Keckritz

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

HUGH ADAM KECKRITZ, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No.: 3:25-CV-276-KAC-JEM

)

MORGAN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL )

FACILITY, SHAWN PHILLIPS, and )

TN DEPT OF CORRECTIONS, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Hugh Adam Keckritz, a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of

Correction (“TDOC”) incarcerated at the Morgan County Correctional Complex (“MCCX”), filed

a (1) Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 1] and (2) motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis [Doc. 2]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion and

DISMISSES the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner who brings a civil action

may apply for permission to file suit without prepaying the full filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

The Motion shows that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the filing fee in a lump

sum [See Doc. 2]. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s

motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 2].

Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate

trust account MUST submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 800 Market Street, Suite 130,

Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 twenty percent (20%) of Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or

income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account for the preceding month), but only when such monthly

income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00), until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00)

as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Clerk MUST send a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the Court’s financial

deputy and the custodian of inmate trust accounts at Plaintiff’s current facility to ensure

compliance with the PLRA’s requirements for payment of the filing fee.

II. COMPLAINT SCREENING

Under the PLRA, the Court must screen the complaint and sua sponte dismiss any claims

that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant that is

immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. The dismissal standard articulated by

the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to

survive initial review, the Complaint [Doc. 1] “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

A claim is “facial[ly] plausib[le]” if the complaint “pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” See Teamsters Local 237 Welfare Fund v. ServiceMaster Glob. Holdings, Inc.,

83 F.4th 514, 524 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.at 678). But allegations that give rise to

a mere possibility that a plaintiff might later establish undisclosed facts supporting recovery are

not well-pleaded and do not state a plausible claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. And formulaic

and conclusory recitations of the elements of a claim that are not supported by specific facts are

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also insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. But the Supreme

Court has instructed that courts should liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases

and hold them to a less stringent standard than “formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

A. Allegations of the Complaint

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff has been “in and out of high security” housing at

MCCX [Doc. 1 at 4]. Inmates in high security housing do not get cleaning supplies other than “a

styrafoam [sic] cup of watered down cleaner and some brown paper towels” [Id.]. This practice

has occurred “for years, since the new Warden Shawn Phillips arrived” [Id.]. The TDOC

inspectors have been informed “to no avail” [Id.]. Plaintiff told staff members that the high

security inmates were not getting proper cleaning supplies, and he filed grievances [Id.]. “They

let Rockman clean the pod,” but do not give high security inmates additional cleaning supplies for

their cells [Id.]. It is purportedly “unsanitary[,] deme[a]ning[,] and affecting [inamtes’] mental

health” [Id.]. Plaintiff has been documenting this practice for a month [Id.]. But the lack of

additional cleaning supplies has been an ongoing issue for “at least a year” [Id.].

“The Prison is Biased they give Majority Cleaning Supplies but Not Max” [Id.]. Warden

Phillips allegedly “wants to make life hard on ‘check ins’ protective custody or RCA (refused cell

assignment) inmates” [Id.]. Additionally, inmates have not received haircuts or access to razors

“during said time” [Id.].

Plaintiff filed the instant action against Defendants MCCX, Warden Shawn Phillips, and

TDOC, seeking monetary relief and a court order requiring Defendants to “give cleaning supplies”

to affected inmates and “pay back tax[]payer dollars not being used on [inmates’] cleaning

supplies” [Id. at 5].

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B. Analysis

To state a claim against a Defendant for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must

establish that a “person” acting “under color of” state law deprived him of “any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

1. Plaintiff’s Claims Against the State

Under the law, Plaintiff may not maintain suit against a State, its divisions, or its employees

in their official capacities because “a state is not a person within the meaning of §1983.” See Will

v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). TDOC is an arm of the State of Tennessee.

See Hix v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 196 F. App’x 350, 355 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding TDOC is

equivalent of the “State”). As is MCCX. See Anderson v. Morgan Cnty. Corr. Complex, No. 15-

6344, 2016 WL 9402910, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 2016) (“A state prison is not a ‘person’ subject

to suit under § 1983”) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-71 (1989)). And

a suit against Defendant Phillips in his official capacity as Warden of the MCCX, is a suit against

the State itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (holding “an official-capacity

suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity”); Monell v. Dep’t

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (“[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”). Therefore,

Plaintiff cannot sustain this action against Defendants TDOC, MCCX, or Warden Phillips in his

official capacity.

