TADDEI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

VINCENT TADDEI : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. :

:

STATE TROOPER CORPORAL BIJAN : NO. 25-303

RASTEGARPANAH :

MEMORANDUM

Bartle, J. September 14, 2026

Plaintiff Vincent Taddei has sued Pennsylvania State

Trooper Bijan Rastegarpanah in both his official and individual

capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint also pleads

claims against defendant under state law. In essence, he

alleges that on April 10, 2023 defendant used excessive force

against him after he was stopped in Plymouth Township,

Montgomery County for various related traffic violations,

including excessive speeding. The complaint contains five

Counts: Count I for excessive force in violation of the Fourth

Amendment; Count II for assault and battery in violation of the

Fourth Amendment; Count III for assault and battery under state

law; Count IV for intentional infliction of emotional distress

under state law; and Count V for negligent infliction of

emotional distress under state law.1

1 While plaintiff asserts a violation of the Fourth Amendment

in his federal claims against defendant, the defendant is a

Pennsylvania State Trooper. Consequently, it is the Fourteenth

Amendment into which the Fourth Amendment has been incorporated,

Before the court is the motion of the defendant for

summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

I

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a

reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254

(1986). The court views the facts and draws all inferences in

favor of the nonmoving party. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust

Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2004).

Summary judgment is granted when there is insufficient

record evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find for the

nonmovant. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “The mere existence

of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party]’s

position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which

the jury could reasonably find for [that party].” Id. In

and not the Fourth Amendment that applies. See Mapp v. Ohio,

367 U.S. 643 (1961). For ease of reference, the court will

continue to refer to the Fourth Amendment.

addition, Rule 56(e)(2) provides that “[i]f a party fails to

properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly

address another party’s assertion of fact as required by

Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for

purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

II

The facts are taken in the light most favorable to

plaintiff. On April 10, 2023, defendant, in full uniform, was

in an unmarked state police patrol vehicle conducting radar

enforcement on Interstate 476 in Lower Merion Township,

Montgomery County. While doing so, he observed an SUV

travelling at a high rate of speed, that is over 100 miles per

hour and at one point over 117 miles per hour. Defendant gave

chase. He saw the SUV2 as it exited the Interstate and then as

it turned into and stopped at a Lukoil gas station on Germantown

Pike in Plymouth Township. Defendant caught up with the SUV at

that point. The defendant advised plaintiff, who was the driver

and the SUV’s lone occupant, that he was being apprehended for

speeding and fleeing and eluding law enforcement. Despite

defendant’s repeated commands (including defendant pointing his

firearm at plaintiff) to get out of the SUV, plaintiff at first

refused but finally did so. Plaintiff did not comply with the

2 Plaintiff disputes that the speeding SUV on the Interstate

observed by the defendant was plaintiff’s SUV.

defendant’s command to provide his drivers’ license, automobile

registration, or insurance information. Plaintiff, now outside

of his SUV, was argumentative with the defendant and orally

challenged his actions with assertions of his Fourth Amendment

rights. Yet plaintiff remained in place, made no threats, and

never attempted to flee. While plaintiff was close to and

facing the SUV, defendant handcuffed him without any resistance.

By this time, a number of Plymouth Township police

officers had arrived on the scene to assist defendant. The

defendant as well as a local police officer patted down and

searched plaintiff but did not find any weapons on his person.

Plaintiff was then directed by a local police officer to spit

out a lighted cigarette in his mouth. He refused to do so.

Defendant then swiped it from his mouth. Shortly thereafter,

defendant forced plaintiff’s head against the side of the SUV.3

According to plaintiff, he suffered a chipped tooth,

lip laceration, scarring of his lip, other related physical

damages and emotional damages. Thereafter, plaintiff was

transported to Roxborough Memorial Hospital for treatment of his

injuries. Plaintiff’s medical records show that he had a

“[r]egular T shaped laceration to [his] lower lip” that was “1

3 The incident at the Lukoil gas station was captured on

defendant’s vehicle camera as well as on the body-worn camera of

two local Plymouth Township police officers who had arrived at

the scene to assist defendant.

cm in diameter.” The records and photographs of plaintiff taken

after the incident show that the laceration was closed using

three sutures.

Plaintiff was charged with fleeing or attempting to

elude an officer, driving under the influence (“DUI”) and unsafe

driving in violation of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3802(a)(1),

speeding over sixty-two miles per hour, driving while license

suspended for third or subsequent DUI, operating a vehicle with

a suspended or revoked license, careless driving, operating a

vehicle with willful and wanton disregard for safety, turning or

changing lanes without signaling, obstruction, and failure to

stop or show identification. He pleaded guilty to misdemeanor

obstruction of the administration of law and operating a motor

vehicle with a suspended license and a blood alcohol

concentration of 0.02 or higher. The remaining charges were

dropped. He was sentenced to three years’ probation.

III

Defendant first argues that the Eleventh Amendment to

the Constitution ousts the federal court of jurisdiction to hear

any claims against him in his official capacity as a state

trooper. He is correct.

