The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
WENDELL HALL,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 2:25-cv-207-SPC-KRH
COURTNEY JONES, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are three pending motions in this civil rights case.
Plaintiff Wendell Hall is a civil committee at the Florida Civil Commitment
Center (FCCC) in Arcadia, Florida. Acting pro se, he has sued two Defendant
FCCC officials, Clinical Director Courtney Jones1 and now-former Security
Director Glean Brown (collectively “Defendants”), seeking damages and
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the first pending motion, Hall
seeks emergency injunctive relief and a hearing. (Doc. 39). Both that motion
and Hall’s claims more broadly are founded on allegations that Defendants
failed to protect him from assault by another FCCC resident. Also pending are
1 Defendants have submitted a declaration from this individual indicating she is now known
as “Courtney Jones Carner.” (Docs. 45-1, 47-1). However, Defendants answer and briefing
continues to refer to her as she is named in the complaint, “Courtney Jones.” (See Doc. 34 at
1; Doc. 45 at 1; Doc. 47 at 1). Therefore, the Court will do likewise.
cross-motions for summary judgment by Hall (Doc. 42) and Defendants (Doc.
47). For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny Hall’s motions and will
grant summary judgment to Defendants.
Background
Hall is an involuntarily civil detainee at the FCCC. The FCCC is not a
prison; rather, it houses sexually violent predators in a secure setting after the
expiration of a criminal sentence. See Pesci v. Budz, 730 F.3d 1291, 1292 (11th
Cir. 2013). On February 18, 2025, Hall was involved in a physical altercation
with another FCCC resident, Andrew Preston. Hall says Preston assaulted
him, punching him twice in the face and grabbing him, causing both of them
to fall to the floor, where Preston continued to punch him in the face and head.
FCCC staff separated them. Hall claims Preston verbally threatened to beat
him up again. Hall denies that he touched Preston before Preston hit him, and
Hall denies ever throwing a punch or hitting Preston.
Hall maintains that, as a result of this episode, he had severe pain,
swelling, and scratches to his face; a painful lump and bruise on his head; as
well as severe mental anguish and depression. Immediately following the
incident, he was escorted to the FCCC health center. Hall was documented to
have a “small lump to [his] left forehead just above [the] brow, three lumps to
[his] right forehead, and one lump to [his] left posterior head.” (Doc. 45-3 at
3). Hall was treated with an ice pack. He then told the nurse, “I’m good,”
denied any pain, and declined further treatment.
Hall and Preston were each charged with a disciplinary violation for
fighting. An administrative disciplinary hearing ensued on February 26, 2025.
Hall appeared at the hearing; Preston did not. Both Defendants, along with a
third official not named as a party in this case, presided at the hearing. Hall
proclaimed his innocence, insisting Preston assaulted him. Hall claims he also
stated at the hearing that he feared for his safety because Preston had
threatened to beat him up again and asked Defendants to be assigned to a
separate dormitory than Preston. According to Hall, Defendant Jones replied
she did not care and that Hall would just have to fend for himself. Hall
maintains Defendant Brown similarly stated he could not help and did not care
and that it was not his problem. Jones and Brown deny making any such
statements. Indeed, they deny Hall even claimed at the hearing to be in fear
for his safety or in need of protection or that he asked to be separated from
Preston.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the disciplinary panel sustained the
fighting charges against both Hall and Preston and imposed 30 days of
confinement for each. The panel acknowledged Hall had claimed he had simply
walked past Preston, who then assaulted him. However, the panel found Hall’s
version of events was controverted by a video recording of the incident, which
is not in the record. The panel’s decision characterized the recording as
depicting the following:
Mr. Hall was observed to engage in a verbal altercation with [Mr.
Preston] down the dormitory’s hallway, before turning to charge
down the hallway toward [Mr. Preston] aggressively. Mr. Hall was
not observed attempting to “walk past” [Mr. Prestson]; rather he
approached [Mr. Preston] directly to the point that both residents
were “chest-to-chest” in proximity before the physical altercation
ensued. [Mr. Preston], prior to this, did not pursue nor enter Mr.
Hall’s personal space.
