Foster

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

NORTHERN DIVISION

DANNY FOSTER PLAINTIFF

ADC #169352

V. NO. 3:25-cv-83-DPM-ERE

DEXTER PAYNE, et al. DEFENDANTS

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

I. Procedure for Filing Objections

This Recommended Disposition (“RD”) has been sent to United States

District Judge D.P. Marshall Jr. You may file objections if you disagree with the

findings or conclusions set out in the RD. Objections must be specific, include the

factual or legal basis for the objection, and be filed within fourteen days. If you do

not object, you risk waiving the right to appeal questions of fact.

II. Background

Pro se plaintiff Danny Foster, an Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”)

inmate, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case. Docs. 2, 5. He currently is proceeding on

First Amendment claims against Defendants ADC Director Dexter Payne, Warden

Christopher Budnik, Deputy Warden Claudia Harris, and ADC Chaplain Defendant

Perry Jackson for confiscating his religious magazines. Mr. Foster sues these

Defendants in their personal capacity only, seeking monetary and injunctive relief.1

Doc. 2 at 2; Doc. 5 at 2.

Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, brief in support,

statement of facts, and supplements to each, arguing that Mr. Foster’s claims fail as

a matter of law. Docs. 37, 38, 39, 54-1, 54-2, 54-3. Mr. Foster has responded to

Defendants’ motion, which is now ripe for review.2 Docs. 46, 57.

For reasons that follow, I recommend the Court grant Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment.

III. Discussion

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in a light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

1 Mr. Foster cannot recover injunctive relief against Defendants in their individual

capacities. See Strutton v. Hacker, No. 4:23-CV-01134-SPM, 2025 WL 26682, at *5 (E.D. Mo.

Jan. 3, 2025) (finding no Eighth Circuit case on point but citing cases from other jurisdictions

holding that only money damages are available from a § 1983 defendant sued only in his or her

individual capacity).

2 In response to Defendants’ original statement of facts, Mr. Foster states, without

explanation, that he disagrees with paragraphs six through thirty. Doc. 46 at 1-6. In addition, he

states that he did not receive additional pages of Defendants’ original statement of facts. However,

I previously provided Mr. Foster new copies of Defendants’ original motion for summary

judgment, brief in support, and statement of facts. Doc. 41.

In response to Defendants’ supplemental filings, Mr. Foster: (1) asserts that Defendants’

exhibit list is confusing; and (2) includes copies of several of the exhibits. Doc. 57. Mr. Foster did

not file any additional substantive response.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). The moving party

bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material

fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once that has been done, the nonmoving party must

come forward with specific facts demonstrating that there is a material dispute for

trial. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042

(8th Cir. 2011). A party is entitled to summary judgment if -- but only if -- the

evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute about any fact important to the

outcome of the case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56; Odom v. Kaizer, 864 F.3d 920, 921 (8th

Cir. 2017).

B. Factual Evidence3

From June 18, 2018 until April 3, 2024, Mr. Foster was incarcerated at the

ADC’s Grimes Unit. Doc. 36-7 at 1-4; Doc. 54-5 at 1. On April 3, 2024, he was

transferred to the ADC’s Ouachita River Unit (“ORU”) to complete the RSVP

Program. Doc. 2 at 5; Doc. 36-7 at 1; Doc. 54-10 at 1. While Mr. Foster was away,

Grimes Unit officials forwarded his mail, including “church magazines,” to ORU.

3 Unless otherwise noted, these facts are taken from: (1) Mr. Foster’s complaint and

amended complaint (Docs. 2, 5); (2) Mr. Foster’s deposition testimony (Doc. 36-1; Doc. 54-4);

(3) Defendant Budnick’s declaration and the supplement to his declaration (Doc. 36-2; Doc. 54-

5); (4) the ADC policies regarding mail at the Grimes Unit, G.U.16.1.0 and G.U. 16.5.0, including

the amendment (Doc. 36-3; Doc. 36-4; Doc. 54-8); (5) Mr. Foster’s returned mail notices (Doc.