The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power

of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any

suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of

the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens

or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Despite its wording, the

Supreme Court has construed the amendment to bar lawsuits in the

federal court against a state by a citizen of that state. Hans

v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1890).

It is the general rule that a state, its agencies and

their officials and employees in their official capacities

cannot be sued in a federal forum, absent consent, waiver or

congressional intervention to remove the jurisdictional bar.

See Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253-56

(2011). There has been no consent to the present lawsuit, and

immunity has not been waived. Nor has Congress acted to allow

this action to proceed in federal court against the defendant.

Although there is a long-standing but narrow exception that

allows state officials in their official capacities to be sued

for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, plaintiff

here is seeking only damages and shown no entitlement to

injunctive relief. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &

Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.

123, 155-56 (1908).

Accordingly, plaintiff’s federal claims against

defendant in his official capacity will be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

IV

Count II of the complaint alleges that defendant

committed assault and battery in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. Defendant maintains that there is no such cause of

action. See Duvall v. Hustler, 447 F. Supp. 3d 311, 338 (E.D.

Pa. 2020). Plaintiff now concedes the point. The court will

grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Count II.

V

Plaintiff also brings claims against defendant under

state law in Counts III, IV, and V respectively for assault and

battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and

negligent infliction of emotional distress. The first two

claims involve intentional torts.

The Pennsylvania General Assembly has granted

sovereign immunity to the Commonwealth, its officials and

employees acting within the scope of their duties, “except as

the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.”

See 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2310; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8521-22. In

paragraph twelve of his complaint, plaintiff avers that “at all

times relevant hereto, defendant Rastegarpanah was employed in

his duties as a State Trooper for the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania.” Plaintiff does not argue that defendant at any

time acted outside of his duties as a state trooper.

Furthermore, the General Assembly has not specifically waived

the immunity for intentional torts of state employees committed

within the scope of their employment. See Williams v. Stickman,

917 A.2d 915, 917 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007); La Frankie v. Miklich,

618 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). Thus, plaintiff does

not have a viable claim against defendant for the intentional

torts of assault and battery or the tort of intentional

infliction of emotional distress.

Under Pennsylvania law, sovereign immunity has been

waived for damages arising out of a negligent act of a

Commonwealth party but only in limited instances. See 42 Pa.

Cons. Stat. § 8522. The waiver does not include instances of

negligent acts of a state police trooper in the situation

alleged here. Id. Plaintiff does not argue to the contrary.

Thus, plaintiff’s claim against defendant under state law for

negligent infliction of emotional distress is barred by

sovereign immunity.

The court will grant summary judgment in favor of

defendant on all of plaintiff’s state law claims asserted in

Counts III, IV, and V of the complaint.

VI

That leaves only Count I, in which plaintiff pleads

that defendant in his individual capacity used excessive force

during his arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

In determining if excessive force has been made out,

the Supreme Court has explained that “the question is whether

the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of

the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to

their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Reasonableness has no precise definition.

The Court stated that the application of the reasonableness test

for a claim of excessive force “requires careful attention to

the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including

the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. The Court emphasized that “the

reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from

the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather

than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. (citation

modified).

The court has outlined earlier the salient facts in

the light most favorable to plaintiff. Based on the video and

audio evidence of the arrest of plaintiff, his testimony and his

medical records, there exist genuine disputes of material fact

as to whether the force used by defendant was unreasonable and

thus excessive under the totality of the circumstances. At the

time plaintiff’s head was forced against the SUV, he was known

to be unarmed, had made no threats, was handcuffed, and was not

attempting to flee. There were numerous local police officers

present. The offenses at issue are related to excessive

speeding and inebriation. Plaintiff was not wanted for a

serious crime. He suffered injury as a result of defendant’s

action sufficient enough to be taken to the hospital. Whether

the force used against him was excessive is a matter for a jury

to decide.

Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified

immunity from suit even if plaintiff has come forward with

evidence that defendant used excessive force in violation of the

Fourth Amendment. For purposes of analyzing this issue, the

court accepts plaintiff’s version of the facts. Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 380 (2007). The doctrine of

qualified immunity protects public officials “from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555

U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citation modified). As our Court of

Appeals has stated, “clearly established means that, at the time

of the officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that

every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

is unlawful.” Anglemeyer v. Ammons, 92 F.4th 184, 191 (3d Cir.

2024) (citation modified). Existing precedent does not have to

have indistinguishable facts but must be closely analogous. Id.

at 192. As noted in Saucier v. Katz, “this inquiry . . . must

be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not

as a broad general proposition . . . .” 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001). The doctrine may be invoked not only by officials sued

in their official capacities but also by those sued in their

individual capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 29-31

(1991). Qualified immunity provides immunity from suit and is

not merely a defense to liability. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.

224, 227 (1991). The defendant has the burden to show that

qualified immunity is applicable. Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th 211,

227 (3d Cir. 2023).