((See Doc. 42-1 at 13). Both Defendants similarly testify to the contents of the
recording, stating:
Camera footage revealed that Mr. Hall approached Mr. Preston in
an aggressive manner and there was a verbal exchange. Mr.
Preston walked away toward his own room. Mr. Hall walked
toward the area of the dorm where his shoes were located and put
on his shoes. Mr. Hall then charged down the hallway aggressively
toward Mr. Preston and got chest-to-chest with Mr. Preston and
the two Residents made contact with each other. An altercation
then ensued between the Residents.
(Doc. 47-1 at 3, ¶ 9; 47-2 at 3, ¶ 9). Hall, on the other hand, insists, “The video
camera recording does not show me pushing or touching Preston with my
hands, chest or with any part of my body, but only shows me walking towards
Preston, then he physically assaulted me for no reason.” (Doc. 49 at 2, ¶ 7).
Hall further states, “[T]he video camera footage … shows that I never threw a
punch … but that [Preston] … punched me first in my face and we both fell to
the floor and Preston then continued to punch me in my face ….” (Id. ¶ 6).
Defendants recognize Hall also presented a statement from another
resident, Raymond Senterfitt, in connection with the disciplinary charges.
Senterfitt claimed Hall and Preston were arguing over switching rooms when
Hall started walking towards the day room. Senterfitt said he heard a
commotion and saw Hall on the floor with Preston on top of him, hitting his
face. Defendants determined, however, that Senterfitt’s testimony did not
contradict the video evidence, as it was not disputed that Hall and Preston had
a physical altercation.
Following the incident, Hall and Preston were confined in separate
dormitories. But beginning ten days later, February 28, 2025, they were again
put in the same one. On March 1, 2025, Hall submitted a written
communication form to Jones stating he was in fear of being assaulted again
by Preston and wanted to be assigned to a separate dormitory. On March 4,
2025, Jones responded. She noted that, as stated in the disciplinary decision,
the video recording showed the February incident had been a “fight, not an
assault.” She added that if Hall “had concerns for his safety, he could speak to
security staff to request Protective Management.”
Hall claims he also submitted a similar form in FCCC institutional mail
addressed to Brown on March 2, 2025. On that form, Hall stated he was in
fear for his life because Preston had previously assaulted him and threatened
to do so again. Hall therefore asked Brown to separate him from Preston. The
form contains no acknowledgement or other response from Brown. Indeed,
Brown denies having seen the document until this litigation.
Hall commenced this action on March 6, 2025,2 claiming Defendants
were liable for failing to protect him from the risk of further assaults by
Preston. Meanwhile, according to Hall, Preston assaulted him again on March
16, 2025, punching him in the face and causing “severe physical pain and
injury.” (Doc. 42-1 at 5, ¶ 19; see also Doc. 33 at 5, ¶ 20). However, Hall makes
no claim he sought, received, or needed medical treatment. Further,
Defendants deny being aware of the incident until this litigation. Indeed, there
is no indication Hall or anyone else brought this alleged assault to the
attention of Defendants or other FCCC staff until August 2025, when Hall first
served a second amended complaint mentioning it. (See Doc. 25 at 5, ¶ 20).
Brown also ceased to be the FCCC Security Director sometime in August 2025.
On January 29, 2026, Hall filed a “Motion for Emergency or Urgent
Order or Motion for Order or Motion for Hearing.” (Doc. 39). It is one of the
motions now pending and is accompanied by a declaration from Hall.3 (Doc.
2 The Clerk formally docketed Hall’s complaint on March 13, 2025. (Doc. 1). However,
because Hall is confined and acting pro se, his filings are generally deemed filed on the date
presented to FCCC officials for mailing. See Boatman v. Berreto, 938 F.3d 1275, 1276 (11th
Cir. 2019).
3 Hall at times refers to this and other evidentiary statements by him as “affidavits.” (See
Doc. 40; Doc. 42-1 at 3–7; Doc. 49). However, these documents are not sworn before a notary
and do not comply with the requirements of a true affidavit. However, they do recite that the
statements they contain are made under penalty of perjury. Therefore, they qualify as
unsworn declarations that can substitute for an affidavit under 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
40). He there alleges that, on January 28, 2026, Preston angrily approached
him as Hall was using the telephone in their dormitory, with Preston
expressing that Hall’s phone use was disturbing him. Preston again
threatened to beat Hall up, pushed him hard in the face, and slapped him
repeatedly. However, Hall does not claim he suffered injury. He again also
makes no claim to have sought, received, or needed any medical treatment.
