Davis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

WINIFRED MARIE DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:25-cv-1331-HDM

DR. DANIEL K. WIMS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Defendant Dr. Daniel K. Wims’s renewed motion to

dismiss Plaintiff Winifred Marie Davis’s amended complaint under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 15). Davis, who now proceeds pro se, filed a

response, and Wims filed a reply. (Docs. 17; 18). For the reasons below, the

motion is due to be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

At this stage, the court accepts the amended complaint’s well-pleaded

factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences in Davis’s favor. In the

winter of 2022, Davis attended a graduation ceremony at Alabama Agricultural

and Mechanical University. As she left the venue, her shoe caught in a cable

protector, causing her to fall and allegedly injure her leg, hip, shoulder, and back.

Davis alleges that university employees and security personnel who witnessed or

responded to the incident did not prepare a report. After corresponding with

Wims’s office, she learned that her claim had been denied and that she needed to

submit it to the Alabama State Board of Adjustment (“the Board”). (Doc. 14 at 1).

The Board conducted a hearing on July 16, 2024. Davis alleges that, after

the hearing, she learned that Wims, “perhaps through one of his lawyers,” had told

the Board “to ignore and disregard all of the witnesses’ testimony” she presented.

Id. at 1–2. She contends that Wims thereby interfered with her ability to pursue the

claim and denied her due process because the claim was not “properly heard.” Id.

at 2. She alleges that Wims acted willfully, intentionally, and maliciously, and she

expressly sues him in his individual—not official—capacity. Id.

The Board entered a written order on September 4, 2024. (Doc. 15-1). The

order states that the Board received the evidence presented at the hearing but

concluded that Davis had failed to establish a legal or moral obligation requiring

the State to pay her claim. Id. at 2. The court may consider that order without

converting the motion into one for summary judgment because the Board

proceeding is central to the amended complaint and Davis does not dispute the

order’s authenticity. See Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2024). The court does not, however, treat the order’s statement that evidence

was “received” as resolving Davis’s allegation that the Board was told to disregard

her witnesses.

Davis first filed this federal action on August 15, 2025. Her original

complaint alleged that Wims violated her right to due process by moving to

dismiss a related action she had filed in the Circuit Court of Madison County.

(Doc. 1). On March 4, 2026, this court granted Wims’s first motion to dismiss but

allowed Davis until April 3, 2026, to file an amended complaint complying with

Rules 8 and 10. (Doc. 13). Davis timely filed the operative amended complaint on

March 30, 2026. (Doc. 14).

The amended complaint does not cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contain separately

numbered counts, identify a jurisdictional statute, or include a demand for relief.

But a plaintiff need not cite section 1983 by name when the facts otherwise state a

constitutional claim against a person acting under color of state law. See Johnson v.

City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11–12 (2014). Construed liberally, the amended

complaint asserts one claim: that Wims, acting under color of state law but sued in

his individual capacity, deprived Davis of procedural due process under the

Fourteenth Amendment by corrupting the Board’s consideration of her personal-

injury claim.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To withstand a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must allege enough facts, accepted as true, to state

a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009);

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible

when the pleaded facts permit a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the alleged misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court accepts factual

allegations as true but need not accept legal conclusions or “[t]hreadbare recitals”

of a claim’s elements. Id.

Because Davis proceeds without counsel, the court construes her filings

liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Liberal construction does not

allow the court to rewrite a deficient pleading, supply facts that have not been

alleged, or disregard the minimum requirements of the Federal Rules. See

Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014). And a

response brief ordinarily cannot amend the complaint. See Gilmour v. Gates,

McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004). Even so, the court has

considered Davis’s explanation in her response that she means to allege

interference after the hearing; that clarification does not affect the legal disposition.

III. DISCUSSION

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from depriving a person of

life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

A traditional procedural-due-process claim requires “(1) a deprivation of a

constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3)

constitutionally inadequate process.” Worthy v. City of Phenix City, 930 F.3d 1206,

1223 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir.