36-6; Doc. 54-9); and (6) Mr. Foster’s inmate assignment sheet (Doc. 36-7;Doc. 54-10).

Doc. 36-1 at 13; Doc. 54-4 at 13. On October 8, 2024, Mr. Foster had completed the

RSVP Program, and ADC officials transferred him back to the Grimes Unit. Doc.

36-7 at 1l; Doc. 54-5 at 1.

Mr. Foster is a Seventh Day Adventist and receives the following magazines:

Seventh Day Adventist Journey; Southwestern Union of Seventh Day Adventist; and

North American Division of Seventh Day Adventist. Doc. 2 at 4; Doc. 36-1 at 27-

33; Doc. 54-4 at 27-33. According to Mr. Foster, these magazines are usually ten or

twenty pages and contain information about the events and activities taking place in

various churches. Doc. 36-1 at 29-34; Doc. 54-4 at 29-34. During his deposition,

Mr. Foster testified that his magazines serve as a news source and provide him with

“joy.” Doc. 36-1 at 28; Doc. 54-4 at 28.

Grimes Unit Policy 16.1.0 (“G.U. Policy 16.1.0”) governs inmate

correspondence (Docs. 36-3, 54-6), and Grimes Unit Policy 16.5.0 (“G.U. Policy

16.5.0”) provides the procedure that the Publication Review Committee must follow

in determining which publications an inmate may receive. Doc. 36-4; Doc. 54-7.

According to G.U. 16.5.0, magazines and religious tracts are considered

publications. Doc. 36-4 at 1; Doc. 54-7 at 1.

On August 16, 2024, Defendant Budnick issued an Amendment to G.U.

Policy 16.1.0. Doc. 54-8 at 1. According to Defendant Budnick, “[t]he amendment

provides that if a piece of mail received for an inmate does not fit the description of

legal mail or publication, as set forth in policy, it is considered general

correspondence.” Doc. 54-5 at 2. The amendment limits general correspondence to

three pages. Doc. 54-5 at 2; Doc. 54-8 at 1. The pages are photocopied along with

the envelope so that two sheets of paper, front and back, are provided for each item.

Id. The amendment further provides that “all religious publications, including

religious tracts, religious catalogs, and religious brochures, which are not addressed

to an individual inmate but for all Grimes Unit inmates, are now forwarded to the

Grimes Unit Chaplaincy Department for distribution.” Doc. 54-5 at 3; Doc. 54-8 at

1. “Pursuant to the amendment, religious tracts, catalogs, brochures, etc. that include

an inmate’s name are now treated as general correspondence.” Id.

On October 28, 2024, January 6, 2025, and March 7, 2025, Mr. Foster

received return mail notices for his copies of Southwestern Union of Seventh Day

Adventist. Doc. 36-6 at 1, 4, 7; Doc. 54-9 at 1, 4, 7. On December 2, 2024, and

December 27, 2024, Mr. Foster received return mail notices for his copies of

Adventist Journey. Doc. 36-6 at 2-3; Doc. 54-9 at 2-3. On February 3, 2025, and

March 3, 2025, Mr. Foster received return mail notices for North American Division

of Seventh Day Adventist. Doc. 36-6 at 5-6; Doc. 54-9 at 5-6. All notices stated that

the magazines were being withheld because they exceeded the page limit contained

in the ADC correspondence policy. Doc. 36-6 at 1-7; Doc. 54-9 at 1-7.

As Warden of the Grimes Unit, Defendant Budnik reviews the ADC

correspondence policies and procedures annually. Doc. 54-5 at 2. In his declaration,

Defendant Budnik explains that ADC officials amended the mail policy at issue to

“combat the influx of illegal drugs into the unit.” Id. at 3. Defendant Budnick

explains: “Prior to the amendment, inmates were asking free-world people obtain a

church or religious groups’ newsletter[] or magazine[,] soak the pages in an illegal

drug such as liquid K-2, liquid meth, or a mixture of drugs, then place it in the mail

to another inmate” allowing drugs to be introduced into the unit. Doc. 54-5 at 3;

Doc. 36-2 at 3. As a result, he states, inmates began overdosing after receiving such

correspondence and several inmates passed away. Id. According to Defendant

Budnik, “the amendment was made not only for the safety of the inmates but also

for the safety of the unit’s correctional staff.” Id.