The Supreme Court in Graham held that police officers

may be held liable for the use of excessive force in violation

of the Fourth Amendment. See 490 U.S. at 394. Whether that

force is excessive depends on the totality of the circumstances

as outlined above. The court must at this stage accept the

plaintiff’s version of facts as true. As noted, defendant

forced plaintiff’s face into the SUV after plaintiff was known

to be unarmed, was handcuffed, was not offering any resistance,

and was not making any threats. The crimes at issue were in

essence excessive speeding and inebriation, and numerous local

police officers were at the scene. As a result of the impact,

plaintiff suffered injuries such that he was taken to the

hospital.

The plaintiff’s right to be free of excessive force is

clearly established with the requisite specificity to

plaintiff’s recitation of the facts. Our Court of Appeals in

Anglemeyer v. Ammons, 92 F.4th 184, 192 (3d Cir. 2024), denied

qualified immunity where the facts were significantly analogous

to those presented here. Anglemeyer involved claims of

excessive force by police who executed a no-knock search warrant

in February 2018 at the house where plaintiffs were living. Id.

at 186. The police had information that another one of the

occupants of the house was engaged in multiple sales of

methamphetamine. Id. After entry, the police zip-tied the

wrists of one plaintiff, sat him down on a chair and punched

him. Id. at 190. He had been unarmed. Id. The Court stated

that once zip-tied he posed no threat and there was no

indication that he was resisting the restraints. Id. at 190-91.

Another plaintiff was zip-tied and then dropped on the floor, as

a result of which both his rotator cuffs were torn. Id. at 191.

Once he had been zip-tied, he was secured, cooperative, and not

at risk of flight. Id. The Court of Appeals held that “it was

clearly established [as of February 2018] that it was unlawful

for the officers to inflict serious bodily harm on individuals

who were plainly unarmed, substantially outnumbered by law

enforcement, cooperative, not suspected of wrongdoing, and in

their own home.” Id. at 192-93.

The Court of Appeals cited with approval Shannon v.

Koehler, 616 F.3d 855 (8th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff Shannon sued

Koehler, a police officer, for the use of excessive force.

Koehler had responded to a call of a disturbance at a bar owned

by Shannon, who was drunk and had punched a woman in the face.

Id. at 858. According to Shannon’s version of the facts,

Koehler performed a takedown as a result of which Shannon landed

on the hardwood floor. Id. Koehler handcuffed one of Shannon’s

arms and used additional force to secure the second arm in a

handcuff. Id. Shannon denied he was uncooperative and alleged

he was injured during the arrest. Id. The Shannon court denied

Koehler’s claim of qualified immunity. Id. at 865. It

emphasized that Shannon had not been suspected of committing a

serious crime, had not attempted to flee or to actively resist

arrest, and posed little or no threat to Koehler. Id. at 862-

63. The Court held that “it was not reasonable for Officer

Koehler to use more than de minimis force against him.” Id. at

863. Shannon admittedly had been disrespectful to Koehler. Id.

at 865. Nonetheless, it is not acceptable, the court declared,

to use improper force simply because a person is argumentative,

contentious or vituperative. Id. (citing Bauer v. Norris, 713

F.2d 408, 412 (8th Cir. 1983).

The Court in Anglemeyer, described Shannon as holding

that “it was clearly established [at least as of February 2018]

that it is unlawful for an officer to engage in serious bodily

harm when the individual posed no danger to the officer and did

not resist or attempt to flee.” Anglemeyer, 92 F.4th at 192.

The Anglemeyer court also cited several other decisions in which

it had denied qualified immunity where police officers or prison

guards had used allegedly unreasonable force on individuals who

offered no threat. See Jacobs v. Cumberland Cnty., 8 F.4th 187

(3d Cir. 2021); Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483 (3d Cir. 2006).

Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to

plaintiff, defendant forced plaintiff’s face into the SUV,

causing plaintiff to suffer bodily injury serious enough to be

taken to the hospital. At the time the injury was inflicted,

plaintiff was unarmed, in handcuffs, not resisting arrest, not

making threats and not attempting to flee. Numerous local

police officers were present at the time, and plaintiff was not

suspected of any serious crimes. Plaintiff posed no danger to

defendant or to others when defendant used the force in issue

against plaintiff. The fact that at times he was argumentative

or uncooperative does not excuse excessive force. Any

reasonable police officer would know that forcing plaintiff’s

face into the SUV under such circumstances was unlawful.

Defendant’s claim of qualified immunity fails.

The motion of defendant for summary judgment on

plaintiff’s claim in Count I of the complaint against defendant

in his individual capacity for the use of excessive force will

be denied.4

4 The defendant argues that the opinion of plaintiff’s expert

that defendant used excessive force is not admissible and should

not be considered in deciding the pending motion. He likewise

argues that the court should not consider the unsworn statements

of Plymouth Township police officers concerning the use of

excessive force given during an internal police investigation of

the incident in question. The court has not taken into account

the opinion or these statements in deciding the pending motion.