1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Davis’s claim fails at the first element

because Alabama law does not give her a constitutionally protected entitlement

either to payment of her claim or to the Board’s procedures as an independent

benefit. Alternatively, Wims is entitled to qualified immunity from damages

because the right Davis asserts was not clearly established when the alleged

conduct occurred.

A. Davis has not alleged deprivation of a protected property interest.

Property interests do not arise from the Constitution itself. They are created

and defined by “existing rules or understandings” from an independent source,

usually state law, that secure a benefit and support a legitimate claim of entitlement

to it. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). A person

must have more than an abstract need, desire, or unilateral expectation. Id. And “a

benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it

in their discretion.” Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005).

Two related but distinct interests might be inferred from Davis’s filings: an

interest in receiving compensation for her injuries, and an interest in having the

Board consider her claim through an uncorrupted process. Neither is protected

property on the allegations here.

1. No entitlement to compensation

Alabama’s sovereign-immunity provision generally prevents the State and

its institutions from being made defendants in court. Ala. Const. art. I, § 14. The

Legislature created the Board of Adjustment to consider specified claims that

cannot be adjudicated in court because of that immunity. Ex parte Houston Cnty.

Bd. of Educ., 562 So. 2d 513, 514 (Ala. 1990). The Board has a statutory duty to

“hear and consider” claims for personal injury caused by the State or one of its

institutions. Ala. Code § 41-9-62(a)(1) (1975). A claimant may file and prosecute a

claim personally or through a representative. Id. § 41-9-63.

For a properly presented personal-injury claim, the Board determines the

facts, uses ordinary negligence rules “as its guide,” considers the State’s moral

obligation, and determines “the amount, if any, which should be paid.” Id. § 41-9-

68(a) (emphasis added). The statute also states that ordinary negligence rules “are

to be followed” for claims by persons who are not state employees. Id. Even so, the

scheme does not direct an award to every person permitted to file a claim; the

Board must determine whether the claimant proved a legal or moral obligation and

what amount, “if any,” should be paid. Id. Alabama’s appellate courts accordingly

describe the Board mechanism as a legislative privilege rather than a new right of

action against the State. See Ex parte Houston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 562 So. 2d at

514. More specifically, Jackson v. Alabama Board of Adjustment held that the

statutory scheme does not create a claim of entitlement to reimbursement; it creates

only the ability to present a claim before the Board without the State invoking

sovereign immunity. 160 So. 3d 821, 826 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014).

The Eleventh Circuit’s recent published decision in African People’s

Education and Defense Fund, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 184 F.4th 1194 (11th Cir.

2026), reinforces that conclusion. There, a nonprofit alleged that a county revoked

one grant and denied another without adequate process. Id. at 1209. The court

affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff’s procedural-due-process claim under Rule

12(b)(6) because no law required the county to award grants to particular

applicants under defined criteria; officials retained discretion after an applicant met

baseline eligibility requirements. Id. at 1214–15. Under Castle Rock, that

discretion defeated any property entitlement. Id. at 1215. The same principle

applies here. Sections 41-9-62 and 41-9-68 open the Board process to specified

claims and supply considerations for the Board’s decision, but they do not secure

payment to Davis or eliminate the Board’s judgment over whether the State bears a

legal or moral obligation and what amount, “if any,” should be paid.

African People’s Education was decided after the parties completed briefing.

The court nevertheless must apply controlling law in effect when it decides the

case. See Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993). In any event,

African People’s Education applied the settled Roth and Castle Rock framework; it

did not announce a new pleading rule.

2. No freestanding property interest in the Board’s procedure

Davis emphasizes that she is not claiming a property interest “in [the]

process” itself. (Doc. 17 at 3). Rather, she says that Wims altered or corrupted the

process established by the Legislature. This distinction does not cure the claim.

Procedural rules ordinarily do not create the substantive property interest that

triggers constitutional protection. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250–51

(1983). A court first identifies an independent liberty or property interest; only then

does it ask what process is constitutionally due before that interest may be taken.