2. Individual Capacity Claims Against Defendant Warden Phillips

To state a claim against Defendant Warden Phillips individually, the Complaint must

adequately plead that Defendant Phillips, through his own actions, has violated the Constitution.

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002)

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(providing that “a complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the

alleged deprivation of federal rights” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted). Liberally

construing the Complaint, it may seek to raise a claim against Defendant Warden Phillips for

(1) subjecting Plaintiff to unconstitutional conditions of confinement and (2) violating Plaintiff’s

equal protection rights by denying him extra cleaning supplies [See Doc. 1 at 4].

Start with the conditions of confinement claims. The Court takes judicial notice that at all

times relevant to the claims, Plaintiff was a convicted prisoner, not a pretrial detainee.1 So, “the

conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” See

Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 839 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

832 (1994)). “[A]n inmate must show ‘that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial

risk of serious harm.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). And the relevant Defendant official

“must know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. (cleaned up).

Here, at step one, the Complaint fails to allege conditions posing a substantial risk of

serious harm. Only “extreme deprivations” that deny a prisoner “the minimal civilized measure

of life’s necessities” violate a prisoner’s rights under the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (cleaned up). The Complaint makes clear that the high security

housing pod is being cleaned by a provider called “Rockman” [See Doc. 1 at 4]. And Plaintiff was

given his own cleaning solution to supplement the cleaning performed by that provider [Id.]. The

bare assertion that the pod is “unsanitary,” without supporting facts, is not enough to state a claim

for an Eighth Amendment violation. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9; see also Fennell v. Bonner, No.

2:20-cv-2844, 2021 WL 3891590, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2021) (holding that plaintiff’s

1 See https://foil.app.tn.gov/foil/search.jsp.

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“characterization of [his] housing as ‘unsanitary’ does not suffice to render those accommodations

unconstitutional”). So, this claim fails.

Plaintiff also complains that inmates in high-security housing have not had haircuts or

access to razors “during said time”—presumably the month that he has been tracking the provision

of additional cleaning supplies [See Doc. 1 at 4]. But on these facts, the denial of a haircut and a

shave for a short period of time also “falls far short” of a constitutional violation. See Stevenson

v. Lubbock Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 3 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 1993), 1993 WL 347322, at *1 (“Conditions

of confinement that merely cause discomfort or inconvenience are not constitutionally

proscribed.”); see also Alexander v. Cnty. of Macomb, No. 07-14740, 2009 WL 260484, at *6

(E.D. Mich. Feb. 3, 2009) (citation omitted). So, this claim fails too.

Moving to the equal protection claim. The Supreme Court has recognized two types of

equal protection claims. The first generally requires a showing of “intentional[] discrimination”

based on a plaintiff’s “membership in a protected class.” Henry v. Blank, 167 F.4th 375, 380 (6th

Cir. 2026). The second requires a showing that Plaintiff was “intentionally treated differently from

others similarly situated and” additionally requires a showing that Defendant “had no rational basis

for the treatment.” See Johnson v. Morales, 946 F.3d 911, 939 (6th Cir. 2020).

The Complaint fails to adequately plead a claim under either theory. First, the Complaint

does not allege that Plaintiff is a member of any protected class or that he was intentionally

discriminated against on that basis. Second, the Complaint fails to allege that those inmates housed

in high security are similarly situated to those in the general population in all material respects

[See Doc. 1]. That would understandably be a hard factual assertion to make. See, e.g., Fogle v.

Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1261 (10th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s equal protection

claim because administrative segregation inmates are not similarly situated to general population

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inmates for equal protection analysis). And to the extent Plaintiff’s claim hinges on an allegation

that all inmates in high-security housing are denied additional cleaning supplies, he “cannot show

an equal protection violation because . . . he is being treated exactly the same way as every other

protective segregation prisoner.” See Adkins v. Jones, No. 206-CV-26, 2007 WL 397044, at *3

(W.D. Mich. Feb. 1, 2007). So, the equal protection claims fail too.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above:

1. The Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis [Doc. 2];

2. The Court ASSESSED Plaintiff the $350.00 civil filing fee;

3. The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account MUST submit the filing fee to the

Clerk in the manner set forth above; and

4. The Court DISMISSES the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a

Section 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

Further, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in

good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Fed. R. App. P. 24. Therefore, should Plaintiff file

a notice of appeal, he is DENIED leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3);

Fed. R. App. P. 24. AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT WILL ENTER.

SO ORDERED.

ENTER:

/s/ Katherine A. Crytzer

KATHERINE A. CRYTZER

United States District Judge

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