The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 M.S., by and through his Guardian ad No. 2:26-cv-01189-DJC-SCR
Litem ARASELI SMITH,
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13 Plaintiff,
ORDER
14 v.
15 MANTECA UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT, et al.,
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Defendants.
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Plaintiff, a minor who in 2023 was a kindergarten student at Joshua Cowell
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Elementary School in the Manteca Unified School District (“MUSD”), brings eight
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claims against Defendants based on allegations of physical abuse by educators and
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other school employees.
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Pending before the Court is Defendant Soliant Health, LLC (dba ProCare
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Therapy) (“ProCare”)’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16) Plaintiff’s claims against
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ProCare under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Section 504 of
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the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act), and California Education Code
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Section 220 (“section 220”). Defendant argues that it cannot be liable under any of
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Plaintiff’s theories. (Mot. (ECF No. 16) at 4,7,8.)
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1 For the reasons below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted in part, and
2 denied in part, with Plaintiff granted leave to amend.
3 BACKGROUND
4 Plaintiff is a child who has been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder and
5 who attended kindergarten at Joshua Cowell Elementary School in the MUSD.
6 (Compl. (ECF No. 1) at ¶¶ 16,18.) Plaintiff claims that in October 2024, Sharafin
7 Rhaman, a paraeducational aide subcontracted to Manteca Unified School district
8 through ProCare, “repeatedly grabbed and restrained [Plaintiff] during school
9 dismissal” “despite the absence of any emergency or imminent threat.” (Compl. at
10 ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant ProCare, Ms. Rhaman’s employer, was a
11 corporation providing the district with “educational and behavioral support services,”
12 (Compl. at ¶ 57), and “acted as a contractor, agent and/or instrumentality through
13 which MUSD provided educational and behavioral services.” (Compl. at ¶ 8.)
14 Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s factual allegations regarding Ms.
15 Rhaman’s conduct. Rather, Defendant argues that, as a private corporation, it cannot
16 be liable under Title II of the ADA as a matter of law, that it is not liable under Section
17 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because it does not receive federal financial assistance,
18 and that it cannot be liable under California Education Code Section 220 because it is
19 not an educational institution. (Mot. at 4,7,8.) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is fully
20 briefed. (Mot., Opp’n (ECF No. 20); Reply (ECF No. 22).) The Motion is taken under
21 submission without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g).
22 LEGAL STANDARD
23 A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can
24 be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the
25 complaint lacks a “cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable
26 legal theory.” , 521 F.3d 1097, 1104
27 (9th Cir. 2008). While the court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes
28 “them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,”
1 , 919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019), if the complaint's allegations do
2 not “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief” the motion must be granted,
3 , 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
4 A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim
5 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed
6 factual allegations.” , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This rule
7 demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the
8 claim at least plausible. , 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or
9 formulaic recitations of elements do not alone suffice. . “A claim has facial
10 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
11 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” . This
12 evaluation of plausibility is a context-specific task drawing on “judicial experience and
13 common sense.” . at 679.
14 DISCUSSION
15 I. Violation of Title II of the ADA
16 In order to state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege: (1) he is
17 an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive
18 the benefit of some public entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) he was either
19 excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity's services,
20 programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity;
21 and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his
22 disability. , 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007). The
23 ADA defines a “public entity” as “(A) any State or local government; (B) any
24 department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or
25 States or local government; and (C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and
26 any commuter authority . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
27 Defendant ProCare does not dispute that Plaintiff meets the statutory
28 requirements for ADA protection, or that the alleged acts took place within a public
1 entity’s service or program. Rather, Defendant ProCare argues that, because it is a
2 private corporation, it is not a “public entity” and therefore is not liable under Title II of
3 the ADA as a matter of law. Plaintiff argues that although Defendant ProCare is a
4 private corporation, Defendant acts as an “instrumentality” of MUSD, bringing
5 Defendant into the statute’s ambit. ( Compl. at ¶¶ 8, 46.)
6 The Court agrees with Defendant. The Ninth Circuit has held that Title II of the
7 ADA only applies to public entities. 170 F.3d
8 1169, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Congress did not make private entities subject to Title
9 II[.]”). And while the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed whether private
10 corporations which contract with public entities may be liable as “instrumentalities”
11 under Title II of the ADA, the balance of persuasive authority from other courts has
12 found such private contractors not to be liable on this basis.