The court has considered Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., in which the

Supreme Court recognized that a state-law cause of action could be property when

state procedure finally destroyed the claimant’s ability to obtain an adjudication.

455 U.S. 422, 428–33 (1982). Logan does not control this case. Davis did not

possess an otherwise enforceable tort cause of action against Alabama A&M that

the Board’s procedure extinguished. Alabama’s sovereign immunity prevented

such an action against the State institution, and the Board statutes did not create a

new judicial cause of action. See Ex parte Houston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 562 So. 2d

at 514. The Board instead provided the only legislative mechanism for requesting

payment from the State on a claim that could not be litigated against it in court.

The court has also considered the Eleventh Circuit’s Medical Laundry

decisions. In the first appeal, the court held that sovereign immunity did not, by

itself, eliminate a contractor’s property interest in an existing state contract because

Alabama had provided the Board process to adjust the contract claim. Med.

Laundry Serv. v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama, 840 F.2d 840, 841–42 (11th Cir.

1988), amended by 856 F.2d 128 (11th Cir. 1988). After remand, however, the

court affirmed summary judgment because a simple breach of a state contract did

not amount to a constitutional deprivation. Med. Laundry Servs. v. Bd. of Trs. of

Univ. of Alabama, 906 F.2d 571, 572–73 (11th Cir. 1990). Most recently, African

People’s Education described Medical Laundry as holding that even an

enforceable public contract did not create the asserted constitutional property

interest. 184 F.4th at 1215.

Those decisions do not establish a property interest for Davis. Medical

Laundry began with a preexisting contract—a traditional source of substantive

rights independent of the Board’s procedures. Davis alleges only an unliquidated

tort claim against a state institution. Under Alabama law, that claim is not an

enforceable cause of action against the institution, and Jackson holds that the

Board statutes do not themselves create an entitlement to reimbursement. 160 So.

3d at 824. A statutory opportunity to request a discretionary award is not protected

property merely because the State prescribes procedures for considering the

request.

3. The alleged interference does not supply the missing property interest

The court accepts for present purposes Davis’s allegation that Wims,

personally or through counsel, told the Board to disregard her witnesses. If true,

that conduct would raise a serious question about compliance with the Board’s

own procedures and the fairness of its decisionmaking. But section 1983 does not

convert every violation of state procedure, every irregular administrative decision,

or every unfair act by a state official into a federal due-process claim. See

McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556–57 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogated on

other grounds by Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). The Due

Process Clause protects against deprivation of life, liberty, or property without

adequate process; it does not create an abstract federal right to correct

administration of every state program.

Because Davis has not alleged a constitutionally protected property interest,

she cannot state a procedural-due-process claim even if the Board process was

affected in the manner she describes. African People’s Education followed the

same course: after finding no protected property interest, the Eleventh Circuit did

not decide whether the plaintiff had received adequate process or whether state

remedies were adequate. 184 F.4th at 1215, 1215 n.5. This court likewise does not

rest dismissal on the mere fact that a hearing occurred, on the Board order’s recital

that evidence was received, on any purported appeal of the Board’s decision, or on

the existence of an unidentified state-law remedy. The absence of a protected

interest is sufficient.

B. Qualified immunity provides an alternative basis for dismissal of any

claim for damages.

Even if Davis had plausibly alleged a protected property interest and

constitutionally deficient process, her individual-capacity damages claim would be

barred by qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields a government official

performing a discretionary function unless the official violates a constitutional

right that was clearly established at the time. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

231–32 (2009). The defendant first must show that the challenged conduct

occurred within his discretionary authority. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland,

370 F.3d 1252, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2004). The court asks whether the official was

performing a job-related function through means within his power, defining the

function at an appropriate level of generality and temporarily disregarding the

alleged illegality. Id. at 1265–66.

The general function alleged here was responding—directly or through

university counsel—to an administrative claim asserted against Alabama A&M

and communicating the University’s position to the body considering that claim.