Hall alleges he told Defendant Jones about the incident later that day,
again claiming to fear for his safety and asking to be separated from Preston.
Jones allegedly refused.4 In his emergency motion, Hall seeks an order
requiring Jones to protect Hall by keeping him and Preston in different dorms.
Upon receipt of Hall’s motion, the Court issued its standing order regarding
confined persons claiming an imminent risk of serious physical harm. (Doc.
41). Hall has not filed a pleading containing allegations related to the January
28, 2026, assault. In their respective summary judgment declarations, neither
Jones nor Brown specifically mention this January 2026 incident.
On April 16, 2026, Hall moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 42). That
motion was accompanied by an evidentiary submission. (Doc. 42-1).
Defendants filed an opposition (Doc. 45), with an evidentiary submission of
4 Hall asserts he also communicated with FCCC Facility Director Jarad Anderson on January
29, 2026, and requested to be separated from Preston. (Doc. 40). Hall says that Anderson
also refused. However, Anderson is not a party to this case, so he faces no potential liability
here. Nor does Hall argue that Jones or Brown could be liable for Anderson’s conduct.
their own. (Docs. 45-1 to 45-9). On May 26, 2026, Defendants filed a cross-
motion for summary judgment (Doc. 47), relying on the same evidence they
filed in opposition to Hall’s summary judgment motion. (Docs. 47-1 to 47-9).
Hall responded with a supplemental declaration (Doc. 49) and more briefing.
(Docs. 50, 51). Defendants did not file a reply in support of their motion for
summary judgment. All pending motions, i.e., Hall’s “emergency motion” and
the cross-motions for summary judgment, are ripe for decision.5
Legal Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it
“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And a material fact is in genuine
5 Hall suggests the “defendants’ response to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
requested … summary judgment in their favor.” (Doc. 50 at 2). He then argues that the
“defendants’ response cannot be converted to a motion for summary judgment for their
requested relief, since the court has not provided plaintiff a 10-day notice and an opportunity
to respond to defendants’ response treated as a motion for summary judgment.” (Id.) Hall
misapprehends Defendants’ filings and the procedures attending summary judgment under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Defendants filed an opposition to Hall’s motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 45), but they also separately filed their own, separate cross-motion for summary
judgment in their favor. (Doc. 47). Accordingly, the Court need not “convert” anything.
Rather, the Court considers Hall’s motion for summary judgment, Defendants’ opposition to
that motion, and Defendants’ cross-motion just as they characterize themselves. The Court’s
scheduling order and Rule 56 put Hall on notice that he was authorized to file evidence and
argument in opposition to Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment. (See Doc. 35 at
2–5, ¶ 4). In fact, since Defendants filed their summary judgment opposition and cross-
motion, Hall has filed additional evidence in the form of a supplemental declaration (Doc. 49)
and additional briefing (Docs. 50, 51), all of which the Court will consider.
dispute “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Id.
The moving party bears the initial burden to show a lack of genuinely
disputed material fact. Clark v. Coats & Clark, 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.
1991). If carried, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to point out a
genuine dispute. Id. At this stage, a court views all facts and draws all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1341–42 (11th Cir. 2002). That the parties
have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter the standard.
See United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Cross-
motions for summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in
granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed[.]” (citation
omitted)). That is, a court considers cross-motions for summary judgment
distinctly, viewing the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of
the non-movant on each one. See Cambridge Christian Sch., Inc. v. Fla. High
Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 115 F.4th 1266, 1287 (11th Cir. 2024).
Analysis
To establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant
deprived him of a right secured under the Constitution or federal law, and (2)
the deprivation occurred under color of state law. Bingham v. Thomas, 654
F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 1998)). In addition, the plaintiff must establish an
affirmative causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the
constitutional deprivation. Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1059
(11th Cir. 2001).
There is no dispute that, as members of the FCCC staff, Defendants were
acting under color of state law. See Hall v. Carner, No. 2:23-CV-595-SPC-NPM,
2024 WL 964194, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2024). The issues, rather, are
whether Hall suffered a violation of his constitutional rights and whether any
violation was caused by Defendants.