13 859 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2012);
14 604 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases).
15 Some courts have found, primarily in the prison context, that certain private
16 entities may perform such core governmental functions that they may be considered
17 “instrumentalities” of the government for purposes of Title II of the ADA.
18 No. 09-cv-00464, 2010 WL 529493 at *2-3 (D. Idaho Feb. 9, 2010)
19 (finding that, “liberally construed,” a prisoner’s complaint stated a Title II ADA claim
20 against the corporation operating the private prison where the prisoner was
21 incarcerated); 46 F. Supp. 2d 49, 58 (D. Me. 1999)
22 (considering a contractor’s prescription service and “disposition of HIV-positive
23 prisoners’ requests for their medication” a “program or service” of a county jail).
24 However, Plaintiff has not met his burden to establish that Defendant ProCare fits this
25 mold. Besides facially asserting that Defendant “ProCare acted as a contractor, agent,
26 and/or instrumentality through which MUSD provided educational and behavioral
27 services,” and that Defendant ProCare “perform[ed] public educational functions on
28 behalf of MUSD,” (Compl. at ¶¶ 8, 46.), Plaintiff does not allege further facts about the
1 nature of the services that Defendant ProCare provides, or the degree to which
2 Defendant ProCare is involved in the provision of educational and behavioral services
3 on MUSD’s behalf. As such, the Court cannot at this stage draw a reasonable
4 inference that Defendant operates as an “instrumentality” of MUSD.
5 Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim is GRANTED. However, because some
6 courts have found private entities to be government instrumentalities based on very
7 specific facts, it is not clear that further amendment would be futile and Plaintiff is
8 accordingly granted leave to amend.
9 II. Violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
10 To state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege (1) he is an
11 individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to receive the benefit; (3) he
12 was denied the benefits of the program solely by reason of his disability; and (4) the
13 program receives federal financial assistance. 502 F.3d at 1060. For Plaintiff
14 to meet this last prong against Defendant ProCare, Plaintiff must adequately allege
15 that Defendant ProCare “affirmatively chose to receive federal monies,”
16 , 731 F.3d 901, 909 (9th Cir. 2013), and that Defendant ProCare was an
17 intended recipient of such funds. No. 16-cv-01676, 2016 WL
18 3519244 at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2016) (citing
19 477 U.S. 597 (1986)). However, “[f]ederal financial assistance can be
20 direct or indirect.” , 60 F.3d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir.
21 1995). And when determining whether a particular program is subject to civil rights
22 laws such as the Rehabilitation Act, courts may “reference …the statutory authority for
23 the particular disbursement at issue[.]” to discern whether the program was an
24 intended recipient of federal funds. 742 F.2d 1202
25 (9th Cir. 1984).
26 While Defendant disputes that Plaintiff has met their burden to allege that
27 ProCare affirmatively chose to receive federal financial assistance, (Mot. at 7-8.), the
28 Court disagrees. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant ProCare “acted as a contractor,
1 agent, and/or instrumentality of MUSD in the provision of educational and behavioral
2 support services funded in whole or in part with federal financial assistance.” (Compl.
3 at ¶ 57.) Further, Plaintiff’s pleadings allege both a statutory authority under which
4 Defendant ProCare may have received this federal financial assistance, as well as facts
5 which plausibly support an inference that Defendant ProCare affirmatively chose to
6 receive the funds. Plaintiff points to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
7 (“IDEA”) as the statutory source of Defendant’s potential federal funding, explaining
8 that IDEA provides funding to states to provide special education services to students.
9 (Opp’n at 4.) Defendant does not dispute that MUSD may receive funds from IDEA, or
10 that IDEA permits its funding to be used by school districts to contract with third
11 parties to provide special educational services, although Defendant disputes that
12 Defendant ProCare in particular was an intended recipient of such funds. ( Opp’n
13 at 4; Reply at 3-5.) While Plaintiff’s allegations do not explicitly establish that
14 Defendant ProCare affirmatively chose to receive federal funds intended for their
15 services, Plaintiff’s factual allegations, taken together, support a reasonable inference
16 that Defendant ProCare indirectly received federal financial assistance within the
17 meaning of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. While Defendant may ultimately
18 demonstrate that they did not receive any such federal financial assistance, Plaintiff’s
19 allegations are sufficient at this stage of the proceedings to support their
20 Rehabilitation Act claim.
21 Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under Section 504
22 of the Rehabilitation Act is DENIED.
23 III. Violation of California Education Code Section 220
24 Section 220 prohibits discrimination based on protected characteristics in any
25 “program or activity conducted by an educational institution that receives, or benefits
26 from, state financial assistance or enrolls pupils who receive state student financial
27 aid.” Cal. Educ. Code § 220. For purposes of the chapter containing section 220, a
28 “educational institution” is defined as “a public or private preschool, elementary, or
1 secondary school or institution; the governing board of a school district; or any
2 combination of school districts or counties recognized as the administrative agency
3 for public elementary or secondary schools.” Cal. Educ. Code § 210.3.
4 Defendant ProCare argues that, as a private corporation, it is not an educational
5 institution within the meaning of the statute. (Mot. at 8.) Here, the Court notes that
6 neither party’s pleadings describe Defendant ProCare’s business with any specificity.
7 Defendant’s pleadings refer to ProCare as a “private staffing contractor[]” while
8 Plaintiff simply alleges that “ProCare acted as a contractor, agent and/or
9 instrumentality through which MUSD provided educational and behavioral services.”
10 (Reply at 5; Compl. at ¶ 8.)
11 Imprecision aside, however, Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant ProCare
12 is not an educational institution within the meaning of California Education Code
13 section 210.3. ( Opp’n at 6-7.) Rather, Plaintiff argues that the plain text of section
14 220 does not limit liability to educational institutions, and that Defendant is liable
15 because “ProCare participated in the operation of a state-funded educational
16 program in which the challenged discrimination occurred.” (Opp’n at 7.)
17 While at first glance the plain text of section 220 does not explicitly limit liability
18 to educational institutions, this Court and other courts’ rulings and explanatory
19 descriptions of section 220 in its statutory context indicate that liability under section
20 220 is, in fact, limited to educational institutions. The California Court of Appeals,
21 writing about the “extensive array of antidiscrimination statutes applicable to any
22 educational institution, public or private, that receives any form of state funding,” cites
23 section 220 to explain that the education code’s anti-discrimination provisions “apply
24 to any school ‘that receives, or benefits from, state financial assistance, or enrolls
25 pupils who receive state student financial aid,’” , 57 Cal.
26 App. 5th 367, 393 (2020) (emphasis added).
27 No. 2:20-cv-00635, 2026 WL 1133582 at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2026) (“Section
28 220 prohibits discrimination by educational institutions on the basis of a protected
1 | characteristic,”); Doe v. Lassen Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 07-cv-01521, 2007 WL 4623042,
2 | at*3(E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2007) (“Review of the entire code illuminates the fact that the
3 | code only applies to ‘Educational Institution’”). The Court thus finds that Plaintiff has
4 | not alleged sufficient facts to establish that Defendant ProCare is an educational
5 | institution, and that Plaintiff's section 220 claim against Defendant ProCare must be
6 | dismissed. However, as it is not yet apparent based on both parties’ imprecise factual
7 | allegations regarding the nature of Defendant ProCare’s business and services
8 | rendered that further amendment would be futile, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend.
9 CONCLUSION
10 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
11 1. Defendant ProCare’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED IN
12 PART and DENIED IN PART.
13 a. Defendant ProCare’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED
14 with leave to amend as to Plaintiff's Second and Sixth Causes of
15 Action.
16 b. Defendant ProCare’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16) is DENIED as
17 to Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action.
18 2. Plaintiff granted leave to amend his complaint. Any amended
19 complaint must be filed within twenty-one days of this Order.
20 3. The motion hearing set for August 27, 2026 is VACATED.
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99 IT IS SO ORDERED.
23 | Dated: _August 21, 2026 Donel J CDbnettr
Hon. Daniel alabretta
24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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26 | pJc9- Manteca26cv01189.mtd
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