Davis herself alleges that Wims undertook the challenged conduct “acting as the

President of the University” and that his actions were state action for that reason.

(Doc. 14 at 2). Responding on the University’s behalf to a claim directed at the

University is job-related, and communicating through counsel is a means ordinarily

within a university president’s authority. The court does not define the function as

“corrupting” the Board or “ordering” it to violate the law, because doing so would

collapse the discretionary-authority inquiry into the merits. See Holloman, 370

F.3d at 1266. Wims has therefore satisfied the threshold requirement.

The burden then shifts to Davis to show both a constitutional violation and

that the right was clearly established. Id. at 1264. A right is clearly established only

if every reasonable official would understand that the particular conduct was

unlawful. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). Ordinarily, the

plaintiff must identify materially similar precedent from the Supreme Court, the

Eleventh Circuit, or the Alabama Supreme Court, or show that the conduct so

obviously violated the Constitution that no case was needed. See Crocker v. Beatty,

995 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2021). The inquiry is measured at the time of the

alleged conduct—here, no later than 2024.

No controlling decision existing in 2024 clearly established that a claimant

possessed a federal property right in the adjudication of a discretionary personal-

injury claim before the Alabama Board of Adjustment, much less that a university

president’s alleged communication to the Board violated such a right. Alabama

authority instead described the Board remedy as a privilege and rejected an

entitlement to reimbursement or an unconditional evidentiary hearing. Ex parte

Houston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 562 So. 2d at 514; Jackson, 160 So. 3d at 826.

Medical Laundry itself noted alleged ex parte contacts between a university

president and Board members but expressly left the issue unresolved. 906 F.2d at

573 n.1. A decision that identifies but does not decide the closely analogous

constitutional question does not give every reasonable official fair warning of the

answer.

African People’s Education, which postdates the alleged conduct by nearly

two years, cannot retroactively supply clearly established law. Its holding that a

discretionary benefit is not protected property instead confirms that the asserted

right was, at minimum, not beyond debate in 2024. Nor is this one of the rare

obvious-clarity cases. The alleged instruction to disregard evidence, if true, is

troubling; but given the unsettled threshold question of whether Davis had

constitutional property at stake, existing law did not make the asserted Fourteenth

Amendment violation apparent to every reasonable official. Wims is therefore

entitled to qualified immunity from any claim for damages.

C. Further amendment would be futile.

The amended complaint still does not fully comply with Rules 8 and 10: it

lacks a jurisdictional statement and demand for relief, and its allegations are not set

out in numbered paragraphs or separate counts. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (3),

10(b). Those defects are curable, and the court has not dismissed the action merely

because Davis failed to use technical pleading conventions. The court can discern

the constitutional theory she intends to assert.

But the substantive defects are not curable by a more carefully formatted

complaint. The court identified the original complaint’s deficiencies, afforded

Davis a deadline to amend, and instructed her to comply with Rules 8 and 10.

(Doc. 13). The operative pleading presents a different factual theory but still fails

as a matter of law: the Board scheme did not give Davis the property entitlement

her due-process claim requires, and any individual-capacity damages claim is

independently barred by qualified immunity. Additional factual detail about who

communicated with the Board, when the communication occurred, or what words

were used would not create a state-law entitlement or make the asserted right

clearly established in 2024. Leave to amend may be denied when amendment

would be futile. Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007).

Dismissal with prejudice is therefore appropriate.

This ruling addresses only the federal constitutional claim pleaded against

Wims. It does not adjudicate whether Alabama A&M was negligent, whether

Davis proved a legal or moral obligation before the Board, or the extent of her

alleged injuries.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Defendant Dr. Daniel K. Wims’s motion to dismiss the

amended complaint, (doc. 15), is GRANTED. Plaintiff Winifred Marie Davis’s

claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and this action is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE. A separate final judgment will be entered.

The court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail a copy of this Memorandum

Opinion and Order to pro se Plaintiff Winifred Marie Davis at her address of

record.

DONE and ORDERED on September 14, 2026.

(AOA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE