The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 LAWRENCE P. HAYES, No. 2:23-CV-2380-DAD-DMC-P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 FAIRFIELD CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT, et al.,
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Defendants.
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18 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
19 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s fifth amended complaint, ECF No. 31.
20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
21 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
22 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was
23 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel.
24 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or
25 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can
26 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
27 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
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1 Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a
2 “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
3 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See
4 McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)).
5 These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim
6 and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996).
7 Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific
8 defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this
9 standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law
10 when the allegations are vague and conclusory.
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12 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
13 Plaintiff Lawrence P. Hayes names the following Defendants: (1) Fairfield City
14 Police Department; (2) Christopher Beck, a Fairfield City Police Department officer; (3) Keith
15 Pulsipher, a Fairfield City Police Department officer; and (4) other unknown police officers. See
16 ECF No. 31, pgs. 1-2.
17 Plaintiff alleges that on April 7, 2022, at approximately 2:35 a.m., Defendant
18 Christopher Beck “intentionally, maliciously, and deliberately authored a ‘fabricated affidavit’ for
19 the search of Plaintiff’s resident, and the arrest of his person.” ECF No. 31, pg. 2. This caused
20 Fairfield City Police to “wrongfully and unlawfully” enter Plaintiff’s residence and order all its
21 occupants outside for the duration of the search. See id. Plaintiff alleges that law enforcement
22 shot chemical agents through the windows, utilized a battering ram on the front door, arrested him
23 and his roommate, searched through the entire residence, and seized a variety of items including
24 three dogs. See id. Plaintiff states that “Defendants’ search and arrest warrants were ‘illegally
25 obtained,’ and [have] since been ‘invalidated.’” Id.
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1 II. DISCUSSION
2 Plaintiff initiates this action against three named Defendants: (1) Fairfield City
3 Police Department; (2) Christopher Beck; and (3) Keith Pulsipher. While Plaintiff has alleged
4 sufficient facts to state a claim against Christopher Beck, Plaintiff has failed to do so for
5 Defendants Pulsipher and Fairfield City Police Department.
6 A. Defendant Pulsipher
7 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual
8 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See
9 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A
10 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of
11 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform
12 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”
13 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations
14 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See
15 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth
16 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional
17 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
18 Here, the fifth amended complaint is devoid of any allegations specific to
19 Defendant Pulsipher. Plaintiff’s reference to “Defendants” collectively is insufficient. Plaintiff
20 will be provided leave to amend to add additional factual allegations as to Defendant Pulsipher
21 consistent with the legal principles outlined above.
22 B. Defendant Fairfield City Police Department
23 Municipalities and other local government units, such as Defendant Fairfield City
24 Police Department, are among those “persons” to whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v.
25 Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Counties and municipal government officials are
26 also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles,
27 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local government unit, however, may not be held
28 responsible for the acts of its employees or officials under a respondeat superior theory of
1 liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal
2 liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of the actions of its employees or
3 officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the plaintiff must allege that the
4 constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or custom of the municipality.
5 See id.
6 Here, the complaint is devoid of any allegations as to a custom or policy of
7 Defendant Fairfield City Police Department which is the moving force behind the violations
8 complained of in the fifth amended complaint. As with Defendant Pulsipher, Plaintiff will be
9 provided an opportunity to amend to allege facts as to a municipal custom or policy resulting in
10 the claimed Fourth Amendment violation.
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12 III. CONCLUSION
13 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
14 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
15 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an
16 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,
17 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the
18 prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An
19 amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
20 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the
21 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See
22 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
23 each named defendant is involved and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between
24 each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167
25 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
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] Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended
2 || complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and
3 || recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such
4 | further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.
5 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a sixth amended
6 || complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.
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8 | Dated: August 25, 2026 Ss..c0_,
? DENNIS M. COTA
10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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