In his deposition, Mr. Foster testified that he is challenging the

constitutionality of G.U. 16.1.0 and G.U. 16.5.0 because they prohibit him from

receiving his religious material. Doc. 36-1 at 21-23; Doc. 54-4 at 21-23. However,

he acknowledges that he is allowed to have his Bible and “paper to write things

down” to practice his religion. Doc. 36-1 at 27; Doc. 54-4 at 27. Mr. Foster further

conceded that: (1) going without the magazines at issue has not interfered with his

ability to practice his religion; and (2) Defendants have not prevented him from

practicing his religion. Doc. 36-1 at 35, 43; Doc. 54-4 at 35, 43. Rather, Mr. Foster

complains that the new policies prevent him from “enjoy[ing] what my church

provides for me.” Doc. 36-1 at 35; Doc. 54-4 at 35.

C. Qualified Immunity

Defendants assert qualified immunity, which protects government officials

from personal liability for damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person [in their

positions] would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

To overcome the defense at the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff must

show: “(1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate

the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the right was clearly

established at the time of the deprivation.” Howard v. Kansas City Police Dep’t, 570

F.3d 984, 988 (8th Cir. 2009). “District courts may address these two questions in

any order but may not deny qualified immunity without answering both questions in

the plaintiff’s favor.” Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1116 (8th Cir. 2014)

(citation omitted).

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prevents prison officials

from substantially burdening a prisoner’s sincerely held religious belief. Patel v.

U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 813 (8th Cir. 2008). To constitute a

“substantial burden” in this context, a defendant’s conduct must:

significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or expression that manifests

some central tenet of a person’s individual religious beliefs; must

meaningfully curtail a person’s ability to express adherence to his or

her faith; or must deny a person reasonable opportunities to engage in

those activities that are fundamental to a person’s religion.

Mbonyunkiza v. Beasley, 956 F.3d 1048, 1053 (8th Cir. 2020); Patel, 515 F.3d at

813. If complained-of government action or policy substantially burdens an inmate’s

sincerely held beliefs, it is nonetheless valid if “reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests.” Gladson v. Iowa Dept, of Corrs., 551 F.3d 825, 831-32 (8th

Cir. 2009) (quoting Turner v. Safely, 483 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). When making that

determination, the court must consider whether: (1) there is a valid rational

connection between the prison regulation and the government interest justifying it;

(2) there is any alternative means for the inmate to exercise that right; (3) an

accommodation would have a significant ripple effect on guards, other inmates, and

prison resources; and (4) there is an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner

at de minimis cost to valid penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91; Gladson,

551 F.3d at 831.

Defendants do not challenge the sincerity of Mr. Foster’s religious beliefs.

Rather, they argue that Mr. Foster has not demonstrated that confiscation of the

religious magazines at issue substantially burdened his ability to practice his

religion. I agree.

As stated above, during his deposition testimony Mr. Foster testified that: (1)

his magazines serve as a news source for him and provide him with “joy” (Doc. 36-

1 at 28; Doc. 54-4 at 28); (2) he is allowed to have his Bible and “paper to write

things down” to practice his religion (Doc. 36-1 at 27; Doc. 54-4 at 27); (3)

Defendants’ preventing him from receiving the magazines is not interfering with his

ability to practice his religion; and (4) Defendants have not prevented him from

practicing his religion (Doc. 36-1 at 35, 43; Doc. 54-4 at 35, 43).

Based on the current record, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that

Defendants’ confiscation of Mr. Foster’s religious magazines substantially burdened

his ability to practice his religion. As a result, Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity on Mr. Foster’s First Amendment claim.

IV. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 36) be GRANTED,

and Mr. Foster’s claims be DISMISSED, with prejudice.

2. Judgment be entered in favor of Defendants.

3. The Clerk be instructed to close this case.

DATED 14 September 2026.