In Youngberg v. Romeo, the Supreme Court held that involuntarily
committed persons have a right to reasonably safe conditions of confinement
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 457 U.S. 307, 322
(1982). Those rights are “at least as extensive” as the Eighth Amendment
rights of prisoners, so “relevant case law in the Eighth Amendment context
also serves to set forth the contours of the due process rights of the civilly
committed.” Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1041 (11th Cir. 1996).
The Eighth Amendment’s “prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments requires prison officials to ‘take reasonable measures to
guarantee the safety of the inmates.’“ Cox v. Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1357 (11th
Cir. 2021) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). That
encompasses a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
inmates. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. “But that does not mean that prison
officials are liable for every act of inmate-on-inmate violence.” Daniels v.
Felton, 823 F. App’x 787, 789 (11th Cir. 2020). A plaintiff must demonstrate
three elements to establish a failure-to-protect claim: (1) confinement
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) an official’s deliberate
indifference to that risk; and (3) causation. Cox, 15 F.4th at 1358.
The first element “is assessed objectively and requires the plaintiff to
show conditions that were extreme and posed an unreasonable risk of serious
injury to his future health or safety.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233
(11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The second
element—deliberate indifference—requires: “(1) the defendants’ subjective
knowledge of the risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; and (3) conduct
that amounts to more than mere negligence.” Daniels, 823 F. App’x at 789. To
be liable, each defendant “must both be aware of the facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
also draw the inference.” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233 (cleaned up). Defendants
contest Hall’s ability to prove any element of his claims.
Hall does not appear to claim Defendants are liable for failing to protect
him from the initial altercation on February 18, 2025. However, to the extent
Hall might be raising such a claim, he fails to show Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm at that time. The
fact that an attack occurred cannot itself show such a risk existed. See Brooks
v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2015). Hall does not present
evidence that Preston had a history of violence or animosity towards Hall,
other FCCC residents, or staff prior to the first altercation. Nor does Hall claim
he faced a substantial risk of serious harm from other residents more
generally. Hall now claims Preston also assaulted him on March 16, 2025, and
January 28, 2026, and assaulted an FCCC staff member in April 2026.
However, “whether a prison official is deliberately indifferent is judged—both
objectively and subjectively—on the facts the prison official knew at the time
she responded to the risk of harm to the prisoner.” Mosley v. Zachery, 966 F.3d
1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020); see also Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1301. Accordingly,
when assessing whether, at the time of the February 2025 altercation,
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm,
subsequent events are irrelevant.
Given the lack of evidence that there was a substantial risk of harm or
that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to such a risk prior to the initial
altercation in February 2025, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
on any claim alleging they failed to protect Hall from that altercation. See
Oliver v. Harden, 587 F. App’x 618, 620 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming summary
judgment for defendants where the plaintiff and another inmate “had no
conflict prior to the attack, none of the guards had any knowledge that [the
other inmate] was particularly violent, and [the plaintiff] had not asked … to
be protected from [the other inmate].”).
Hall clearly does claim, however, Defendants are liable for failing to
protect him after that first incident. In particular, Hall alleges in his latest
complaint that Preston assaulted him less than a month later, on March 16,
2025. Hall claims Preston punched him in the head and back, causing severe
pain and mental anguish. There is no evidence that Hall reported the incident
or that he sought, received, or needed any medical attention. Nevertheless,
Hall argues he faced a substantial risk of serious harm at that time based on
the February incident, which had included a threat by Preston to beat him up
again. Hall also maintains Defendants were deliberately indifferent to that
risk. Specifically, Hall emphasizes Defendants were aware of the February
altercation, and he claims he advised Defendants of Preston’s threat asked to
be assigned to a different dormitory for protection.
The record does not establish that Hall faced a substantial risk of serious
harm before the March 2025 incident. Because this element is judged by an
objective standard, Hall’s subjective fears or beliefs do not control. To be sure,
Hall and Preston had a physical altercation the preceding month. But the
record shows the fight was spontaneous and Hall’s injuries were minor, despite
Hall’s vague and unsupported claims of severe pain and mental anguish.
