Moore

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DORENZO MOORE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 26-cv-491-DWD

)

ILL. PRISONER REVIEW BOARD, )

ALYSSA WEITZ, )

JB PRITZKER, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Dorenzo Moore, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC) currently detained at Stateville Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights while

incarcerated. Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary

review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to

screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-

(b). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by

law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture,

the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges he and nearly 10,000 Illinois inmates were the victims of what they

contend was an erroneous and overly broad response by the Illinois Prisoner Review

Board (PRB) to a request for information. (Doc. 1 at 5). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that

although he did not learn of it for many months, in August, September, and October of

2024, outside parties sought information about clemency proceedings via Freedom of

Information Act (FOIA) releases, and the PRB’s responses included inmate’s social

security numbers or other personally identifiable information. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges the

disclosure of his social security number was unauthorized, unnecessary, and it violated

his privacy protections. Plaintiff faults Defendant Weitz, an alleged FOIA officer, and

Defendant Pritzker as the head administrator of the Prisoner Review Board, alleging that

they should have redacted the personally sensitive information from the records before

releasing them. (Id. at 6).

Plaintiff alleges that on November 17, 2025, he received a letter dated August 27,

2025, notifying him of the release of his information. (Id.). He claims the delay in

notification was intentionally deceitful conduct by Pritzker and Weitz. Plaintiff

complains he tried to call the Prisoner Review Board’s attorney and Pritzker to solve the

situation. (Id. at 6-7). He claims that the defendants’ remedy, contacting the recipients of

the FOIA information and asking them to delete it, was inadequate and leaves him

vulnerable. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff alleges he is suffering from an invasion of privacy, a risk

of identity theft, and emotional distress. (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges that by knowingly

withholding the information leak for nearly a year, defendants violated his First

Amendment right to access the courts. As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation

from Pritzker and Weitz. (Id. at 8).

In support of the complaint, Plaintiff tendered a copy of the August 27, 2025, letter

from the PRB notifying him that his name and social security number was possibly

inadvertently distributed in a FOIA response. (Doc. 1 at 9). Plaintiff also included a copy

of a grievance he tried to submit at the prison, which was rejected because the PRB is a

separate entity not subject to the grievance process. (Id. at 10). Additionally, he

submitted copies of two letters he sent to the PRB seeking help protecting himself from

identity theft problems during the remainder of his incarceration. (Id. at 12-15).

Here, Plaintiff’s claims are insufficient to proceed because he has not adequately

described personal actions of a named defendant that amount to a violation of a

constitutional right. Plaintiff’s generic assertion that his privacy rights were violated is

not sufficient. The Court was unable to locate any binding cases where the Seventh

Circuit or Supreme Court recognized a constitutionally protected privacy interest in an

inmate’s social security number. By contrast, the Court located a district court decision

indicating that a plaintiff’s social security number was not protected by a federal

constitutional right to privacy. See e.g., Sexton v. Runyon, 2005 WL 2030865 at * 9 (N.D.

Ind. Aug. 23, 2005) (finding that to the extent a federal constitutional right to privacy

exists, it has not been extended to the disclosure of a plaintiff’s social security number).

Average Americans are subject to data breaches and leaks of personal information on a

regular basis, such as the leak described by Plaintiff, but this now commonplace

misfortune simply does not infringe on a constitutional right. Plaintiff also assumes that

Weitz and Pritzker were personally responsible, without providing any details about

their knowledge or direct involvement in reviewing FOIA responses before they are

released to the public. Thus, Plaintiff has not identified a constitutionally protected

privacy interest, and he has not sufficiently alleged personal involvement of the

defendants.

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges defendants somehow violated his First

Amendment right of access to the Courts via their slow dissemination of notice about the

data leak, this theory as also unavailing. Prisoners have a fundamental right of

meaningful access to the courts, and this right extends to pretrial detainees. Bounds v.

Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Casteel v. Pieschek, 3 F.3d 1050, 1053 (7th Cir. 1993). When

analyzing claims for the denial of court access, the court uses a two-part test. Smith v.

Shawnee Library Sys., 60 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 1995); Jenkins v. Lane, 977 F.2d 266, 268 (7th Cir.

1992). First, the plaintiff must show that prison officials failed “to assist in the preparation

and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries

or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Jenkins, 977 F.2d at 268 (quoting

Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828). Second, the plaintiff must show “some quantum of detriment

caused by the challenged conduct of state officials resulting in the interruption and/or

delay of plaintiff’s pending or contemplated litigation.” Alston v. DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036,

1041 (7th Cir. 1994); Jenkins, 977 F.2d at 268. Plaintiff does not meet either prong of the

two-part test. He does not allege that the lack of legal materials or resources hindered

his ability to present a claim, and he does not plausibly identify a measurable detriment

to pending or contemplated litigation. To the contrary, Plaintiff filed the complaint in

this case and relevant documents as exhibits, suggesting that he was not hindered in his

ability to pursue a claim about the release of his personal information.

Though there may be some sort of remedy available to Plaintiff under Illinois state

laws, he has not said enough to make it obvious what theory of relief that might be. Even

if he had done so, the Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a

freestanding state law claim where all federal claims are inadequate. 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a

claim...if...the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction”); see Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (“A district

court's decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing every

claim over which it had original jurisdiction is entirely discretionary.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint has failed to

state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Though the Court almost always affords at least

one opportunity to amend, it cannot see any viable constitutional theory that could

emerge from this set of facts, and thus it concludes that leave to amend is unnecessary.

Always Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2 F.4th 695, 707 (7th Cir. 2021) (courts

may deny leave to amend if an amendment would be futile); McCree v. Grissom, 657 F.3d

623, 624 (7th Cir. 2011) (leave to amend shall be granted where justice so requires, but

leave to amend need not be given if an amendment to the complaint would be futile).

The dismissal of this case shall count as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DISPOSITION

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a

federal claim, and without prejudice to the extent he intends to pursue a state law claim.

Plaintiff’s Motions for Status (Docs. 8, 9) are GRANTED by the issuance of this Order.

If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this

Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If Plaintiff

chooses to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 filing fee irrespective of the outcome

of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d

724, 725-56 (7th Cir. 2008). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff

may incur another “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A proper and timely motion filed

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline.

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e) motion must be filed no later than 28 days after the

entry of judgment, and this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 14, 2026

________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge