferes with docket

18 management. Therefore, the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

19 Turning to the risk of prejudice, “pendency of a lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial in

20 and of itself to warrant dismissal.” (Id.) (citing Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991). However, “delay

21 inherently increases the risk that witnesses’ memories will fade and evidence will become stale,”

22 id. at 643, and it is Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order and to prosecute this case that

23 is causing delay. Therefore, the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

24 As for the availability of lesser sanctions, given that Plaintiff has chosen not to prosecute

25 this action and has failed to comply with the Court’s order, despite being warned of possible

26 dismissal, there is little available to the Court that would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction

27 while protecting the Court from further unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources.

28 Considering Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status, it appears that monetary sanctions are of little

1 | use to prompt him to comply with future orders. And given the stage of these proceedings, the

2 | preclusion of evidence or witnesses is not available.

3 Lastly, because the dismissal being recommended in this case is without prejudice, the

4 | Court is stopping short of using the harshest possible sanction of dismissal with prejudice.

5 | Therefore, the fourth factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

6 Finally, because public policy favors disposition on the merits, this final factor weighs

7 | against dismissal. (/d.)

8 After weighing the factors, the Court finds that dismissal is appropriate.

9 | VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

10 Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1] 1. This action be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim, failure to

12 prosecute, and failure to comply with a court order; and

13 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.

14 Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

15 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30)

16 | days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

17 | objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

18 Findings and Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages. Any

19 | Pages filed in excess of the 15-page limit may not be considered. Exhibits shall not be filed

20 with objections, but they may be referenced by the document and page number. No new

> exhibits may be filed with objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s

factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing

°° Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

24 | IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ August 25, 2026 [se heey □□

26 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.