Immediately after the skirmish, Hall was taken to the nurse, who observed
only superficial bumps and bruises that were treated with an ice pack. The
nurse further documented that Hall stated, “I’m good,” denied any pain, and
declined further treatment. Hall does not dispute that account. Further, there
is no evidence that Hall and Preston had prior animosity or that Preston had
a history of violence with other residents or staff.
Even if Hall could show he faced a substantial risk of serious harm at
the time of the March 16, 2025, incident, the evidence fails to support that
either Jones or Brown was deliberately indifferent to such a risk. In the
context of potential inmate-on-inmate violence, “not every risk carries an
inherent threat at a substantial level, or of severity beyond the norms.” Lakin
v. Barnhart, 758 F.3d 66, 72 (1st Cir. 2014) (Souter, J., sitting by designation).
“The unfortunate reality is that threats between inmates are common and do
not, under all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge of a substantial
risk of harm.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2019); see
also Milledge v. Fla. Dep't of Corr. Sec'y, 760 F. App'x 741, 744 (11th Cir. 2019)
(holding that a single threat by the plaintiff’s cellmate was insufficient to show
a substantial risk of serious harm). Likewise, that an inmate has sought and
been denied protective custody does not itself mean officials were deliberately
indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm. See McClinton v. Warden,
Baldwin State Prison, 172 F.4th 1276, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 2026); see also
Mosley v. Zachery, 966 F.3d 1265, 1271–72 (11th Cir. 2020) (rejecting that if
an inmate says he is in fear for his life, prison officials must immediately place
the inmate in protective custody pending an investigation); Alsobrook v.
Alvarado, 656 F. App'x 489, 494 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding defendant was not
deliberately indifferent despite the plaintiff’s remarks that he and his cellmate
were having “problems” and needed to be separated). The same is true when
officials decline to keep inmates separated after a prior physical altercation.
See Hodges v. Dep’t of Corr., 61 F.4th 588, 592–93 (8th Cir. 2023). “Successful
deliberate-indifference claims will generally require some further reason—
beyond the plaintiff having informed the defendant officers of the threat—that
a prison official could have concluded that a particular threat evidenced a
substantial threat, rather than the mere possibility, of serious harm.”
Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1236.
Both Defendants were well aware of the initial altercation on February
18, 2025, having served on the disciplinary hearing panel and viewed a video
recording of the incident. Hall claims he expressed fear for his safety at the
disciplinary hearing because Preston had threatened to beat him up again and
asked Defendants to assign the two to separate dormitories. Hall claims
Defendants expressly refused that request at the hearing. Hall states he also
sent written communications via FCCC institutional mail to Jones on March
1, 2025, and to Brown on March 2, 2025, in which Hall similarly claimed to
fear further assault by Preston and asked for protection.
Defendants deny that Hall requested protection or separate dorm
assignments at the disciplinary hearing and that they denied any such request.
The Court, however, must credit Hall’s testimony in addressing Defendants’
motion for summary judgment.6 But even assuming the hearing transpired
the way Hall says it did, Jones cannot be liable for failing to protect Hall from
the assault on March 16, 2025. In particular, Hall sent Jones a written
communication form dated March 1, 2025, stating the same things Hall claims
he voiced at the hearing, i.e., that Preston had threatened him, he feared
another assault, and he wanted to be separated from Preston. On March 4,
2025, twelve days before the next incident, Jones sent a written response
stating that if Hall had concerns about his safety, he could apply for Protective
Management with the FCCC security staff. It is undisputed Hall never did so.
In any case, Jones’s response advising Hall of the proper institutional channel
6 The Court also notes Hall further alleges in his summary judgment declaration that Jones
told him at the disciplinary hearing that she would not separate him from Preston “since
[Hall] file[d] so many lawsuits against the FCCC.” (Doc. 42-1 at 4, ¶ 7). Jones also denies
making any such statement. But assuming she did for purposes of summary judgment, the
Court recognizes that the First Amendment prohibits officials from taking materially adverse
actions against inmates and other detainees in retaliation for protected expression or
activities, including the filing of grievances and lawsuits regarding conditions of confinement.
See Hall v. Merola, 67 F.4th 1282, 1294 (11th Cir. 2023). Despite the allegation in his
declaration, however, Hall does not argue in his summary judgment briefs that he might
recover under a First Amendment or retaliation theory. Even if he had, the complaint does
not mention any statement by Jones about Hall’s prior lawsuits, the First Amendment, or
retaliation. Accordingly, the complaint fails to raise any such claim. See Coon v.. Ga. Pac.
Corp., 829 F.2d 1563, 1568–71 (11th Cir. 1987). Nor may Hall use summary judgment filings
to raise new claims. See Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir.
2004). Accordingly, no First Amendment or other retaliation claim is properly before the
Court.
to request protective custody was prompt and objectively reasonable, belying
that she was deliberately indifferent to any risk of harm. See Kornagay v.
Tabil, No. 2:24-CV-980-SPC-NPM, 2025 WL 833228, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 17,
2025) (defendant responded reasonably to a risk by advising the plaintiff of the
proper procedure for seeking relief and forwarding the grievance to the
warden). Jones is entitled to summary judgment on Hall’s claim that she failed
to protect him from the alleged assault on March 16, 2025.
Hall claims he also sent a similar written communication form to Brown
on March 2, 2025. Brown states he never saw that form until he reviewed the
copy attached to Hall’s motion for summary judgment. Indeed, Defendants
believe Hall fabricated and backdated the form for this case. Hall adamantly
denies that.7 Nevertheless, there is no indication within the four corners of the
form or elsewhere in the record that Brown received it. The form includes
spaces for an FCCC official to mark when it is received and to respond to the
request, and both spaces are blank. What is more, there is no evidence
regarding how internal mail is collected, sorted, and delivered at the FCCC.
The Court thus declines to recognize any presumption under the “mailbox rule”
7 The Court recognizes that Hall has a documented history of abuse of the judicial process,
including filing fraudulent exhibits. See Hall v. Carner, No. 2:24-cv-338-SPC-NPM, 2024 WL
4373632, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct.2, 2024) (summarizing Hall’s history of abusing the judicial
process); see also Hall v. Watson, 734 F. Supp. 3d 1281, 1283 (M.D. Fla. 2024) (finding that
Hall filed fraudulent documents). Of course, the Court may not make credibility
determinations at summary judgment.
doctrine that the form was delivered to Brown. See Green v. Hooks, 798 F.
App’x 411, 425 (11th Cir. 2020). Because there is insufficient evidence to
dispute Brown’s claim he did not receive the form, he cannot be deemed
deliberately indifferent based on his failure to act on it. Id.
However, Hall claims he also verbally stated at the disciplinary hearing
on February 26, 2025, that he feared being assaulted by Preston and asked to
be housed in a separate dorm for protection. Hall asserts that Jones and Brown
each expressly rejected that request. Both Defendants deny Hall’s account of
the hearing, but the Court accepts it as true for purposes of Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment.
Even so, there is no evidence that Brown or Jones subjectively drew an
inference that Hall was, in fact, at substantial risk of serious harm because of
the February 2025 altercation, as required to establish deliberate indifference.
As discussed, the February 2025 fight alone did not establish that Hall faced a
substantial risk of serious harm. Again, that prior incident was spontaneous,
and Hall’s injuries were not serious. Rather, he had only minor bumps and
bruises. Hall denied any pain and declined treatment beyond an icepack.
Further, while Hall claims Preston threatened to beat him up, there was no
evidence that Preston had prior animosity towards Hall or a reputation for
violence against other residents or staff. Also, Defendants determined Hall
was partly responsible for causing the February incident, finding both Hall and
Preston guilty of fighting in violation of FCCC rules. Everyone agreed that
Hall approached Preston while arguing with him, even if it was Preston who
physically escalated the confrontation by punching and grabbing Hall.8
Anderson v. Darden, No. 5:07-CV-208(CAR), 2008 WL 4376824, at *3 (M.D. Ga.
Sept. 25, 2008) (“[A]cting as a provocateur to the subject altercation certainly
does not support [the plaintiff’s] claim that he needed protection.”). Also, Hall
ignored Jones’s advice to apply for Protective Management, suggesting even
Hall had doubts about the necessity of further protective measures. Under all
the circumstances, the evidence does not support that Brown or Jones
subjectively recognized the February altercation to present a substantial risk
of serious harm to Hall, as required to establish the element of deliberate
indifference. See Hodges, 61 F.4th at 592-93 (evidence established defendants
subjectively determined that a prior fight between inmates did not indicate a
8 Defendants stated belief that Hall was partially responsible for the fight was based
primarily on a video recording of the incident. That recording might have limited how much
credit the Court would have to give on summary judgment to the parties’ competing accounts
of the altercation. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007). However, for reasons not
explained, the video is not in the record. Therefore, in resolving the cross-motions for
summary judgment, the Court remains bound to accept the characterizations of the video
and the underlying incident as offered by each non-moving party. Defendants claim the video
shows Hall “approached [Preston] directly to the point that both residents were ‘chest-to-
chest’ in proximity before the physical altercation ensued” (Doc. 42-1 at 13), making “contact
with each other,” (Doc. 45-1 at 3, ¶ 9; Doc. 45-2 at 3, ¶ 9), and that, “prior to this, [Preston]
did not pursue nor enter Mr. Hall’s personal space.” (Doc. 42-1 at 13). Hall denies that he
first touched Preston or that he hit or tried to hit Preston at any time. Rather, Hall insists
Preston punched and grabbed him, thereby committing assault. For present purposes, the
Court credits Hall’s testimony on those points and assumes it would be borne out on the
recording. However, Hall admits he approached Preston, not the other way around. (Doc. 49
at 2, ¶ 10). Nor does Hall contest the evidence that he and Preston verbally argued before
they fought.
substantial risk of serious bodily injury requiring separation of the inmates,
despite a prior incident involving a weapon, injuries, and gang affiliations).
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Hall’s claim that they failed
to protect him from Preston’s alleged assault on March 16, 2025.
Hall also insists Defendants failed to protect him from Preston after the
March 2025 assault. In particular, he argues Defendants failed to protect him
from another assault by Preston some ten months later, on January 28, 2026.
However, Hall’s theory that Defendants are liable for failing to protect him
after the March 2025 assault has several shortcomings.
First, “the scope of litigation is framed by the complaint at the time it is
filed.” Manning v. City of Auburn, 953 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 1992). Thus,
a complaint does not present claims based on events occurring subsequent to
its filing. See id.; cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) (authorizing a supplemental
complaint setting forth transactions, occurrence, or events happening after the
filing of the operative complaint). Hall filed his operative second amended
complaint on September 13, 2025. (Doc. 33). As a result, Hall’s governing
pleading does not—and cannot—present a claim based on the January 2026
incident.
Second, Defendants deny being aware of the March 16, 2025, incident
until this litigation, and Hall fails to present evidence disputing that. Hall
makes no claim that he or anyone else reported the March 2025 incident or the
January 2026 incident to anyone or that he sought, received, or required any
medical attention for either one. Rather, Hall appears to have first mentioned
the March 2025 assault in his second amended complaint, first served in late
August 2025.9 In any case, Defendants cannot be deemed deliberately
indifferent based on events of which they were not aware. See Mosley, 966 F.3d
at 1271. Further, Brown ceased serving as FCCC Security Director sometime
in August 2025, and he could not have become aware of the contents of the
second amended complaint until sometime after that pleading was first
docketed on August 28, 2025.
In sum, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Hall fails to
establish the Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of
serious harm in violation of Hall’s due process rights. There is no genuine
issue of material fact, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. As such, Hall is not entitled to any relief, including damages or a
preliminary or permanent injunction, whether sought by his pleadings or his
“emergency motion.”
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
9 In fact, Hall oddly neglects to mention the March 2025 in an amended complaint he signed
on March 19, 2025, just three days after the assault supposedly occurred. (Doc. 6). Nor does
Hall reference the incident in another amendment filed June 6, 2025. (Doc. 14).
For the reasons explained above:
(1) Plaintiff Wendell Hall’s “emergency motion” for injunctive relief (Doc.
39) is DENIED.
(2) Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 42) is DENIED.
(8) The motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Courtney
Jones and Glean Brown (Doc. 47) is GRANTED.
(4) The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate all pending motions and
deadlines, enter judgment, and close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on September 14, 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTMP-3
Copies: All Counsel and Parties of Record
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